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We Are Watching You
In April 2026, the UK Ministry of Defence revealed that it had tracked a covert Russian submarine operation apparently intended to map critical undersea cables and pipelines in the North Atlantic and the North Sea. A Russian attack submarine and two specialised intelligence vessels operated by the Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research, commonly known as GUGI, were reportedly monitored for four weeks by the Royal Navy, including HMS St Albans and P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft.
Russia possesses specialised submarines and surveillance vessels capable of mapping, monitoring and potentially interfering with undersea communications cables and energy pipelines. This infrastructure is essential to Europe’s telecommunications networks and energy security.
The UK Defence Secretary, John Healey, addressed a warning directly to Russian President Vladimir Putin: “We are watching you.” He added that any deliberate damage to undersea infrastructure would have “serious consequences”.
Some British intelligence and defence specialists have described the growing confrontation beneath the Atlantic as a form of shadow conflict. Russian vessels have repeatedly conducted surveillance operations close to Western infrastructure, particularly in the North Sea, through which a significant proportion of the United Kingdom’s gas supplies pass. Reports have also suggested that Russian submarines may have deployed sensors or unmanned vehicles near seabed communications cables.
The Russian oceanographic vessel Yantar has been identified as one of the principal ships involved in gathering intelligence on underwater infrastructure. It has frequently been monitored or escorted by the Royal Navy while passing through the English Channel, signalling that its movements are being closely observed.
It remains uncertain whether these operations form part of a psychological campaign intended to intimidate and destabilise Western governments, an intelligence-gathering programme, or preparations for the possible disruption of critical infrastructure. Another possibility, raised by The Times on 5 April 2025, is that Russia is attempting to collect information about Britain’s Vanguard-class nuclear-armed submarines.
Some British security analysts believe that cyberattacks and the potential disruption of underwater communications cables form part of a broader Russian strategy designed to confuse, provoke and test Western governments. Such activities may not constitute preparations for conventional war in themselves, but they can create uncertainty, expose vulnerabilities and weaken public confidence.
The European Union Institute for Security Studies argued in January 2026 that a conventional Russian armoured invasion was not necessarily Europe’s most immediate security risk. More probable, it suggested, were disruptive hybrid attacks against critical infrastructure. The Slovakian think tank GLOBSEC has similarly warned that Russian sabotage may be intended to “fracture European resolve”.
From Unthinkable to Inevitable
If psychological pressure is one of Moscow’s objectives, it appears to be having an effect. Across Europe, governments and citizens are increasingly considering the possibility that the war in Ukraine could spread beyond its current borders.
Concern is particularly acute in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, as well as in Finland, Norway and Poland. Each country shares either a border with Russia or close exposure to Russian-controlled territory and has a long history of political or military confrontation with Moscow.
Statements by Donald Trump questioning the durability of the United States’ commitment to NATO have intensified this uncertainty. European governments can no longer assume that American military support will always be automatic or unconditional.
These tensions became particularly visible during the opening weeks of the US-Israeli conflict with Iran. Several NATO members were reluctant to provide direct operational support. They declined to open their airspace to US combat aircraft, resisted proposals for naval involvement in the Strait of Hormuz and publicly questioned the objectives of the campaign.
The possibility that Iran could retaliate against US military facilities in Cyprus, Saudi Arabia, Germany, Italy or the United Kingdom increased European fears of being drawn into a wider Middle Eastern conflict. NATO governments took Tehran’s warnings seriously after Iranian leaders reportedly called on Europe to remain outside the conflict or face retaliation (The Guardian, 6 March 2026).
At the same time, Russia has continued to reinforce its military capabilities, while confidence in the United States’ commitment to European defence has weakened. European governments are consequently accelerating investment in aircraft, missile systems, armoured vehicles, ammunition, submarines and satellite technology.
These capabilities cannot be created overnight. Modern combat aircraft, missile systems and armoured vehicles require years to design, manufacture and deploy. Ammunition production must be expanded, military logistics modernised and trained personnel recruited. Several European countries are also debating whether some form of compulsory military or civilian service should be reintroduced.
The prospect of a Europe strategically abandoned by Washington once appeared almost unimaginable. It is now being treated as a plausible scenario. A major war has been taking place in Ukraine since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, while another conflict has destabilised the Middle East. The increasingly aggressive language used by political leaders has further contributed to the sense that the international system is becoming less restrained and less predictable.
The question is therefore no longer confined to military specialists. As Reuters and other international news organisations have asked: could NATO defend Europe without the United States?
No Gas Masks Required—Yet
Anxiety is gradually entering European public consciousness. Scenarios once dismissed as implausible are now discussed by governments, military officials and mainstream news organisations.
In April 2026, Moscow responded to reports that companies in Germany, Poland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom would manufacture drones for Ukraine by warning that the factories involved could become Russian military targets (L’Express, 16 April 2026). Whether intended as a concrete threat or an act of intimidation, the statement contributed to a growing atmosphere of insecurity.
The European Union has begun encouraging its approximately 450 million citizens to prepare for major emergencies. Governments are not yet distributing gas masks, but households are increasingly being advised to keep emergency supplies of food, drinking water, medicine, batteries and essential documents.
Sweden distributed a 32-page booklet titled In Case of Crisis or War, explaining how citizens should respond to emergencies, identify shelters and stockpile essential supplies. Finnish authorities have published a digital guide on preparing for incidents and crises. Germany is reportedly developing an application that would help residents locate the nearest available shelter during a military or civil emergency.
Euronews and other broadcasters have reported rising public anxiety about Europe’s military vulnerability and the possibility of declining American support. The problem is not limited to the size of European armed forces. Much of the continent’s infrastructure was not designed to support the rapid movement of modern military equipment.
Many older bridges, for example, were built to carry vehicles weighing approximately 40 tonnes, while modern battle tanks can weigh between 55 and 70 tonnes. Rail capacity presents another obstacle. Germany reportedly possessed around 1,000 railway wagons capable of transporting tanks and artillery in 1990; today, only a few hundred remain available.
According to the EU report The Road to Readiness: How the EU Can Strengthen Military Mobility, published on 23 October 2025, transferring military equipment from Western to Eastern Europe could take weeks or even months. The European Union has identified approximately 500 infrastructure projects requiring substantial improvements to support military mobility.
Some defence estimates suggest that deterring or responding to a Russian attack without substantial US support would require Europe to mobilise approximately 300,000 additional high-readiness troops, equivalent to around 50 new brigades. It could also require hundreds of billions of euros in additional annual spending to replace American armoured forces, intelligence capabilities, logistics and other forms of strategic support.
