Reflections on the Moroccan Initiative for the Negociation of an Autonomy Status for the Sahara Region, in the Light of Security Council Resolution 2797

On Friday October 31, 2025, the Sahara affair took a strategic turn. In Resolution 2797, the Security Council clearly enshrined the Moroccan autonomy initiative as the exclusive basis for negotiations aimed at finding a definitive solution to the regional conflict that has plagued the region for half a century. As His Majesty the King emphasized in his address to the nation immediately after the adoption of the new resolution, "we are living through a pivotal stage and a decisive turning point in the history of modern Morocco: from now on, there will be a before and an after to October 31, 2025".

Moroccan diplomacy has at least two good reasons for satisfaction: firstly, the Security Council has endorsed the exclusivity of the autonomy option as the sole basis, but also the ultimate goal, of the negotiations. In point 3 of the resolution, the Security Council, the supreme body of the UN system, "calls on the parties to participate in discussions without preconditions and on the basis of the autonomy plan proposed by Morocco, in order to reach a definitive and mutually acceptable political solution". Secondly, the Council recognizes the regional nature of the dispute by directly implicating Algeria. Algeria is mentioned by name and urged to enter into negotiations in good faith.

This Strategic Momentum should be a source of deep satisfaction, but it should also prompt us to formulate a few points of vigilance. First of all, there is reason for satisfaction, because after 50 years of marching, sacrifices and negotiations, the option of a positive final outcome finally seems to be taking shape. Both the Security Council and the major players in the international system have endorsed the Moroccan proposal for autonomy for the Sahara region under Moroccan sovereignty.

The Security Council's resolution represents the beginning of the end of the Sahara affair, not the consecration of its definitive resolution. The parties to the dispute are now called upon to negotiate the final status of the Sahara region on the exclusive basis of the Moroccan autonomy proposal. This represents a change in the framework and logic of the dispute. If Morocco is confirmed in its autonomy proposal, which constitutes a considerable diplomatic victory, the kingdom will now have to negotiate its parameters and contours: a real political-legal battle is taking shape, where diplomatic performance should go hand in hand with legal expertise and drafting engineering.

The idea behind this paper is to contribute to a much-needed reflection on the new issues that will shape the national question in the future. To this end, the paper suggests and analyzes a series of points likely to contribute to the politico-legal management of negotiations around the text of the Moroccan autonomy proposal.

Considered in this way, a number of non-exhaustive points need to be addressed by the Moroccan negotiator: 1. ensure that the Moroccan Autonomy Initiative is not perceived as a minimal basis of benefits granted from the outset, but as a whole representing an overall balance, 2. define the conceptual framework of the notion of "Genuine Autonomy", 3. delimit the meaning and promote the restrictive scope of the "referendum consultation" that is to ratify the final text on Saharan autonomy, 4. calibrate and weight Algeria's place and role in the various stages of the negotiations and implementation of the final text, 5. safeguard the overall coherence of the national legal corpus by harmonizing the final text of the negotiations with Moroccan constitutional and administrative law, 6. grasp the changes that have occurred since 2007 to better support the position of the Moroccan negotiator, and finally, 7. to establish the consubstantiality between the principle of territorial integrity and that of national unity.

1- Ensure that the text of the Moroccan Autonomy Initiative is not perceived as a minimum basis of benefits granted up front, but as a whole representing an overall balance. 

Indeed, the Moroccan Autonomy Initiative should not be seen as a minimum of concessions guaranteed to the other party. It is an overall balance that may well be negotiable, but which cannot be called into question. In other words, the text and spirit of the Moroccan proposal of 2007, as well as that to be presented in the future, should not be taken for granted to be reinforced by further Moroccan concessions during the negotiation phase. A negotiating technique that sought to call this balance into question would be unfair and unjust and would express a flagrant violation of the principle of good faith that must guide all negotiations. Indeed, it is to ensure this overall balance of the parties' rights and obligations that Morocco is entitled to reconsider certain points of its proposal. On this point, it is widely accepted, both in international law and in jurisprudence, that proposals made by a party can in no way be set up against it as long as they have not yet been set down in writing in a final agreement which has exhausted all the conditions for its validity.

2- Outlining the conceptual framework for the concept of "genuine autonomy".

This is a slippery concept, which could well be overused by other parties. What, after all, is genuine autonomy? Is it possible to quantify such a notion and draw clear demarcation lines between what is genuine autonomy and what is not? Neither administrative law nor international law settle such questions. The reason is simple: each architecture of autonomy is the fruit of a singular process that applies to a given space in a particular temporal context.

On this point, any attempt to import autonomy schemes that are geographically remote and/or traditionally incompatible with the specific features of Moroccan positive law and its national legal traditions should be resisted. The idea of international standards that could be raised during negotiations in no way implies the existence of a universally accepted legal corpus of autonomy, which would be enforceable in this case. At most, "international standards" could have a guiding value, but never acquire a binding character.

3- Defining the scope and emphasizing the restrictive nature of the “referendum” that is intended to ratify the final text on Saharan autonomy. 

It is true that the Moroccan autonomy proposal of 2007 refers twice to the possibility of recourse to a referendum. On the one hand, point 8 stipulates that "the autonomy statute resulting from the negotiations will be subject to a referendum consultation of the populations concerned, in accordance with the principle of self-determination and the provisions of the United Nations Charter". On the other hand, point 27 states that "the autonomous status of the Region shall be the subject of negotiations and shall be submitted to a free referendum of the populations concerned. This referendum constitutes, in accordance with international legality, the United Nations Charter and the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, the free exercise by these populations of their right to self-determination".

However, the technique of consultation by means of a referendum should in no way mean a return to the basic concept of the referendum. Firstly, this would be completely at odds with the text and spirit of the Moroccan proposal, which in substance is justified by the desire to overcome the deadlock caused by the obstinacy of resorting to a referendum. Secondly, a substantial change needs to be forcefully underlined: the question that could be asked in the referendum will not be about independence, but only about the autonomy text as negotiated and agreed by the parties. Moreover, the parties are under no obligation to think of a referendum solely in terms of consulting the entire Saharan population; other forms of referendum consultation could emerge from the negotiations, such as the ratification of the final text by one or more local representatives.

4- Assess and weigh Algeria’s role and position at the various stages of the negotiations and the implementation of the final text. 

The Sahara dispute is now widely characterized as regional in nature, and Algeria is a party to it. This de facto and de jure situation is systematically and consistently affirmed by Security Council resolutions, including resolution 2797. The Moroccan proposal of 2007, for its part, underlines this perfectly when it methodically uses the formula of "other parties" and not that of the other party.

However this point needs to be qualified. In future, Algeria's role should be weighted according to the different stages of the resolution process. Indeed, it is possible to distinguish three essential stages in the 2007 Moroccan Initiative: a negotiation phase, a transitional phase and an implementation phase. However, if Algeria were to be involved initially as the main party, its status would have to be reduced during the transitional and implementation phases. Algeria's status would shift from that of a party to the dispute to that of a facilitator, before naturally falling into line with that of a third-party state bound by the obligation of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states.

5- Ensure the overall consistency of the national legal framework by aligning the final text of the negotiations with Moroccan constitutional and administrative law. 

One of the issues that could mobilize the attention of Moroccan negotiators concerns the discrepancy between the date of the Sahara autonomy proposal initiated by Morocco in 2007, and the years, among others, of the adoption of the new constitution in 2011 and the organic law on the regions in 2015. This is a sequencing problem that calls into question the coherence that needs to be (re)built between the Sahara autonomy proposal and subsequent texts. In any case, particular attention should be paid to the overall coherence of the national legal corpus, while ensuring that the autonomy proposal, in its final version, is compatible with the standards of Moroccan constitutional and administrative law, foremost among which is the constitution.

6- Understand the changes that have taken place since 2007 in order to better strengthen the position of the Moroccan negotiator.  

In any negotiation, the parties shape their positions and calibrate their concessions according to the realities on the ground. The starting clauses, let alone the interpretations to be given to them, are never set in stone. They are dynamic and evolve in line with the situation on the ground.

Changes in the situation of the parties and in the international environment. This is why the Moroccan negotiator would do well to take into account the impact that the balance of power on the negotiating table could have.

Yet since 2007, when the Moroccan Autonomy Initiative was presented, the national situation and the international environment have largely evolved, generally in Morocco's favor. Today, in 2025, the Kingdom is much more resilient, and the international community is more supportive.

7- Establish consubstantiality between the principle of territorial integrity and the principle of national unity. 

Particular importance should be attached to the principle of national unity, which should be the indispensable corollary of the principle of territorial integrity. Indeed, making the principle of national unity a fundamental issue would provide a shield against any attempt to break up the nation. Indeed, after their failure to fragment Morocco by dividing its territory, opponents of the Moroccan identity of the Sahara could once again be tempted to divide the Kingdom, this time by segmenting its people. This is why any plan for Saharan autonomy within the framework of Moroccan sovereignty should incorporate the preservation of its national unity. Thus, in addition to preserving the territory through the principle of territorial integrity, the people should be protected by the principle of national unity. On this point, it's worth noting that both the royal speech of Friday October 31, 2025 and the 2011 constitution mention national unity and territorial integrity in the same breath, which bears witness to their consubstantial relationship. As much as the territory, the nation is one and indivisible.