Publications /
Policy Brief

Back
Cooperation Against Transnational Crime: The Case of the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic
Authors
Mostapha Mouzouni
January 23, 2017

Cooperation against transnational crime in the North Atlantic region is highly institutionalized in the framework of regional organizations that are reinforced by ancestral identities. Europol and the U.S. Joint Interagency Task Force-South are exemplary in this regard. The South Atlantic region, however, is less institutionalized, making the study of such cooperation a difficult exercise. With the exception of some actions initiated by specialized international organizations, there is little tangible cooperation at the regional level against transnational crime. Yet the idea of establishing South-South security cooperation between Africa and Latin America is not new. In the 1980s, at the initiative of Brazil, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution establishing a Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic (ZOPACAS), with the aim of promoting mutual assistance, peace, and security in the region.1 ZOPACAS consists of 24 countries, including Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay from the Latin American side, and all countries on the West African coast, except for Morocco and Mauritania. Having been conceived in the Cold War context, it was the realist security paradigm of self-help by states in asymmetric power relationships that originally led to the creation of this zone, in particular hostility toward any foreign military presence in the region. This organization could have taken advantage of the shift in threat perception after the fall of the Berlin Wall to refocus on unconventional threats, particularly transnational organized crime and terrorism. However, although cooperation projects have been developed for this purpose through ZOPACAS, their implementation has not been successful for several reasons related to the absence of a common threat perception and lack of institutionalization. This chapter discusses these two phenomena and their consequences.

RELATED CONTENT

  • Authors
    Amine Ghoulidi
    February 5, 2026
    This Paper was originally published on orient-online.com  The Western Mediterranean’s exposure to the Sahel is usually framed in terms of security spillovers and crisis management. This paper argues that this framing misreads how Sahelian access conditions now shape Mediterranean integration. Morocco’s Atlantic Initiative is a state-led corridor strategy combining Atlantic port infrastructure, inland transit routes, and energy systems to connect landlocked Sahelian economi ...
  • February 4, 2026
    This article examines the quiet but profound implications of the erosion of U.S.-led hegemony for small and vulnerable states of the New South. While the post-1945 international order was never egalitarian, it offered predictability: power was organized through law, and sovereignty for weaker states rested less on justice than on procedural stability. Davos 2026 marked a turning point in the public acknowledgment of that system’s unraveling. Statements by leading Western figures rev ...
  • Authors
    February 3, 2026
    From the use of tariffs as a foreign policy instrument, to the weaponization of critical resources, and from targeted sanctions to attacks on critical infrastructure, economic security is at the forefront of international debates. The aggressive use of economic instruments for strategic purposes has become an explicit feature of international affairs, in a way not seen since the interwar period[1]. Beyond the weaponization of resources of all kinds, an increasing ‘monetization’ is u ...
  • Authors
    Gabriela Keseberg Dávalos
    January 26, 2026
    This Opinion was originally published by the Hanns Seidel Stiftung on January 19th, 2026. The author of this opinion, Gabriela Keseberg Dávalos, is a 2013 alumna of the Atlantic Dialogues Emerging Leaders Program. The signing of the EU–Mercosur agreement is a small geopolitical miracle. Signed on 17 January 2026 in Paraguay, it arrives at a moment when Europe is unmistakably being cast aside by the United States. Meanwhile Latin America, and with it, the Mer ...
  • January 23, 2026
    This episode of AfriCAFÉ examines how Africa’s development aid landscape is shifting amid major cuts by traditional donors and changing global priorities. Through a discussion with Stephen Klingebiel and Andrew Sumner, it questions whether aid has truly driven development or fostered de...
  • Authors
    Stephan Klingebiel
    Andy Sumner
    January 9, 2026
    Global cooperation is under stress. It hardly requires detailed analysis: the international system is in a profound crisis, when seen from many Northern vantage points. What if we see the same turbulence but from a different vantage point? For many in the Global South the current period signals risk, but also opportunity. That the same events could spark a sense of crisis in one group but opportunity in another is nothing new. However, the sheer scale, speed, and scope of recen ...
  • January 2, 2026
    Ce Policy Paper analyse les enjeux politiques, économiques et opérationnels du Fonds pour les pertes et dommages, créé pour répondre aux impacts climatiques irréversibles subis par les pays les plus vulnérables. Il clarifie d’abord la notion de pertes et dommages, qui mêle effets économiques et non économiques, et souligne les défis d’attribution liés à la superposition entre chocs climatiques et fragilités structurelles. L’analyse met ensuite en lumière les tensions d’économie poli ...
  • Authors
    December 18, 2025
    The return of President Donald Trump to the White House at the start of 2025 was expected to signal an American retreat from international engagement, especially in regions of traditional security interest, such as southern Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East. To the surprise of many observers around the Mediterranean, and perhaps to the dismay of some in the Trump administration’s ideological orbit, this has not happened. If anything, the second half of 2025 has seen a high d ...