THE RECONFIGURATION OF THE AES'S EXTERNAL ALLIANCES An alternative to the “Western order”?

INTRODUCTION

Since 2020, political transformations in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have profoundly reshaped the geopolitical balance in the Sahel. These three countries have undertaken a major reorientation of their foreign alliances; they have chosen to adopt a stance of security sovereignty and strategic autonomy. This shift marks a historic break from dependence on former colonial powers and from cooperation frameworks deemed restrictive, notably ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States). The AES countries are pursuing a diplomacy of “openness in all directions,” characterized by the diversification of their partners. This policy aims to break away from an exclusive focus on former partners, while seeking pragmatic alliances to expand their diplomatic room for maneuver.

In this context, Sahelian countries face intense competition for influence between Western powers, on the one hand, and Russia and China, on the other. They are pursuing a diplomacy of “openness in all directions,” characterized by the diversification of their partners in the Global South. This policy aims to break away from an exclusive focus on former partners while seeking pragmatic alliances. These new alliances help expand the Sahel’s diplomatic room for maneuver. However, they do not guarantee effective autonomy unless certain conditions are met. The challenge lies in maintaining a diplomatic balance that allows them to defend their interests without falling into new dependencies. Autonomy cannot be decreed; it is built through strong institutions and strategic coherence.

The objective of this Policy Brief is to understand the foundations, challenges, and prospects of this quest for autonomy, in light of evolving international alliances and new regional integration strategies. It is part of an analytical approach aimed at shedding light on the issues at stake and the conditions for success along this path. It examines the current limitations and conditions for success of a geopolitical rebalancing and its effects on regional sovereignty. It highlights the challenges facing the AES in building new international alliances, South-South diplomacy, and balanced relations with the Maghreb.

1. THE DECLINE OF FRENCH AND EUROPEAN INFLUENCE

Since 2023, the three countries have terminated their military and economic cooperation agreements with Western powers and begun reaching out to new partners, including China and Russia. Their goal is to assert sovereignty.

1.1 A deliberate break with former security tutelage

The borders, institutions, and administrative models of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger were inherited from the French colonial system. Political independence in 1960 was not followed by true sovereignty: aid, currency (the CFA franc), diplomacy, and defense remained under French influence. This historical legacy has produced weak states whose legitimacy depends on external support rather than internal cohesion. Since the 2010s, France has embodied the Western presence in the Sahel through various operations (Serval in 2013, followed by Barkhane from 2014 to 2022) and interventions (training national armies; intelligence coordination, etc.). While these interventions temporarily halted the advance of jihadist groups, they also marginalized national armies, undermined the legitimacy of governments, and sparked strong popular hostility. The withdrawal of French forces from Mali (2022), followed by Burkina Faso and Niger, marked a rejection of an asymmetric security dependence relationship.

France and the EU have sought to impose a liberal governance model as a condition for financial aid. European programs have often prioritized institutional form (elections, administrative reforms) at the expense of supporting socioeconomic transformation. This technocratic approach has produced “showcase” democracies that lack genuine social legitimacy. By severing their ties with France and cooling their relations with the European Union, the three countries are now rejecting the democratic and moral conditionalities imposed by the West and turning to other partners.

1.2 The Americans are negotiating a return

Between 2019 and 2022, U.S. influence in the Sahel paradoxically increased, while European influence declined. This was due to sustained economic aid, diplomatic engagement, and security cooperation. Despite the region’s instability, the United States has maintained diplomatic relations and supported efforts to combat extremism and restore stability in the region.

The United States’ relationship with the countries of the Sahel has gradually weakened following the military’s rise to power. The AES countries' withdrawal from ECOWAS (2024) and the establishment of close ties with Russia have put the military regimes at odds with the administration of former President Joe Biden. The administration supported regional sanctions against Sahelian leaders and called on them to hand over power to civilians. Aid was frozen, and U.S. influence was reduced. After a period of tension, the United States appears to be seeking to rebuild ties.

Within the Trump administration, two trends emerged: one, focused on the regions most critical to U.S. security, paid little attention to the central Sahel; the other sought to keep an eye on a region that accounts for the bulk of global jihadist violence. The three AES countries also possess deposits of critical minerals, such as uranium and lithium, which could be of interest to the United States. These considerations may explain the new approach the Trump administration appears to be adopting toward the region. Various developments point to a gradual thaw.1 These developments seem to indicate that President Trump’s administration wishes to restore its relations with the three countries of the Central Sahel after years marked by high tensions.

Some analysts believe that Sahelian governments might prefer the transactional diplomacy of the U.S. president —characterized by little regard for international law and a more flexible stance toward Russia—over the multilateral approach focused on aid and respect for the rule of law promoted by previous U.S. administrations (Crisis Group). From their perspective, Sahelian governments seek greater investment and want the United States to ease restrictions on military equipment shipments.

2. RUSSIA AND CHINA: ALTERNATIVES OR NEW DEPENDENCIES?

Russia and China have become the Sahel’s preferred partners. Russia is involved in the security sector, providing weapons, training, and military cooperation. China, for its part, is investing in Sahelian infrastructure: roads, dams, and telecommunications. These alliances offer a pragmatic alternative to Western partnerships but raise questions about financial sustainability and strategic dependence.

2.1 Russia: Security in Exchange for Resources

As relations between the member countries of the Alliance of Sahel States and Western powers continue to deteriorate, Russia has stepped up its economic initiatives to strengthen its influence in the region. Russia has declared its willingness to strengthen its military support for the member countries of the Alliance of Sahel States by providing them with military equipment and training their troops to intensify the fight against jihadist groups. The Russian partnership has become a symbol of the rejection of unpopular Western aid missions, earning it widespread popularity among a segment of the population.2

Following the security cooperation agreements signed with the Alliance’s member countries, Russia has stepped up its economic cooperation with the Organization. The termination of military and economic cooperation agreements with Western powers and the revocation of licenses for several foreign mining companies—in the name of a policy to reclaim natural resources—have paved the way for Russian companies. These companies have signed a growing number of agreements and contracts in fields ranging from renewable energy to the processing of agricultural products and minerals, as well as civil nuclear power, aerospace, and new technologies.

Memoranda of understanding on cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy have been signed with Mali and Burkina Faso. The Russian group Rosatom has signed training agreements in the field of civil nuclear energy with both countries. The same group is seeking to take control of uranium assets previously held by the French company Orano in Niger. On another front, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso are planning to develop a joint communications satellite in collaboration with the Russian space agency Roscosmos, with the aim of improving telecommunications services (telephony and high-speed Internet, radio broadcasting, secure communications, etc.) in hard-to-reach areas with underdeveloped infrastructure.3

Along with security and energy, education is also a priority area in cooperation between Russia and these countries. Several projects have been implemented, including the introduction of Russian as a language of instruction in schools, the implementation of executive training programs designed to facilitate the transfer of skills, an increase in the number of scholarships, etc. However, the expansion of Russian influence in the AES places Russia in competition with other powers, such as China, which has its sights set on mineral resources and infrastructure construction contracts.

2.2 China: Development Versus Resources

Mali views its ties with China as “a strategic and sincere partnership.” Beijing’s influence in the gold and mining sectors is no less significant than that of Russia. Nevertheless, Mali has adopted a new mining code that allows the government to increase its stake in mining projects and to strengthen regulation of Chinese companies in the sector.4 An agreement with the Chinese company Ganfeng Lithium, which operates the Goulamina deposit, has increased the Malian government’s stake to 35%, up from 20% previously.

China has also increased its influence in Burkina Faso. It has achieved its goal of ending the country’s cooperation with Taiwan. It has obtained exploration licenses for gold, copper, and nickel. China is stepping up its efforts to protect its interests against security threats to resource exploitation by supplying weapons to the Burkinabe government.

The relationship between Niger and China, although considered strategic by both countries, has recently been marked by tensions over oil production, employment conditions, and the governance of energy infrastructure. Since the late 2000s, China, through the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), has become the major player in Niger’s oil sector. It has financed and built the Zinder refinery (SORAZ), the Niger–Benin pipeline, and the development of the Agadem oil field. For a long time, CNPC enjoyed a favorable balance of power, characterized by Niger’s heavy technological dependence and Chinese control over the oil value chain.

In 2024, Niger temporarily suspended its exports to Benin due to border and diplomatic tensions, which indirectly impacted CNPC’s interests. Niger is moving toward a structural renegotiation of the agreements. The goal is to increase the government’s share of oil revenues, ensure a more effective transfer of expertise, and enhance transparency in management. Despite diplomatic incidents, Niger has not ended its cooperation with China. The relationship between the two countries reflects a negotiated tension rather than a breakdown. Niger needs financing and infrastructure, while China seeks to secure its crude oil supply and its regional influence.

These tensions reflect a shift in relations between China and the AES countries. Niger, like Mali and Burkina Faso, wants to demonstrate that its proclaimed sovereignty applies to all partners. China, for its part, must adapt its cooperation model to partners who now demand greater transparency and local benefits.

2.3 Challenges and Risks to Sahelian Sovereignty

The three Sahelian countries are experiencing a rise in political influence and greater economic penetration by Russia and China. Russia has intensified its presence in the Sahel through a strategy known as “strategic barter,” combining military support with economic agreements. Russia is a key partner in the security restructuring: supplying weapons, ammunition, and reconnaissance drones; deploying military instructors and advisers (through the Africa Corps initiative); and providing diplomatic support to the AES in international forums. Russia offers cooperation based on “non-interference and reciprocity,” thereby strengthening the operational autonomy of Sahelian armed forces.

China is taking an economic and infrastructure-focused approach. It already has a presence in the Sahel through state-owned enterprises (CNPC, Sinohydro, China Road & Bridge). The agreements are generally based on the “resources for development” model: infrastructure financing in exchange for exploitation rights. But while it presents itself as a technological and logistical partner, it is gradually expanding its cooperation into the security sector: supplying armored vehicles, communications and surveillance equipment; providing technical training and cooperation in cybersecurity; and offering logistical support to internal security forces. Its discreet and pragmatic approach strengthens material capabilities without imposing political constraints.

Both of these partnerships offer advantages but also have limitations. They enable strategic diversification and strengthen bargaining power, but they also risk creating new economic and technological dependencies. The benefits include: diversification of economic and geopolitical partners; access to new technologies and financing; and increased state control over certain mining sectors. As for the risks, they include the lack of transparency in agreements, particularly with Russia; growing debt to China; security dependence and loss of control over certain mining areas; and insufficient transfer of local expertise.

3. SOUTH-SOUTH RELATIONS: DIVERSIFICATION DIPLOMACY

Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger are seeking to strengthen their strategic autonomy and expand their scope for international action. To this end, they are also seeking to diversify their foreign relations with countries in the Global South in order to build balanced and sustainable partnerships. This diversification aims to establish a genuine diplomacy of emancipation from the West.

3.1 Relations with the BRICS+: Greater Room for Maneuver?

Relations with the BRICS+5 countries offer the AES an opportunity to consolidate its sovereignty and strengthen its international influence. For the Sahel countries, this framework allows them to break free from the diplomatic isolation resulting from their withdrawal from ECOWAS and the deterioration of their relations with Western powers.

By strengthening their ties with the BRICS+ countries, they can help build a multipolar world and assert their role as advocates for a sovereign Sahel within the “Global South.” These ties also provide political support in international forums and solidarity in the face of external sanctions.

The Sahel is developing partnerships with India, Brazil, and South Africa as part of a South-South diplomacy initiative aimed at technology sharing, training, and agricultural development. India supports solar energy projects, while Brazil participates in sustainable agricultural programs. The BRICS+ also represent a proposed alternative to international financial institutions (the IMF and the World Bank). Through the New Development Bank (NDB), created by the BRICS countries, Sahel nations expect to receive financing for infrastructure, energy, and development projects without restrictive political conditions. Agreements with China, India, or Russia could facilitate trade in local currencies and provide access to sovereign wealth funds from actors such as Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates. This increased financial autonomy would strengthen their ability to set their own national priorities.

By joining forces with BRICS+, the Sahel countries can collectively defend their interests on crucial issues: Security Council reform, global economic justice, climate, fair trade, and more. The AES could thus strengthen its influence on the international stage by adopting a pragmatic non-aligned diplomatic approach. This position would enable these countries to defend their own strategic interests. This is the foundation of sovereign autonomy. However, the success of this diplomatic approach depends on the ability of the Sahelian states to define clear priorities and pursue a coordinated diplomatic strategy within the AES6. TILL HERE

3.2 The Sahel and the Maghreb: Convergences and Tensions

Recent developments in relations between the Maghreb countries and the AES are taking place amid a period of major geopolitical realignment in the Sahel-Saharan region. This dynamic has led to a reconfiguration of the Maghreb countries’ relations with the Sahel countries, with each country adopting a distinct stance based on its geopolitical interests, its strategic depth in the Sahara, and its regional rivalries.

In this context, Algeria finds itself in a paradoxical position. Historically, Algeria has played a role in managing crises in the Sahel, particularly in Mali, where it was a key party to the 2015 Algiers Peace Agreement between the Malian government and Tuareg groups in the north. Today, Malian authorities accuse Algeria of interfering in Mali’s internal affairs and maintaining ambiguous ties with certain Tuareg forces, while Algiers criticizes Mali for its military strategy in the north and its growing ties with external security partners.7 This Algerian-Malian tension has had a regional ripple effect due to internal solidarity within the AES. Algeria has thus found itself marginalized in the Sahel region, where it had previously exercised significant influence. However, Algerian diplomacy is now attempting to restore balance to this situation, notably through a gradual rapprochement with Niger, which would allow it to maintain strategic depth in the Sahel.

In this shifting landscape, Morocco has positioned itself as a key partner of the AES countries. Moroccan diplomacy, which has been highly active in West Africa since the early 2000s, has found a new sphere of influence in the shifting dynamics of the Sahel. This dynamic is part of a broader strategy aimed at strengthening economic, security, and diplomatic ties with Sahelian countries. The most significant Moroccan initiative in this context is the one aimed at providing landlocked Sahelian countries with access to the Atlantic Ocean via Moroccan port infrastructure. The authorities of the Sahelian Economic Community (AES) have expressed their support for this project, seeing it as a means to diversify their trade routes and strengthen their economic autonomy. Beyond this initiative, relations between Morocco and the Sahelian countries are part of a multidimensional cooperation that includes the military, religious, and economic spheres.8

Mauritania is a special case within this regional context. Geographically and historically situated at the intersection of the Maghreb and the Sahel, Nouakchott maintains close ties with Mali while seeking to maintain a balanced position vis-à-vis all regional actors. Trade, pastoral movements, and security dynamics strongly link Mauritania and Mali, particularly in border areas. However, Mauritania remains cautious toward the AES. This balanced stance does not preclude certain tensions. The border areas between Mauritania and Mali are regularly affected by the activities of armed groups and jihadist violence, which are a source of concern for Mauritania and undermine its model of relative stability. Despite these concerns, bilateral relations remain generally pragmatic, based on security and economic cooperation aimed at preventing the spillover of instability from the Sahel.

As a result, relations between the Maghreb and the AES are currently characterized by a complex mix of rivalries, diplomatic realignments, and new opportunities for cooperation. This evolution could, in the long term, reshape the geopolitical balance across all of North and West Africa, making the Sahel-Saharan corridor one of the continent’s main theaters of strategic realignment. In this context, the Maghreb countries are seeking to preserve or redefine their influence in the Sahel region, which has become central to their security and economic interests.

3.3 AES's relations with its southern African neighbors and the rest of the continent

The evolution of relations between the AES member countries and their neighbors on the continent can only be understood by viewing this organization through a two-pronged lens: on the one hand, a desire for political and strategic sovereignty vis-à-vis existing regional organizations, and, on the other hand, the search for new economic and diplomatic partnershipson a continental scale.

The AES’s break with ECOWAS does not mean that relations between the two parties have completely ceased. Economic, social, and migratory interdependencies remain strong. The free movement protocols inherited from ECOWAS continue to apply temporarily to citizens of AES countries, and trade remains integrated into existing regional mechanisms. In practice, the relationship between the two blocs is evolving into a hybrid situation: a political break but continued economic and security interactions out of necessity

Several regional actors have, in fact, called for the establishment of a framework for cooperation between the two organizations in order to address the jihadist threat affecting the entire Sahel and West African region.

A series of initiatives shows that the AES is gradually seeking to establish itself as an autonomous regional hub, capable of taking over certain functions formerly carried out by ECOWAS (creation of a joint force, establishment of a confederal bank, etc.). However, despite the political rift, geoeconomic realities necessitate constant interaction with the coastal states of West Africa. This geographical constraint explains the strategic importance of relations with the Atlantic states.

Since 2024, there has been a shift toward greater pragmatism among these countries. Some coastal states, which initially aligned with ECOWAS’s firm stance, have gradually adopted a more flexible approach. Economic and energy cooperation initiatives have been discussed with Ghana, particularly regarding infrastructure projects and air links. Togo has also expressed interest in a strategic rapprochement with the AES countries, as part of an effort to diversify its regional partnerships.

This development reflects a gradual realignment of West African geopolitics. The coastal states, which also face security threats and the need to maintain regional trade flows, appear to favor a pragmatic approach rather than a prolonged confrontation with the AES. In other words, despite institutional fragmentation, economic and security considerations are driving a form of functional cooperation.

The relationship between the AES and the African Union is another crucial aspect of this realignment. The African Union, which is required—under its charter—to uphold the principles of constitutional governance and to reject unconstitutional changes of government, initially took a critical stance toward the military regimes in the Sahel. However, recent developments point to a trend toward institutional pragmatism.

The African Union must come to terms with a new political reality: the consolidation of a Sahelian bloc with its own institutions and enjoying a certain degree of popular support in these countries. In this context, the AU is seeking to maintain a dialogue with the AES member states in order to prevent further fragmentation of the continent. This approach reflects a structural tension between two imperatives: the defense of democratic norms and the need to preserve African geopolitical cohesion.

Overall, relations between the AES, ECOWAS, the African Atlantic countries, and the African Union are part of a process of regional realignment. The institutional break with ECOWAS does not mean the end of regional interactions, but rather a transformation in the nature of cooperation. The AES member states are seeking to build an autonomous Sahelian hub, while developing pragmatic partnerships with coastal countries and other African actors. The future of these relations will depend on several key factors: the evolution of the security situation in the Sahel, the AES’s ability to build robust economic institutions, the attitude of coastal states toward this new regional configuration, and the manner in which the African Union will succeed in integrating this new reality into its institutional architecture.

CONCLUSION

In their efforts to stabilize the Sahel, external powers have often contributed to making it ungovernable by propping up dependent, divided, and contested states. The reclaiming of sovereignty, as advocated by the Alliance of Sahel States, is therefore as much an internal political project as it is a geopolitical response to decades of interference. The three Sahel countries have gradually broken ties with their former Western partners and forged new relationships with other powers such as Russia and China. These new alliances are reinforced by a revitalization of South-South cooperation with the BRICS+ countries and the Maghreb nations, as well as a rebalancing of ties with ECOWAS.

The realignment of external alliances is reshaping the security landscape in the Sahel. It marks the end of a model of imposed security and the search for a “sovereign security,” based on the political will and autonomy of states. The impact of the realignment of external alliances on security and economic sovereignty remains to be seen: it requires a balanced diplomatic approach and institutional consolidation of the Alliance to avoid falling back into a new form of dependence and internal and regional instability. If these conditions are met, the Sahel could become an African laboratory for strategic autonomy and shared security.
 

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1. Visit by the Prime Minister of Niger to Washington to discuss strengthening bilateral and trade ties with representatives of the U.S. State Department (April); presentation of credentials (May) by the U.S. ambassador to the President of Niger, two years after she took office; Visits in late May by the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for West Africa to Burkina Faso and Niger to “encourage a new dynamic of cooperation.”
2. The group—Wagner, renamed “Africa Corps”—has won the approval of Malian troops and part of the population, which had been disappointed by the failures of the Western intervention.
3. As part of this initiative, the three countries signed a memorandum of understanding with Glavkosmos, a subsidiary of Roscosmos, to provide training for personnel involved in space activities.
4. We can therefore speak of tensions, but not yet exactly of the same kind as those mentioned in the context of Niger–China (layoffs, expulsion of executives). Mali seems instead to be pursuing a strategy of contractual rebalancing and increased oversight.
5. Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, and their new members, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, and Ethiopia
6. The African Union (2023) recommends that the AES be provided with a permanent technical secretariat responsible for coordinating these initiatives
7. The crisis worsened in 2025 when a Malian drone was shot down near the Algerian border, an incident that led to the recall of ambassadors and a diplomatic escalation between the two countries.
8. This Moroccan policy is based on a strategy of gradual influence that combines economic diplomacy, security partnerships, and religious cooperation through the training of imams and the promotion of moderate Islam.