Publications /
Opinion

Back
Control of the Nile
August 24, 2021

The Nile is a monster, at 6,650 kilometers the longest river on the planet. Control of its waters has kept rulers in power for thousands of years. The Blue and White Niles merge in Khartoum then flow northwards, travelling through Sudan to Egypt, the glorious land of Pharaohs.

Conflict or cooperation

The Blue Nile nations, Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt, are facing the question of conflict or cooperation, as Sara Hasnaa Mokkadem wrote in her study for the Annual Report on Africa’s Geopolitics 2020 for the Policy Center for the New South. In April 2011, the Ethiopian government started the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), also known as the Millennium Dam, on the Blue Nile near the border with Sudan. Mokkadem noted: “Since the laying of the first stone, the GERD has been source of tension between the three countries.” War was considered possible, a seemingly incredible conflict possibly unavoidable. She added: “All three countries are clear about the economic cost of a potential conflict. A direct confrontation would be devastating for the region and would have far reaching consequences”. Egypt and Sudan fear that the dam will slow or, eventually, stop their water supplies, dramatically damaging agriculture and industry, adding to the water shortages felt already in larger Egyptian towns. In other words: the water is a national security issue, and military action is possible.

Over nearly a decade, numerous meetings and negotiations to ease tensions have failed to secure agreement. Although the downstream countries (Egypt and Sudan) remain extremely concerned about the consequences for their water security, work seems to progress on the dam, which is now 80% complete. “With its reservoir of 74 billion cubic meters of water—equivalent to Egypt’s annual water needs—16 turbines, and its expected production capacity of 6448 megawatts of electricity, it will be the largest hydroelectric dam in Africa. The planned energy production, equivalent to six nuclear power plants, could make Ethiopia the continent’s largest electricity producer and a net energy exporter,” Mokaddem wrote. Construction of the GERD has raised fears that the flow of the Nile will drop, undermining its value as a vital resource, particularly for Egypt. With 95% of its population concentrated on the banks of the river, Egypt already faces “an alarming situation. In proportion to the increase in its population, and to the decrease in its agricultural land, Egypt’s water needs are continually increasing. Since Ethiopia began construction in 2011, Egypt and Sudan have pushed for a tripartite agreement on how to operate the dam before filling”.

For example, as Hasnaa Mokkadem stated in her paper, the opponents of the project, mainly Sudan and Egypt, want “negotiated rules on filling the dam during drought years, and want the slowest possible filling time, 12 to 21 years, to minimize the effects of the filling on the flow of the Nile. However, Ethiopia wants to fill the reservoirs much faster, between five and seven years. Another sticking point is how the dam will be managed during periods of drought and how much water Ethiopia is willing to release in order to safeguard the downstream countries’ interests”. Mistrust and tension remain high. Ethiopia is not willing to accept international arbitration, as suggested by Cairo and Khartoum, but insists, wrote Mokaddem, that the GERD issue is an African matter, and negotiations should be part of an African Union-led process. “The exchange between the Blue Nile countries became more heated when in July 2020 satellite images revealed that water was being stored in the GERD reservoir, notwithstanding the two other countries’ objections, which has been shared with the United Nations Secretary General. In fact, in May and June 2021, the Egyptian and the Sudanese Foreign Ministers wrote to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) stressing the need to finalize an agreement on the Ethiopian dam and urging the international community to pressure Addis Ababa so it does not take any unilateral regarding the filling of the reservoir.” Obviously without success—on July 15, 2020, Ethiopia’s water minister announced that the filling of a reservoir behind the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam has started. It is still unknown, where the source of this water flow is hiding. In the end it does not really matter as long nature is delivering rain and floods to feed the Nile, forever a mythical monster.

 

The opinions expressed in this article belong to the author.

RELATED CONTENT

  • February 13, 2026
    There is a story told by Václav Havel, the Czech dissident writer who later became president after the fall of communism. In his essay The Power of the Powerless, Havel describes a shopkeeper who, every morning, places a sign in his window reading: “Workers of the world, unite!” He does not believe in it. Nor do the people around him. Yet the sign remains. ...
  • Authors
    February 12, 2026
    Divergent regulatory regimes for data, driven by different motivations, ranging from privacy protection in the European Union to information control in China, could eventually produce distinctively different, and possibly contradictory, bodies of data. Artificial-intelligence models trained on those datasets could produce differing and possibly even conflicting outputs. To the extent that AI outputs start to shape human perception and to influence decisions, in governments and ...
  • Authors
    February 11, 2026
    The U.S.–China technological rivalry has become a central axis of global economic and geopolitical competition. While the United States continues to lead in frontier innovation—most notably in advanced semiconductors and artificial intelligence (AI)—China has consolidated strengths in large-scale implementation, manufacturing capacity, and control over critical segments of global supply chains. These advantages are especially visible in clean energy technologies and in the processin ...
  • Authors
    Amine Ghoulidi
    February 5, 2026
    This Paper was originally published on orient-online.com  The Western Mediterranean’s exposure to the Sahel is usually framed in terms of security spillovers and crisis management. This paper argues that this framing misreads how Sahelian access conditions now shape Mediterranean integration. Morocco’s Atlantic Initiative is a state-led corridor strategy combining Atlantic port infrastructure, inland transit routes, and energy systems to connect landlocked Sahelian economi ...
  • February 4, 2026
    This article examines the quiet but profound implications of the erosion of U.S.-led hegemony for small and vulnerable states of the New South. While the post-1945 international order was never egalitarian, it offered predictability: power was organized through law, and sovereignty for weaker states rested less on justice than on procedural stability. Davos 2026 marked a turning point in the public acknowledgment of that system’s unraveling. Statements by leading Western figures rev ...
  • Authors
    February 3, 2026
    From the use of tariffs as a foreign policy instrument, to the weaponization of critical resources, and from targeted sanctions to attacks on critical infrastructure, economic security is at the forefront of international debates. The aggressive use of economic instruments for strategic purposes has become an explicit feature of international affairs, in a way not seen since the interwar period[1]. Beyond the weaponization of resources of all kinds, an increasing ‘monetization’ is u ...
  • January 30, 2026
    En 2019, Donald Trump a proposé d’acheter le Groenland, déclenchant un refus catégorique du Danemark et une tension diplomatique transatlantique. Cette initiative reflétait l’intérêt stratégique et économique des États-Unis pour l’Arctique et ses ressources. L’épisode a mis en lumière l...
  • Authors
    January 30, 2026
    The 2026 World Economic Forum (WEF) Annual Meeting took place in an environment of elevated economic uncertainty and structural risk repricing. According to the Global Risks Report (GRR) 2026, geoeconomic confrontation and economic downturn rank among the most severe near-term risks, while inflation-related risks and economic volatility have risen sharply in perceived severity compared with the previous edition. Notably, 50% of respondents to the Global Risks Perception Survey ...
  • January 29, 2026
    Le Mali, le Burkina Faso et le Niger, réunis au sein de l’Alliance des États du Sahel (AES), affirment l’ambition de bâtir une souveraineté nationale qui leur permettrait de s’émanciper de la domination et des influences extérieures et de se doter d’une liberté d’action dans les choix de développement politique et économique. Cependant, cette ambition se heurte à de nombreuses contraintes économiques et sécuritaires.La souveraineté ne peut se construire sans une base économique soli ...