Social Justice in Question

INTRODUCTION

Reflection on social justice is all the more complex because the notion of equality with which it is associated is poorly defined. The notion of social justice refers to modern theories of justice which, because they respect the pluralism of citizens' moral values, ensure that everyone respects the organization of individual freedoms at the collective level. The aim of social justice theories is to develop principles that are coherent and operational, i.e. that can be translated into public policy action.

The very purpose of public policy, or politics more broadly, is to deliberate on the standards of justice that govern choices. Public or political decision-making, especially in a democratic system, consists first and foremost in deciding what should be equal and what can remain unequal. The debate on inequality and the norm of social justice is clearly part of this deliberation. The principle of Equality, supported by that of Legality, remains enshrined in the constitutions of all political systems, including our own. Nor is it one of those that can be discussed; it can be observed. It responds to an unconditional need. It's up to Justice to set it in motion; in a way, it's responsible for restoring de facto inequalities to equality in principle.

The national debate on justice and equality is too often subordinated to the strong surges of demands for equality that the political system is sporadically forced, through its parties, to take into account, without having the time to properly address them over the long term, resulting in disappointment. Clearly, if there's one problem that needs to be addressed continuously and over the long term, it's this one. This reflection on the principles of justice is doubly necessary. Firstly, economically, because in order to correctly define public policies, we need clear thinking on issues of equality and justice, which are fundamental aspects of these policies. Secondly, politically, because it is a requirement of democracy: to function properly, democracy needs conflict-regulating principles and efficient social welfare mechanisms.

A theoretical detour will enable us, in this article, to highlight the complexity of notions of justice and equality, and to see to what extent these notions are understood and integrated into the national political discourse, independently of their ideological frames of reference. This reflexive detour will make it easier to observe and appreciate the socio-spatial dimensions of social justice in Morocco, as well as the evolution of social mobility as an expression of the trend towards a more open and fairer society, despite the dysfunctions of public policies.

A THEORETICAL DETOUR TO APPRECIATE THE COMPLEXITY OF THE NOTIONS OF JUSTICE AND EQUALITY

The idea of equality is confronted with two types of diversity: the heterogeneity of human beings and the multiplicity of variables in terms of which equality can be assessed, as Amartya Sen reminds us. The formula "All men are born equal" and the powerful rhetoric of "human equality" distract attention from differences in people's internal characteristics (age, gender, aptitudes, skills, vulnerabilities) and differences in external circumstances (inheritance and property ownership, social origin, environment). Equal consideration for all may imply unequal treatment in favor of the disadvantaged. Ignoring distinctions between individuals can be an unequal approach. Real equality requires extensive and complex measures to counteract a legacy of inequality.

Estimating and measuring inequality depends on the choice of the variable (income, wealth, happiness, etc.). Different people may choose a different "focal variable" as their preferred focus of interest. A focal variable may present an internal plurality, in a different order. Rejection of equality on one focal variable may be combined with support for equality on another. A potential risk of conflict between two equalities may arise: the choice of one variable may act as a constraint on the nature of other social decisions. The demand for equality on one variable tends to collide with the desire for equality on another. This observation raises another question: can we apply a classificatory principle to forms of equality? Can we identify invariant properties and fortuitous or conditional relationships between two types of equality? Answering these questions is even more complicated as the characteristics of inequality in different spaces tend to diverge from one another, due to the heterogeneity of individuals. Comparing individuals necessarily introduces the question of inequality and leads us to question the meaning of social justice.

All existing theories in welfare economics and political philosophy (utilitarianism, Rawlsian resource-based egalitarianism, libertarianism, etc.) reflect a desire to equalize the situations of individuals in a given space: equality of persons in the procedure for aggregating utilities, equality of basic freedoms for Rawls, equality of formal rights for libertarians, and so on. Economic theories have always been confronted with the difficulty of conceiving an economy that favors both the optimal allocation and the egalitarian distribution of resources. The economic optimum in Pareto's sense reflects an optimal allocation of resources, and the distribution is equitable but could be unequal. The authors of the classical school based their theories on the question of wealth alone.

Rawls sets out two principles of justice to distribute fundamental rights and the benefits derived from social cooperation. A principle of equal liberty: "each person is entitled to a perfectly adequate set of equal basic liberties compatible with the same set of equal liberties for others." Second principle: economic and social inequalities must satisfy two conditions: first, (principle of fair equality of opportunity) they relate to positions or functions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; second, (principle of difference) they must exist for the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society. Rawls gives priority to the first principle of equal liberty, over the second, and within the latter, to the principle of fair equality of opportunity over that of difference.

The principle of difference, a principle of economic justice, is thus subordinate to the two principles of political justice. In other words, no restriction of freedom or the slightest inequality of opportunity can be legitimized on the grounds that it would improve the material lot of the most disadvantaged. Basic freedoms are therefore not just formal, but real.

These principles give rise to the concept of "justice as fairness": equality of freedoms and opportunities must be guaranteed, but certain inequalities will be considered fair if they benefit the most disadvantaged (principle of difference). "Just inequality" is therefore fair. The equality guaranteed here does not concern the achievements of individuals but the means available to each person, through primary social goods, to reach a certain level of well-being.

It's these "primary goods" that interest Rawls, because the fairness of a given political community depends on the fairness of their distribution, which is chosen and not random. These include: fundamental freedoms, access to the various functions of society, the powers and advantages associated with these functions, income and wealth, and self-respect. These primary goods are known to all under the veil of ignorance, and desired by all: it is the bundle of primary goods that will enable them to lead the life they consider good. So, the principles of justice adopted must be such that everyone will accept them, whatever their moral, religious or philosophical values: priority is thus given to the right over the good.

In his critique of egalitarian conceptions, Sen has proposed a synthesis that draws on the libertarian emphasis on choice and freedom to act, and the attention of Rawls' theory to individual freedom and the resources necessary for substantive freedoms. For him, selecting one type of information to describe inequalities (income, wealth, living conditions, subjective well-being, etc.) cannot be ethically and politically neutral. He also criticizes this conception for taking into account only people's achievements, as opposed to their freedom to achieve (the available alternatives). Sen consolidates his approach by discussing Rawlsian theory of justice, and more specifically its informational basis centered on primary goods. He substitutes an information base centered on individual "capabilities" for resource-based variables. In terms of informational base, focusing on the means that people possess is insufficient, for the simple reason that they probably don't have the same capacity to convert these resources into identical accomplishments or achievements.

The informational base is not limited to the means of freedom but aims to provide more direct information on the extent of this freedom itself. This real freedom is what we call the individual's "capability" to accomplish the various possible combinations of functionings that make up the course of life to which he aspires. The course of a person's life is the set of functionings that cannot be reduced to a set of resources: for example, knowing how to read and write, having a job, being politically active, being respected by others, being in good physical and mental health, having received a good education and training, being safe, having a roof over one's head, etc.

The capabilities approach has an immediate application: to propose a new way of conceiving economic development and poverty. "Development can be understood as a process of expanding the real freedoms enjoyed by individuals. By focusing on human freedoms, we avoid defining development too narrowly, whether by reducing it to growth in gross national product, income increases, industrialization, technological progress, or even social modernization”.(1)

However, the capabilities theory remains incomplete. This incompleteness is evident on two levels: first, in the selection of the different dimensions to be included in the evaluation: which achieved and achievable functionings should be considered and assessed? And second, how should these dimensions be prioritized? 

SOCIAL JUSTICE IN MOROCCAN POLITICAL DISCOURSE: WHAT SOURCE OF INSPIRATION?

Considering the range of its paradigms, social justice currently provides Moroccan political parties, in the broad spectrum of their ideological frameworks, with a reference value assured of consensus in the "collective psyche". As such, it continues to hold a prominent place in party election pledges. In this pre-election year, all parties will be discovering a new interest in social justice. In this sense, the debate on social justice can contribute, to a certain extent, to an ethical awakening, and set a milestone in the moralization of the economic system.

Social justice, a multifaceted concept, indeed encompasses many dimensions. For some, it is understood as the minimal satisfaction of needs and presupposes a minimum of solidarity with the less fortunate. The representations of this minimum vary from one party to another and range, from one extreme to the other, from the demand for a universal allowance granted to each citizen without any conditions, to a reduction in existing social benefits. For others, it is understood as distributive justice that aims to correct the inequalities of the primary distribution ensured by the market, by introducing a vertical redistribution of income by the state, taking from the richest to give to the poorest, mainly through direct taxation, via the progressivity of income tax.

Today, social justice is as much a reference point for liberal parties seeking to combat "too much state" and the burden of taxation, as it is for socialist and Islamist parties seeking to protect the individual against existential risks. The relationship between freedom and equality is the foundation of social justice. The rhetoric of all political parties refers to the same values of freedom, solidarity and justice. For some, these values derive from religious values, for others from liberal thought, and for others from socialist ideology in its various meanings.

The differences observed in the respective hierarchies of these values and in the programmatic declarations reveal the political identities of the various parties. Freedom is always cited first by liberal parties, in relation to equality by socialist movements, and in relation to justice by religious parties. For some, solidarity stems from man's social nature and the imperative of neighborly love. For others, solidarity between the strong and the weak, which must be reciprocal, leads to obligations and not just duties. For others, equality before the law and equality of opportunity require greater equality in the distribution of income, wealth and power.

The emphasis placed here on freedom, there on equality, and a different conception of solidarity allows us to understand the differences in the conception of social justice in the different political currents.

These differences, perceptible in political discourse and electoral programs, become blurred in the management of social policies when these parties take over the management of public affairs. It is for this reason that the question of social justice needs to be revisited today, as citizens question the effectiveness of public policies in curbing inequalities. The national debate on equality is too often subordinated to strong bursts of demand for equality, which the political system is sporadically obliged to take into account without having the time to deal with them properly over the long term, resulting in disappointment. Clearly, if there's one problem that needs to be addressed continuously and over the long term, it's this one. This reflection is necessary for the conduct of our social transfer policies, our distribution policies within companies and our social policies.

We need criteria that are sufficiently clear and operational to distinguish acceptable or justifiable inequalities from those that are not, in order to guide action. Where do we find these benchmarks, and based on which principle? Should we refer to a single principle of justice (or a small number of principles), which may claim to be universal, but will necessarily be highly abstract in nature? Or should we refer to principles that vary according to the nature of the goods in question? This reflection on the principles of justice is doubly necessary. Firstly, it is economically necessary, because if we are to define public policies correctly, we need clear thinking on questions of equality and justice, which are fundamental aspects of these policies. Secondly, politically, because it is a requirement of democracy: to function properly, democracy needs conflict-regulating principles and efficient social welfare mechanisms.

The difficulty of conceiving and applying these principles naturally leads us to reflect further on the links between social justice and freedom. Certainly, freedom is the recognition and safeguarding of the possibility of initiative, of the right to undertake something, in one's private and professional life. But some people use the freedom of the market to levy, through normal corporate profit, a "private super-tax" that is simply the right of the strongest. It's up to the community, by law, to prevent them from doing so, or to take a share. A democratic society is not a uniform society, otherwise it breeds boredom, fatalism and resignation. This is why a social system based on equality is not incompatible with differences in circumstances. But these differences must be motivated (by natural gifts, merit, effort, work). And these differences must be achievements, that is, the result of the individual's own actions.

A LOOK AT ASPECTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE IN MOROCCO

The link between social justice and spatial justice is one of the most talked-about themes of social justice in Morocco. A reading of the territorial dimension of social justice reveals the difficulty of translating the principles of justice and equality into public policy.

A closer look at spatial disparities reveals that Morocco suffers from major socio-economic inequalities, creating rifts between regions, between town and country and between cities. Significant disparities persist between the twelve regions that make up the country. Indeed, the national territory is characterized by a demographic and economic concentration along the Atlantic coastline, and by cleavages between the central region and outlying regions, on the one hand, and between highly urbanized and agricultural regions, on the other. These disparities concern demographic growth, economic dynamics and social sectors. Their evolution is mainly determined by three factors: urbanization, migration and the location of activities.

As a result, regional disparities in terms of population have widened. The distribution of the population across the country has undergone perceptible changes. The spatial distribution of the population and the resulting housing structure help to determine quality of life, both for city dwellers living close to rural areas and for people living in rural areas with easy access to services. Wealth creation remains highly uneven, and disparities have even increased (industrial activities remain concentrated on the coast from El Jadida to Kenitra).

Territorial equality is "neither innate nor spontaneous". Territories are by nature unequal, and the interplay of the market and public policies tends to make them even more unequal. Thinking about territorial equality requires us to consider the link between social justice and spatial justice, between the equality of people and the equality of territories. Inequalities between territories are plural and often cumulative. If we want to combat them, we need to know about them. These inequalities between territories translate into inequalities in social pathways and "destinies between citizens, persistent social inequalities due to the territory".

Nor does territorial equality have a single meaning. It is necessary to specify the concept of justice by which we intend to promote and build territorial equality. It is difficult to aim for the equalization of spaces: natural conditions, collective preferences of inhabitants, freedom of movement, territorial specialization, differentiated local development strategies, and global integration are all constraints and choices on which it is very complex to act. A second aspect of territorial justice relates to the competitiveness of territories, through which they seek to capitalize on their potential, but also to attract resources and better position themselves in relation to other territories. This competition goes hand in hand with competition for human and public resources. Territorial competitiveness and attractiveness should not be understood in a narrowly economistic sense: the value and attractiveness of a region depend crucially on the quality of its infrastructure and public services, an institutional capital that plays an essential part in national "competitiveness" on a global scale.

Territorial equality is not just equality between territories. It is, more precisely, equality within territories. Equality of territorial authorities, which has no precise legal definition, is in fact based on the idea of "mediated equality", "equality in the protection of personal freedoms across all territories", which implies both "uniformity of status" and "respect (or consideration) for differences" (2). The principle of equality of territorial authorities is justified by the "concern to preserve a uniform application of fundamental rights throughout the national territory".

This is an essential issue: thinking about territorial equality implies thinking about the link between social justice and spatial justice, between equality of people and equality of territories. Territorial equality can in fact be interpreted as clarifying the ethical foundation of the regional planning project, i.e. the search, within the geographical framework of the national territory, for a better distribution of people, according to natural resources and economic activities. This search is carried out with the constant concern of providing people with better living and working conditions, and greater leisure and cultural facilities. This pursuit is not driven by strictly economic objectives, but rather for the well-being and fulfillment of the population. It is indeed "a principle of justice (and well-being) that is reaffirmed as superior to the sole principle of territorial efficiency or economic optimization of the national space".

This approach to the question of territorial equality/inequality, which mobilizes the concept of spatial justice/social justice, opens up a wide field of reflection on the types of public policy likely to contribute to territorial equality and allows for the introduction into the reflection, in addition to the mechanism of equalization of financial resources, of the questions of public investment as a vector for the balanced and harmonious endowment of territories with infrastructures and facilities, a prerequisite for people's accessibility to economic and social rights. Territories are by nature unequal, and market forces combined with inappropriate public policies tend to make them even more so. It is necessary to specify by means of which conception of justice between people we intend to promote and build territorial equality.

We can hardly aim to equalize spaces: natural conditions, residents' collective preferences, freedom of movement, territorial specialization, differentiated local development strategies and global integration are all constraints and choices on which it is both highly complex and hardly legitimate to try to act. As the resources of public authorities are particularly scarce and precious these days, it's best not to squander them in the pursuit of an illusory top-down control of territories. But territorial equality does have a meaning: it's akin to the territorial continuity of public service, promised to every citizen by the Constitution. It could mean, by means of plural equality and dynamic justice (3), the promotion of human development and the capacities of all, whatever their position in physical and social space.

The principle of territorial equality is justified by the "concern to preserve a uniform application of fundamental rights throughout the national territory." Reflecting on equality of territories requires us to consider the relationship between social justice and spatial justice, between the equality of people and the equality of territories. Territorial equality can in fact be interpreted as the explication of the ethical foundation of the spatial planning project. The constant concern is to provide people with better living and working conditions, as well as greater leisure and cultural facilities.

SOCIAL JUSTICE AND PUBLIC POLICY: IS THE SOCIAL LADDER BROKEN?

Social mobility is an expression of social justice in motion. Mobility is progressing in Morocco, even if the indicators used mask the effects of the crisis on younger people. That said, a society can be both highly mobile and highly unequal. In Morocco today, the meritocratic ideal - equality of opportunity promised to all - is an essential element of social consensus. By giving the impression that everyone has a chance, society helps to legitimize the social hierarchy, which is nonetheless marked by significant inequalities. In practice, however, access to social positions, which determine income, consumption and lifestyles, is anything but egalitarian. At first glance, Moroccan society seems increasingly mobile.

In 1960, how many executives in Morocco were the children of poor workers or peasants? 1% or 2% at most. Today, there are certainly more. The proportion of sons who have surpassed their father's social position has probably changed significantly in fifty years. But what kind of mobility are we talking about? Traditional approaches to mobility measure both changes in employment (so-called structural mobility) and the ascent (or descent) of individuals (fluidity, or net mobility). In fact, the proportion of sons of blue-collar workers who have become managers has not kept pace with the rise in the proportion of managers among the working population. This is because the boom in industry and modern service sectors has only benefited a few skilled jobs.

Conversely, the continuing decline in agricultural employment has had a mechanical effect on mobility. It is probably more the "low-skilled jobs" in the service sector that have absorbed the human movements of spatial and social redeployment. Assessing changes in the fluidity of our society is no simple matter. How can we estimate what would have happened if the social structure had remained unchanged? Because the boundaries between categories are changing. What's more, their hierarchy is difficult to define: what criteria can be used to say that one category is above or below another? Income is not enough, and the notion of qualification is becoming ever more difficult to establish as the structure of employment changes.

Mobility analyses are only informative over the long term. We observe the trajectories of people who have been in the professional world long enough for their social position to be considered stable. After the age of 40, things no longer change radically, and we therefore study the situation of those who have passed this milestone in relation to that of their fathers at the same age. The social situation of younger people is not taken into account. And yet, today, it is precisely those under 40 who are paying the heaviest price for the employment crisis and are at risk of social downgrading.

Conventional mobility does not measure the evolution of mobility in society as a whole, but only for certain generations. If we look at the most recent generations, this increase in fluidity is much less clear-cut. The employment crisis has left a deep mark on the generations that have entered the job market in recent years. Disillusionment has been profound among some middle-class parents, often products of the upward mobility process of the first decades of independence, who have seen their children - in whom they had invested heavily psychologically and financially - struggle to break into the world of work. As schooling lengthened, job opportunities were not always forthcoming, often appearing to bear no relation to the efforts made. Even if schooling has been democratized to some extent, competition has increased, and it's the children of the upper classes who fare best.

The cohorts of university graduates affected by the crisis in the education system and the lack of employment opportunities are already over forty years old; they have been on the job market for many years, are sometimes even considered "old", and therefore have little chance of seeing their social position significantly improve... As for the new jobs being created, these are less in high-level positions than in low-skilled ones, with little hope for those employed in such jobs of developing a genuine career.

Society is changing, and traditional identifications (tribe, bourgeoisie, working class, etc.) are becoming blurred, but social hierarchies, even when recomposed, still exist. Concrete economic capital (money) and symbolic capital (Jah) continue to mark social reproduction and power. Cultural capital (the diploma), more complex, has not radically altered the structure of our society. It's not just the school that's to blame: the rigidity of career paths is also one of the major factors behind our inertia. Companies invest very little in continuing training. Last but not least, fluidity can serve as a smokescreen for strong social inequalities. A society can be both highly mobile and unequal. Shuffling the cards better with each generation is not enough if the social stratifications themselves are not challenged. The heart of progress towards greater equality lies in bringing conditions closer together, not in rotating elites.

CONCLUSION

Despite social mobility, the history of Morocco and other countries shows us a host of tricks and violations of the principles of equality, freedom, justice, responsibility and rights. What, in the individual ethic, can be explained in terms of impulses, aspirations or ideals, remains weighed down, at the collective level, by the impressive sum of reciprocal utilities or nuisances, of antagonistic interests. The movement of our society is confronted with resistance to the application of the principles of equality, freedom, responsibility and justice.

The result of this process is that the public's perception of two coexisting societies has become entrenched: one where members enjoy equal rights, initiatives and rewards; another where, indiscriminately, individuals are equal only in the deprivation of rights open to others. This perception may be tainted with subjectivism, but it nonetheless permeates the behavior of a fraction of the population in its relations with others, if not even with the State (4).

Today, collective solidarity calls for a renewal of the social protection system. At least two new factors must be taken into account when configuring the system. On the one hand, the international environment weighs heavily on the national situation and on every principle of social organization. Thus, income, employment and social protection are exposed to the threat of market dangers; accumulations of capital and economic power are a potential source of inequality. On the other hand, faced with the complexity of collective life, no society can claim to be democratic unless it organizes a minimum of collective solidarity. Public policies must therefore address this need by re-examining the principles of freedom, justice, responsibility and equal rights. These policies must facilitate the implementation of these principles through mechanisms and laws that are sufficiently relevant to ensure their effective application. The truth is that there is no theoretical miracle formula. Only concrete political will can guarantee and sustain a democratic and just society.

It is for this reason that the question of social justice is being revisited today, as citizens question the effectiveness of public policies in curbing inequalities. The difficulty of conceiving and applying these principles naturally leads us to reflect further on the existing links between social justice and freedom. Equality, liberty, justice, responsibility, rights... These references are normally and, so to speak, necessarily enshrined in our Constitution. Their repeated use in political discourse exposes them to erosion. They must therefore be reinterpreted in the light of reality, invigorated and redefined, so that their inclusion in the constitutional architecture of a collective organization is more than mere form. The nobility of these principles seems to have an inexhaustible virtue. Why? From a political morality point of view, the answer is easy: these superior values are imposed and cannot be discussed. In the great history of human society, they embody the side of GOOD.

Bibliography

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Rawls, J. (1997). Théorie de la justice. Paris: Points, collection Essais.

Paugam, S. (2011). Repenser la solidarité. Paris: PUF.

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Sen, A. (2008). Une politique de la liberté. Paris: Éditions Michalon, collection Le bien commun.

1). Sen, A. Un nouveau modèle économique. Paris: Éditions Odile Jacob, p. 13.

2). Report: Vers l’égalité des territoires. Dynamiques, mesures, politiques. Edited by Éloi Laurent.

3). It's too simplistic to statically assess the position of territories in terms of their "deviation from the average" without considering their development trajectories (or lack thereof).

4). It should be noted that even in the most advanced democracies, this distortion in the perception of equal rights is not insignificant, and indeed concerns rights enshrined in constitutional texts. This is why the humorist Michel Colucci, known as Coluche, said: "Men are born free and equal, but some are more equal than others".