Publications /
Opinion

Back
Deep-Sea Mining and Ocean Governance at a Crossroads
Authors
Eduarda Zoghbi
July 4, 2025

The author of this opinion, Eduarda Zoghbi, is a 2024 alumna of the Atlantic Dialogues Emerging Leaders Program.

It is no longer news that critical minerals are becoming increasingly important for global supply chains, and are essential to the energy transition. Countries are racing to secure mining rights in the Global South, and to expand refining capacity within their borders, but few have been paying attention to a new frontier for mineral extraction—the deep sea. The issue has flown under the radar, in part because of its controversial and sensitive nature.

On April 24, however, President Trump issued an Executive Order (EO), declaring that “the United States has a core national security and economic interest in maintaining leadership in deep sea science and technology and seabed mineral resources”. The EO promotes the responsible development of seabed minerals, and calls for the acceleration of extraction and processing technologies to secure supply chains for defense, infrastructure, and, notably, the energy sector. It also proposes a fast-tracked licensing process and a seabed mapping initiative to position the U.S. as a global leader in seabed mineral exploration and innovation.

Another of President Trump’s goals is to reduce dependence on foreign suppliers—particularly China—and boost U.S. competitiveness. To that end, the EO includes a politically sensitive provision that allows for exploration licenses not only in U.S. waters but also in “areas beyond national jurisdiction”.

In 1982, the United Nations adopted the Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a legal framework regulating oceans and marine resources. It led to the creation of the International Seabed Authority (ISA), tasked with overseeing mining in areas beyond national jurisdiction. For decades, ISA member states have struggled to reach agree rules to govern this emerging industry. While most countries have ratified UNCLOS, the U.S. has remained an exception, which may now justify its own regulatory path and, arguably, to sidestep multilateral governance.

Governments, scientists, and environmental organizations argue that the EO is a unilateral move that undermines ISA’s authority. Letícia Reis de Carvalho, ISA’s Secretary-General, responded with a letter raising concerns about the EO’s applicability in areas beyond national jurisdiction. She said that the EO contradicts the UNCLOS framework, which stipulates that mineral activities in international waters must be conducted under ISA’s oversight, with equitable benefit-sharing and strong environmental protections. UNCLOS asserts that no state has the right to exploit deep-sea minerals unilaterally—a norm that is understood to be binding even on countries that haven't ratified the treaty.

De Carvalho also expressed surprise since the U.S. has historically played a constructive role in ISA negotiations, offering technical expertise to shape new regulatory frameworks. However, the decision to mine beyond national jurisdiction disregards the principle that international waters are a common heritage of humankind. Trump’s EO could therefore compromise decades of negotiations and set a dangerous precedent that could destabilize the entire system of global ocean governance.

While the crisis over ocean governance rights unfolds, Pacific Island nations are also asserting their sovereignty and influence. Some countries are advancing domestic regulations on deep-sea mining, while others continue to uphold indigenous stewardship and their longstanding commitments to protecting ocean biodiversity. Meanwhile, the EO could create incentives for countries with seabed minerals to partner with Washington, reshaping how these nations protect their environmental heritage.

Whether deep-sea mining will create a positive or negative effect for the ocean’s ecosystem is also being contested. Critics of deep-sea mining argue that only 5% of the ocean has been explored, leaving the remaining 95% as a vast, unknown ecosystem. Jeff Watters, vice president for external affairs at Ocean Conservancy, notes that there is consensus among scientists that the long-term risks outweigh the short-term economic benefits. The damage wouldn’t be confined to the ocean floor—it would impact the entire water column, and by extension, all life that depends on it.

A recent BBC article highlighted a paper from the UK’s Natural History Museum and the National Oceanography Centre, which has monitored the effects of experimental seabed mining since the 1970s. While some sediment-dwelling creatures were able to recolonize the site and recover from the test, larger animals appeared not to have returned. Scientists emphasized that polymetallic nodules collected from the seabed take millions of years to form and cannot be replaced.

In contrast, mining companies claim the environmental concerns are exaggerated. In interviews with CNN, several CEOs argued that their research proves the viability of their operations. They acknowledged it’s not a zero-impact endeavor, but claimed that ocean mining causes less harm than land mining, which often involves deforestation and illegal labor exploitation. Opposing groups fear that ocean mining will not reduce land mining, and instead, will potentially create a new frontier of devastation.

This geopolitical conundrum illustrates a classic case of the prisoner’s dilemma. In other words, while international cooperation would benefit all by ensuring long-term ecological preservation and equitable access to marine resources, the temptation for unilateral action—in pursuit of short-term national interests—can influence even historically cooperative states. This is precisely the risk posed by Trump’s EO: it signals a shift to self-interest, encouraging others to follow, rather than uphold shared governance. Abandoning multilateralism in favor of unilateral gain is dangerous for ocean governance, especially as climate change continues to destabilize marine ecosystems. Just as in game theory, the dominant strategy for individual players may lead to a collectively suboptimal outcome, that would jeopardize not only biodiversity, but the climate commitments on which our shared future depends.

RELATED CONTENT

  • Authors
    March 3, 2026
    Sur les marchés mondiaux de matières premières, l’année 2025 s’est inscrite dans le sillage de 2024 : une hausse record des cours des métaux précieux dans le contexte d’incertitudes, toujours plus marquées, et des métaux de base dont la performance a, une fois encore, été largement déterminée par les niveaux de l’offre minière. Du côté des ‘’ softs’’, cacao et café se sont repliés après les records de prix passés, tandis que le marché des céréales a connu une relative stab ...
  • Authors
    Fatima Ezzahra Mengoub
    February 20, 2026
    Après plus de sept années de sécheresse, le Maroc a connu durant l’hiver 2025–2026 des précipitations exceptionnellement abondantes, témoignant d’une variabilité hydrique de plus en plus marquée. Cette alternance rapide entre déficit chronique et excès ponctuels révèle le paradoxe hydrique national : un système historiquement centré sur la rareté doit désormais gérer des épisodes extrêmes concentrés et intenses.Les infrastructures hydrauliques ont limité les impacts humains et écono ...
  • February 10, 2026
    تناقش هذه الحلقة إشكالية الفيضانات في المغرب في ظل التغيرات المناخية وتزايد حدّة الظواهر القصوى، وتسلّط الضوء على تحديات إدارة الموارد المائية بين الوقاية من المخاطر وضمان الأمن المائي، كما تستعرض السياسات العمومية وآليات التدبير الاستباقي والبنية التحتية المرتبطة بالمياه، وتفتح النقاش ...
  • Authors
    February 9, 2026
    L’arrestation du président vénézuélien Nicolàs Maduro a suscité la sidération internationale en interrogeant sur le respect du droit international ; puis, fort logiquement, cette opération a conduit à maintes analyses tant sur les arguments politiques, sécuritaires et géostratégiques avancés par Washington que sur les ambitions sous-jacentes ayant présidé à cette décision sans réel précédent dans l’histoire récente. Outre la lutte contre le narcotrafic, c’est bien évidemment la ...
  • Authors
    February 3, 2026
    From the use of tariffs as a foreign policy instrument, to the weaponization of critical resources, and from targeted sanctions to attacks on critical infrastructure, economic security is at the forefront of international debates. The aggressive use of economic instruments for strategic purposes has become an explicit feature of international affairs, in a way not seen since the interwar period[1]. Beyond the weaponization of resources of all kinds, an increasing ‘monetization’ is u ...
  • Authors
    January 26, 2026
    L’impératif de sécurisation des approvisionnements en ressources minérales stratégiques est au cœur des politiques publiques de réindustrialisation nord-américaine et européenne. L’essentiel des efforts porte toutefois sur les métaux de l’électromobilité (lithium, cuivre, nickel, cobalt, manganèse, graphite) ou sur ceux indispensables à certaines hautes technologies (gallium, germanium, antimoine, etc.) et ayant fait l’objet de restrictions aux exportations de la Chine qui en est, s ...
  • January 20, 2026
    The episode explores the global push to move beyond fossil fuels amid climate urgency, geopolitical tensions, and energy security shocks. It highlights how the energy transition is advancing unevenly, with advanced economies decarbonizing faster than many Global South countries constrai...