Publications /
Opinion

Back
Deep-Sea Mining and Ocean Governance at a Crossroads
Authors
Eduarda Zoghbi
July 4, 2025

The author of this opinion, Eduarda Zoghbi, is a 2024 alumna of the Atlantic Dialogues Emerging Leaders Program.

It is no longer news that critical minerals are becoming increasingly important for global supply chains, and are essential to the energy transition. Countries are racing to secure mining rights in the Global South, and to expand refining capacity within their borders, but few have been paying attention to a new frontier for mineral extraction—the deep sea. The issue has flown under the radar, in part because of its controversial and sensitive nature.

On April 24, however, President Trump issued an Executive Order (EO), declaring that “the United States has a core national security and economic interest in maintaining leadership in deep sea science and technology and seabed mineral resources”. The EO promotes the responsible development of seabed minerals, and calls for the acceleration of extraction and processing technologies to secure supply chains for defense, infrastructure, and, notably, the energy sector. It also proposes a fast-tracked licensing process and a seabed mapping initiative to position the U.S. as a global leader in seabed mineral exploration and innovation.

Another of President Trump’s goals is to reduce dependence on foreign suppliers—particularly China—and boost U.S. competitiveness. To that end, the EO includes a politically sensitive provision that allows for exploration licenses not only in U.S. waters but also in “areas beyond national jurisdiction”.

In 1982, the United Nations adopted the Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a legal framework regulating oceans and marine resources. It led to the creation of the International Seabed Authority (ISA), tasked with overseeing mining in areas beyond national jurisdiction. For decades, ISA member states have struggled to reach agree rules to govern this emerging industry. While most countries have ratified UNCLOS, the U.S. has remained an exception, which may now justify its own regulatory path and, arguably, to sidestep multilateral governance.

Governments, scientists, and environmental organizations argue that the EO is a unilateral move that undermines ISA’s authority. Letícia Reis de Carvalho, ISA’s Secretary-General, responded with a letter raising concerns about the EO’s applicability in areas beyond national jurisdiction. She said that the EO contradicts the UNCLOS framework, which stipulates that mineral activities in international waters must be conducted under ISA’s oversight, with equitable benefit-sharing and strong environmental protections. UNCLOS asserts that no state has the right to exploit deep-sea minerals unilaterally—a norm that is understood to be binding even on countries that haven't ratified the treaty.

De Carvalho also expressed surprise since the U.S. has historically played a constructive role in ISA negotiations, offering technical expertise to shape new regulatory frameworks. However, the decision to mine beyond national jurisdiction disregards the principle that international waters are a common heritage of humankind. Trump’s EO could therefore compromise decades of negotiations and set a dangerous precedent that could destabilize the entire system of global ocean governance.

While the crisis over ocean governance rights unfolds, Pacific Island nations are also asserting their sovereignty and influence. Some countries are advancing domestic regulations on deep-sea mining, while others continue to uphold indigenous stewardship and their longstanding commitments to protecting ocean biodiversity. Meanwhile, the EO could create incentives for countries with seabed minerals to partner with Washington, reshaping how these nations protect their environmental heritage.

Whether deep-sea mining will create a positive or negative effect for the ocean’s ecosystem is also being contested. Critics of deep-sea mining argue that only 5% of the ocean has been explored, leaving the remaining 95% as a vast, unknown ecosystem. Jeff Watters, vice president for external affairs at Ocean Conservancy, notes that there is consensus among scientists that the long-term risks outweigh the short-term economic benefits. The damage wouldn’t be confined to the ocean floor—it would impact the entire water column, and by extension, all life that depends on it.

A recent BBC article highlighted a paper from the UK’s Natural History Museum and the National Oceanography Centre, which has monitored the effects of experimental seabed mining since the 1970s. While some sediment-dwelling creatures were able to recolonize the site and recover from the test, larger animals appeared not to have returned. Scientists emphasized that polymetallic nodules collected from the seabed take millions of years to form and cannot be replaced.

In contrast, mining companies claim the environmental concerns are exaggerated. In interviews with CNN, several CEOs argued that their research proves the viability of their operations. They acknowledged it’s not a zero-impact endeavor, but claimed that ocean mining causes less harm than land mining, which often involves deforestation and illegal labor exploitation. Opposing groups fear that ocean mining will not reduce land mining, and instead, will potentially create a new frontier of devastation.

This geopolitical conundrum illustrates a classic case of the prisoner’s dilemma. In other words, while international cooperation would benefit all by ensuring long-term ecological preservation and equitable access to marine resources, the temptation for unilateral action—in pursuit of short-term national interests—can influence even historically cooperative states. This is precisely the risk posed by Trump’s EO: it signals a shift to self-interest, encouraging others to follow, rather than uphold shared governance. Abandoning multilateralism in favor of unilateral gain is dangerous for ocean governance, especially as climate change continues to destabilize marine ecosystems. Just as in game theory, the dominant strategy for individual players may lead to a collectively suboptimal outcome, that would jeopardize not only biodiversity, but the climate commitments on which our shared future depends.

RELATED CONTENT

  • Authors
    Meryam Amarir
    August 13, 2026
    Les crises récentes au Moyen-Orient, notamment les attaques ciblant les navires commerciaux en mer Rouge et les tensions autour du détroit d'Ormuz, ont mis en évidence la vulnérabilité des principaux corridors stratégiques du commerce mondial. Plus qu'un bouleversement de l'organisation des échanges, elles accélèrent une transformation déjà engagée, fondée sur la recherche de chaînes de connectivité plus résilientes, la diversification des itinéraires commerciaux et le développement ...
  • Authors
    Loubna Eddallal
    August 13, 2026
    The renewed instability in the Middle East has exposed Africa's continued vulnerability to external energy shocks. Shipping disruptions through the Strait of Hormuz, the maritime chokepoint through which roughly one-fifth of global oil and LNG supplies transit, have once again demonstrated that African fuel security remains highly dependent on geopolitical developments beyond the continent. While many African economies have traditionally relied on refined petroleum imports from Gulf ...
  • Authors
    August 12, 2026
    La géographie mondiale des hydrocarbures n'est évidemment pas figée. De nouveaux producteurs de pétrole et/ou de gaz naturel apparaissent suite à des découvertes, le plus souvent réalisées par des compagnies pétrolières internationales. On pense notamment au Mozambique, qui produit et exporte du gaz naturel liquéfié (GNL) depuis la fin 2022, au Sénégal, qui est un producteur de pétrole offshore depuis la mi-2024, et au Sénégal et à la Mauritanie, qui sont devenus conjointement expor ...
  • Authors
    August 5, 2026
    This paper addresses the persistent challenge of resource dependence in the world's poorest countries, focusing on the ten poorest African nations where natural- resource rents average 14% of income. It argues that four decades of conventional policy advice, which treated resource dependence primarily as a revenue management problem, have failed to help these countries. While stabilization funds and permanent-income frameworks aim to smooth consumption, they do not answer the fundam ...
  • July 29, 2026
    En un siècle, le cours de l’once d’or est passé de 20 dollars à 5 300 dollars au premier trimestre 2026. Cette étude, consacrée à l’analyse de cette envolée, comporte deux parties.La première privilégie une approche historique. Elle retrace tout d’abord le changement de statut du précieux métal jaune, monétisable jusqu’en 1971 puis démonétisé par la suite. Elle rappelle ensuite que cette évolution, loin d’être linéaire, est ponctuée de phases de forte hausse, de stagnation et d ...
  • Authors
    July 17, 2026
    The close relationship between energy and geopolitics is well established. The same holds true for several armed conflicts. In recent years, however, the conflict most closely intertwined with energy has been the 2026 Iran War, which began on February 28. A ceasefire has been in effect since April 8, and a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed by Iran and the United States on June 17. Nevertheless, as demonstrated by Iran's attacks on commercial vessels and recent U.S. strike ...
  • Authors
    July 17, 2026
    Les relations, très étroites, entre l’énergie et la géopolitique sont bien connues. Cela vaut aussi pour plusieurs conflits armés. Mais, dans la période récente, le conflit le plus lié à l’énergie est la guerre d’Iran de 2026, qui a débuté le 28 février. Un cessez-le-feu est en vigueur depuis le 8 avril et un protocole d’accord a été signé le 17 juin par l’Iran et les États-Unis. Mais, comme le montrent les attaques de l’Iran contre des navires et les frappes américaines de ces dern ...
  • Authors
    July 13, 2026
    On “marinetraffic.com”, thousands of triangles fill a map of the world’s ports and oceans, each representing the active location and destination of a ship, reported the “McGill International Review” (April 16, 2026) adding,” suspicious tankers are plentiful among them.” One of these vessels, marked by a red triangle, appears, zoomed, as “Monique”, a twenty-year-old vessel, aka Tokyo, Phuket and Elysia. Its old age and the frequent name change, suspects reporter Julnar Alzuki, “indic ...
  • Authors
    July 9, 2026
    Cet essai analyse la guerre Iran–États-Unis–Israël de 2026 comme un révélateur de la transformation profonde de l’ordre international. À travers le prisme du droit de la mer, du détroit d’Ormuz, des alliances fragmentées, des câbles sous-marins et des flux énergétiques, il montre que le pouvoir mondial se déplace progressivement du contrôle des territoires vers la maîtrise des infrastructures de circulation. Loin de disparaître, la mondialisation entre dans une phase de connectivité ...