Publications /
Opinion

Back
COVID-19 and the New Normal
March 25, 2020

A feeling of collective insanity has overtaken the world since the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-2019) emerged in Wuhan, China. The virus—more lethal than influenza—was initially treated lightly by the West. This approach showed the lack of preparedness of many countries in dealing with the epidemics we are currently facing. Instead of implementing immediate measures to deal with the challenges imposed, some political and business leaders started labeling COVID-19 as the Chinese virus or Kung-Flu.  Asian people around the world have been attacked or ostracized, enhancing racial discrimination and unfairness.

The truth is that while coronavirus was a problem initially affecting mostly China and Asia, the West waited while doing little to address the challenge. As the spread of COVID-19 intensified, the virus found a fertile breeding ground because of enormous inefficiencies in public healthcare systems. From Italy, COVID-19 spread rapidly throughout the world, particularly in the Northern Hemisphere.

To hide the lack of capacity for dealing with such an extreme situation, conspiracy theories started popping up exponentially. History shows that conspiracy theories demonize certain groups. For instance, Jews were blamed by anti-for the Black Death in Europe and the economic chaos in Germany before World War II. Conspiracy theories are used to justify xenophobic, racist and discriminatory behavior. The scapegoat now is Asia. Daily, new conspiracy theories come to light in the West—from Chinese eating habits to a supposed financial orchestration enabling global companies to be bought at reduced prices. But there have also been conspiracy theories in China regarding the first cases of COVID-19. These affirm, for instance, that the 7th CISM Military World Games, held on October 18-27, 2019, in Wuhan, were the cause of the transmission of the disease by the Americans to the Chinese. Only time will tell whether there is any empirical evidence to justify any assumptions behind these theories.

It is essential to highlight four critical aspects in an age of so much information but such superficial understanding. The first relates to the Chinese government's alleged delay in releasing data on COVID-19. Governments generally opt to be slow to disclose epidemics. In a country with 1.4 billion people, this becomes even more complicated since collective panic could have generated a very stressful impact in the country. It generally takes time to solidify knowledge about a disease outbreak and its reach. The Chinese government addressed the issue once it realised the seriousness of the situation. Additionally, one should stress that the country that identifies the outbreak of the virus might not be necessarily the country where the virus came into being. In the West, for instance, there have also been delays in communicating epidemics. For example, during the Ronald Reagan Administration, recognition in the U.S. of the devastating impact of HIV took a long time to happen, with a devastating mortality impact.

Secondly, COVID-19 is a disease that has emerged in the Global North. When a particular disease occurs in the Global North, its repercussions are wider. The North still controls the global narrative. Ebola in West Africa was much more worrying and lethal. Since it was a disease of the Global South, African countries received limited support in dealing with the illness. However, they managed to solve the situation.

Third, with the political divide in the West increasing, because of financial crises and decreasing productivity, COVID-19 has also become a political tool with which to address grievances against governments including Trump’s, Johnson’s and even Bolsonaro’s in Brazil. Added into this equation is the electoral cycle of the United States and President Donald Trump's antagonistic relationship with the media, which fuels the feeling that whatever he does, will be wrong or not enough, or for those who support him, a sense of constant persecution.

Fourth, the world has realized how dependent it is on China as the global factory and that it cannot meet the demands of a growing, wealthier China. China has started to assume great-power status, generating a new normal of China-bashing. The truth is that China has presented a different model to liberalism for economic development. To those who believed 1989 was the end of history, this alternative has created great cognitive dissonance. In a world full of diversity, the possibility of accepting alternative ways to achieve development seems to be entirely comprehensible. The stigmatization of China at this moment only serves the political purpose of creating an imaginary adversary at the cost of the wellbeing of the people affected by COVID-19. The reality is that, despite all conspiracy theories, China is likely to emerge stronger from this crisis, with a particularly positive impact on its social fabric. In terms of governance, the gap will be even greater, when comparing with the inefficient and clumsy way in which the West has dealt with COVID-19 thus far.

In China, the words crisis (Wéijī, 危机) and opportunity (jīhuì, 机会), carry one common ideogram. In every crisis, there is opportunity. The Chinese will find opportunities in COVID-19 despite the crisis. Hopefully, the West will have the wisdom to also find new opportunities deriving from the crisis. This is a moment for cooperation, not great power competition.

RELATED CONTENT

  • August 3, 2026
    This policy paper explores how China’s economic development model—rooted in pragmatism, long-term planning, and civilizational renewal—has become its most compelling soft power asset, particularly in the eyes of the Global South. While critically engaging with Joseph Nye’s original conception of soft power as a primarily cultural and normative force, the paper argues that China’s ability to transform itself from an impoverished postimperial state into the world’s largest trading nat ...
  • August 3, 2026
    This Opinion was originally published in Project Syndicate Data from a period in which both China and India pursued deliberate industrial policies show that neither country's development route is accessible to other countries. At best, their experience can alert policymakers to structural limitations and coordination problems that will require their own homegrown solutions.RABAT—What is the most reliable development path for an increasingly fragmented global economy? China ...
  • July 10, 2026
    For much of the post-war period, the Global South was framed as an object of history, defined by dependency, constrained by structural asymmetries, and confined to the margins of global decision-making. That narrative, once empirically grounded, is now no longer adequate. A profound yet uneven transformation is underway. The Global South is no longer only reacting; it is increasingly shaping rules, institutions, and narratives.This Policy Brief argues that the Global South is thus t ...
  • June 22, 2026
    History devotes considerable attention to the rise and fall of great powers. Scholars have spent centuries analyzing why empires collapse, why nations decline, and why dominant states eventually lose their position. By comparison, relatively little attention has been devoted to a different question: what happens when a country succeeds beyond its own expectations? ...
  • Authors
    Diogo Ramos Coelho
    Bruno Saraiva
    June 22, 2026
    Global imbalances are back—and this time the risks look different. The 2008 financial crisis showed how persistent current-account deficits and surpluses between major economies can fuel financial instability and trigger sudden, severe reversals of capital flows. After almost two decades, many thought that episode had been resolved. It had not. New imbalances have built up, with a familiar cast: China, Germany, Japan, and oil exporters running large surpluses, and the United States ...
  • March 18, 2026
    The first BRICS summit, convened at Russia's initiative in 2009, would be followed by sixteen more, the most recent being the Rio summit held on July 6 and 7, 2025. Until 2022, only one enlargement had taken place — the admission of South Africa, which turned BRIC into BRICS. From 2023 onward, however, three consecutive summits — 2023, 2024 and 2025 — transformed BRICS into BRICS+5, admitting five new member countries and introducing a new “partner country” status that now groups ni ...
  • March 18, 2026
    Le premier sommet des BRICS, tenu à l’initiative de la Russie en 2009, sera suivi de 16 autres, le dernier étant celui de Rio dont les travaux se sont déroulés les 6 et 7 juillet 2025. Jusqu’en 2022, un seul élargissement est intervenu, celui accueillant l’Afrique du Sud, transformant les BRIC en BRICS. À partir de 2023, en revanche, trois sommets, ceux de 2023, 2024 et 2025, vont se solder par la transformation des BRICS en BRICS+5, accueillant 5 nouveaux pays membres, en ...
  • Authors
    February 12, 2026
    Divergent regulatory regimes for data, driven by different motivations, ranging from privacy protection in the European Union to information control in China, could eventually produce distinctively different, and possibly contradictory, bodies of data. Artificial-intelligence models trained on those datasets could produce differing and possibly even conflicting outputs. To the extent that AI outputs start to shape human perception and to influence decisions, in governments and ...