LEADERSHIP OF CHINA

INTRODUCTION

A double enlargement that entrenches the leadership of China

The acronym BRIC was coined by Jim O'Neill, an economist at Goldman Sachs, in a 2001 paper examining which countries were most attractive to international investors.⁽¹⁾

Four countries outside the G7 seemed to him to answer that question particularly well: Brazil, Russia, India and China — four countries with large populations and strong growth potential, which set them apart from the rest. Ever since, the term BRIC has referred to Brazil, Russia, India and China. Nothing changed until 2006, when these countries' foreign ministers met on the sidelines of the G8 in Saint Petersburg, Russia. In 2009, again in Russia but this time in Yekaterinburg, the four presidents decided that such summits would henceforth be held annually. In 2011, at the third summit, held in Sanya, China, BRIC became BRICS with the admission of South Africa. It was not until 2023/2024, after the candidacies of Mexico, Turkey and Algeria were rejected, that BRICS admitted five new members: Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia, Indonesia and Iran. BRICS then became BRICS+5. In 2024, at the sixteenth summit in Kazan, Russia, a new "partner country" status was proposed. At the 2025 BRICS+5 summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, nine partner countries joined the group: Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Uganda, Uzbekistan and Thailand. This Policy Brief, combining geopolitical and economic analysis, is devoted to them.

The first part takes a geopolitical approach. It retraces a long history: that of seventeen uninterrupted summits, beginning in 2009 and continuing to the present day (I). This long history falls into three periods: the founding summits of BRIC, then BRICS (2009-2011) (A); followed by eleven summits with five member countries unchanged, from 2012 to 2022, which were also the years in which the candidacies of Mexico, Turkey and Algeria were turned down (B).

1. O'Neill Jim: "Building Better Global Economic BRICs," Goldman Sachs, Economic Paper, No. 66, November 2011.

The last three summits (2023, 2024 and 2025) mark their enlargement and the introduction of the new partner-country status (C). This long history continues into the second section, which focuses on their situation in 2025 (II), examining in detail the ten member countries (A) and the nine partner countries (B) in terms of population, GDP per capita in dollars, and continent or region. The second part takes an economic approach. It draws a mixed record that ultimately sees the rejection — after having topped the agenda of several summits — of both global de-dollarization and the idea of a common currency (I). The record remains just as mixed for the NDB, the BRICS development bank, which, no sooner formalized, found itself competing with a wholly Chinese bank, the AIIB (II) — the bank of the "Belt and Road".

BRICS 2025: 19 countries, members and partners

I- A look back at seventeen uninterrupted summits

A- Three founding summits that led to the recognition of BRIC, then BRICS

The first BRIC summit, held in 2009 at Russia's initiative — with Medvedev as President and Putin as Prime Minister — brought together the presidents of four countries: host country Russia, along with Brazil, China and India. These were four countries outside the G7 that Jim O'Neill had identified as particularly attractive to international investors. This summit founded BRIC, the acronym for Brazil, Russia, India and China. Notably absent was the African continent. The second summit, held on April 16, 2010 in Brasília, Brazil, saw BRIC weigh in on the Iranian nuclear issue. It was also the last summit held under the BRIC name: at the third summit, in Sanya, China, on April 14, 2011, the four BRIC countries agreed, at China's initiative, to expand to include South Africa and the African continent. BRIC thus became BRICS, and at this same summit the group called for a reform of the international monetary system.

B- Eleven BRICS summits, with no enlargement

The fourth summit, in March 2012, was held in New Delhi, India. For the first time, BRICS considered the merits of creating a joint investment bank as an alternative to the World Bank (WB). The fifth summit, held in Durban, South Africa, on March 26 and 27, 2013, formalized both its creation and that of a joint currency reserve fund.

The sixth summit, hosted by Fortaleza, Brazil, from July 14 to 16, 2014, coincided with the bank's inauguration. The seventh summit returned to Russia, to Ufa, capital of the Republic of Bashkortostan, from July 8 to 10, 2015, bringing together the five BRICS leaders alongside those of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) for the first time. The city of Goa, India, then hosted the eighth summit on October 15 and 16, 2016, centered on the need to reaffirm unity among BRICS member states. China took over as host for the ninth summit, held on September 29 and 30, 2017, in Xiamen — a summit marked by the first serious discussion of a possible enlargement to new members.

The tenth summit, held on July 26 and 27, 2018 in Johannesburg, South Africa, saw Turkey take part in its capacity as chair of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Finally, the eleventh summit, held on November 13 and 14, 2019 in Brasília, gave BRICS an opportunity to reaffirm its commitment to multilateralism, peace and security, while reiterating the need to reform multilateral organizations (the WTO, the UN, the IMF, and others).

Three summits held by videoconference because of the Covid-19 pandemic brought this long, enlargement-free period to a close: the twelfth summit, held on November 17, 2020, in Russia, focused mainly on political stability and security; the thirteenth, chaired by India, was held on September 9, 2021, and made inter-BRICS cooperation a priority. Finally, the fourteenth summit took place in China on June 23, 2022, where President Xi Jinping delivered a major address, in the presence of the other three BRICS presidents, calling for openness, inclusiveness and "win-win" cooperation among the group.

C- BRICS+5 succeeds BRICS

1- The Johannesburg summit turns BRICS into BRICS+5

This 15^th summit was not only about enlargement, but also prompted discussion of a common currency and of de-dollarizing the global economy.

An enlargement far from unanimous

Since South Africa's accession, every subsequent application to join BRICS had been turned down — including, among others, those of Mexico in 2013 and Algeria in July 2023. For the first time, the rejection of Algeria's application came with an explanatory note, citing a per-capita GDP judged too low by India and Brazil, a notably modest degree of economic diversification, and an Algerian GDP deemed insufficient and, moreover, too dependent on hydrocarbons. But behind these technical arguments, the summit revealed two opposing camps: a pro-enlargement camp made up of South Africa, China and Russia, and an anti-enlargement camp comprising India and Brazil, which viewed enlargement as weakening the group and handing China a gift. This divide was sharpened further by another contentious item on the summit's agenda: the de-dollarization of the global economy and the prospect of a common currency.

An agreement in principle to admit six new states

In the end, BRICS agreed to admit six new countries: Saudi Arabia, Argentina, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Ethiopia and Iran. Beyond the rejections of Algeria and Mexico, it is worth noting that Indonesia, Turkey and Nigeria were also turned away, casualties of a compromise struck between China and India.

2- BRICS+5 suffers two withdrawals

The sixteenth summit marked the first withdrawal, that of Argentina, which had just elected a new president, the staunchly libertarian Javier Milei. Milei's Argentina was not the Argentina whose candidacy had been backed by Lula's Brazil — that had been the Argentina of outgoing president Alberto Fernández, who stood for re-election and lost to Milei. Throughout his campaign, the newly elected president had repeatedly denounced the anti-Westernism and anti-Americanism espoused by South Africa, Brazil, China and Russia.

It came as no surprise, then, that Argentina's new strongman chose not to follow through on this agreement in principle. BRICS thus became BRICS+5 — and would soon effectively be BRICS+4, since Saudi Arabia has still not formally agreed to join.

And as time passes, the Wahhabi kingdom's formal accession appears ever less likely. This summit also introduced the new "partner country" status, open to all countries that had previously applied for membership, whether successfully or not. Countries admitted under this status become observer states, able to attend the special summit sessions and the foreign ministers' meetings that precede them. They are not, however, entitled to vote — a right reserved for full member states — on any future decision to expand BRICS+5 to new members or to admit new partner countries.

3- Seventeenth summit: nine partner countries admitted

This latest summit saw a number of notable absences, with four presidents sending representatives in their place: China's President Xi Jinping was conspicuously absent — a first since he took power — as were the leaders of Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Iran, a BRICS+4 member for barely a year. Russian President Vladimir Putin, for his part, was obliged to participate by videoconference because of the arrest warrant issued against him by the International Criminal Court. None of this prevented BRICS from admitting a new member country, Indonesia — formally restoring the group to BRICS+5 — and welcoming the first nine partner countries: Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Uzbekistan, Uganda and Thailand.

II- BRICS in 2025: 10 member states and 9 partners, mostly Asian

A- Ten member countries totaling nearly 4 billion people, with per-capita GDP ranging from $1,350 to $45,549

Table 1 lists these member countries, together with their population in millions, GDP per capita in dollars, and their continent or region.

Analysis of this table reveals a broadly "O'Neillian" pattern, favoring the most populous states, even though the highly political choice of South Africa marked a first departure from that logic, and the UAE stands out as an exception.

On the economic front, GDP per capita reveals a relatively homogeneous group among the original BRICS: figures range from $3,889 for India to $14,952 for Russia, with three countries above $10,000 — Russia, as well as Brazil at $10,296, and China, whose per-capita GDP has drawn considerably closer to Russia's, at $12,968.

With BRICS+5, four of the five new member countries have very low per-capita GDP, at or below $5,000 — among them Ethiopia ($1,350) and Egypt ($3,541). The UAE, meanwhile, stands out on two counts: it is by far the least populous member (11 million people), yet has by far the highest per-capita GDP of all ten member states.

Geographically, Asia is the best-represented continent with five states: Gulf Asia (the UAE and Iran), East Asia (China), South Asia (Indonesia) and Southeast Asia (India). Africa follows with two representatives, South Africa (Southern Africa) and Ethiopia (the Horn of Africa).

B- Nine partner countries with a combined population of over 500 million and per-capita GDP ranging from $1,186 to $14,569

Table 2 lists the first nine partner countries, indicating for each their geographic affiliation (continent/region), population in millions, and GDP per capita in dollars.

With the addition of partner countries, BRICS+5 turns the page on the "O'Neillian" logic. Gone is the era of favoring the most populous states. Seven of the nine partner countries now have populations of 50 million or fewer: Belarus (9m), Cuba (11.2m), Kazakhstan (20.5m), Malaysia (35.5m), Uzbekistan (36.6m), Bolivia (48.2m) and Uganda (50m). The only exceptions are Thailand (71.6m) and, above all, Nigeria (232m). Notably absent, however, are Mexico and Turkey — Mexico, a repeat unsuccessful candidate for full membership, and Turkey, which failed in its bid for membership at the 16^th Kazan summit.

These are candidates with modest, at times very modest, per-capita GDP: Uganda ($1,186), Nigeria ($1,637), Uzbekistan ($3,050), Bolivia ($3,919), Thailand ($7,527), Belarus ($8,007), and Cuba ($9,499). Only two countries exceed $10,000: Malaysia, at $13,142, and Kazakhstan, at $14,569. This suggests that the agreement on partner countries was political in nature, rather than resting on any homogeneous economic rationale.

Lastly, geographic representation is dominated by Asia: Kazakhstan (Central Asia), Malaysia (Southeast Asia), Uzbekistan (Central Asia) and Thailand (Southeast Asia). Next comes the Americas, with two representatives — Bolivia (North America) and Cuba (Central America) — followed by East Africa, with Uganda, and Europe, with Belarus.

Conclusion to Part One

The enlargement of BRICS — growing from five to ten member countries and admitting nine partner countries under the new status — moves the group definitively away from the "O'Neillian" logic, a logic that had already been dented once with the admission of South Africa. The acceptance of new members with pro-Western leanings, such as the UAE, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, confirms this — even though Saudi Arabia remains on "stand-by." The list of partner countries — only one of which, Nigeria, has a population above 100 million, with seven others at 50 million or fewer — reinforces this inconsistency and the near-irreversible abandonment of the original logic.

This enlargement took place with China's agreement and at its initiative. Only India, and to a lesser extent South Africa, opposed it — without success. The Chinese pursued and imposed it with full awareness of the consequences. It is an enlargement that weakens BRICS, reducing its capacity for collective action and its strategic coherence, while consolidating China's political leadership. As the second part of this Brief will show, that political leadership will allow China to close the chapter on a push for global de-dollarization championed chiefly by Brazil, to set aside a common currency that neither China nor India wanted, for their own separate reasons, and to establish — in the wake of the BRICS-branded development bank, the NDB, based in Shanghai — a wholly state-owned Chinese bank based in Beijing, the AIIB, the bank of the "Belt and Road".

Part two: Chinese political leadership imposes the rejection of any push toward de-dollarizing the global economy

This study first focuses on what has dominated the headlines at the most recent BRICS summits: a twofold question — the group's role in the de-dollarization of the global economy, and the prospect of a common currency (I). It then turns to the near-simultaneous creation, in 2014, of two banks that concern BRICS directly and indirectly: the NDB, based in Shanghai, and the Belt and Road's AIIB, based in Beijing (II).

I- BRICS as non-actors in global de-dollarization, and opposed in principle to a common currency

At the videoconference summits of 2020, 2021 and 2022, BRICS projected an appearance of unity on the question of global de-dollarization and the prospect of a common currency. At the most recent Rio summit, the masks came off: with the exception of Brazil, BRICS members officially stated that this had never been the goal, or was no longer one. On the question of a single currency, the official positions taken by China and India, each rejecting it for different reasons, follow the same logic.

It is worth recalling that the dollarization of the global economy — long contested by BRICS, chiefly at the initiative of Brazilian President Lula — historically owes a great deal, directly and indirectly, to BRICS and to emerging economies themselves (A). It should also be stressed that although de-dollarization of the global economy is now a reality, it owes nothing to BRICS. In 2025, four of its members made clear, officially or unofficially, that it had never been a priority for them (B). Finally, the recognition that a common currency was unworkable among five members, let alone ten, together with its formal rejection by both China and India for different reasons, closes this chapter for a long time to come (C).

A- A dollarization of the global economy contested by its own instigators

While roughly 58 to 60 percent of global trade is conducted in dollars today, that figure stood at around 80 percent before the euro was introduced. The dollarization of the global economy is therefore beyond dispute — and so is a de-dollarization trend that began well before President Lula took up the cause. Yet in the recent past, both before and after the euro, it was emerging countries, BRICS among them, that contributed most to the dollarization of the world economy. Numerous examples bear this out; four will suffice here: emerging economies' use of the dollar as the reference invoicing currency during the Cold War; the dollar-denominated official price of a barrel of Brent crude; China's own considerable trade surpluses accumulated in dollars; and, finally, BRICS members' general lack of interest in the euro. At the height of the Cold War, the communist Soviet Union and a great many emerging countries not only wished to be paid in dollars for their exports — they insisted on it. The reason is easy enough to understand: the dollar was the undisputed international reserve currency, and these countries needed hard currency to pay for their imports. The dollar was then the strongest option by far, well ahead of its only real alternative, the pound sterling. Even so, this behavior undeniably fueled the dollarization of the global economy. OPEC, from its founding in Baghdad in 1960, chose the dollar as the official invoicing currency for a barrel of Brent crude — a decision that likewise contributed to the dollarization of the global economy. Nor did the 2016 expansion into OPEC+ change this rule; on the contrary, the official price of a barrel of Brent is still expressed in US dollars to this day. China's foreign exchange reserves stand at around $3,340 billion, a substantial share of which ($800 million) is held in US Treasury bonds. This is a considerable sum, and it explains why China has never called for de-dollarization of the global economy: were it to happen, it would weaken the dollar and, de facto, trigger a loss in the value of China's own foreign exchange reserves. BRICS members, for their part, have never shown any real interest in the euro — even though the euro represented the only credible alternative for countries seeking to challenge a world dominated by the US dollar. And insofar as de-dollarization of the global economy is a reality today, it is thanks to the euro, not to BRICS.

B- BRICS no longer treats de-dollarization as a goal

The most recent BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro — held in Lula's own country — is particularly telling. The summit's final declaration, spanning 126 points, makes no mention whatsoever of de-dollarization, nor of any initiative that might weaken or reduce the dollar's role in the global economy. The only indirect reference to the issue came from Lula himself, on the subject of a common reserve currency. The other four BRICS presidents — of Russia, India, China and South Africa — took care to state, unambiguously, that they wished to remain spectators rather than actors in any future de-dollarization of the global economy.

As early as 2024, at a public event hosted by the Kremlin in late October — the day after the Kazan summit, and two days after Trump's re-election — Vladimir Putin was at pains to state: "We have not sought to abandon the dollar, and we are not seeking to do so," adding: "Our proposals are not aimed at fighting the dollar." It was a shrewd statement, since it is historically beyond dispute that Western sanctions against Russia are precisely what pushed Moscow toward the yuan. It should be noted, however, that this position is a recent one, dating only from November 2024, and that it glosses over a number of earlier statements favorable to BRICS involvement in de-dollarizing the global economy.

India has never publicly commented on the question of a common currency or de-dollarization. It is known, however, that in internal BRICS negotiations it has consistently taken the same position: rejection of any common currency. On the eve of the latest Rio summit, what had been unofficial became official. Nor did Trump's recent 2025 tariff retaliation prompt the Indian authorities to declare themselves in favor of a common currency that, had BRICS adopted it, would have made the group an actor in de-dollarization. Given the sheer scale of its dollar reserves, China has always been very cautious, if not outright reserved, about de-dollarizing the global economy. This is by no means a political choice, but a deliberate macro-financial trade-off, one that takes into account the consequences of a development model built around globalization and exports. In South Africa, at the 2025 BRICS summit in Johannesburg, the country's financial officials campaigned against de-dollarizing the global economy. In March 2025, South Africa's ambassador to the United States, Ebrahim Rasool, formally cautioned BRICS members, stating: "We need to avoid de-dollarization, such as actions that thumb our nose at the United States. Even China no longer talks about de-dollarization, and Russia even less so. Not only is it theatrical, but it is neither practical nor economically viable — and simply talking about it could trigger immediate punitive measures."

C- A common currency, politically impossible among five

Since its videoconference summits, the idea of a common currency — envisioned as a first step toward an eventual single currency — has been a recurring BRICS theme. At the time, this reflected a mood of the moment, more unofficial than genuine, aimed at reducing the dollar's hegemony over international financial and monetary markets. As we have just seen, by 2025 the question of de-dollarizing the global economy was no longer a priority, and had even been formally rejected by four of the five BRICS members. What remains is the question of a common currency. As we shall recall, this is a recurring Brazilian pipe dream (1) that overlooks the fact that, since Bretton Woods, no country has ever been compelled to use any particular invoicing currency (2); that it is always preferable to invoice in a strong currency (3); and that a common currency is, in any case, rejected by both China and India, for different reasons (4).

1- A Brazilian pipe dream

President Lula deserves credit for one constant: his dream of a common currency, unworkable among five members and unimaginable among ten. In April 2023, a few months before the Johannesburg summit, the Brazilian president declared himself "in favor of creating, within BRICS, a currency for trade between our countries, just as the Europeans did in creating the euro." Such a scenario is simply unimaginable for BRICS, and overlooks the long and difficult road Europeans had to travel to get there.

A single currency along euro lines would require satisfying a set of convergence criteria yet to be defined, taking into account the inflation and debt levels of BRICS member states. Once accepted, this would mean abandoning national currencies altogether — unimaginable for China, unless the common currency were simply the yuan. But in that case it would no longer be a euro-style currency, which by definition requires giving up national currencies. Is China prepared to sacrifice the yuan? The answer lies in the question itself. It is also worth recalling that the five BRICS central banks operate under very different statutes: in China and Russia, for example, they answer to the state, which is not the case in South Africa, Brazil or India, where they are independent of political power. Which model, then, should prevail?

At the 2023 Paris summit on a new financial pact, the same President Lula proposed that countries invoice their trade in their own respective currencies, posing a two-part question: "Why do Brazil and Argentina trade in dollars? Why not do so in our own currencies instead?"

2- Payment in a partner currency, a third currency, or barter: a freedom never challenged since Bretton Woods

Let us return to that second question. Nothing stops President Lula from trading with Argentina in Brazil's own currency and/or in his partner's currency — since Bretton Woods, a country has always been free to choose its invoicing currency, so long as its trading partner agrees. What is surprising about Lula's statement is that it came just a few weeks before an agreement was signed between Beijing and Brasília specifying the use of their respective national currencies in bilateral trade.

3- For emerging economies, a strong currency is the better choice

Economic theory offers an answer to the first question. When it comes to choosing an invoicing currency, one can always opt for a third currency, such as the dollar or the yuan, or even resort to barter. For countries with weak currencies, such as the Brazilian real or the Argentine peso, invoicing in either of their own currencies is hardly advisable, especially for forward contracts, where exchange-rate risk is far greater when invoicing in a weak currency. The reverse logic holds for the dollar, the euro, and now the yuan — which explains why Brazil and Argentina invoice in dollars, but also why a great deal of intra-BRICS trade is conducted in yuan, as is the case for trade between China and Russia.

4- China and India's rejection of a common currency

Of the five original BRICS members, the only realistic candidate for a common currency was, and remains, the Chinese yuan/renminbi. That, however, would require it to be accepted by all BRICS members — and it is far from being the case: India will not hear of it, and China itself no longer treats the idea as a priority. India's position has been consistently opposed to both enlargement and a common currency — one that, were it ever accepted, could only be the yuan. Neither the Indian rupee, nor the ruble, the Brazilian real, or the South African rand, could have offered any real alternative to the digital yuan. Moreover, a BRICS common currency required the agreement of both China and India. By opposing enlargement, India had rightly anticipated that it would only benefit China — which it duly did. It likewise consistently opposed a Chinese-led common currency that could only reinforce a Chinese leadership already strengthened by enlargement — which, again, is exactly what happened. What was less predictable, however, was China's own refusal to pair this enlargement with a common currency.

China's refusal rests first on a simple observation: without ever becoming a BRICS common currency, the yuan/renminbi is steadily and surely acquiring international status in its own right. It is now one of five currencies recognized for repayments to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), even as Chinese overseas lending continues to grow sharply (source: IMF). Second, there are the perverse effects a BRICS common Chinese-backed currency would have on China's own monetary and trade policy. On the monetary side, such a currency would strip Chinese authorities of control over cross-border capital flows, risking a return to the illicit financial flows of the 2010s. On the trade side, becoming a de facto reserve currency — which is what the yuan would effectively become as a BRICS common currency — comes at a price: a structural trade deficit, the kind the United States has long accepted. Is China prepared to accept that trade-off? The answer is no, because China's development model, like India's, is built on exports. Lastly, there is the perverse effect on what has come to be called Chinese currency dumping — an exchange rate managed administratively by political authorities rather than by supply and demand. This has allowed China, whenever labor costs rise, to administratively devalue the yuan to offset the increase — a form of currency dumping that a common Chinese-backed currency would, of course, make far easier to pursue.

II- The creation of two banks: one BRICS, one Chinese

Ever since their first summit, the BRIC countries have called for a thorough reform of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank — two distinct but complementary institutions that have failed, or refused, to keep pace with a changing world. Founded in 1944 by 44 countries, they now count around 190 members without having correspondingly reformed their governance. This has led emerging countries to denounce policy conditions attached to their assistance, which they argue favor the institutions themselves at the expense of the local populations of the emerging countries requesting aid. It is thus no surprise that the NDB was created in July 2014, swiftly followed by the creation of the AIIB — a development that was, if anything, even less surprising. Two inseparable banks, two multilateral development institutions that would prove central to China's investment strategy.

A- A new BRICS development bank

The New Development Bank (the BRICS development bank) was established on July 14, 2014, alongside a contingency reserve fund, the Contingency Reserve Arrangement (CRA), designed to give BRICS member countries access to foreign currency in the event of a shortfall. While headquartered in Shanghai, the bank also maintains a regional office in South Africa. Its mandate is twofold: through the CRA, to support member countries facing potential financial shocks; and through the NDB itself, to help finance their development, particularly their infrastructure.

Both the bank and its reserve fund are capitalized at $100 billion each. The bank's capital was paid in in two installments, with each of the five founding members contributing $5 billion each time. This parity was not carried over to the CRA, where China is by far the leading contributor, at $41 billion, followed by Brazil, Russia and India at $18 billion each, and South Africa at $5 billion. Under its statutes, the CRA's paid-in capital may not fall below 55 percent — leaving real available resources of $45 billion out of a total capital of $100 billion.

The bank's governance rests on a Board of Governors, a Board of Directors, several vice-presidents and a president, elected on a rotating basis by the founding members. The current president is Brazilian: Dilma Rousseff. No member country holds a veto; decisions are taken by simple majority. As of 2025, the NDB has nine members: the five founding members plus four new ones — Bangladesh and the UAE since 2021, and Egypt and Algeria since 2023. While Egypt and the UAE are now also BRICS members, Bangladesh and Algeria are not — proof that a country need not belong to BRICS to be co-opted into the NDB.

B- The Asian Infrastructure Bank, China's AIIB

The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) was first floated in October 2013, on the occasion of Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to Indonesia. It would take another year for the idea to materialize, five months after the creation of the NDB. Its aim: to offer financial institutions at the international level that were not directly dependent on the United States. The failure of IMF reform — approved by Barack Obama but blocked by a Republican Congress — gave the AIIB an immediate boost. While 21 countries signed a memorandum of understanding at its launch in October 2014, that number had grown to 57 founding members by the March 31, 2015 deadline, including a number of European states. By September 2015, the bank counted 105 member countries, including of course the 57 founding members. Among these 105 were BRICS and BRICS+5 countries, along with five partner countries: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Thailand in 2016; Malaysia in 2017; and Belarus in 2020. Notable absentees are also worth mentioning: beyond four partner countries (Bolivia, Cuba, Nigeria and Uganda), neither the United States nor Mexico is a member.

It is worth recalling that while the United States holds a de facto veto at the IMF and the World Bank — what some call a "blocking minority" — in practice this influence has proven inconsistent. Certain projects, notably those linked to Iran, illustrate the point: Washington invoked its influence at one stage, only to set it aside by the time of the final vote at the World Bank's Board of Directors. As for the AIIB, its governance structure is still being worked out, but no country, not even China, holds a veto there. China does, however, insist on a 75/25 split between its Asian and non-Asian members. Wholly Chinese-owned and answerable to Beijing's central bank, the AIIB offers the same kind of financing as the NDB, drawn from different resources. Created after the NDB, it is hard to deny that it is also, in effect, a rival to it.

C- An NDB that strengthens the AIIB

A study by Éric Toussaint, published on October 28, 2025,⁽²⁾ makes it possible to compare the various lenders worldwide by lending volume over the 2016-2023 period. Table 3 reproduces this comparison, covering flows from the CRA, the NDB, the AIIB, the Asian Development Bank (3), the World Bank, the IMF and Chinese state-owned banks (4).

(2) Toussaint Éric: "Do the New Development Bank and the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement Constitute an Alternative to the Bretton Woods Institutions?" Source: https://www.cadtm.org, CADTM, October 28, 2025.

(3) The Asian Development Bank (ADB) was established on August 22, 1966 to support the economic and social development of countries across Asia and the Pacific; its principal funders are the United States and Japan.

(4) China's state-owned banks fall under the authority of the central bank. The main ones are the Agricultural Bank of China, the Bank of China, the Bank of Communications, the CITIC Group, China Construction Bank, the China Development Bank, the Export-Import Bank of China, Hua Xia Bank, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the People's Bank of China, and the Postal Savings Bank of China.

Analysis of this table shows that, over the period, China relied more heavily on the AIIB than on the NDB, and that the CRA has still never been drawn upon since its creation. Another finding: by creating the AIIB so soon after the NDB, and offering developing countries the same kind of alternative as the World Bank and the IMF, China has knowingly weakened the NDB. This confirms, in our view, that if China had to choose between BRICS/BRICS+5 on one hand and the Belt and Road on the other, priority would go to the Belt and Road. As this table shows, China has no intention of favoring the NDB, lending through its state-owned banks somewhere between 23 times (low estimate) and 35 times (high estimate) as much as it lends through the NDB.⁽⁵⁾

Financially speaking, the NDB benefits the AIIB more than the other way around, even though it remains the BRICS bank in its own right and can also draw on AIIB financing. The NDB does, however, hold one non-financial advantage over the AIIB: it can offer loans free of the political or economic conditions associated with the so-called Washington Consensus. While its activity remains modest, its potential for growth is significant, bolstered since 2023 by new areas of intervention — the energy transition, green infrastructure, and so on — as well as by its new and future partner countries.

Conclusion to Part Two

The economic approach underscores the importance of the pandemic-era videoconference summits of 2020, 2021 and 2022, and of the post-Covid summits of 2023, 2024 and 2025. These last three summits led, at China's initiative and with India's backing, to the formal rejection of any move toward de-dollarizing the global economy, and to the abandonment of discussions on a common currency. This outcome — no common currency, the only one acceptable to India, and ultimately backed by South Africa and Russia — only reinforces China's leadership. If the creation of a new BRICS-branded development bank came as no surprise, what did come as one was the near-simultaneous creation of the AIIB, imposed by China. This makes the NDB a bank that serves BRICS, certainly, but also — and primarily — one that serves to finance Belt and Road infrastructure.

GENERAL CONCLUSION

Under Chinese leadership, BRICS in 2025 has definitively turned the page on the original "O'Neillian" logic of BRIC, which favored the population size of member countries. BRICS and BRICS+5 now display strikingly contrasting demographics and economies.

China must contend with an aging population, even as India's continues to grow at an exponential rate. Russia faces a persistently declining birth rate coupled with an abnormally high death rate. Brazil's fertility rate in 2024 stood at a worrying 1.63. And while South Africa continues to reap the benefits of high population growth (1.65 percent in 2023), it now also faces very high unemployment and mortality rates. The admission of five new member countries does little to improve this overall picture.

Both the geopolitical and economic approaches have revealed priorities that are often divergent, if not outright conflicting — priorities that China has used to build, and then impose, a leadership that no other BRICS member, let alone any BRICS+5 member, has been able to challenge. Applying the well-known maxim "divide and rule," China has been behind every enlargement: from BRIC to BRICS, by backing South Africa's candidacy; from BRICS to BRICS+5, by admitting five new member countries, including the UAE; and the admission of nine partner countries, including two of the poorest countries on the planet, Uganda and Nigeria. In 2025, this enlargement has allowed China to close the chapter on a common currency — one that India never wanted, having, as this study has shown, never wanted global de-dollarization either, for reasons of its own. Finally, by imposing on BRICS a bank under its own control, the AIIB, China makes clear that the "Belt and Road" remains its true priority.

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