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POLICY PAPER

THE ARCHITECTURE OF CONSENSUS: TANZANIA'S POLITICAL CULTURE AND THE 2025 ELECTIONS

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The October 2025 general elections in Tanzania unfold within a political culture grounded in consensus and institutional continuity. President Samia Suluhu Hassan's leadership has reopened political space by restoring elite dialogue, easing restrictions on rallies, and facilitating the return of exiled figures. Yet the exclusion of CHADEMA the principal opposition party highlights the enduring limits of pluralism. This paper analyzes the Tanzanian electoral process less as a conventional test of democratic competition than as a recalibration of consensus politics, where inclusion and exclusion are managed within a hegemonic framework shaped by the legacies of ujamaa and the dominance of Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM). Drawing on the works of Hyden and others, the analysis situates the 2025 elections within a historical continuum in which elections function as instruments of national affirmation and elite negotiation rather than mechanisms for alternation of power. The discussion develops along three interrelated dimensions: the persistence of elite accommodation within CCM, the bounded openness of civic and opposition space, and the symbolic but limited role of procedural pluralism. It argues that Samia's leadership reflects a strategy of "negotiated legitimacy," with reforms carefully calibrated to safeguard stability and international credibility while preserving the architecture of dominance. The conclusion reflects on the implications of this model for Tanzania's future: while stability is maintained through consensus without contestation, growing demographic, social, and digital pressures may test the resilience of this political order beyond 2025.

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INTRODUCTION

As Tanzania approaches the October 2025 general elections, it faces a complex political landscape. On the surface, the country projects an image of continuity and institutional order. Under President Samia Suluhu Hassan's leadership, political space has reopened in visible ways: political rallies have resumed, key opposition figures have returned from exile, and the media environment, though uneven, has experienced some degree of liberalization. These developments have been welcomed by many national and international actors as signs of renewed openness and dialogue (Paget, 2021).

At the same time, the elections are set to proceed without the participation of the main opposition party, CHADEMA. Its leader Tundu Lissu was arrested on charges of treason in April 2025, and the party was disqualified from the electoral process after refusing to sign the official code of conduct. While the electoral commission cited procedural grounds for the decision, CHADEMA maintained that reforms should precede participation. These developments have prompted varied interpretations among observers some expressing concern over the narrowing of competitive space, others emphasizing the continued functionality and predictability of Tanzania's electoral institutions (Paget, 2021). This policy paper seeks to analyze the upcoming Tanzanian elections through a framework rooted in the country's exceptionalist political culture shaped during the single-party era and reinforced across successive administrations. Drawing on the works of Hyden (1999, 2005), the paper examines how a culture of consensus, born out of the ujamaa model and a tradition of state-centered nationalism, continues to structure Tanzania's electoral governance, party dynamics, and mechanisms of opposition containment.

The Tanzanian state has long prioritized harmony over contestation, the management of dissent over its celebration, and the integration of elites over ideological pluralism. Within this framework, elections are less competitive arenas than they are rituals of national affirmation and elite distribution. The ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party is not merely an incumbent but an institutional expression of the post-colonial state, embodying a narrative of unity, development, and moral legitimacy. This perspective helps explain why opposition parties that operate within the system's margins such as ACT-Wazalendo are tolerated, while those that challenge its foundational assumptions such as CHADEMA are excluded.

This paper argues that the 2025 elections are not a test of Tanzania's democratic health in the conventional sense. Instead, they signal a reconfiguration of consensus, in which mechanisms of inclusion, exclusion, and symbolic pluralism are being recalibrated under President Samia Suluhu Hassan's leadership.

The analysis unfolds in six parts. It first unpacks the historical foundations of Tanzania's consensus-based political order. It then examines the recalibration strategies employed by Samia within the ruling party and across the opposition landscape. The subsequent sections analyze the dynamics of electoral governance, civic space, and regional engagement. The conclusion reflects on the implications of this model for the future of democracy understood not as a checklist of normative benchmarks, but as a political culture embedded in institutional memory and strategic practice.

FOUNDATIONS OF POLITICAL CONSENSUS IN TANZANIA

The foundations of Tanzania's political consensus lie in the country's early post-independence trajectory, shaped by the leadership of Julius Nyerere and the ideology of *ujamaa*. Unlike many African states that embraced liberal pluralism or descended into immediate factionalism, Tanzania pursued a deliberate project of national unity. This was anchored in a one-party system, the promotion of Swahili linguistic policy, and the institutionalization of rural socialism.

Between 1967 and the mid-1980s, this project consolidated a political culture that prioritized cohesion over contestation, collective discipline over individual ambition, and ideological uniformity over adversarial politics.

The one-party system under TANU, and later under CCM after the 1977 merger with the Zanzibar-based ASP, was a symbolic framework that equated political dissent with national disloyalty. The party presented itself as the embodiment of the people's will, and elections functioned as affirmations of collective identity rather than instruments of political choice. As Hyden (1999) explains, this structure institutionalized a form of hegemonic legitimacy that relied not only on repression, but also on an internalized belief that competition was antithetical to national unity.

The persistence of CCM's dominance in the multiparty era is not simply the result of historical legitimacy. Since the reintroduction of competitive politics in 1992, Tanzania has avoided the kind of dramatic alternation seen in other African countries. CCM has maintained its hold not only through access to state resources, but also through its ability to absorb dissenting voices and accommodate internal divisions through informal negotiation. The party has mastered the art of managing elite circulation without ceding institutional power. Elections thus become less about challenging incumbency and more about sustaining factional equilibrium.

This consensus model is reinforced by a broader moral-political discourse that portrays Tanzania as exceptional within the region. The absence of ethnic civil war, the dominance of Swahili, and the endurance of a strong central state contribute to a national self-image centered on unity, order, and moderation. Within this framework, open opposition is often perceived not as a democratic necessity but as a disruption to the post-independence compact. Political actors who operate outside the norms of institutional politeness or who adopt confrontational strategies such as mass protest, refusal to participate in formal processes, or the public internationalization of domestic issues are frequently delegitimized not only by the state but by a broader political culture that values discretion and discipline (Paget, 2021).

The opposition has long struggled to articulate itself as a legitimate governing alternative within this context. CHADEMA's rise, particularly under Tundu Lissu, marked a departure from this tradition, as it embraced a confrontational posture and openly challenged CCM's moral supremacy. Yet such approaches have often provoked exclusionary responses, with opposition leaders facing legal persecution, media marginalization, and procedural disqualification. These responses are not only institutional but also cultural: they reflect a deeply rooted political norm that equates loyalty with compliance and perceives challenge as deviance.

Understanding this consensus framework is crucial for interpreting the dynamics of the 2025 elections. It explains why the electoral commission's exclusion of CHADEMA is framed as a

technical issue rather than a political crisis, why civic space can be reopened without meaningful redistribution of power, and why elite dissent is absorbed rather than dramatized. The consensus is not static it evolves, negotiates, and adapts but it remains the structuring principle of political life. Under Samia Suluhu Hassan, this grammar persists: the style is modified, yet the architecture remains intact.

ELITE ACCOMMODATION AND INTERNAL RECALIBRATION UNDER SAMIA SULUHU HASSAN

President Samia Suluhu Hassan's ascent to power in 2021 marked a critical inflection point in Tanzania's political trajectory. Succeeding John Magufuli after his unexpected death, she inherited a system marked by centralization, populist nationalism, and institutional closure. Rather than breaking overtly with her predecessor's legacy, Samia has opted for a strategy of gradual recalibration preserving the architecture of single-party dominance while softening its modalities. Her approach illustrates a form of elite accommodation embedded in Tanzania's consensus tradition, where continuity is maintained not through confrontation but through negotiation and symbolic inclusion.

One of Samia's early moves was to reconstitute the ruling party's internal equilibrium by bringing back figures previously marginalized under Magufuli. Notably, she reinstated former foreign minister Bernard Membe and reengaged sidelined party cadres whose exclusion had created internal rifts (Paget, 2022). This gesture was not merely reconciliatory it signaled a strategic repositioning within CCM, aimed at restoring the party's internal cohesion without weakening its hierarchical control. In doing so, Samia reaffirmed the logic of internal pluralism: multiple voices can exist within the party as long as they do not challenge its institutional primacy.

Her leadership style is also marked by a recalibrated public rhetoric. In contrast to Magufuli's confrontational populism, Samia has adopted a discourse of inclusion, dialogue, and moderation. Her administration has emphasized economic recovery, diplomatic reengagement, and infrastructure investment, all framed within a narrative of national renewal. These shifts have been interpreted by some as democratizing signals. However, they are better understood as instruments of "negotiated legitimacy" reforms pursued not to open the political field, but to secure elite consent and maintain order within the boundaries of consensus politics.

The party-state nexus remains central to this strategy. Rather than weakening CCM's hegemonic role, Samia has worked to stabilize it through elite rotation and policy moderation. Internal factions have been absorbed into new appointments and consultative mechanisms, reducing the likelihood of open dissent. As Hyden (2005) noted in earlier assessments of Tanzanian political culture, stability is often achieved not through formal institutional checks but through informal negotiation among elites. Samia's leadership reactivates this logic, reinforcing the party's adaptability without ceding structural power.

The opposition landscape has also been reshaped under her tenure, albeit within tightly controlled parameters. The return of exiled opposition leaders, including Tundu Lissu and Godbless Lema, was initially welcomed as a sign of political normalization. However, this opening has not translated into deeper institutional reforms. Legal charges, procedural restrictions, and administrative exclusions have persisted, particularly targeting parties or leaders that challenge CCM's legitimacy or its management of electoral management. This disqualification of CHADEMA in 2025 officially

on procedural grounds exemplifies this bounded pluralism: openness that does not destabilize the underlying consensus.

Samia's recalibration is thus twofold: it seeks to rehabilitate Tanzania's international image as a cooperative and moderate actor, while preserving the domestic political order grounded in elite control. Her foreign policy engagements including renewed relations with development partners, active participation in regional bodies, and a pivot toward economic diplomacy have been framed as signs of pragmatic leadership. Yet these moves also function strategically to reinforce the regime's legitimacy without challenging the foundational principles of Tanzanian consensus politics (Paget, 2021).

This strategy presents both strengths and limitations. On one hand, it ensures continuity and avoids the destabilizing ruptures observed in other leadership transitions. On the other, it constrains the emergence of genuinely competitive politics, as dissent is managed through selective inclusion or procedural containment. Samia's recalibration reflects the enduring logic of Tanzanian governance: to accommodate, to absorb, and to reframe dissent within acceptable limits.

In this sense, the 2025 electoral landscape should be interpreted not as an arena of democratic competition, but as a carefully managed space of elite signaling. The ruling party's internal cohesion, the symbolic return of opposition figures, and the procedural exclusion of CHADEMA are not contradictory they are components of the same consensus-preserving logic. Elections, in this context, are less about alternation than about reaffirming the institutional narrative of national unity. Samia Suluhu Hassan does not dismantle the system; she adapts it in continuity with Tanzania's political tradition.

MECHANISMS OF ELITE ADAPTATION AND PARTY CONTINUITY

Over the years, CCM has demonstrated an ability to accommodate internal shifts while maintaining continuity in its hegemonic position. These mechanisms include strategic reshuffling of leadership, absorption of dissent, decentralization of candidate selection, and investment in grassroots infrastructure each contributing to the party's capacity to pre-empt fragmentation and marginalize challengers without resorting to overt coercion.

Within this model, elite turnover is managed not through rupture but through rotation. Presidential transitions, such as the one that brought Samia Suluhu Hassan to power in 2021, are framed as opportunities to realign factions and renew party legitimacy. In the years leading up to the 2025 elections, the ruling party has recalibrated its internal power structures. Key figures marginalized during the Magufuli era were rehabilitated, including politicians like January Makamba and Nape Nnauye, while others were distanced in a manner signaling continuity without confrontation. These movements are not exceptional but part of a long-standing repertoire in Tanzanian politics, where internal cohesion is prioritized over open ideological contestation.

Institutional reforms within CCM have also reinforced this continuity. In 2024, the party amended its 1977 constitution to decentralize the nomination of candidates, granting regional and district branches a greater role in the vetting process. This structural shift was framed as a response to popular dissatisfaction with imposed candidates, but it also functioned as a mechanism to absorb

local grievances and re-legitimize central control through the appearance of participation. The initiative aligns with the party's historical approach of diffusing tensions through formal inclusion rather than policy rupture.

Alongside internal reconfiguration, CCM has invested in expanding its organizational reach. A mass digital registration campaign increased party membership from 3.6 million to over 12 million between May and December 2024.¹ Vehicles and digital tools were distributed to local branches, signaling both material capacity and symbolic presence. This grassroots expansion is consistent with what Hyden (2005) described as “organizational penetration” a means through which the party-state extends its influence into everyday life, blurring the boundaries between governance and political mobilization.

Furthermore, opposition containment has occurred in parallel, largely through procedural and normative mechanisms. The disqualification of CHADEMA from the 2025 elections is a case in point. Framed by the electoral commission as a legal matter, the decision underscores how consensus politics can render exclusion legitimate when grounded in institutional norms. Rather than relying on repression, the system leverages administrative tools to define the parameters of acceptable dissent. This reflects a political culture in which opposition is not outlawed but circumscribed expected to operate within established channels or risk marginalization.

In this context, elite adaptation and continuity are not contradictory but mutually reinforcing. The apparent openness of Tanzania's political space manifested in the return of exiled leaders and the resumption of rallies coexists with a calibrated narrowing of meaningful contestation. The consensus model does not preclude reform; rather, it manages change in ways that preserve the architecture of dominance while allowing for tactical flexibility. The mechanisms sustaining CCM's rule are thus less about authoritarian imposition than about strategic absorption, symbolic accommodation, and procedural legitimacy.

ELECTORAL GOVERNANCE AND THE MANAGEMENT OF CIVIC SPACE

The architecture of Tanzania's electoral governance has historically combined institutional regularity with informal political calibration. While constitutionally autonomous, the National Electoral Commission (NEC) operates within a broader political ecosystem shaped by the long-standing dominance of CCM. This institutional arrangement allows elections to be held regularly, in accordance with legal procedures and electoral timetables, while simultaneously ensuring that outcomes remain largely predictable. It is this tension between procedural formality and political asymmetry that defines the management of electoral processes in contemporary Tanzania.

The 2025 elections offer a clear illustration of how this dual logic functions. On one hand, the NEC has maintained its commitment to the electoral calendar, issued updated guidelines, and launched civic education campaigns. On the other, its decision to disqualify the main opposition party, CHADEMA, from the presidential race on grounds of non-compliance with the code of conduct raises important questions about the discretionary power of electoral bodies. CHADEMA's refusal to sign the code was itself a political gesture, rooted in a demand for broader institutional reforms. Yet,

1. <https://allafrica.com/stories/202202070251.html>

by treating the matter as a technical infraction, the NEC was able to reframe a political contestation into a procedural violation, thereby justifying exclusion without invoking overt repression.

This pattern is consistent with previous electoral cycles. As Paget (2020) has observed, the Tanzanian electoral field is not closed, but tiered: opposition participation is tolerated within boundaries that do not threaten systemic stability. Electoral rules, far from being neutral instruments, are often calibrated to reflect and reproduce the logic of consensus politics. The code of conduct, candidate vetting, and media accreditation all serve as mechanisms through which political competition is contained rather than encouraged.

Alongside these institutional arrangements, the broader civic space has undergone both liberalization and re-regulation. Under President Samia Suluhu Hassan, the government lifted bans on political rallies, allowed the return of previously exiled politicians, and granted new licenses to media outlets. These steps were widely welcomed, domestically and internationally, as signs of political openness. However, this reopening has been accompanied by legal instruments that preserve the executive's capacity to delimit dissent. The Media Services Act and the Political Parties Act, while revised, still grant wide discretion to regulatory authorities. Similarly, civil society organizations remain under scrutiny through the NGO Coordination Act, which requires registration and restricts advocacy activities considered "political."

Rather than following a linear trajectory of liberalization, civic space in Tanzania has evolved as a domain of strategic flexibility. Visibility is permitted, even encouraged, when it aligns with national narratives of unity and development. Yet visibility becomes vulnerability when used to challenge foundational norms or mobilize disruptive dissent. This logic was evident in the case of Tundu Lissu's arrest in April 2025, officially justified on the grounds of "treasonous incitement," but widely interpreted as a preemptive move to neutralize a polarizing figure ahead of the election. While Lissu's detention drew criticism from human rights groups, the government framed it as a matter of national security, reinforcing the notion that civic expression must remain within the boundaries of political decorum.

Ultimately, the governance of elections and civic space in Tanzania is structured less by authoritarian decree than by the institutionalization of a consensus logic. The state does not systematically repress dissent; it integrates, reframes, and occasionally disciplines it. Elections proceed with regularity, and civic activity is visible but both are embedded in a political culture where pluralism is tolerated only insofar as it does not undermine the legitimacy of the post-independence state project. Understanding this dynamic requires moving beyond normative assumptions about democratic backsliding and recognizing the ways in which institutional continuity and managed pluralism coexist in Tanzania's evolving political landscape.

PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL PLURALISM BEYOND 2025: CONSENSUS WITHOUT CONTESTATION?

As Tanzania prepares to enter the post-election period, the absence of CHADEMA in the 2025 general elections raises critical questions about the future of political pluralism. While the electoral process remains procedurally intact, the exclusion of the main opposition party disrupts the conventional architecture of competition. The ruling CCM faces no substantive electoral threat, and this structural asymmetry has implications that extend beyond the immediate vote count.

In the short term, the 2025 elections are expected to consolidate CCM's dominance without major disruption. The party's electoral machinery has been activated at all levels from digital member registration to the decentralization of candidate selection ensuring coherence and discipline throughout the campaign cycle. Samia Suluhu Hassan is likely to secure a second term with a wide margin, supported by a fragmented opposition and institutional continuity. In this sense, the elections serve to reproduce the consensus-based model rather than test its resilience.

Yet beneath the surface, the implications of a non-competitive election are more complex. The exclusion of CHADEMA from the electoral field introduces a legitimacy dilemma: while legally justified by the Electoral Commission's enforcement of the Code of Ethics, the decision limits citizens' choices and narrows the horizon of political debate. The absence of adversarial discourse during the electoral campaign may reinforce stability in the short term, but it also risks depoliticizing public engagement and eroding democratic expectations over time. Studies of electoral authoritarian regimes have shown that ritualized elections without contestation can lead to voter apathy, declining turnout, and eventual disengagement from formal politics (Levitsky & Way, 2010; Cheeseman & Klaas, 2018).

Within this configuration, alternative parties such as ACT-Wazalendo may play an increasingly symbolic role. Their participation offers the appearance of pluralism and debate, yet their limited national reach and reluctance to openly challenge the systemic consensus make them unlikely vehicles for meaningful change. Instead, they risk becoming what Hyden (2005) once called "sanctioned dissent" voices that operate within acceptable limits, helping to legitimize the system without destabilizing it. If CHADEMA remains sidelined beyond 2025, the opposition landscape may evolve toward either fragmentation or co-optation, with few actors able to articulate a coherent counter-narrative.

Samia Suluhu Hassan's second term will likely shape the trajectory of Tanzania's political system in decisive ways. Her leadership style marked by elite inclusion, moderation, and technocratic reform has so far proven effective at navigating internal party dynamics and regional expectations. The question is whether this model can continue to deliver legitimacy in the absence of open political contestation. With no constitutional possibility for a third term, the issue of succession will also become more salient by the end of the decade. How CCM manages internal competition in the lead-up to 2030 will be a key test of the consensus model's adaptability.

At the same time, there are early signs that contestation may shift to other arenas. While the formal civic space remains constrained, particularly in rural areas, urban youth populations and digital networks are increasingly engaging in alternative forms of political expression. Independent media, online satire, and informal activist networks have become spaces where dissent is voiced, albeit cautiously. The state's tolerance of these forms of expression remains limited, but their persistence suggests a slow reconfiguration of political agency outside institutional boundaries.

The 2025 elections, therefore, may mark a paradoxical moment in Tanzania's political evolution. On one hand, they reaffirm the stability and continuity of a consensus-oriented system. On the other, they signal the narrowing of electoral competition at a time when economic and social pressures are reshaping citizen expectations. Without recalibrating the mechanisms of inclusion both within the ruling party and in the broader political field the consensus may endure procedurally while weakening substantively. Tanzania's challenge, moving forward, will be to maintain political harmony without suppressing the plurality of voices that a maturing polity inevitably demands.

CONCLUSION

The October 2025 elections in Tanzania do not signal a rupture, but a strategic recalibration of the country's long-standing political order. From the outside, the exclusion of CHADEMA from the electoral process, the arrest of key opposition figures, and the limited space for civic contestation may suggest democratic backsliding. Yet such interpretations risk overlooking the deeply embedded norms, institutions, and political habits that have long shaped Tanzanian electoral governance. Rather than a transition from democracy to authoritarianism or vice versa the 2025 elections illustrate the continuity of a political culture that privileges stability, elite consensus, and national unity over open contestation and ideological pluralism.

President Samia Suluhu Hassan's leadership, while more conciliatory and internationalist than that of her predecessor, does not fundamentally depart from this script. On the contrary, her administration has demonstrated a keen ability to operate within these boundaries, adjusting the style of governance without altering its structure. Her tenure has restored some channels of political dialogue, reactivated international partnerships, and marginally reopened civic space. Yet these gestures remain carefully bounded: they do not signify an institutionalized opening, but rather a recalibrated balance between reform and control. Samia's ability to bring back sidelined elites, maintain internal party cohesion, and manage factional tensions while avoiding open confrontation illustrates what might be termed a model of "negotiated legitimacy" where change is permitted, even encouraged, as long as it does not threaten the foundational consensus on which the Tanzanian polity rests.

The current electoral process, therefore, must be understood as part of a broader logic of managed pluralism. Elections in Tanzania, as in many post-liberation regimes, serve not simply as instruments of competition, but as mechanisms of political reproduction. The ruling party, CCM, is not just a dominant actor it is an institutional expression of the state itself, embodying narratives of unity, development, and national identity. Its longevity is not only a function of coercion or patronage, but also of symbolic capital accumulated over decades of state-building. In this context, opposition parties that accept the rules of consensus and refrain from confrontational politics such as ACT-Wazalendo are permitted a degree of participation. Those that challenge the moral authority of CCM or mobilize outside the established grammar of discipline and decorum such as CHADEMA are excluded not only procedurally, but discursively, framed as threats to cohesion rather than as legitimate competitors.

This model of electoral governance has thus far succeeded in preserving political order and averting the violent alternations or civil conflicts witnessed elsewhere in the region. It has also allowed for a degree of institutional continuity that underpins Tanzania's international reputation as a stable actor in East Africa. However, this stability comes at the cost of narrowing the scope for genuine pluralism. As Tanzanian society becomes more demographically youthful, digitally connected, and economically diverse, the social foundations of the consensus model may begin to erode. Demands for accountability, representation, and participation are likely to intensify in ways that informal negotiation alone may no longer contain.

The exclusion of CHADEMA from the 2025 elections, while legally justified by the electoral commission, may have longer-term implications for political legitimacy. Even if CCM secures a resounding electoral victory, questions will persist about the representativeness of the process and the sustainability of a system in which meaningful competition is structurally inhibited. International

observers, while often cautious in their language, will likely continue to raise concerns about the integrity and inclusiveness of the electoral process. Domestically, the silencing of dissent through administrative, legal, and symbolic means may further alienate segments of the population who no longer see themselves reflected in the post-independence consensus.

In this light, the challenge for Tanzania is not simply to reform its electoral system, but to rethink the boundaries of its political governance. Can the culture of consensus that has underpinned national unity be expanded to accommodate dissent without triggering fragmentation? Can political legitimacy be reconstituted through more open participation without undermining the state's cohesion? These are not questions that can be resolved in a single election cycle. Yet they are likely to become more pressing as the gap widens between the institutional logic of Tanzanian governance and the social transformations unfolding on the ground.

Ultimately, the 2025 elections may mark neither a democratic breakthrough nor an authoritarian regression. Instead, they offer a revealing moment of institutional reproduction where consensus is not disrupted but rearticulated, where exclusion is not denied but rationalized, and where the politics of continuity is repackaged in the language of stability. Understanding this moment requires not simply judging Tanzania against external benchmarks, but engaging with the internal logic through which its political system has historically managed dissent, contained opposition, and preserved order. Within this logic, Samia Suluhu Hassan's presidency appears less an anomaly than a continuation pursued by different means.

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The Policy Center for the New South (PCNS) is a Moroccan think tank aiming to contribute to the improvement of economic and social public policies that challenge Morocco and the rest of Africa as integral parts of the global South.

The PCNS pleads for an open, accountable, and enterprising "new South" that defines its own narratives and mental maps around the Mediterranean and South Atlantic basins, as part of a forward-looking relationship with the rest of the world. Through its analytical endeavours, the think tank aims to support the development of public policies in Africa and to give the floor to experts from the South. This stance is focused on dialogue and partnership and aims to cultivate African expertise and excellence needed for the accurate analysis of African and global challenges and the suggestion of appropriate solutions.

As such, the PCNS brings together researchers, publishes their work and capitalizes on a network of renowned partners, representative of different regions of the world. The PCNS hosts a series of gatherings of different formats and scales throughout the year, the most important being the annual international conferences the "Atlantic Dialogues", the "African Peace and Security Annual Conference" (APSACO), and the "Africa Economic Symposium" (AES).

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