

Policy Brief

Implications of Food Systems for Food Security: The case of the Republic of Mozambique

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Mozambique is resource-rich and strategically located on the east coast of Africa between Tanzania and South Africa. Its mineral wealth includes coal, iron ore, bauxite, copper, gold, rubies, and natural gas. Valuable marine stocks include crustaceans, demersal and pelagic fish which populate its long coastline. Its agriculture is endowed with plentiful land, water, and a generally favorable climate for agricultural (crops and livestock) production. Yet, its agriculture cannot produce enough surplus, thus trapping the vast majority of rural people in grinding poverty.

This Policy Brief focuses on how policy and institutional neglect of a country's food systems ensure millions suffer chronic malnutrition and poor health status, right from conception to infancy. The Frelimo government has not prioritized using Mozambique's mineral wealth to invest in agriculture, the primary sector the majority depends upon for their livelihood. Its growth model has been import-substituting, extractive industrialization first.

Mozambique confirms the historical fact that neglecting agriculture in the early stages of development condemns a country to massive poverty and food insecurity.¹



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INTRODUCTION

The Republic of Mozambique (Mozambique for short) suffered over 25 years or so of the war, first to achieve independence from Portugal in 1975, then from the civil war raging between Frelimo and Renamo until 1992.² The country was in ruins when peace was finally signed. Peace enabled over two decades (1992-2015) of high growth averaging 8% per year. During this period, Mozambique was considered a development success. Unfortunately, the hidden debt of U.S. \$ 1.4 billion (equivalent to 10% of GDP) revealed in April 2016 plunged Mozambique into a crisis, just when there was a downturn in commodity prices and a regional drought. Growth remained subdued and even turned negative under the frontal assault of COVID-19 in 2020. Growth declined from 6.6% in 2015 to 3.3% in 2016. (WBG, March 2017).

Mozambique discovered Africa's largest natural gas reserves in 2010 in its northern region in the Rovuma basin off the coast of Cabo Delgado province. So far, this discovery is becoming a resource curse rather than a blessing. The hidden debt, which came to light in 2016 and plunged Mozambique into a crisis, was contracted to develop the gas field and the LNG plant.³ Local populations have been forced to relocate to make way for the newcomers investing in these reserves. The locals who live in one of the poorest provinces of Mozambique also have to endure increasing insurgency, known locally as al-Shabaab⁴, which claims links with ISIS. Widespread poverty and high unemployment among the local youth fuel resentment against the Maputo government. Hostilities persisted despite the peace agreement between Frelimo and Renamo in September 2014, and concerns about hostilities remain after the Maputo peace agreement in Aug 2019.⁵

Given its natural resource abundance and high growth rates for over two decades of peace and stability, what is the status of its food systems and their implications for food security? The goal of the Five-Year Development Plan of the Frelimo-dominated government of President Felipe Nyusi⁶ is to "adopt a more diversified and competitive economy, promote the productive sectors to increase income generation and create more jobs, especially for young people". (WBG, Oct 2021)

Mozambique is at a crossroads after discovering Africa's largest natural gas reserves. It has the opportunity to develop this new found resource in a way that promotes the type of diversified and competitive economy with the income and job creation envisaged in its

1. Of course, countries must have an agriculture to begin with. This historical fact does not apply to oil exporters like Saudi Arabia or city states like Singapore.

2. Mozambique, formerly called Portuguese East Africa, gained independence after 11 years of war from September 1964 until its independence on June 25, 1975. The civil war lasted from 1977 to 1992 between the Marxist Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo) and the anti-communist Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo). The 15-year civil war followed long years of guerrilla warfare for independence. Frelimo dropped its Marxism-Leninism in 1985 when it joined the World Bank and the IMF. In 1989, Mozambique was no longer "The People's Republic..." but became officially known as "The Republic ..." Frelimo stands for Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique); Renamo stands for Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambican National Resistance).

3. The Mozambique Rovuma Venture (MRV) is a joint venture of EXXON MOBIL (40%); ENI (40%), and CNPC (20%) is the operator and holds 70% interest in Area 4 exploration and production contract. GALP, KOGAS, and Empresa Nacional de Hidrocarbonetas each hold 10% of the block. The French oil and gas company TOTAL owns a majority stake in the Mozambique Rovuma Offshore Area 1 development consortium and is the operator of the LNG project.

4. It is not linked to Somalia's Al – Shabaab.

5. In 2009, a third party, the Democratic Movement of Mozambique (MDM) emerged. However, Frelimo and Renamo remain the two main political forces in Mozambique.

6. He was elected for a second 5-year term on Jan 15, 2020.

latest Five-Year plan. This Policy Brief analyzes the progress it has made to its food systems since the peace accord of 1992 and the challenges for the remaining years of the current plan to address. Given its past performance, what should it learn going forward?

This Policy Brief is organized following two basic concepts. We adopt IFPRI's concept of food systems and FAO's (1996) concept of food security.⁷ Thus,

"Food systems are sums of actors and interactions along the food chain—from input supply and production of crops, livestock, fish, and other agricultural commodities to transportation, processing, wholesaling and preparation of foods to consumption and disposal..." (IFPRI).

"Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life." (FAO 1996)

Both concepts are holistic. Food systems are all-encompassing. The holistic concept of food security demands that all four pillars of availability, access, utilization, and stability simultaneously hold. This policy brief will assess the functioning of Mozambique's food systems along these four pillars/dimensions. It will draw upon similarities and differences, if any, with Nigeria to the extent relevant. This richly endowed country must diversify from oil dependence to promote inclusive and poverty-reducing growth.⁸

MOZAMBIQUE: GNI/CAPITA: US \$ 460 (2020, CURRENT \$, ATLAS METHOD)⁹

Brief Background

A country richly endowed with land, water, and mineral resources, and with a strategic location but weak land tenure security: To the many landlocked countries of Africa,¹⁰ Mozambique's location must be enviable: situated southeast of the continent, it has over 2500 kilometers (km) of coastline on the Indian Ocean. Mozambique boasts three deep seaports: from south, center, to north—Maputo, Beira, and Nacala. Mozambique can thus play a vital entrepot role in agricultural trade for the neighboring countries. Mozambique occupies 800,000 sq. km of land and stretches about 2000 km from north to south. It has ample fertile land, abundant water, energy, gas, and mineral resources, and a generally favorable climate for agricultural production. The most fertile lands are in the northern¹¹ and central¹² provinces; the southern provinces¹³ have poorer soils and scarce rainfall and are more subject to droughts and floods. With such abundant land, the government owns all land, and land administration is cumbersome and costly, "Mozambique farmland is prize

7. IFPRI: International Food Policy Research Institute; FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization

8. Nigeria was the subject of a previous Policy Brief, published by PCNS, PB - 41/22 June 2022

9. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD?locations=MZ>

10. Out of Africa's 55 countries, 16 of them are landlocked: Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, South Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and the Kingdom of Eswatini (since 2018, formerly Swaziland) border Mozambique to the west.

11. Northern Region consists of Cabo Delgado, Niassa, Nampula, and Zambézia provinces.

12. Central Region consists of Manica, Sofala, and Tete provinces.

13. Southern Region consists of Inhambane, Gaza, Maputo provinces, and Maputo City, capital of Mozambique.

in land grab fever" (NPR, June 2012). There is virtually also no legal protection for usage rights.¹⁴ Not surprisingly, land titling has been controversial and led to conflicts over land rights and tenure, which are significant challenges for private investment. (WBG, 2017) On this vast land, its population is about 32 million (2021) but multiplying at around 2.9% per year (2021), with youth (age 15-24) constituting roughly 20% of the total, an essential segment of the population that has not known the protracted civil war.

High growth from 1992 to 2015 for an economy in ruins—main drivers: With the return to relative peace and stability with the 1992 formal peace agreement between Frelimo and Renamo, Mozambique was able to grow and reduce poverty, even though such reduction bypassed some regions and the bottom 40%. Specifically, the Marxist-Leninist Frelimo pursued a central planning approach from 1975-86. During this period, Frelimo followed an import-substituting economic strategy promoting the heavy industry as the main driver, but this did not work. (Brookings et al., 2012). It then changed political allegiance: it decided to embrace capitalism and markets as aid was not forthcoming from Russia.¹⁵ (Fauvet, March 2013) As a result of this political switch, Mozambique received much donor aid, bilateral and multilateral. The return to peace and stability enabled sound macroeconomic management and attracted much Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), which financed infrastructure and the expansion of public services. Over the 1997-2006 and the 2007-16 periods, Mozambique benefitted from two waves of megaprojects and FDI inflows for coal and Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) exploration. These first decades achieved recovery and reconstruction after decades of wars.

Poverty declined, but the bottom 40% was primarily left behind: This period of stability and growth was a welcome relief to a population devastated by years of continuous wars, but unfortunately government did not address structural factors which undermine productivity, inclusive and resilient growth. The poverty rate fell from around 60% in 2002/03 to 48% in 2014/15. But the share of private consumption of the bottom 40% declined over the same period. (WBG, 2021) The export-oriented, capital-intensive nature of megaprojects which were the primary drivers of growth, had limited linkages with the rest of the economy.

An uneasy peace between Frelimo and Renamo, the hidden debt crisis, and the Islamist insurgency are some things that highlight governance challenges: The cracks in the uneasy peace between Frelimo and Renamo surfaced in 2013 and 2018 but were settled in two new agreements in 2014 and 2019. The hidden debt crisis of 2016 exploded when tensions between Frelimo and Renamo were intensifying; with Renamo maintaining its armed militias in the center of Mozambique. Thus, observers point out that while peace agreements have been repeated, lasting peace (as opposed to what is referred to as "negative peace") is still to be achieved so long as conditions of distrust; marginalization of Renamo as Frelimo elites and supporters maintain control over resources and political appointments; flawed electoral processes; and other forms of exclusion, etc., persist. (Bussotti, Nov 2021). The Islamist insurgency in Cabo Delgado since 2017 also has roots in economic, social, and ethnic exclusion, among other things. Governance indicators for Mozambique also show a gradual decline in government effectiveness, including a crisis of confidence in the government's fiduciary capacity and responsible management of natural resource revenues; and the control of corruption. (WBG, 2017) The business environment is costly and restrictive, as shown by two indicators: (i) Mozambique ranks 137/190 in the

14. In 2012, only 1.3% of smallholders had formal land titles.

15. The Soviet Union was dissolved on Dec 26, 1991. Since, it was founded on Dec 30, 1922, the Soviet Union lasted 69 years. The Soviet Union was in turmoil and its disintegration stretched from 1988 to 1991. During these tumultuous years the Berlin Wall fell on Nov 9, 1989 and the official unification of East and West Germany was on Oct 03, 1990.

WBG's cost of doing business (2017); and (ii) 133/138 in the World Economic Forum's (WEF) Global Competitiveness Index (GCI, 2016-17). (WBG, 2017)

Determinants of availability: supply side—status and issues

Agriculture, the backbone of the economy, is constrained by low productivity despite high potential: Agriculture accounts for nearly 25% of GDP and 70% of employment. The livelihoods of over 85% of rural households (almost 2 out of 3 Mozambicans are rural)¹⁶ and virtually all rural poor depend on agriculture, directly and indirectly. Crop production and processing comprise 80% of value added in agriculture; the balance is made up of livestock; fishing and aquaculture; and silviculture, each of the 3 sub-sectors contributing around 6-7% of AG GDP. The agricultural potential of Mozambique is estimated at approximately 62% of the total land area, yet only about 7% is being cultivated. In extensive grass-based or back-yard scavenger systems, livestock (cattle, goats, sheep, and pigs) rearing is practiced on 55% of total agricultural land area. There is a small, fast-growing, modern poultry industry. The high prevalence of the disease is the primary constraint on livestock size and productivity, e.g., tsetse flies undermine cattle in the northern provinces; African swine fever affects pigs, and Newcastle disease attacks poultry. Of the estimated three million acres of potential for irrigation, only 118,000 ha of land (4% of total) are equipped for irrigation; and of that, only 62,000 ha (62%) are cultivated (2015). Thus, only around only 2.5% of potential is irrigated. As of 2000, 37% of Mozambique was natural forest cover. From 2002 to 2021, the total area of humid primary forests decreased by 9.5%. (Global Forest Watch, 07-04-2022). Agriculture is predominantly rainfed, with all the risks that it entails. Crop production is dominated by staple crops, namely rice, maize, sorghum, and cassava, which cover 33% of the total cultivated area. The principal cash crops are sugar, tobacco, and cotton, mainly cultivated and processed by large multinationals and state-owned companies. These occupy less than 5% of farmland. The major agricultural exports include cashew nuts, sesame, tobacco, cotton, sugar, timber, fruits, shrimps, and prawns. Despite its substantial agricultural potential, the trade deficit has been relatively high. Mozambique has some of the lowest cereal yields in southern Africa, barely reaching one-third of its potential yields. (CIAT, World Bank, 2017) For example, the average yield for maize, the most grown crop, is below 1000 kg/ha. There has been little growth in the last two decades in bringing yields of traditional crops closer to the regional average. The yield gaps (between actual and potential) are most pronounced in the Central Region and the highlands in the Northern Region, despite favorable ago-climatic conditions and soil quality.

Agricultural growth and productivity severely constrained by grossly inadequate public spending and policy favors the few: Mozambique has the lowest land and labor productivity levels in Southern Africa. (WBG, Oct 2021) Over the 2008-17 period, agriculture expanded by just 0.6% in contrast to the growth of non-extractive industry and services, by 12%. Over 99% of farmers are smallholders, most of whom are engaged in subsistence agriculture. Subsistence farmers constitute around 62% of the total; those emerging from subsistence to commercial, another 38%; and a tiny fraction, 0.4%, are fully market-oriented. The median area cultivated by most smallholders in the primary growing season is one ha, although there are significant variations across regions and income groups. Most smallholders practice slash and burn agriculture as they struggle against tremendous odds. Only 5% of farmers use fertilizers or any other modern inputs like improved seeds and pesticides, and levels of mechanization remain low at 1-2% of arable land. (WBG, March 2020) The major problem

16. More than 50% of Mozambicans will still be rural through 2040. (WBG, March 2020)

is that public spending on agriculture is only 4% of the national budget, less than half of the 10% advocated by NEPAD.¹⁷ Overall agricultural support in terms of public goods and services represented only 0.6% of AG GDP in 2018. Some 95% of that small public spending is allocated to producer support through trade protection using market price support (MPS). Thus, only the minority of commercial farmers benefit at the expense of the vast majority. This policy hurts poor agricultural households who are all net food consumers through high prices. (World Bank, June 2022) Smallholders are constrained by a scarcity of public goods and services, including: virtually non-existent services in agriculture research and extension (R&D) and assistance for plant and animal health; poor connectivity undermines access to input and output markets as the rural infrastructure remains underdeveloped, while public investment has prioritized primary roads in urban areas.

Climate change is an existential threat to Mozambique's agriculture and food supply: Mozambique is one of the most vulnerable and least prepared countries for natural disasters, ranking 153 out of 178 nations on the Global Adaptation Index (ND-GAIN),¹⁸ with a low score of 38.6. In the 5-2015, climate hazards such as droughts, floods, and cyclones, generated losses of roughly US\$ 790 m. (Ciat and World Bank, 2017) Increased rainfall variability threatens coastal cities through flooding, coastal erosion, and sea level rise. There has been an increase in hot days, an upsurge in crop and livestock pests, decreases in rainfall amounts, and shifts in seasons. Climate projections for Mozambique indicate an expected change in mean annual temperature by up to +1.4°C by 2030, with the Northeast experiencing the highest increase. Negative impacts of climate change on agriculture will primarily be caused by the increased likelihood of extreme weather events, such as cyclones and flooding. This increased frequency will aggravate the riskiness of rainfed agriculture, undermining agricultural production and productivity, hence food supply.

Determinants of access: demand-side—status and issues

Since 1992, Mozambique's growth performance has not been pro-poor and not employment-rich: The high growth years (1992-2015) were driven by capital-intensive mega projects with limited linkages with the domestic economy. In the 1990s, there was strong growth in manufacturing, particularly in the aluminum sector. In the late 2000s, there was a shift in extractives driven by investment in coal and liquefied natural gas (LNG). During those dynamic years, FDI poured into Mozambique, which accounted for 15% of total inflows into SSA. These years essentially represented FDI- and aid-financed post-war reconstruction and recovery. Industry's contribution rose from around 15% (1997) to 24% of GDP (2020). The share of jobs in industry increased from 4.4% to 4.9% of the total over the same period. Most of the jobs are in services, contributing to 41% of GDP in 2020. The employment share of services rose from 9% (1997) to 24% in 2015. Agriculture's share of total employment fell from around 87% to 71% (1997-2015). Much progress was achieved on a per capita basis in Mozambique: per capita income which was only 16% of the average for SSA countries at the end of the civil war in 1992, grew to 35% in 2019. (World Bank, June 2022) There was poverty reduction, but inequality was already high and increased further: the Gini coefficient rose from 0.47 (2008) to 0.56 (2014), making Mozambique one of the most unequal countries in SSA. (World Bank, 2021)

17. NEPAD: New Partnership for Africa's Development was adopted by the African Union in 2001 and ratified in 2002.

18. The ND-GAIN index summarizes a country's vulnerability to climate change and other global challenges in combination with its readiness to improve resilience. The higher the score the better. For comparison using the 2019 scores: Norway ranked No. 1 with a score of 76.2; Mozambique ranked No. 154 (out of 182 countries), score 38.1

Spatial dimensions of poverty persist given a concentrated pattern of growth: Whatever growth occurred in recent decades has been concentrated in industry and services and not in the dominant sector, virtually stagnant agriculture. Unfortunately, the dynamic sectors do not generate good jobs; but the non-dynamic industry generates most jobs. Services are dominated by low productivity commerce and informal activities. Almost half the population is classified as poor—that is, they cannot afford the minimum level of consumption necessary to ensure a satisfactory standard of wellbeing. Most of them are rural and concentrated in the Central and Northern regions. The Northern part has the highest proportion of poor. The Northern and Central Regions have more children per rural woman (6.6) than urban (4.5) women. The rural poor of these two regions typically have large families; engage in subsistence farming on small plots of land with no linkages to input and output markets; have low levels of education, and virtually no access to essential services. In short, they are isolated and trapped.

Determinants of utilization: nutrition and health

Health problems from birth perpetuate the cycle of poverty: Infants, children, and women suffer the highest health risks. Some 14% of newborns begin life with low birth weight, increasing their risk of infant mortality, delayed cognitive and motor development, and stunting. Stunting is about twice as high among poor Mozambican children than among the wealthiest households: around 51% versus 24%.¹⁹ Mozambique has the fourth highest stunting prevalence rate of all SSA countries: approximately 43% (2011). This rate has remained constant since 2003, with the provinces of Cabo Delgado, Nampula, and Zambezia having the highest rates. Vitamin A deficiency affects 69% of children aged 6-59 months and 14% of pregnant women.²⁰ Anemia affects 75% of children aged 6-24 months and over 50% of pregnant women.²¹ Maternal mortality is high at 408 deaths per 100,000 live births. Mozambique ranks 11 out of 15 countries in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) in infant and child mortality, with 64 deaths per 1,000 live births and 97 deaths per 1 000 live births, respectively. (WBG, 2017) Burdened by such devastating health problems, it is no wonder that labor productivity is low. In the meantime, the total fertility rate (TFR) remains high at 5.3, with the world's fifth highest adolescent fertility rate.²²

Limited access to primary education, health, and sanitation services condemns millions to increased health risks: The Mozambique government has virtually not invested in the human capital of the poor, especially the rural poor, as evidenced by their limited access to essential services. Literacy rates have improved from around 46% in 1997 to 63% in 2015, but still, 50% of the youngsters in Niassa, Tete, Cabo Delgado, Nampula, and Zambezia cannot read or write. Given the high proportion of youth—some 66% of the total population is under 25- the high illiteracy rate and lack of job training threaten to perpetuate inter-generational poverty and breed social discontent. Access to health care services is grossly inadequate; common problems are distance to a health facility and cost of treatment. Ease of access varies substantially by region and income, resulting in the poorest being less likely to seek medical help when sick. Quality is also a problem. According to the 2016

19. Stunting results from chronic undernutrition which retards linear growth.

20. Vitamin A deficiency leads to inflamed skin, night blindness, infertility, delayed growth and respiratory infections.

21. Anemia is a condition in which one lacks sufficient healthy red blood cells to carry adequate oxygen to one's body tissues. If untreated, anemia can lead to many health problems such as extreme fatigue, pregnancy complications, heart problems, and increased risk of death.

22. Adolescent Fertility Rate (births per 1000 women age 15-19) was 142 for Mozambique (2020). For comparison, it was 98 for SSA; 22 for South Asia; 21 for East Asia and Pacific; 60 for Latin America and the Caribbean; and 90 for least developed economies (UN classification). WDI. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.ADO.TFRT>

Service Delivery Indicators, only 43% of health facilities had all priority drugs in stock; and only 33% meet minimum infrastructure requirements. Teachers' and doctors' absenteeism is a common problem. Only one in three households has access to safe water; one in ten to sanitation; one in four to electricity. Poor sanitation costs Mozambique an estimated US\$ 124 million per year. Fecal contamination is the root cause of an annual average of 8,000-10,000 cholera cases. Children from households forced to use unimproved water sources are 50% more likely to suffer from stunting. Low-lying informal settlements are more prone to flooding and poor drainage, a risk increasing with climate change.

Determinants of stability: macro, trade, and resilience to shocks

Mozambique's resilience continues to be severely tested by multiple shocks since 2016: After high growth with macro stability since 1992, Mozambique has been hit by three major crises in rapid succession: the hidden debt of US\$ 1.4 b, which came to light in 2016; the assault of COVID-19 pandemic in 2020; and the food and fuel inflation triggered by the Russian invasion of Ukraine since February 2022. Although Mozambique has weak direct linkages with Russia and Ukraine, the concern is that the rise in international oil and cereals prices may undermine the economy and the external balance as Mozambique's imports of oil and wheat represent 12% and 3% of its total imports respectively. (World Bank, June 2022) The impact on the poor of the hidden debt crisis was devastating. Growth decelerated and turned negative in 2020. The Mozambican Metical depreciated sharply against the U.S. dollar by 36% in 2016, with inflation soaring to 20% in 2016, with food inflation reaching 32%. (WBG, 2017) Following closely on this weakened economy, the pandemic was both a health and an economic blow. It was also financially taxing as public debt increased. The domestic debt stock reached 22% of GDP in 2021, up from 19% in 2019. (World Bank, June 2022). Mozambique is still struggling to recover from these three crises as the humanitarian and security situation in the Northern Region continues to deteriorate in 2022. The Islamist insurgent group known as al-Shabaab (also known as Ansar-al-Sunnah) has launched deadly attacks in the northeastern region of Cabo Delgado. Observers feared what started as a limited insurrection in 2017 is a "new civil war"²³ (Aidi, May 2022). Whether a new civil war or not, violent conflict in Cabo Delgado, where poverty reduction has been minimal, highlights the fragility of Mozambique's non-inclusive growth model, which has been driven primarily by extractives and mega projects. In contrast, agriculture, the primary source of income, employment, and food, and therefore resilience to shocks, has stagnated.

Some striking similarities with Nigeria: Like Nigeria, Mozambique is a resource- and mineral-rich country, but it has not been able to counter the Dutch Disease to transform its largely subsistence agriculture. In both countries, inequality is high, and growth has not been pro-poor. Agriculture remains low productivity, the refuge of the poor. Currently, the stability of both countries is being threatened by insurgency, which is rooted in complex ways in competition for resources and legitimacy. With the latest discovery of vast natural gas reserves, Mozambique has a second chance to counter the Dutch Disease and adopt a different growth model.

23. This insurrection has attracted intervention from Western powers: France, the EU, and the US; and African military from SADC and from Rwanda. They view their struggle mainly as combatting extremism and violent terrorism. Scholars and analysts however think otherwise. According to Chatham House, an International Affairs Think Tank based in London: "Success depends first and foremost on the willingness (much more than on the capacity) of corrupt leaders to reform and renew their social contract with their citizens, especially in rural areas. International efforts will fail as long as impunity prevails and local armies can kill civilians and topple governments without consequence." (Aidi, May 2022). Should the suppression of the insurgency in Cabo Delgado be considered primarily as a War on Terror?

CONCLUSION

The five-year plan of the Government of President Felipe Nyusi is to build "... a more diversified and competitive economy, promote the productive sectors to increase income generation and create more jobs, especially for young people". To realize such inclusive growth means that Mozambique cannot continue with "business as usual". This approach has resulted in food systems that leave at least half of the population severely food insecure. With the latest discovery of and current investment in Africa's largest natural gas reserves off the coast of Cabo Delgado, one of the richest provinces in terms of mineral wealth but one of the poorest in terms of development, Mozambique faces a stark choice: invest this new found source of income stream to transform Mozambique or succumb to the Dutch Disease like so many resource-rich countries? Though there is no single formula or magic bullet to transformative development, there is a sure way to continued underdevelopment and food insecurity: neglect agriculture, for "No country has succeeded in its industrial development without a prior (or at least simultaneous) agricultural revolution. Neglecting agriculture in the early stages of development is neglecting development." (Timmer, 2015)

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About the Policy Center for the New South

The Policy Center for the New South (PCNS) is a Moroccan think tank aiming to contribute to the improvement of economic and social public policies that challenge Morocco and the rest of Africa as integral parts of the global South.

The PCNS pleads for an open, accountable and enterprising "new South" that defines its own narratives and mental maps around the Mediterranean and South Atlantic basins, as part of a forward-looking relationship with the rest of the world. Through its analytical endeavours, the think tank aims to support the development of public policies in Africa and to give the floor to experts from the South. This stance is focused on dialogue and partnership, and aims to cultivate African expertise and excellence needed for the accurate analysis of African and global challenges and the suggestion of appropriate solutions.

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The views expressed in this publication are those of the author.

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