

Policy Brief

Implications of Food Systems for Food Security: The case of the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire

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For the second time, Côte d'Ivoire is known for being a "miracle economy" –high aggregate GDP growth of 8% per year since 2012. Despite this achievement, its food systems are unable to deliver food security to most Ivoirians. These systems are being undermined by several structural factors, which include broad-based low productivity and limited diversification of its agri-food sector; the high numbers of extremely poor, some 30% of the population; and the vulnerable who are millions more who toil in the informal sector—70% of all workers; and the men, women, children, and infants who are afflicted by the double burden of malnutrition. The Government of President Ouattara, responsible for this "miracle economy," is well aware of the long road ahead as it sets its sights on Côte d'Ivoire becoming an upper-middle income country by 2030, with a more food-secure population.

INTRODUCTION

Côte d'Ivoire has been one of the fastest-growing economies in Sub-Saharan Africa since 2012, after years of violent conflict and turmoil (1999-2011). For the second time, its growth performance is referred to as the "second Ivoirian miracle". The first one was under its first President, Félix Houphuet-Boigny (1960-1993).

What does this "second Ivoirian miracle" mean to reduce poverty and vulnerability and for food security in the short and long runs? This Policy Brief analyzes critical implications of Côte d'Ivoire's food systems for food security.

First, two basic concepts. We adopt IFPRI's concept of food systems and FAO's (1996) concept of food security.¹ Thus,

"Food systems are sums of actors and interactions along the food chain—from input supply and production of crops, livestock, fish, and other agricultural commodities to transportation, processing, wholesaling and preparation of foods to consumption and disposal..." (IFPRI).

«Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.» (FAO 1996)

Both concepts are holistic. Food systems are all-encompassing. The holistic concept of food security demands that all four pillars of availability, access, utilization, and stability simultaneously hold.

This policy brief analyzes the quantity and the nutritional quality, affordability, and stability of food intake, particularly by the poor and vulnerable. Specifically, of interest in this policy brief are features of the economy—from macro, through trade down to farm levels—that impact food production, processing, and consumption, etc.; and on food production, processing, consumption, etc.; and food security.

CÔTE D'IVOIRE: GNI/CAP US\$ 2,280 (CURRENT \$, 2020, ATLAS METHOD)

Brief background—from high growth to decline and high growth again: Under its first and long-time President Félix Houphuet-Boigny (1960-1993), Côte d'Ivoire was referred to as a "miracle" economy.² From 1960 to 1980, annual growth averaged 6%. Houphuet-Boigny's open door policy promoted immigration, welcoming migrants from Burkina Faso and Mali to work the land in southern Côte d'Ivoire, which was then plentiful. However, this expansive period did not last as the economy was not resilient to multiple economic shocks during the 1980s—drought, low commodity prices on cocoa and coffee, and rising debt burden—which led to a sharp economic downturn. With the combination of economic shocks and

1. IFPRI: International Food Policy Research Institute; FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization

2. Côte D'Ivoire gained independence from France on August 07, 1960. Prior to that, the country was a member of the French Community in December 1958. At the end of World War Two, De Gaulle had converted the French empire, to the French Union in 1946; which then became the French Community in 1958.

political instability,³ Côte D'Ivoire entered a long period of political instability and economic stagnation until 2011. In the 2000s, there were two episodes of turmoil:

- i. The coup d'État in 1999 soon followed by the civil conflict of 2002 when rebels led by Guillaume Soro controlled the North, and the Gbagbo government controlled the South; and
- ii. The 2010 contested elections between Ouattara and Gbagbo.

During the 1990s, ethnic tensions between the migrants from the North and the local communities in the South broke out over land disputes. When the land was plentiful, the Northerners were welcomed. However, their access to the land was not anchored in a legal land tenure system but rested merely on verbal agreements. With increased land scarcity, such access was questioned and fought over. Thus, annual GDP growth averaged less than 2% during the 1991-2011 period. (World Bank Group, Aug. 2015). Political stability was not restored until 2012, well after the fiercely contested elections of 2010.⁴ With the return to political stability even though still fragile, high annual GDP growth prevailed until the onslaught of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. However, this impressive 8% per year growth was not inclusive; poverty was reduced from around 46 % in 2015 to 39 % in 2020, benefitting mainly urban areas. Rural poverty has increased by 2.4 % over the same period. (World Bank, Overview, May 03, 2021).

Determinants of availability: supply-side—status and issues

Agriculture has been a slow transforming sector of low productivity: The AG/GDP declined from around 32% in 1970 to 22% in 2013 (WBG, June 2015) and 20% in 2019.⁵ This slow transformation is evident when compared to Sri Lanka, for which the AG/GDP was around 28% in 1970, declining to 11% in 2013. Sri Lanka, which had a similar GNI/capita as Côte d'Ivoire in 1995—US\$ 690 and US \$ 700, respectively—was a middle-income country with a GNI/Cap of US\$ 3,490 (Atlas Method) in 2013, compared to US\$ 1,350 (Atlas Method)⁶ for Côte d'Ivoire. This slow structural transformation is due to the prevalence of low value-added in agriculture, a sector dominated by smallholders. Agriculture is primarily rainfed (98%) with irrigation reserved only for industrial/cash crops.⁷ (WBG et al, 2019) Most smallholders produce export cash crops, with 20% only growing food crops. Subsistence agriculture with minimal inputs prevail. Slash and burn is common practice, responsible for the high deforestation rates. Due to the high population growth rate, fallow periods have decreased, contributing to increased soil degradation. Most smallholders are informally employed with low levels of mechanization and input use. Nearly 50% are self-employed. Low productivity occupations characterize self-employment in agriculture and non-agriculture.

Agriculture produces several cash crops but is dominated by cocoa: Since the 1960s, agriculture has been dominated by cocoa, with coffee, palm oil; and cashews and cotton

3. Houphuet-Boigny was re-elected in a landslide in October 1990. But he died in office soon after (Dec 07, 1993) and was succeeded by his deputy Henri Konan Bédié who was the President of the Parliament. Bédié was however overthrown in a coup by General Robert Guéi on Dec 24, 1999. Elections were held in 2000, but they were won by Laurent Gbagbo. The first Ivorian Civil War broke out in 2002

4. The disputed elections of 2010 between Gbagbo (from the South) and Ouattara (from the North) led to the second Ivorian Civil War of 2010-11. Alassane Ouattara took office as the undisputed president on April 11, 2012. He was re-elected in 2015, and 2020. He is now serving his third 5-year term in office.

5. The AG/GDP changes by decade are: 26% in 1980; 33% in 1990; 24% in 2000. (WBG, June 2015)

6. World Development indicators. Sri Lanka also depended on one export crop, tea; and had a protracted civil war during 1983-2009.

7. Out of a total irrigation potential of 475,000 ha, only 73,000 ha (15%) is actually equipped, and only 45% of this is actually irrigated (.15X.45=.0675). (WBG et al, 2019)

(mainly in the North) also as cash crops. These cash crops occupy some 72% of cultivated area. (Plan National de Développement (PND), 2012-15) The main food crops are cassava, rice, plantain, and corn. AG/GDP at 20% in 2019 contributes to 60-70% of total export earnings and employment, which has declined from 60% in 2008 to 48% of the total in 2018. (WBG, April 2021) Over the 2012-2019 period, the economy grew at an average of 8% per year, with agricultural production growing by 50%. However, the value-added in agriculture is low: agriculture contributed only 1.9 percentage points (ppts) to the high annual growth rate of 8%, while services contributed 4.1 ppts and industry to 2.6 ppts. (WBG, 2021) Cocoa is produced by smallholders on farms that average 4-5 ha. Though a dominant crop, cocoa yields are low.⁸ It employs about one million producers and provides income to 5 million people (20% of the total population). Côte d'Ivoire's cocoa exports contribute to 40% global supply. (WBG, 2019) Cocoa is therefore often referred to as "black gold."

Côte d'Ivoire's reliance on cocoa is however problematic: It is problematic in four major ways. One, its dominance makes Côte d'Ivoire highly vulnerable to declining terms of trade as happened after 1976, its highest point. Cocoa prices have been falling since then and never fully recovered. Between 1985 and 1992, international prices of both cocoa and coffee collapsed, with smaller declines between 1992 and 2008.⁹ (WBG, June 2015) Thus, after an enviable growth record from 1960 to 1979, the economy stagnated and declined when terms of trade turned negative. Thus, GDP/capita, which was US\$ 1,379 (in 1995 dollars) in 1978, fell to under US\$ 776 in 2002.¹⁰ (Bogetic et al., Nov 2007) Two, since cocoa yields are low, as in the case of many of the other cash and food crops, their production increased—from around 550,000 MT in 1980 to 2 m MT in 2018. This increase was achieved at the cost of destroying all Côte d'Ivoire's forests virtually.¹¹ Forest cover fell from roughly 12 m ha in 1960 to 3 m ha in 2018. Consumers in industrialized countries increasingly require certified cocoa; that is, production certified not to be detrimental to the environment and not in violation of labor's rights. Deforestation and child labor are threats to Côte d'Ivoire's continued access to these markets. Three, Côte d'Ivoire's share of profits along the cocoa-chocolate value chain is only 5%-7%. Most of the profit of the cocoa-chocolate value chain is in the chocolate paste and distribution phase—almost 80%—a phase in which Côte d'Ivoire plays no role. This non-existent role is a threat to Côte d'Ivoire's access to the growing Asian markets (e.g., China and India), as Malaysia is positioning itself as a center for cocoa grinding and chocolate marketing in Asia. Four, more than half of the cocoa producers (smallholders who predominate in Côte d'Ivoire's agriculture) live below the extreme poverty line of US\$ 1.9/day. These producers receive a much lower percentage of international prices than other West African cocoa-producing households: 60 % in Côte d'Ivoire¹² compared to more than 70% in Ghana; 80% in Cameroon, and 90% in Nigeria. Ivorian producers' low-profit profit-sharing is due to high domestic marketing costs and 22% taxation of the cost-insurance-freight (CIF) value of exports. (WBG, 2019)

Lack of competition, a major productivity-decreasing factor for agriculture and non-agriculture: In addition to the above factors which undermine market access and value-

8. Harvested yields of cocoa average 450 kg/ha (2015). Target rate: 1 ton/ha (2019). (WBG, Aug 2015)

9. International cocoa prices/MT fell from US \$ 4000 in 1976 to US \$ 2000 in 1979; it has not risen to the level of 1976. Prices between 2016-2019 fluctuated between US \$ 1900 to US \$ 2700.

10. Of course, the collapse was exacerbated and prolonged by political turmoil soon after Houphuet-Boigny's death in 1993, and by continued high population growth (3.26% between 1980-2002).

11. Cocoa trees take 5 years to start bearing pods and 7 years to become commercially productive. They reach their peak in 10 years; yields start declining after 16 years; and they can live up to 100 years. However, they have a useful productive life for 3-4 decades; and their productive pod-bearing life is considered to be 60 years.

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addition along agri-business value chains, a cross-cutting factor that decreases productivity and diversification throughout the economy is market concentration. Competition is weak as business activity is in the hands of relatively few market players. According to the latest Global Competitiveness Report, Côte d'Ivoire is ranked 106th among 140 countries in terms of market dominance in 2019. (WBG, April 2021). Businesses do not operate on a level playing field. There are high levels of market concentration and limited numbers of new firms. Important examples are the mobile telecom services and road transport. Côte d'Ivoire's Competition Commission lacks the institutional independence and the power to enforce competition rules at the national level.

Land, once a source of wealth creation under Houphuet-Boigny, now a source of conflict: Houphuet-Boigny's immigration policy welcomed some three million immigrants from the surrounding countries to coexist with over 60 ethnic groups in Côte d'Ivoire. With such increased labor, cash incentives, and rising farmgate prices, cocoa production expanded on abundant land from 100,000 tons (1960) to 370,000 tons (1980). (WBG, 2015) In 1963, Houphuet-Boigny announced that those who used Ivoirian land for production would earn rights to the land, but he did little to reduce the land title requirements that the French had set up. As a result, land ownership and enforcement of such rights was unclear, thus providing fertile ground for conflict. Disputes between local farmers and immigrants inevitably arose when cocoa prices declined, (especially between 1985-1992), as farmers required more land to produce more to maintain profits. The competition between Northerners and Southerners for agricultural land became intense. In the west of Côte d'Ivoire, land disputes and social instability are particularly critical. Land disputes and tenure insecurity became potent forces fueling conflict over ethnic lines raising questions about what constitutes "ivoirité" (what constitutes Ivoirian identity) and what is immigrant.¹³ Despite the return to political stability and to high growth under President Alassane Ouattara after 2012, land disputes between locals and immigrants remain a major source of fragility to the Ivoirian state.

Côte d'Ivoire's food systems at the farm, processing and marketing levels: Achieving food self-sufficiency was a goal under Houphuet-Boigny. In the late 1980s, his government launched a campaign of food self-sufficiency to reduce food imports as cereals constituted 20% of the national diet during the previous decade. Food crop production had increased by 3.4% per year between 1965 to 1985. Still, food crop productivity had risen by around 1%, well under the population growth rate, which was over 3.5 % per year.¹⁴ Root crops and cereals are main food crops, but imports of rice and wheat, meat, and milk are essential. The main root crops are yams, plantains, cassava, and taro. The main cereals are maize, sorghum, millet and paddy rice, grown mainly in the northern savanna zone. Productivity in food agriculture is low, as constraints on smallholders include lack of water control; low access to production inputs such as fertilizers and credit; and to technologies that are climate smart and resilient. Moreover, slash and burn is still widely practiced. As in the cash crop sector, widespread land tenure insecurity does not promote proper soil fertility management and other long-term investments. Continued years of political polarization, turmoil and crisis (especially from 1993-2011), contributed to the degraded state of much

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ethnic mixing, the country can be broadly divided in regional blocks. The center and east are mainly occupied by the Baoulé and Agni from Ghana; the north by the Malinké, and Dioula, from Guinea and Mali; and the Senaphou and Lobi from Burkina Faso and Mali; the west by the Dan, or Yacouba and Gouro from Southern Guinea and Sierra Leone; and the south west, the Krou peoples including the Bété and Wê. They are believed to be one of the earliest migrants from the south western coast. Bedié is a Baoulé; Gbagbo a Bété; and Ouattara a Dioula.

14. Houphuet-Boigny encouraged immigration: From the north, they came mainly from Mali and Burkina Faso; from the west, mainly from Guinea. Its current rate of population growth is nearly 2.6 % per year. As of mid-2020, Côte d'Ivoire had roughly 2.6 m migrants, or an estimated 9.7% of total population.

of the infrastructure and poor logistics services which inevitably reduced market access. Post-harvest value added is undermined by significant storage losses; high marketing costs, and inefficiencies throughout the agribusiness value chain.

Despite low productivity, the dominance of local food production an advantage under COVID-19, and given the Russian invasion of Ukraine: ¹⁵ Limited marketing of food staples became an advantage for Ivoirian consumers during COVID-19 lockdown, as marketing links were damaged. In the 2000s, food crops became the largest contributor to growth within the primary sector, in contrast to the 1970s and the 1980s when export crops were the largest contributor to overall growth. (WBG, March 2015) Côte d'Ivoire is self-sufficient in basic staples as they are produced locally. The main imports include vegetables, fish, and especially rice from Asia. Fortunately, recent food harvests were good. (WBG et al., 2019) As in the rest of West Africa, most of the calories consumed come from local production, from Europe and Asia. For West Africa, trade in wheat provides only 1.7 % of total calories consumed. ¹⁶ (IFPRI, April 2019)

Determinants of access: demand-side—status and issues

The growth acceleration since 2012 reduced urban poverty, but it was neither high productivity nor inclusive: The Government of Ouattara succeeded in regaining political stability and generating high GDP growth. During political turmoil, poverty increased from 10% in 1985 to nearly 50 % in 2008. In 2015, poverty at US\$3.2/day was 57%; at the national poverty line, 46%; at the extreme poverty line of US \$ 1.9/day, 28%. Poverty further declined to around 39 % in 2018. Urban people benefitted: from 2008-2015; urban poverty fell from 63% to 57% of the population; for rural areas, poverty went up from 38% to 43%. (WBG, May 2020). Thus, despite these high growth rates, rural poverty has increased. The high level of inequality explains the uneven impact of growth. The Gini coefficient was 0.44 in 1985; it declined to 0.38 in 1993 but rose to 0.42 in 2008. (WBG, June 2015) Most of the benefits of the high growth materialized in urban areas, particularly Abidjan, with regional disparities (notably poverty rates in the North and Central regions) remaining major challenges. This differential poverty impact on urban versus rural areas also contributes to the high rate of urbanization. The rate of urbanization soared: "at breakneck speed" from 17.7% in 1960, to over 50% in 2018. (World Bank, Feb 2019) The wealthiest 20% of the population accounted for 40% of total consumption in 2018, while the bottom 40%, for only 18%. The disparities within the cities are even sharper. For example, in Abidjan, the top 20% consumed 85 times as much as the bottom 20%. (WBG, April 2021) The informal sector contributed to around 70% of value-added, employing 90% of the population. Approximately 47% of the labor force in agriculture and 29% in non-agriculture are self-employed. (World Bank. Aug. 2020) Self-employment tends to be informal, low productivity, and highly vulnerable to shocks.

Determinants of utilization: nutrition and health

Widespread nutritional deficiencies and limited access to essential health services exact a heavy toll despite some improvements: The limited progress made in reducing poverty and continued high-income inequality are amply reflected in widespread nutritional deficiencies. Having enough staple foods is a far cry from being well nourished and food secure. Although Côte d'Ivoire has achieved the status of a lower middle-income country—

15. The Russian invasion of Ukraine started on Feb 24, 2022.

16. Trade with Ukraine is minimal, though Russia is more important.

GNI/Cap US\$ 2,280 (2020)—its epidemiological profile is that of a low-income country.¹⁷ Its health outcomes are among the worst in the region and globally. Noteworthy examples include: (i) one in every ten children died before the age of 5 (96 deaths/1000 live births, 2016); (ii) 22 % of infants were stunted; (iii) for the last two decades, maternal mortality ratio has been one of the highest in the world at 645 deaths/100,000 live births; (iv) infectious diseases constitute a significant burden with malaria posing the most significant burden of disease; and (v) neo-natal disorders, HIV/AIDS, and lower respiratory infections are the top three causes of death. HIV, TB, and malaria combined constitute over 24% of annual deaths. Although Côte d'Ivoire was one of the nine West African countries committed to Family Planning 2020 to accelerate the use of family planning services, contraceptive prevalence rate remained low at 18%.¹⁸ Skilled birth attendance at 59%—is one of the lowest in West Africa, due to limited funding. There have been some improvements; e.g., in life expectancy, however, it is still the lowest in West Africa at 55 years old; for infant and child under-five mortality, though it has declined, it is still high at 100/1000.¹⁹ (WBG, 2020)

Many factors inhibit access to quality health care delivery for the bulk of the population: Despite progress made between 2015 to 2018, long distances pose a major barrier to service utilization as only 33% of the population live within a five-kilometer radius from a health facility. Given the high-income inequality in Côte d'Ivoire, some urban areas like Abidjan are well served, whereas many rural areas have virtually no access. Even if patients reach the facility of the three-tiered health delivery system, the service is hampered by severe shortages of resources—staff, equipment, medications, etc.²⁰ The entire health care system is seriously underfunded: Côte d'Ivoire spends less on the system than almost every country in the West Africa region, and the region itself is below SSA averages. The public health system does receive donor financing, but this financing does not go through the government. Most external funding is allocated to primary health care to control infectious diseases, some 70% of which is spent on HIV and malaria. In addition to underfunding, the public system is undermined by numerous inefficiencies in administration and in the supply chain of drugs and medications. Out-of-pocket payments in 2016 were the single biggest source of financing for the system. The wealthiest quintile uses private services; the lowest quintiles use mainly traditional healers, community health workers and public health centers.

Determinants of stability: macro, trade, and resilience to shocks

Maintenance of macro, price, and social stability since 2012 and under the COVID-19 pandemic: Since 2012, political calm has largely prevailed although it was interrupted by violent clashes following President Ouattara 's election for a third consecutive term in October 2020. Remarkably, the clashes did not last for years. The shock of the pandemic slowed GDP growth to 1.8% for 2020. Like many governments, the Ouattara government

17. The ups and downs of Côte d'Ivoire's GNI/cap are dramatic. Thus, GNI/cap at current US \$ (Atlas method) at independence in 1960, it was 160; in 1980 it rose to 1,160; in 1985, during troubled times, it was 640; in 2002, it was 570; in 2011, it was 1,110; in 2015, it was 2,050; in 2020, it reached 2,280. (Source: WDI). Low income is GNI/Cap < US \$ 1045; lower middle income is: 1046-4095 (July 2021 classification)
<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD?locations=CI>

18. The government's goal was to increase the prevalence rate to 30%. Low use of contraceptives is a major problem as it will limit further decline in fertility. This decline is important to lower Côte d'Ivoire's current high population growth rate at 2.6% per year, and enable it to benefit from the demographic dividend—that is minimize the dependency ratio or maximize the ratio of working age population to dependents by 2050.

19. For comparison: The average IMR for SSA is 52.7/1000 live births (2018); in OECD countries, the average is 4.1/1000; life expectancy for SSA is 61.63 years (2019)

20. The three-tier system consists of: (1) primary care clinics; (2) regional hospitals; and (3) specialized care not treated at levels one and two.

had to respond to provide both relief and support to a battered economy. The fiscal cost of the response is estimated at around 1.9% of 2019 GDP (US\$ 823 million), some 90% of which requires external financing.²¹ (WBG, 2020) Since February 24, 2022, global wheat, oil and fertilizer prices have risen with the Russian-Ukraine crisis. The FAO price index for March 2022 has jumped 12.6% since February 2022. (FAO Food Price Index, released April 04, 2022).²² Since none of the essential commodities (e.g., wheat, vegetable oils, meat, sugar, and dairy are major consumption items for most Ivoirians), Côte d'Ivoire may not experience destabilizing food price inflation. Much depends on how long these pandemic- and war-induced disruptions will last and whether global demand for its exports will suffer. It is too soon to tell.

Maintaining stability longer term may be a challenge though: Côte d'Ivoire was not resilient to prolonged market shocks like falling cocoa and other commodity prices. Domestic political conflicts, including conflict over land further increased its fragility. One major reason was its lack of diversification from primary commodities. Another was conflicting claims over land and land tenure insecurity. In the future, maintaining macro, price, and political stability—all needed to strengthen availability and access to affordable and nutritious food, will be a significant challenge. Government will have to balance its greater indebtedness with the demands of increased investments and reforms needed to diversify its economy while raising productivity in a sustainable, climate-resilient, and inclusive manner.

CONCLUSION

The Ouattara Government wants Côte d'Ivoire to reach upper middle-income status by 2030. If its impressive aggregate growth since 2012 continues, it can succeed. The challenge ahead is: how to make such high growth sustainable and transformative. In other words, how should it build sustainable, increased productivity, inclusive, and climate-resilient food systems? Côte d'Ivoire's current food systems are low productivity, not inclusive, not resilient to commodity market downturns and to climate change. Consequently, all four pillars of food security are on shaky foundations.

Looking forward: Both (i) the priority Côte d'Ivoire places on making best use of the opportunities for diversification and productivity growth which the vastly expanded markets of the AfCFTA offer; and (ii) the ability of its agri-food system to adapt to a climate changing world will have a determining impact on how sustainable, high productivity, inclusive and climate resilient its food systems will become. The opportunities and the challenges can hardly be higher.

21. Côte d'Ivoire received a loan of US \$ 886 m from the IMF and has applied for a US \$ 300 m in Emergency Response and Development Policy Financing from the World Bank.

22. The latest increase reflects new all-time highs for vegetable oils, cereals and meat sub-indices, while those of sugar and dairy products also rose significantly.

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Isabelle Tsakok is an adjunct professor at SIPA and a Senior Fellow at the Policy Center for the New South, previously known as OCP Policy Center, who focuses on rural development, agricultural economics, policy analysis, food security and poverty reduction. She holds a PhD in Economics. Dr. Tsakok has worked on development issues for over twenty-five years, first as World Bank staff and since retirement as a consultant. She has specialized in policy analysis, program and project formulation and evaluation, research and training activities in agriculture, agro-business, rural development and poverty reduction. She has worked in most regions of the developing world: Africa, Asia - South, Southeast and East, North Africa and the Middle East and Latin America.

About the Policy Center for the New South

The Policy Center for the New South: A public good for strengthening public policy. The Policy Center for the New South (PCNS) is a Moroccan think tank tasked with the mission of contributing to the improvement of international, economic and social public policies that challenge Morocco and Africa as integral parts of the Global South.

The PCNS advocates the concept of an open, responsible and proactive « new South »; a South that defines its own narratives, as well as the mental maps around the Mediterranean and South Atlantic basins, within the framework of an open relationship with the rest of the world. Through its work, the think tank aims to support the development of public policies in Africa and to give experts from the South a voice in the geopolitical developments that concern them. This positioning, based on dialogue and partnerships, consists in cultivating African expertise and excellence, capable of contributing to the diagnosis and solutions to African challenges.

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author.

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