



ATLANTIC CURRENTS

AN ANNUAL REPORT ON WIDER ATLANTIC PERSPECTIVES AND PATTERNS

OVERCOMING THE CHOKE POINTS

DECEMBER 2018

5th Edition

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About OCP Policy Center

The OCP Policy Center is a Moroccan policy-oriented think tank based in Rabat, Morocco, striving to promote knowledge sharing and to contribute to an enriched reflection on key economic and international relations issues. By offering a southern perspective on major regional and global strategic challenges facing developing and emerging countries, the OCP Policy Center aims to provide a meaningful policy-making contribution through its four research programs: Agriculture, Environment and Food Security, Economic and Social Development, Commodity Economics and Finance, Geopolitics and International Relations.

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List of Abbreviations

AAPSO	The Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization
ACDP	Agricultural Competitiveness and Diversification Program
AGOA	Africa Growth Opportunity Act
CAADP	Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program
CBDR	Common but Differentiated Responsibilities
CHS	UN Commission on Human Security
CSDP	Common Security and Defense Policy
DSB	Dispute Settlement Body
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EII	European Intervention Initiative
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreements
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
G20	Group of 20
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HDR	Human Development Report
ICC	International Criminal Court
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INDC	Intended Nationally Determined Contribution
JCPOA	Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MERCOSUR	Mercado Común del Sur (Southern Common Market)
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NORDEFFCO	Nordic Defense Cooperation
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OSPAA	Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization
OSPAAL	Organization for the Solidarity of the Peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America
PAFI	Pan-African Financial Institutions
PESCO	Permanent Structured Cooperation
PES	Payment for Ecosystem Services
PLAZA	Périmètre Logistique Aménagé en Zone Aéroportuaire
R&D	Research and Development
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
REDD+	Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation
SDGs	Sustaining Development Goals
SSCCC	South-South Cooperation on Climate Change
TEU	Treaty of the European Union
TSI	The Three Seas Initiative
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNESCO	UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
US FED	United States' Federal Reserve System
USSR	The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WAAPP	West African Agricultural Productivity Program
WTO	World Trade Organization
YPG	The People's Protection Units (from the Kurdish word Yekîneyên Parastina Gel)

Foreword

by Hafsati Abiola

When my dear friend, Professor Bouchra Rahmouni asked me to write the foreword for this edition of the Atlantic Dialogues, I knew I had to say yes. Having read the dozen chapters that make up the edition, I'm glad I did.

The quotation - the best way to predict the future is to create it - rang through my mind several times as I read chapter after chapter in this wonderful trove of ideas and innovative thinking.

Several elements of this edition will delight the reader. First, the breadth of issues covered is impressive. Every major area of tension to outlaugh crisis between the communities joined together by the Atlantic is covered, from the current migrant crisis to NATO and the prevailing trade system. Second, the choice of scholars and practitioners who were invited to weigh in on the subjects is a veritable who's who from academia and development. And third, each writer took seriously the request that they go beyond description and analysis of the issues and offer their ideas for what levers can be pulled to get to desirable outcomes, hence the quote above.

It would be a good idea to democratize these ideas. They are not meant for books that will be kept on shelves but should be engaged, debated, attempted. It is a good thing that most will be discussed during the December 2018 Atlantic Dialogues, a space that is quickly becoming a brain trust for the African continent. One hopes they find an even wider audience for, taken together, the chapters make a strong case for responsible globalization. Allow me to quote from one of the contributors to the collection to illustrate this point:

“There is no easy solution to the issue of inequality and disruption caused by globalization and technology. Policymakers must step up their efforts to explain the benefits of trade, while at the same time strengthening the mechanisms that protect the most vulnerable. However, there are limits to social assistance and the most promising long-term solutions are those that promote mobility of workers, which above all means building skills and flexibility” (The Future of the World Trading System by Uri Dadush.)

Without being abrasive, grounded in sound research and data, our various experts help chart a course to possible futures that offer broader prosperity and stability than the present. I hope you enjoy reading them

and more than that, I hope whenever you find yourself in a meeting where migration or agriculture or Europe's defense architecture comes up, you put forward some of the ideas offered up generously in this edition and contribute to creating that new world that is long overdue.

by Hafsah Abiola

Introduction

By Bouchra Rahmouni

Since the first edition in 2014, the Atlantic Currents publication has enriched the literature about the Atlantic area to incorporate it in its wider historicity, temporality and, to a large extent, to advancing thinking about shaping its future. Building the future of the Atlantic area means, first of all, identifying the aspects that characterize such a dense and rich in its diversity.

Without complacency, by identifying shortcomings and challenges, a dozen authors from different horizons undertook the task of analyzing the Atlantic area of this new millennium. A cultural focus can be found at the heart of this analysis. Indeed, it would be almost impossible to understand the dynamics at play in the Atlantic area, without exploring its history, nor would it be possible to reject the ideas of material and immaterial territoriality and temporality that is specific to Atlantic zone, without avoiding its dilution in “the global time” (le “temps Mondial” concept borrowed to Zaki Laidi). In 1993, Samuel Huntington’s clash of civilizations did not reject the idea of new ideological or cultural fractures in the making, but he had put forward a conceptualization of opposing “worlds” to analyze major geopolitical zones: The Chinese world, the Russian world ... A naïve question may come to our minds: Could we speak of an Atlantic world?

To answer this question, two chapters are dedicated to cultural issues in this Atlantic Currents’ edition. In Chapter 1, Paulo Antonio Paranagua analyses, the cultural exchanges as part of a « connected history » within transatlantic triangle (Africa, North and South America and Europe) in order to determine the main characteristics, dynamics and perspectives of cultural relationships over time. In Chapter 2, Mohamed Benaïssa starts by addressing the concept of the « Atlantic Space » through a geographical, historical, and strategic lenses. He then presents four parameters that are relevant for understanding cultural questions in the Atlantic world such as the historical legacy, strategic considerations, cultural stakes, and new cultural transformations.

We often ask ourselves if the Atlantic is a fracture zone, or if on the contrary, it favors exchanges and contacts? History tells us that the word “Atlantic”, given by the Greeks in reference to the Atlas Titan or the people of the Atlanteans (Herodotus), disappeared from the cards in the Middle Ages, becoming essential a term that refers to “ocean sea” or “western sea”. This

last name takes all its meaning after the discovery of the Americas and the bypassing of Africa to reach India. This opened a new geopolitical era where, this ocean, renamed “Atlantic” by Mercator in the middle of the 16th century, becoming the center of the global economy. Today, the Atlantic Ocean is still not ready to be abandoned by the vital maritime flows of the world economy.

In the Southern hemisphere, trade between Latin American and African countries grew by 75% between 2005 and 2012, thanks to several free trade agreements, including an agreement between MERCOSUR and the South African Customs Union (which includes Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland). In the North, the United States remained the largest partner for EU exports of goods in 2017, and the second largest for EU imports of goods.

But beyond trade numbers on a balance sheet, Uri Dadush in his chapter about The Future of the World Trading System tries to explain the apparent paradox: “The trading system has never, in the post-war era, been under severe strain as is the case today” by providing a panoramic view of the causes driving the current trade tensions. He then insists on the importance of a coordinated and broad-based approach to resolve them. Indeed, the present challenges facing the trading system are likely to become more pressing in the future, particularly due to president Donald Trump’s and vision, which will likely result in further protectionism.

In addition to disrupting the global economy, another legacy of the Trump administration is assessed by Younes Abouyoub in a chapter entitled “A perilous Legacy: From Trumping Multilateralism to the Demise of the U.S. Storytelling?”. The 50th president of the United States of America is described in these words: “President Trump is as much the product of a nationalist Zeitgeist reinvigorated as its promotor.” Could this lead to the end of the international governance system in place since the end of World-War II? Will it lead to an irreversible erosion of the US storytelling? What could be a lasting impact on the fate of the Palestinians, on the Middle East region, or on the world more broadly Dr. Abouyoub affirms in his chapter that Trump’s presidency has harmed the US strategic narrative and its soft power on the world stage. His legacy will outlive him for years to come and it will be difficult for his successor(s) to undo the policies of the current administration policies, both domestically and internationally.

Donald Trump’s effect has not spared NATO. Since his election, the president has kept renewing attacks on the organization. Does this reflect a crisis of confidence in the context of a more chaotic security environment and important geopolitical changes? The Alliance finds itself challenged by rival states across a wide spectrum of ongoing conflicts. In addition, other

geopolitical changes, such as the proliferation of ballistic missiles among both state- and non-state actors around the Atlantic sea put key military and commercial transit points at risk. In Chapter 5, Rachid El Houdaigui advocates that NATO is an evolving strategic concept in need of a fresh strategic consensus around "burden sharing" through two dynamics: "Europeanism" and "Atlanticism".

Describing the dynamics at play around the Atlantic basin has led us to consider the crises and security issues that drive them. Migration is explored from a number of different standpoints in this edition. Based on the relationship between the demographic transition and African migration towards Europe and the evolution of European demographics, Abdelhak Bassou in Chapter 6 argues that African migration could help meet the European needs. In Chapter 7, this analysis is supplemented by Soukeyna Ndiaye Ba, who gives an overview of the exponential growth of migration in Atlantic countries leading to transnational and transcontinental issues in the South, and to the emergence of xenophobic racist political forces in the North.

What are the factors that motivate migrants to leave their countries? One may cite human insecurity - whether generated by neo-liberal globalization, militarization, trafficking and the sex industry – along with social inequality, poverty, terrorism and local conflicts. These are all enormous and pressing challenges, both for developing countries and for countries in the Atlantic area.

This edition proposes to explore the concepts of "human security" and "positive peace" in order to lay a foundation for self-sustainability of human security responses. Youssef Mahmoud in Chapter 8 presents the concept of positive peace as a complementary framework and explores the UN 2030 Agenda as an overarching framework for pursuing both people-centered human security and positive peace in the transatlantic space.

Ten years after the global economic crisis, economic recovery is still fragile in Atlantic Basin. The expectations of growth are decreasing and take-off is struggling from feeble demand from developed countries, pushing developing ones to look for alternative growth strategies. These challenges have constrained structural transformations which would enable new growth drivers. Without unnecessary pessimism, but based on a deep analysis of four main market actors (US, Europe, emerging countries and low-income markets) Otaviano Canuto and Eric Ntumba explain why 10 years after the international financial crisis, a new one might be looming.

Food and agricultural issues in the Atlantic are explored by Fatima

Ezzahra Mengoub and Tharcisse Guèdègbé in Chapter 10. Grounded in sound research and data, the authors present the situation of food security in Latin America and in Africa in order to identify opportunities for transatlantic cooperation in the agricultural sector between the two continents.

In the Atlantic basin, there is another type of cooperation that could help overcome one of the major challenges facing humankind: fighting climate change and achieving sustainable development. Rim Berhab and Mbuih Zukane describe the asymmetries that exist between developed and developing countries in terms of their responsibility. Chapter 11, gives an overview of historical and recent trends of carbon dioxide emissions, explores key issues that perpetuate the North-South divide during discussions about climate change, and proposes some recommendations to rebalance this debate.

Last but not least, El Mostafa Rezrazi's chapter tracks the evolution and philosophical conceptualization of the so-called "South" since the Bandung Conference of 1950 and offers an attempt to revisit the concept by insisting on the need to raise awareness of its geographical and geo-strategic advantages, with a special focus on Africa.

In addition to providing key elements needed to analyze specific chokepoint within the Atlantic space, this publication's statistical annex further enriches the different points of view expressed throughout the publication. Badr Mandri and Yassine Msadfa provide over 60 tables and graphs with wide-ranging indicators that illustrate trade, investment, migration and remittances flows, while capturing the economic, labor market, and business climate in each Atlantic country or sub-region.

Admittedly, the Atlantic area has witnessed drastic changes in its environment, ecology, economy, culture, demography and geopolitics. The latter, under the influence of multiple factors, both regional and international, will continue to evolve. Some of the inherent difficulties and paradoxes that this space encounters have been discussed at length by the authors of this publication. Undeniably, the Atlantic area is a tormented space in the North, and an area of economic, political and social vulnerability in the South because due to an apparent lack of strategic guidance for developing an approach that reinforces the sense of belonging to an Atlantic community. This would require giving various stakeholders of the Atlantic area an impetus to create a transatlantic union comprising both the North and the South of the Atlantic and its three banks.

Chapter 1

The Atlantic, a Triangular Arena for Cultural Interaction

Paulo Antonio Paranagua

“Ancient ocean, you are a symbol of identity: forever equal to yourself. In essence you do not vary and if your waves are somewhere furious, further away in some other area, they are of the most complete calm...”

Count of Lautréamont, Les chants de Maldoror (1868)

The founding documents of the Atlantic Area are of immediate cultural significance. Indeed, it is both notarial and literary acts that announced transatlantic discoveries e.g. the letters of Flagship Admiral Christopher Columbus to the Spanish crown and the letter of scribe Pero Vaz de Caminha, reporting to the King of Portugal on the findings of navigator Pedro Alvares Cabral.

Explorations made during the century of great navigators while certainly commercial in nature, also led to an expansion of scientific boundaries, gave rise to new objects of knowledge and triggered a general shift in understanding. These journeys upset ideas, prejudices and mentalities, widening physical and intellectual horizons and thus gave new impetus to culture.

The New World, the Old Continent and Africa, whose coastlines provided anchor points for seafarers, have since forged enduring links and ceased to evolve in isolation. This evolution is part of a “connected history”, as Sanjay Subrahmanyam, Chair of Global History at the Collège de France, put it. A universe in motion, no longer closed in on itself but open to others. Universalism sentencing localism to obsolescence. Since then, the intermixing of populations over centuries through wars and migrations, ever-changing identities and cultural blending, have become common features of all three Atlantic continents.

Crossbreeding as a legacy

Human history is not a long, quiet stream, but a succession of divisions, clashes and violence sometimes leading up to peace and serenity. The Americas, Europe and Africa all bear an indelible scar in the slave trade.

Rightly seen today as a crime against humanity, slavery was common practice for centuries, with the complicity of African and Arab traffickers, European slave traders, who made the fortune of many Atlantic ports, and settlers from both North and South America and the Caribbean, including those from major plantations. Africa, Europe and the Americas therefore share a heavy yet ambivalent heritage, as it fostered cultural cross-fertilization between the three continents over an extended time period.

Population movements, whether forced or more or less voluntary (such as migration), are a source of intense and often fertile exchange between cultures. They bear as much if not more weight than the action of institutional actors. Jazz for instance, among modernity's main creations, is the product of the presence of an African-American community whose vitality was sustained by a mixed spirituality. American music, in turn, had a prolonged and stimulating effect on the compositions and performers of Europe, Latin America, the Caribbean and Africa. This is a fine example of impact that is not one-way, nor binary, but triangular and with two-way flows.

At the risk of awakening historical quarrels, the ambivalence of colonization is also perceptible in Jesuit action among the indigenous populations of the Americas. Priests of the Society of Jesus were the first to study and establish a grammar and lexicon of the Tupi-Guarani language, the main nucleus of Brazil's indigenous idioms. Jesuit Missions in South America constituted an anthropological and social experience prefiguring the utopias of the 19th century. One can argue whether catechesis saved human lives without preserving hearts and minds, souls and cosmogony. That is the ambiguity of civilization and assimilation. The issue however, is the survival of these communities in the face of enslavement predators. Consequently, despite the dismantling of the Missions by the Iberian crown in the 18th century, Guaraní culture survived and flourished in former Jesuit evangelization territories. The Inquisition, at any rate, does encapsulate the action of Catholicism, at least not in Latin America.

“Triangular trade” refers to the slave trade, deporting 12 million Africans. Yet relations between the three sides of the Atlantic are not circumscribed to this infamous trade. The Atlantic has been and remains an area of cultural exchange that deserves to be revived and consolidated through cooperation and negotiation. The common past should neither be idealized nor rejected, but captured in its contrasts and contradictions. Since the dawn of modern times,

the search for wealth and prosperity has been accompanied by discovery and exploration of nature and of other civilizations: scientists follow in the footsteps of colonists, artists follow merchants. Cultural interaction was always based on economic initiative, the two are inseparable. Such is even more so today, in the age of cultural industries and the Internet.

The transatlantic triangle as a space for economic and cultural exchange is at virtual opposites of traditional binary relations that lead to Manicheism, antagonism, polarization and overly exclusive power struggles. Nevertheless, its potential remains underestimated and under-initiated. The common heritage of crossbreeding deserves to be highlighted, because it is an antidote to the identity and sectarian deviations afflicting contemporary societies.

Challenges of the new century

Africa, Europe and the Americas in the 21st century are going through crises and moments of doubt. These can morph into beneficial transitions when challenges are met without resorting to simplistic, demagogic or populist responses, while problems at hand are undeniably complex. All three continents experience the sometimes-painful incompleteness of their historical destiny, causing frustration and perplexity. African independence, the return of Latin America and Southern Europe to democracy and regional integration of Europe and the Americas, have all failed to keep all their promises.

This moment of doubt about the future of societies calls for ambitious initiatives to boost confidence and hope, to ensure the cohesion of populations and even to re-enchant the world, through cultural, political, economic, ecological and social innovation. In Europe and Africa, as in the Americas, there is no salvation in nationalist withdrawal, nor in outdated hegemonic systems. The shadow of revived imperialism and colonialism comes today from outside the transatlantic triangle. China is increasingly present through trade, investments and initiatives around a renewed silk route.

While respecting diversity and pluralism, the universalism of humanist values and the commitment to multilateralism are shared convictions within the transatlantic triangle, despite the imperfections of democracies and nations that form it. Denial of the universality of human rights comes from States that profess so-called “Asian values” as an excuse for their failings in the eyes of the international community. Europe, Africa and the Americas are also unfortunately not immune to challenges to the rule of law. Asia however draws an increasing share of the world economy. Asians fascinate because of their old civilizations and ancestral spirituality. No nation will accordingly relinquish its potential Pacific face and that is quite understandable.

Moreover, both Africa and the Americas are often in a pivotal position between the Atlantic and the Pacific and intend to exploit this advantage. This is particularly the case for South Africa, the three countries of North America (Canada, the United States, Mexico), most of Central America and Colombia. Despite the vitality of the Asia-Pacific region, one must note that trade flows dating back to colonial times and the roads of the East seldom come with cultural exchanges comparable to those in the Atlantic triangle.

Linguistic capital

How to give new impetus to this fertile transatlantic space? To begin with, triangular and inter-regional partnerships can be more fruitful than mere bilateral relations. This applies to both States and institutions, such as universities and civil society actors. The main legacy of colonization, passed down one generation to the next, that all can claim without shame, is that of linguistic capital, made of European idioms spread over all continents. These old Latin or Anglo-Saxon languages have undergone changes that have enriched and altered them. The crossbreeding has taken place. Literatures from Africa and the Americas bear witness to this.

Idioms are no longer the prerogative of nations that saw them born, but of all the peoples who adopted and transformed them, through a process of creative appropriation. These linguistic assets now extend beyond any national framework. They serve as intangible passports in a globalized world. We live in a language; the poets rightly say. Nevertheless, this “creolization” highlighted by Martiniquan writer Edouard Glissant (1928-2011) is not a purely linguistic phenomenon. It reveals a cultural interaction that has shaped exchanges and societies. It makes it possible to circumvent identity traps present on all three continents.

The displacement or transposition of cultures induces adaptations and metamorphoses. Changing the place of production or perception comes with more than mere identical reproduction. Mimicry is a game of hide-and-seek, not copy and paste. Thus, the Baroque of the Americas has its own personality, which moves it as far away as it brings it closer to its origin in Europe. New York writer Henry James (1843-1916) and Cuban Alejo Carpentier (1904-1980) meticulously uncovered the subtle differences and tensions induced by the transposition of ideas and customs between the Old Continent and the New World. The transatlantic space has long been a laboratory for globalization and modernity, with all their contradictions.

The triangular relationship does not always enjoy equal intensity as time passes, and the three poles are not necessarily affected by the same influence.

Effects can be reversed, at times representing tradition and at other times innovation. African “primitive” art has thus contributed to modernity in Europe. The paradox is only in appearance. Transatlantic exchanges are not one-way and not all influences carry the same weight at a given moment in time. Sometimes the relationship weakens to the point of being reduced to a watermark, yet its potential remains. Donald Trump’s shattering appearance on the American and world political scenes does not necessarily entail an eclipse of the United States in transatlantic relations. Despite executive branch oscillations, continuity and stability characterize other institutions in the United States and its civil society. Starting with universities, which are essential actors in cultural exchanges.

In the words of a young Frenchman born in Montevideo, Isidore Ducasse, known as Count of Lautréamont (1846-1870), about the Atlantic: “In essence you do not vary and if your waves are somewhere furious, further away in some other area, they are of the most complete calm...”. The future in a globalized world belongs to polyglots. Bilingualism is already a reality in many nations in Africa, Europe and the Americas, if not always effectively integrated into educational programs.

Linguistic capital however needs to be consolidated and to grow. It is undoubtedly necessary to revitalize existing structures, including the Francophonie, Lusophony and institutions for the dissemination of Spanish and English, and to create new networks, new media and new digital platforms. Can these experiences be used to establish equivalent structures for Arabic or African vehicular languages, such as Bambara, Wolof and Swahili? The question deserves to be asked, if only in the interests of balance and respect for multilingualism.

Education and civil society

Reviving cultural action is not limited to organizing exhibitions or promoting the distribution of artists’ works or tours. It is more important to invest upstream, co-produce and train new generations. Cultural cooperation and soft power enjoy a privileged place in education, but also in the exchange and collaboration between civil society actors. Promoting a culture of peace, a culture of democracy and human rights, a culture of the rule of law, a culture of freedom, is not the sole preserve of governments, because it involves the future of populations and future generations.

This implies broadening the scope of cooperation beyond classical literary and linguistic fields, and the human sciences. It must extend to scientific, technical, managerial, economic and legal fields, as well as political science, diplomacy and defense. Once again, culture is not the monopoly of States, even if it does need public policies, especially when it comes to international

cooperation and negotiations with the new Internet behemoths.

Alongside the digital and ecological transition as experienced by virtually the whole planet at the beginning of this century, there is a demographic transition to be considered. Demography, the object of all fantasies and fears, is certainly a challenge, but also an opportunity, an opportunity for humanity. The first obvious fact to be highlighted is that the main migratory flows take place within Africa, due to the urbanization and displacements caused by conflict and violence. Demographic transition is on the agenda for Africans, but it is worth placing it in the context of the Atlantic triangle.

Transatlantic nations are often successful examples of migration intermingling. Integration, assimilation and cross-fertilization have been at work for centuries, with results that are both unrecognized and underestimated. In a diasporic world, integration does not necessarily entail renouncing the culture of origin. Migrants and their descendants have the potential to become actors in intercultural dialogue. While racial and ethnic tensions remain high in the three Atlantic poles, religious conflicts do not have the dramatic intensity they have in the Near and Middle East, or even Asia. The peaceful coexistence of Jews and Muslims is particularly notable in North and South America is an illustration of this. This experience should lead to more active participation in interfaith dialogue. Especially since major monotheisms are undergoing crises that invite the faithful and religious to be more humble and to renounce aggressive proselytism towards other faiths.

Catholicism, in competition with evangelical churches, struggles to stem the scandals caused by one of its main dogmas, the celibacy of priests. Protestantism suffers from fragmentation multiplied by the proliferation of evangelicals. Islam is challenged by fundamentalism. Tolerance and the separation of faith and politics can bring together all three Atlantic poles. Despite secularization, religious actors continue to play a significant role in education, cultural exchanges, development assistance and humanitarian work.

Triangular cooperation

Globalization and the end of the Cold War created a multipolar world in place of former blocs led by nuclear superpowers. The new international configuration, however, cannot be the exclusive preserve of emerging powers, to the detriment of small and medium-sized nations. The answer is not nationalist withdrawal, but the creation of regional and inter-regional groupings based on cooperation and negotiation.

The African Union, the Organization of American States and the European Union each face their own challenges. This does not preclude them from

forging new links and engaging other virtuous dynamics involving civil society. Universities, for example, sign agreements with their counterparts in other countries, often on a purely bilateral basis. Why not consider agreements involving teachers, researchers and students from all three regions on issues that are relevant and of common interest? The future belongs to cooperation networks between multiple actors. In the arts, the design and organization of major exhibitions is often beyond the capacity of a single institution and requires multiple partnerships. Visibility of the transatlantic area also requires ambitious events, with an impact on audiences.

The audiovisual sector is in the midst of major upheaval, with a shift in the focus of creativity shaking up the rules of production and consumption habits. Studios, cinemas and television channels are not immune to the downturn. What is the point of increasing the plethora of festivals, if their impact is ephemeral? Supporting the production of a film or television work, deploying co-productions, is undoubtedly positive, but it does not ensure the continuity of the effort. The rising wave, now drowning old-fashioned audiovisual entertainment is elsewhere: invention and real novelty, comes from serial fiction, produced with very variable budgets, both in traditional creative centers and in countries that are virtually non-existent in the international audiovisual landscape. HBO yesterday, Netflix today, cracked monopolies and certainties. Not even documentaries are immune to the impact of serial fiction. Growing demand and the multiplication of screens and media encourage the emergence of independent productions from elsewhere. Series production, writing and staging methods favor collective work and therefore competitions of different origins. Castings, stories, crews and shoots involve several countries. This is already the case for productions targeting diverse audiences. It is thus fertile ground for future cooperation in bringing the Atlantic triangle to life.

Today, “navigation”, communication and information are carried out via the Internet. For better or worse, social networks now occupy a considerable place in human relationships. A thorough reflection is required on this subject. Should we, for example, promote the circulation of works by overlooking the rights of creators? Conversely, in aggressively defending copyright, is there not a risk of disappearing from the web, the only proof of existence in the digital age?

For books, audiovisual and the music industry, not to mention events and fashion, these questions are almost existential. It is their survival in the age of digital dematerialization that is at stake. The cultural potential of the transatlantic space will not be fulfilled by ignoring modernity and the vertiginous transformations of today. The “connected history” of all three continents cannot nowadays avoid maximum connection via new technologies. That being said, such a reflection cannot be conducted in chambers or among researchers and academics, it must necessarily include all actors involved, States and civil society.

Faced with Internet giants and large conglomerates, creators and producers must take an approach of cooperation, convergence and negotiation, instead of giving in to centrifugal tendencies. Corporatism, retrenchment, conservatism, “every man for himself”, inevitably leads to a “save that can” debacle in the face of superior forces.

In conclusion, the Atlantic has been an arena for cultural exchanges often fraught with short-term economic interests and of variable intensity depending on the moment in time. Racial interbreeding retains the proof of this. It is nevertheless conceivable that this space could become the setting for an otherwise prolific and sustainable relationship, for the benefit of populations on all three shores of the Old Ocean. Distances have shortened, time has moved closer, compasses and clocks need to be adjusted, and the evolution of the planet needs to be harnessed rather than suffered.

Chapter 2

The Cultural Track of the Atlantic Dialogue

Mohamed Benaïssa

I want to share with you, in brief, my vision of cultural aspects of an Atlantic dialogue - from an Afro-Arab perspective, natural to someone from the southeastern shores of the Atlantic, where different worlds overlap and where there's a rich blend of cultural assets.

Before delving deeper, I shall address the concept of the "Atlantic space," a concept that seldom receives the scrutiny and analysis that it deserves. The concept is widely used in two separate senses, to which I shall refer to in brief:

First, the geographical-historical sense, which focuses on the bridges of communication that the Atlantic Ocean has fashioned between the three continents (Africa, Europe and the Americas), especially since the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope route in 1487 and Christopher Columbus's voyage to the Americas in 1492. The Atlantic space became the center of the world from the late 15th century onwards, slowing down development in the Asian world and leading to the evolution of modernity on the Atlantic shores of Europe. The world economy became concentrated around the Atlantic routes known as the triangular trade, and this had the worst possible impact on Africa because of the forced removal of millions of slaves to the New World.

Second, the strategic sense, which is associated with the Cold War and the international system that arose after the Second World War, based on the pivotal role of the United States as the center of the world economic system and as the greatest military power in the world. This was reflected in the creation in 1949 of the world's most important military alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), with a mission to ensure the security and stability of the Atlantic world, though its mission was later expanded to include mostly European countries.

These two senses set the general framework for the cultural question that concerns us here. There are four parameters that are relevant here and that call for some detailed observations:

First, a problem arises when cultural worlds that are very different, like those contained in this large Atlantic space, coexist, overlap and come into conflict.

The reality is that the concept of an Atlantic space arose at the end of the 15th century against the background of two tragic events, which were:

- (1) The expulsion and extermination of the Muslim and Jewish inhabitants of Andalusia by the ruling authorities that then seized control of the newly discovered continent; and
- (2) The extermination of the original inhabitants of the Americas in the name of the values of the civilization of the European Renaissance.

These two events were followed by another tragedy – the enslavement and deportation of a vast number of people from the African coast of the Atlantic in order to meet the needs of a new global economy based on exploiting the material and human resources of the countries of West and Central Africa. The wounds inflicted, which are not yet healed, did not however prevent cultural permeation in some cases, and this has been especially obvious in music, architecture, language, fashion, dance, customs and religion. However, the wounds did draw lines that obstructed real cultural assimilation, which remains an urgent and objective demand.

Second, since the two world wars, strategic considerations have dominated the relationship between the components of the Atlantic world in two respects:

- (1) The strong organic relationship between the United States and Western Europe to protect the Western world against the Soviets and then the Russian threat; and
- (2) The implication of African states in this international bilateral struggle.

In this way, cultural aspects and elements were suppressed in Atlantic relations and interest in them did not go beyond proselytizing activity (the American and Anglo-Saxon protestant churches active in Africa, for example), or anthropological interest in the black African influence on contemporary American culture.

Third, the cultural stakes in the Atlantic world are currently focused on two pivotal issues, which are:

- (1) Migration from the southern shores of the Atlantic to America and Europe, with the fundamental challenges that this poses to the social and cultural fabric (problems of cultural multiplicity); and
- (2) The radical violence that assumes a spurious religious coloring.

This latter phenomenon can lead to cultural problems with diverse manifestations in symbolic and behavioral values, the sacred, organizing the religious domain and interpreting texts, in ways that require various forms of careful and objective comparative study.

Fourth, new cultural transformations have taken place in the Atlantic world as a result of the current communications revolution, which has radically changed the nature of cultural production and the quality of the cultural industries that are now among the cornerstones of a second industrial civilization based on artificial intelligence and non-material activity. One of the effects of these changes is the paradox that this intense communication space has allowed, such as varied cultural material, which has spread and extended worldwide. Yet, at the same time, cultural hegemony has been embedded in the world centers that monopolize the technical instruments of the new culture, which, in practice, restrict the possibilities of a serious and balanced cultural dialogue between the components of the Atlantic world.

I'd like to wrap up these initial ideas with a few critical and forward-looking observations that I can summarize in the following points:

- It is essential to correct the negative images that the various peoples and cultures in the Atlantic space have of each other, including the African and South American peoples who are linked by various ties and relationships and are held together by a common destiny. This will not happen unless they visit each other's countries more often and unless cooperation programs between cultural actors are strengthened, creating the right atmosphere for interaction between the components of this wide Atlantic space. In addition, widespread investment is required in cultural work in its various aspects, from organizing intellectual forums, conferences, artistic activities, and translating creative works. Africans know very little about the major thinkers and creative artists in the countries of Latin America, and the latter know very little about the creative artists, writers and intellectuals of Africa.
- There is a pressing need to strengthen the bridges of cooperation and coordination between Atlantic cultural institutions, which are still mostly focused on their own narrow environment, despite the pervasive linguistic and cultural overlapping between the components of this wide space. Brazil, under former President Lula da Silva, adopted an ambitious initiative for partnership with Africa, based on aspects of human and cultural interplay between this rising world power and Africa. The Arab League adopted a similar initiative for a cultural dialogue between the Arabs and the Latin American world, but these initiatives had a limited effect and need a strong impetus in the future in order to bear fruit and fulfill their far-reaching objectives.
- New methods of communication have a very important role in strengthening the bonds of cooperation, knowledge and exchange between the shores of the Atlantic and its diverse cultural components. These methods can undoubtedly introduce people to cultural and

artistic products, such as music, dance, literature and architecture. There should therefore be cooperation to take advantage of the current communications revolution to build a common Atlantic culture that respects cultural diversity and combines the elements of authentic identity and the requirements of renewal and open mindedness.

I cannot end these remarks without praising the efforts that my own country Morocco has made to bring the shores of the Atlantic together, in line with the pioneering approach adopted by King Mohammed VI towards stronger relations between Africa and the Atlantic world. His Majesty was the first head of an African nation to have undertaken, in November 2004, state visits to Mexico, Brazil, Peru, Chile, Argentina and the Dominican Republic. Morocco, today, has 12 embassies in South America, in Cuba, Dominican Republic, Santa Lucia, Mexico, Guatemala, Peru, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Colombia and Panama. This qualifies Morocco as Africa's strong voice in the Atlantic forum and the gateway of the three continents, a pillar of peace, security and stability in a troubled environment. General de Gaulle used to say that Europe, which extends from the Atlantic to the Urals, would define the future of the world if it united. What we say today is that this future depends on partnership with the other shore of the Atlantic, which cannot be avoided in the making of history and the building of a global civilization.

by Mohamed Benaïssa

Chapter 3

The Future of the World Trading System

Uri Dadush

International trade is prevalent in our daily lives. The operation of cross-border value chains is crucial for firms across the world. Yet, the trading system has never, in the post-war era, been under as severe a strain as is the case seen today. In this chapter, I will try to make sense of this apparent paradox, and I will outline some possible steps to ensure that trade remains open and predictable.

The post-war era saw an unprecedented advance in global economic integration, and since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the process accelerated further. Thus, the share of trade of goods and services in world GDP increased from less than 40% in 1990 to 60% today, while the share of global Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in GDP has trebled. World trade slowed sharply in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008-9 leading some to believe that this marks the end of globalization – the “peak trade” theory. I disagreed. What is true is that the growth of world trade prior to the crisis was temporarily boosted by a hundred-year positive shock, namely the entry of China and other developing countries into the world economic mainstream, and that this was not going to repeat. However, the biggest reason for the slowdown in trade was cyclical, not structural. The financial crisis had a disproportionate depressing effect on investment and on the demand for consumer durables, which rely heavily on trade for both markets and for parts and components. With the economic recovery, trade has accelerated again, even though it is unlikely to match pre-crisis growth rates on a sustained basis.

Mc Kinsey recently issued a report on digital globalization that should help put the idea of “peak trade” to rest. They show that the amount of cross-border bandwidth used has grown 45 times since 2005, and project that it will increase 9 times over the next 5 years. We may now only be at the threshold of the next wave of globalization, which will consist of information flows and be powered by artificial intelligence. This coming wave will entail an explosion of e-commerce that will create opportunities for small firms (e.g. in arts and crafts), greatly increase the tradability of many services (e.g. taxi rides, short-term apartment

rentals, medical diagnosis), increase the share of services in the provision of manufactures (e.g. remote monitoring and operation of devices through the internet of things), and enable entirely automated customized manufacturing (3D printing). Mc Kinsey estimates that already, today, about 12% of global goods trade is carried out on e-commerce platforms, which until recently, did not exist.

Drivers

What accounts for the secular, seemingly unstoppable, advance of world trade? The present era of globalization can be dated back to the great navigational advances and exploits of the 15th century. Ferdinand Magellan, who died in 1521 on his way to the first circumnavigation of the earth, can be justifiably called the first globalist. The centuries since show that trade is powered by three forces: (1) markets (i.e. consumers and producers), (2) technology and (3) policy. Consumers who continually search for better products at lower prices and producers who look for cheaper input and for customers willing and able to pay are not inclined to stop at the border. Technology, especially innovation in transport and communication, is key to reducing the costs of trading and to making trading opportunities known. Policies allow trade by lowering tariff and non-tariff barriers but they can also stop trade by raising barriers or by prohibiting trade altogether.

In the post-war period, the advance of markets abetted by policy is best symbolized by the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, the rule-making body whose 164 members account for 98% of world trade, and the establishment within that institution of the Dispute Settlement System, which has ruled upon hundreds of cases. Moreover, the benefits of the advance of markets and of technology is best conveyed by noting that, according to World Bank data, the world's average per capita income has about trebled since 1960, and the share of the absolute poor in the world's population has declined from 36% in 1990 to 10% in 2015.

Why, in the light of this remarkable progress, is the trading system under direct challenge today? The challenge to the trading system is today most evident in President Trump's questioning of the United States' major trade agreements, namely his withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Trade Agreement, his renegotiation of the North-America and Korea-United States Free Trade Agreements, both of which have moved in the direction of less free trade, his imposition of steel tariffs and tariffs on some \$250 billion of imports from China, and his threat to impose tariffs on automobile imports. Perhaps, most important is President Trump's direct challenge to the legitimacy of the WTO's dispute settlement system on

account of its ostensible “overreaching,” or legislating on issues outside its mandate, and ruling too often against the United States.

However, it would be unfair and overly simple to attribute current tensions to the United States alone. The decision of the United Kingdom to exit the European Union (EU) and the EU’s refusal to entertain the notion that the UK could remain part of the single market, while outside the EU, has called into question one of the world’s most important trade relationships. According to Global Trade alert, over the last ten years, G20 members have adopted far more individual trade restrictive measures than trade-opening ones.

Countercurrents

The present trade tensions reflect five sets of problems, none of which are new, and none of which are amenable to a quick fix. In order of importance these problems are: the uneven sharing of the benefits from the current era of globalization and technological advancements, especially, but not only, in the United States; crises and the wave of populism; Chinese exceptionalism; macroeconomic imbalances; and the dysfunction of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Each of these issues have been the object of extensive study, including dozens if not hundreds of academic papers, and they have also been the object of many reform attempts. Yet, while progress has been made in some areas, each issue remains, and the trends, unfortunately, are not promising.

Inequality: Much of the rise in inequality and the increased economic disruption, which stirs the discontent with globalization, is due to unskilled-labor-saving technology, not trade. However, the disruptive effects of trade and technology interact and reinforce each other in many ways. For example, cheaper transport and communication facilitate outsourcing and all forms of trade; and, firms, which are confronted with new sources of low-cost competitors, respond by automating and innovating. Technology facilitates trade, and trade prompts technology adoption. Separating the effect of these two powerful forces is hard. And workers who are employed in sectors exposed to international competition and who lose their jobs naturally find it easier to blame foreigners than to blame robots.

Trade and technology appear to have hit unskilled workers in the United States the hardest, where social safety nets are the weakest. In the US, the life expectancy of white men who are high-school dropouts was 67 in 2008, down from 70 in 1990. According to a recent Brookings study, the mortality rate for Whites with a high school degree or less, aged 50-54 has shot up from over 700 per 100,000 to over 900 per 100,000 since 2000, and is now much higher than that of Blacks and Hispanics. Angus Deaton, the Nobel Prize winner who co-

authored this study calls them “Deaths of Despair.” Based on the GINI coefficient and on shares of different income percentiles, the United States has become the most unequal advanced country after Israel, reaching levels of inequality not very different from those in developing countries such as Mexico.

The largest disruptive effects of trade liberalization may be behind us, as trade is already largely free, and there does not appear to be another China about to rise (India is a candidate for the next great trade disruption but this remains a distant and uncertain prospect). Therefore, ironically, the next wave of job losses is just more likely to come from increased protectionism than from the trade liberalization.

However, there is no sign that technology and the other forces driving increased inequality are slowing, on the contrary. Labor-saving technology (artificial intelligence, autonomous vehicles, etc.) is, according to a recent McKinsey report and to others, already capable of displacing hundreds of millions of workers. Furthermore, in our globalized IT-driven economy, the returns to innovation tend to accrue to small groups of people. And the return to capital – whose ownership is highly concentrated – continues to outstrip the rate of growth of GDP by a wide margin, as argued by Tomas Piketty and confirmed by recent empirical studies. Though governments should be fighting these trends, the recent tax, spending and health-care reforms in the United States, which is the advanced country with the most unequal income distribution, do the opposite. The reforms benefit wealthy individuals and companies far more than they help the average American. Even though social spending in the United States is very low by the standards of other advanced countries, in coming years, rising budget deficits will put even greater pressure towards reducing it.

Crises and Populism: Rising individual and regional inequality caused by technology and by globalization provides only part of the answer to what caused the rise in protectionism. For example, an interesting analysis of election outcomes by the Barclays Investment Bank highlights another important cause, namely a growing concern about the loss of sovereignty to super-national institutions such as the European Union, the WTO, and to far-reaching and deep trade agreements such as the now discarded Trans-Pacific-Partnership.

Of course, these concerns are far from new – inequality and the worry about eroding sovereignty were with us 20 years ago, and longer, back when the resurgence of right-wing nationalism and protectionism was still only nascent in most countries. Yet, grievances tend to cumulate if they are not addressed. In addition, what is new is the grave effect of the global financial crisis and the glacial pace of recovery from it. The crisis established the perception that policy-makers (“the elites”) were not only incapable, but that the choices they made, such as bailing out the banks, were self-serving and inequitable. EU enlargement to the East is also quite new, and it led to a surge of European migrants into the

UK – widely believed to be the most important grievance of those who voted for Brexit. The recent instability in the Middle East and the spur given to large refugee flows and to terrorism also contributed to the legitimation of a brand of nationalism that is racist and religiously intolerant.

Populist policies spread and trade is often a target. Thus, the President of the United States, the world's richest country and the architect of the Post-War trading system, said in his inauguration speech:

“For many decades, we’ve enriched foreign industry at the expense of American industry; [...] and spent trillions of dollars overseas while America’s infrastructure has fallen into disrepair and decay. We’ve made other countries rich while the wealth, strength, and confidence of our country has disappeared over the horizon. One by one, the factories shuttered and left our shores, with not even a thought about the millions upon millions of American workers left behind. The wealth of our middle class has been ripped from their homes and then redistributed across the entire world.”

There are many other examples. Brexit has already been mentioned. Marine Le Pen, the anti-Euro head of the National Front, once an outcast party, obtained one third of votes in the last French Presidential election. Matteo Salvini, a right-wing nationalist and anti-European Union populist has become the most popular politician in Italy. Right-wing nationalist politicians have prevailed in Hungary, Poland, and pose a serious challenge in Austria and the Netherlands.

China: A great paradox and unprecedented feature of the current era is that the world's largest exporter and manufacturer (the Chinese manufacturing sector is as large as that of the United States and Japan combined) remains a state-driven developing country. Even as its firms conquer world markets, China's average tariffs are two to three times higher than those of the European Union, Japan, and the United States. Although many Chinese firms already operate at the cutting edge of technology, and China is increasingly enforcing intellectual property rights at home, it continues to be accused by scores of firms and observers across Europe and the United States of forcing technology transfer from foreign investors and to engage in widespread intellectual property theft. Although the share of State-Owned Enterprises in China's employment has declined sharply in past decades, it remains far higher than that of any large economy, and these enterprises are widely believed to benefit from preferential non-transparent credit awarded by the formal banking system, which also remains state owned. As Chinese firms penetrate global markets with exports and, increasingly, with acquisitions and greenfield investment, the differences between the Chinese system and that of its advanced country competitors have

become an increasing source of friction.

On one crucial issue, China has changed. China's current account surplus has declined massively, from around 10% of GDP a few years ago to below 1% of GDP projected by the IMF for 2018. Thus, China is making rapid progress towards a more balanced growth model, one that is less reliant on exports and more reliant on domestic demand. In fact, for countries around the globe, China is well on its way to becoming their largest export market by a wide margin. However, given the economy's large presence on world markets, its high investment rate and rapid growth as both importer and exporter, the tensions associated with Chinese exceptionalism are more likely to increase than abate. As the saying goes, it is difficult to sleep next to an elephant, whichever way it turns.

Imbalances: In designing the International Monetary Fund at the end of World War 2, the great British economist John Maynard Keynes and his American counterpart Harry Dexter White had imbalances, and the risk they posed for international macroeconomic stability and the trading system, was at the center of their preoccupations. Tensions over large current account deficits and surpluses are always present. However, in recent years, the dramatic narrowing of China's current account surplus and of the United States' deficit had taken some steam out of the issue. Nevertheless, China's large bilateral trade surplus with the United States remained a source of tension, and President's Trump obsession with bilateral imbalances – whose importance economists dismiss – has added a lot of fuel to the fire. Yet, it is not at all clear what China could do to significantly and quickly reduce its bilateral trade surplus with the United States, an outcome that Trump's negotiators are demanding.

Germany's very large current account surplus, which is nearly as big as that of China's and Japan's combined, is a more recent phenomenon, but it has become an equally important source of tension, not only with the United States but with other members of the Euro zone, especially the struggling countries of the South. To a significant degree, Germany's surplus is the artificial result of the creation of the Euro – since had Germany retained the Deutsche Mark, it would almost certainly have seen a very large appreciation. It is true that Germany's monetary, exchange rate and trade policies are in the hands of European institutions, so outside of Germany's direct control. However, there is no sign that Germany is prepared to undertake the increased government spending, higher wage policies, or tax reforms that would be needed to significantly dent its current account surplus and provide some relief to its Euro zone partners and help defuse trade tensions. Unfortunately, with the new tax and spending policies in the United States, the nation's current account deficit is projected to widen again in coming years, spelling even more trouble in the future.

WTO. The institution, which is the bedrock of the orderly, open and predictable trading system that emerged after World War 2, has – contrary to

the popular narrative – registered significant successes since its establishment in 1995 as a follow-on to the GATT. Most notable, as already mentioned, are the expansion of its membership which now covers 98% of world trade (versus some 85% at inception), the Bali Trade Facilitation Agreement, the Government Procurement Agreement, the Information Technology Agreement and its extension, the prohibition of agricultural export subsidies, and of voluntary export restraints. However, the WTO's incapacity to move forward on wide-ranging multilateral negotiations in the Doha agenda and to deal with many long-standing trade impediments, such as agricultural subsidies and barriers to services trade, and even less to take on new issues such as electronic commerce, has meant that its negotiating arm has fallen behind the times.

Its other major function, the dispute settlement system, has continued to be extensively used, but has come under increasing challenge, mainly from the United States, for “overreaching” and “gap-filling”, i.e. adjudicating on issues or in a way that goes beyond that which negotiators had agreed. All this preceded the arrival of Mr. Trump. Continuing a policy of the Obama administration, the United States is now refusing to replace the members of the Appellate body as their terms come due. This means that the Dispute Settlement system could effectively cease to function before the end of 2019. Moreover, three recent measures undertaken by the United States are almost certainly in violation of the WTO, namely the spurious appeal to national security in raising tariffs on steel and aluminum imports, the negotiation of voluntary export restraints on the same with Korea, and the section 301 actions against China, which now sees almost half its exports to the United States the subject of increased tariffs. The effective demise of the Doha agenda, the flouting of WTO rules by its emblematic member and the United States' increased reluctance to support its adjudication is bound to weaken it further. A de facto exit of the United States from the WTO leading to the organization's demise or to a truncated WTO is no longer unthinkable.

This panoramic of the causes of the current trade tensions underscores the importance of a coordinated and broad-based approach in resolving them, such as could be undertaken by the G-20 context but looks distinctly unlikely at present. All this strongly suggests that things will get worse before they get better. Far from going away, the present challenges to the trading system are likely to become even more pressing in the future.

Drawing the Threads: Implications for policy action

Standing up to Mr. Trump is not easy. It risks escalation. However, the greater risk is condoning policies which are likely only to result in more and more protectionism and which undermine the legal foundations of the present system. The Trump administration will end, perhaps sooner than later, and the next administration, whether Democrat or Republican is unlikely to be as disruptive or reckless as the current one. Even so, many of the trade concerns that are prevalent today will continue.

There is no easy solution to the issue of inequality and disruption caused by globalization and technology. Policy-makers must step up their efforts to explain the benefits of trade, while at the same time strengthening the mechanisms that protect the most vulnerable. However, there are limits to social assistance and the most promising long-term solutions are those that promote mobility of workers, which above-all means building skills and flexibility. In a note published in the *Global Solutions Journal*, prepared under the aegis of the Trade working group of the G20, several co-authors and I have elaborated a set of proposals intended to mitigate the cost of adjustment to international trade shocks.

China must accelerate its market reforms, engage in more far-reaching trade liberalization and privatization, and take more aggressive measures to boost consumption. If it is, one day, to lead the reforms of the trading system, as its size and dynamism suggest it should, it must first resolve its internal contradictions. Germany must, for its own sake address those of its Southern European partners, and for trade peace, increase public spending, raise its public sector and minimum wages, and encourage more domestic investment to bring down its current account surplus. The United States will sooner or later have to reverse its tax cuts on the wealthy to contain inequality and reverse its policy of fiscal stimulus to reduce its budget deficits. These measures will help contain the United States' national overspending which lies at the root of its current account deficits.

The members of the WTO need to find ways to revitalize its negotiating arm – for example by undertaking multiple sectoral or plurilateral agreements. They should aim to reform and strengthen the dispute settlement system (as recent white papers issued by the European Union and Canada have proposed) to respond to the concerns of the United States and others. But they should also prepare for a contingency where the United States effectively abandons the Dispute Settlement Understanding. At the same time, nations should accelerate their efforts to conclude bilateral and regional trade agreements that are complementary to the WTO. These agreements are very important in consolidating and deepening trade liberalization and can provide an insurance policy against a resurgence of protectionism. For example, members of the

European Union, such as Belgium now conduct about 80% of their trade under regional and bilateral trade agreements.

As already said, trade tensions are likely to get worse before they get better. The current impasse may persist over many years, but my expectation (or perhaps more accurately, my hope) is that ultimately the international community will avoid a return to the trade wars of the 1930s and to the import substitution practiced in many parts of the world just a few decades ago.

I do not base my cautious optimism on confidence in the capacity of policy-makers to deal comprehensively and rapidly with the issues – I expect that they will do what they can under severe political constraints and, at best, muddle through. I base my hope on the forces that are pushing for a more integrated global economy, and which are becoming stronger with every passing day. The same information, communication and transportation technologies that are disrupting our societies are also bringing firms and consumers closer together irrespective of national borders. In addition, firms and consumers are more aware than ever of the opportunities of arbitrage across the world market in goods, services and capital. In such a world, it is increasingly difficult to separate free trade from individual freedom. History has shown again and again that those that choose to withdraw behind national borders in the face of the twin forces of markets and technology, sooner or later succumb to them



Chapter 4

A Perilous Legacy: From Trumping Multilateralism to the Demise of the U.S. Storytelling?

Younes Abouyoub

Bellum omnium contra omnes.

Hereby it is manifest that during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called War; and such a war as is of every man against every man [...] In such condition there is no place for Industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continual Fear, and danger of violent death; And the life of man solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.

Thomas, Hobbes. chapter XIII, The Leviathan.

A specter is haunting the world! The return of Nationalism.

Since the inauguration of President Donald Trump, the world has been experiencing worrisome developments. Nationalism, racism, isolationism and unilateralism are once again building up. The Trump Administration's policies nationally and internationally range from a direct confrontation with the American institutions, a roll-back of what was already frail social policies, renegeing on many components of previous welfare programs, while scapegoating migrants and undocumented workers -giving thus free reign to xenophobic, nativist and nationalist sentiments both domestically and internationally-

to a shift away from multilateralism, with acerbic criticism of international governance institutions such as the United Nations, the International Criminal Court (ICC), global trade arrangements, international efforts at curbing Global Warming; and a public denunciation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), besides his unilateral decisions in the Israel-Palestine conflict and his move to defund the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and other United Nations funds and programs. In sum, nationalism is gradually trumping multilateralism.

The "America First" policy inaugurated by President Trump, with his reinvented, and rather appealing old slogan "Make America Great Again", has led to a sustained US tendency to renege on international commitments, or rather to what is tantamount to a declaration of war on international obligations and cooperation" (Weiss, 2018:10), regardless of how these international instruments and institutions of the post-war era might have contributed to the immense development of the US so far. President Trump has ended Washington's participation in the Paris Agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the JCPOA in addition to setting an expiry date on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Should this trend continue, many commentators fear the new administration could accelerate the weakening, or rather the all-out deconstruction of the concept of multilateralism itself, the symbols of which have already been wearing thin for some time now. Several international institutions, co-founded by the U.S., such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) – though this is unlikely given the mounting tensions with Russia- are the constant target of the President's ire.

Besides the consequences at the domestic level of the policies ushered in by President Trump– who still enjoys large support from his base- the rest of the world is already sneezing from this American cold. Some argue that president Trump's presidency will have long lasting effects, "disengaging the U.S. from crucial bilateral and multilateral treaties" (Amirfar et al., 2018:459), pushing the world towards a "a global order that is a Hobbesian free-for-all, where power is the only arbiter and the strong States dominate the weak" (ibid.). Although many scholars argue, that international crises such as war, climate change and migration can only be tackled by international cooperation, president Trump, through a staunch confidence in the virtues of nationalism is bent on resolving unilaterally complex issues such as terrorism, North Korea, the question of Palestine and climate change. However, no country is powerful enough to impose continuously its will and resolve global problems on its own, which is why human welfare is at risk if an international governance system based on cooperation and solidarity fails to exist. The current US administration puts much effort into eroding trust among both allies and rivals. Once severely undermined, trust is hard to regain, even if the next president turns out to be a devoted internationalist.

What all this really holds for the future is yet to be seen. Yet, important questions are already in order, namely: would the main legacy of this Trump administration at the international level be the deconstruction of the post-world-war II international governance system, and together with it the irreversible erosion of the U.S. storytelling?

America First: Nationalism Trumps Multilateralism

In his second address before the United Nations General Assembly (2018), President Trump was candid and unapologetic in his delineating the fundamentals of his administration's foreign policy of; one of nationalism trumping multilateralism. "America is governed by Americans," he said to the UN General Assembly; "We reject the ideology of globalism and accept the doctrine of patriotism. Shattering the concept of international cooperation and solidarity, he stressed that the United States of America is a sovereign nation, and that every nation is on its own. "Each of us here today is the emissary of a distinct culture, a rich history, and a people bound together by ties of memory, tradition, and the values that make our homelands like nowhere else on Earth. That is why America will always choose independence and cooperation over global governance, control, and domination. We only ask that you honor our sovereignty in return." Both multilateralism and multiculturalism, which were advanced for decades by the US-led globalization are no longer values worth promoting by the new administration. Meanwhile, the purported respect for the diversity of cultures globally and sovereignty of nations is no doubt worthy of praise: "I honor the right of every nation in this room to pursue its own customs, beliefs, and traditions. The United States will not tell you how to live or work or worship; president Trump's message was nevertheless received by many on the international stage as echoing that of the Athenians to Melos, namely that the powerful do what they wish, while the weak suffer what they must¹. This may well be the first step towards tearing asunder the post-World War international system.

It is true that the international appetite for multilateralism and the ideals of an international governance system, have been wearing things down for some time now. President Trump is as much the product of a nationalist zeitgeist reinvigorated as its promotor. He is thus not the sole advocate of brushing away such ideas nor the first proponent of nationalism, since nationalist and populist tendencies, coupled with strong anti-migrants' sentiments have been resurfacing in Europe and the US, and now in South America. Yet, given the weight of the US

1 Thucydides; "History of the Peloponnesian War.

on the international stage, and the fact that president Trump is matching words with acts, this is a harbinger of serious existential threats for the international system, embodied mainly by the United Nations. Its largest funder, the US, announced its withdrawal from “UN negotiations toward a global compact on migration, shortly after withdrawing from the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (Weiss, 2018:13), all this coupled with the open threats² against the international criminal justice regime, namely the ICC. Although the US signed the ICC Statute under president Bill Clinton, this decision was reversed by G. W. Bush’s under-secretary of state John Bolton. During president Obama’s tenure, relations between the US and the ICC improved only to deteriorate again after the recent attacks on the ICC by J. Bolton, now president Trump’s national security advisor. Motivated by a deep-seated dislike of the multilateral approach in favor a narrow nationalistic perception of sovereignty, this policy is reversing hard-won gains at the multilateral level, by undermining a frail and budding world vision of justice, embodied in the work of the only court that is designed to prosecute the world’s worst crimes³.

It is worth noting that the United States pays 22% of the UN’s annual operating budget, and it recently stopped funding the UN population Fund, as well as imposed unprecedented cuts to peacekeeping funds, setting an initial target of \$1 billion in cuts from an \$8 billion budget (ibid:12). Additionally, in August 2018, and in line with his policy of the “Deal of the Century” to dissolve the Palestinian question, President Trump decided to defund the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) from \$130 million to \$65 million, aggravating thus the UN chronic financial crisis⁴. UNRWA’s “financial instability is arguably the most serious practical problem with the Agency’s set-up, with the most serious day-to-day repercussions for the refugees it serves” (Irfan, 2017:16). It is feared, that Washington will thus delegitimize the refugee status of the Palestinians and their descendants and hence foreclose the right of return, a key demand for any peace

2 These include a wide range of measures, namely negotiating even more binding, bilateral agreements to prohibit nations from surrendering US persons to the ICC; banning ICC judges and prosecutors from entering the US, sanctioning their funds in the US financial system and prosecuting them in the US criminal courts, and doing the same for any company or state that assists an ICC investigation of Americans; taking note if any countries cooperate with ICC investigations of the United States and its allies, and remembering that cooperation when setting US foreign assistance, military assistance and intelligence sharing levels.

3 Ironically enough, some of the main cases before the ICC are at the behest of the US. Among the UN Security Council’s referrals to the ICC supported by the US government, one relates to alleged atrocities committed in Sudan, the other in respect of the alleged crimes committed by Col. M. Gaddafi in Libya.

4 It is worth noting that the UN’s relief and human development agency provides education for approximately 526,000 schoolchildren and assists more than 1.7 million food insecure people. About 53% of the funding, for “UNRWA’s humanitarian intervention activities in the occupied Palestinian territory are related to health alone, including health care, food security, shelter, water and sanitation, and education” (Seita et al., 2018:295). The occupation/annexation is forcing a distinct demographic change and health vulnerabilities, threatening Palestinians with chronic diseases, and without UNRWA these problems would be even more devastating (ibid.). To implement the Deal of the Century, President Trump decided to strangle UNRWA financially. Instead of \$350 million UNRWA will have a U.S. contribution of just \$60 million. Already in 2017, the Agencies deficit counted \$81 million, and led to UNRWA cutting its services for the health and education sector. So consequently, \$60million will not be enough to keep schools open and health clinics running, to provide emergency food and cash distribution systems. UNRWA’s clinics are the main provider of healthcare to Palestinians.

negotiation. President Trump's policy will have long-lasting disastrous impact on more than five million Palestinians, and further destabilize the Middle East for decades to come.

From Globalization to Trade Wars

When it comes to international trade arrangements, and in line with the American First policy, believed to provide new jobs for the distressed US working class and expand the domestic economy to reduce America's trade deficit, Trump's administration is reneging on its longstanding foreign trade commitments (McKibbin & Stoeckel, 2017:27). Yet, many economists and commentators are dubious about the efficiency of these protectionist measures. Exports would be lower than base for all sectors; agricultural exports faring worse (lower by 26 percent in 2020), then mining and services exports (lower by 19 percent in 2020). Durable manufacturing exports are estimated to be 13 percent below base in 2020 while for nondurables the fall could reach 16 percent (McKibbin et al., 2017:27f). The adopted fiscal program could eventually worsen the United States' trade performance even though its rhetoric has so far proven to be politically expedient. "America's worsening trade balance means an expanded trade surplus for other countries, two of the largest surplus economies being Germany and China. Germany's trade surplus could initially rise by 1.9 percent (as a share of GDP) over baseline and for China the increase could be 1.6 percent (McKibbin et al., 2017:28). Furthermore, President Trump imposed a 25% tariff on steel and a 10% tariff on aluminum on goods from the EU, whereupon European nations labelled the announcement as illegal and filed a suit against the US at the World Trade Organization (Kanat, 2018:85). Nevertheless, the European Union has so far failed to act in unison to face the protectionist policies of the new American administration. Countries such as France are wishing for "punitive measures against the U.S. through the WTO, whereas Germany and others prefer to de-escalate the conflict before it reaches a full-scale trade war" (ibid.).

This being said, the European-US trade crisis is far from an exception, and by far not as severe as the economic sanctions on Turkey and Iran, and the almost all-out trade war with China. According to president Trump, China has largely profited from the American largess and naivete in the bilateral trade. He has claimed time and again before large crowds of his supporters during and after the electoral campaign that China is the main culprit of job losses in the American economy (Rosyadi & Widodo, 2018:125), since most of the American industries import materials from China, instead of using "domestically produced materials or constructing new domestic factories" (ibid.). It is true that many economists and commentators have pointed out that China still fails to comply with the trade-liberalizing commitments (Yu, 2018:41), but instead of using the

internationally-agreed mechanisms for dispute resolution, namely in this case the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) umbrella of the WTO, president Trump acted unilaterally by imposing sanctions on China. The section 301 was launched, an investigation based on “US domestic law rather than the WTO trade dispute settlement mechanism” (ibid:43). In early 2018, President Trump implemented \$100 billion tariffs on steel and aluminum products from China, pushed for more bilateral agreements throughout East Asia and restructured the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement. In retaliation, China threatened to impose tariffs on over 1,300 American export products (Kang, 2018:201). Quite recently, in mid-2018, president Trump imposed additional tariffs, amounting to an additional \$200 billion in Chinese goods, taking the risk that the American stocks could fall 10 to 15 percent. Should this trend continue, there is a risk that the trade war will influence “other countries to follow (the) trade protectionism trend since (the) U.S. is currently at the forefront of global trade liberalization” (Rosyadi et al., 2018:126). The crisis could then affect the global economy in general, e.g. European and Asian countries, and lead to a “declining GDP and negative welfare effect for both countries (ibid:126;140).

Although the global trend is leaning towards retaliation, which may bring back the world to a “Frontier Law” context, the WTO still restricts what countries are allowed to do, through legal disciplines⁵. However, the unilateral Section 301 tariffs by the U.S., which preempted the WTO judgement before its enactment, would be, according to the WTO, illegal, which if nothing is done would further diminish the already tainted credibility of this organization. Last but not least, the Trump administration “refuses to confirm nominees to its appellate body, blocking appointments and paralyzing the WTO’s court, falling short of the quorum; i.e. the minimum of three panelists required to sign off on rulings”. Some are already predicting dire global effects of unilateralism, sanctions and blockades in other areas such as global health. As Bowles and Bowles stated: “the subsequent loss of global trade and productivity from a Trump presidency (...) would interfere with global health (...) protectionism would increase the risk of countries not freely exporting food. (...) Restrictions on trade will increase food insecurity. Impediments to the free flow of medical supplies would similarly be deleterious to health” (Bowles & Bowles, 2017:142).

Strong winds ahead... A Change in Climate

Furthermore, obsessed with dismantling his predecessor’s legacy as well as by short-term gains and political expediency, president Trump focuses solely on short-term economic gains first and foremost rather than the long-term

⁵ Harvard Business Review, June 2018.

inevitable consequences, not only for the United States but for the whole world, of intensive economic activity and climate-unfriendly industrial practices. According to several experts in environmental law, since his arrival to the White House, with a cohort of climate skeptics, President Trump launched a regulatory rollback larger in scope than any other since the establishment of the Environment Protection Agency 47 years ago. Repealing the limits for power plant emissions and the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, has led to the assumption, that the President of the United States is threatening the global health security (Takahashi et al.,2017:1465). According to President Trump, the Paris Agreement and the internationally-pursued objective of keeping the global temperature below 2 degrees Celsius, through reducing global carbon emissions, is undermining the US economy and sovereignty, and hence not in line with Trump's 'America First' policy. Fortunately for the time being, these unilateral measures faced opposition from European countries and China, which reacted with new initiatives to ensure the success of the climate agreement (Palackova, 2017:255). It is even expected that the world's largest producer of greenhouse gas, China, may take the lead, assuming an "unexpected new role as the leading advocate for action on climate change" (Weiss, 2018:12).

Besides, the construction of the Keystone XL pipeline and the decision to reintroduce coal mining, as a job creation stimulus and boost for the U.S. economy, has led to international criticism, due its negative impact on the environment. This unilateral attitude of the Trump administration in a matter of life and death for the planet, such as the climate change crisis, if not addressed globally in a responsible manner will impact the most vulnerable areas of the world, such as Africa and poor countries in Asia. For the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, the outlook is disastrous. Extended drought periods, hotter heat waves, shrinking water resources and more frequent dust storms will most probably than not lead to mass migrations and instability in the MENA (The Economist, May 2018).

Nevertheless, some good signs of relative optimism exist. The U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement has activated domestic opposition with 377 US mayors, representing 67.7 million Americans, pledging to implement the Agreement's climate goals (Palackova, 2017:256). In this regard, the UNFCCC has been stressing the paramount role of cities and non-governmental stakeholders, stating that "local commitment at the individual level is the key to real, long-term progress and economic and social transformation (...) [and that] under the US federal model, this bottom-up surge of progress has proven efficient and is perhaps the only way to enable change" (ibid:256,257). The American institutional set-up with its diffuse power system and checks and balances has shown that not the entire U.S. is backing Washington and that a multilateral approach will still be a viable option, at the very least in certain issues.

Waiting for Godot or the Ephemeral Peace in the Arab Region

As far as the troubled geopolitics of the North African and West Asia region is concerned, the prospects look rather grim. So far, the Trump's administration has "greatly increased military aid to its traditional allies in the region, fueling further the regional cold war, which is marred in an unprecedented violence, while expanding US military operations in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Somalia" (Sedghi, 2017:82). According to some analysts, American foreign policy in the Middle East seems to be more and more characterized by "spontaneous, impulsive and situational volition" (Hassan, 2017:187) as well as Orientalism, Islamophobia and an increased securitization of Islam (ibid.). Hassan claims, that the U.S., under Donald Trump's presidency, is willing to accept greater civilian casualties in the fight against Terrorism, as well as disposed to do away with "democracy and human rights policy in the region" (ibid:189). This attitude is coupled with a tendency to simplify a complex region, in an overdetermined context into three basic elements: powers we can work with, powers we cannot work with, and those without enough power whom we can functionally disregard or sacrifice" (Eriksson, 2018:52). Eriksson continues, claiming that Israel, Saudi Arabia and Egypt belong to the first group, Iran to the second, and Palestinians to the third (ibid.). So far as this trend continues, the Arab World will face increasing "authoritarianism, sectarianism and a further downward spiral of violence" (Hassan, 2017:189).

Instead of waning, the tensions with a NATO ally such as Turkey have escalated even more with the new American administration. The announcement to move the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem, the defunding of UNRWA and the support of Kurdish YPG forces in Syria have angered the strong men of Ankara. On the other hand, the imprisonment of an American citizen in Turkey, the weapon deals with Russia and the trade with Iran, which undermine U.S.' sanctions, have caused frustration in Washington. It is believed, that these disagreements will push Turkey closer to Russia and pressure new alliances among EU and NATO members (Gunter, 2017:80). As a result of the failed coup in 2016, Turkey arrested the American Pastor Andrew Brunson, accusing him of being one of the string pullers behind the coup. In retaliation, Trump imposed sanctions on two Turkish ministers and doubled the rate of import tariffs on Turkish metals, which further exacerbated the economic crisis in Turkey and caused a 40% decline of the Turkish Lira's value. This led President Erdogan to display the sanctions as an attack on all of Turkey and propagates for an economic war with the U.S., in order to assert Turkish independence before his constituency, further tightening his grip on power. As a counter measure, Turkey secured a \$3.6 billion

loan package from the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, as well as a pledge from the government of Qatar to invest \$15 billion in Turkey over the coming years. Would President Trump's legacy be marked by a loss of a long-term ally and a NATO member?

All told, the American withdrawal from the JCPOA is probably one of the boldest and most dangerous foreign policy decisions made so far by the current administration, with far-reaching consequences for the future of the Middle East, and global peace and security. In fact, Iran is considered, by the Trump administration, as the main threat in the Middle East. President Trump's top priority is to contain Iran's rising influence in the Middle East, through its asserted presence in Iraq, Syria and the Persian Gulf, with the help of some leading Sunni Arab regimes and Israel (Eriksson, 2018:56). President Trump's anti-Iran policy has turned Washington into a sectarian actor, that further fuels instability and the resulting regional rivalries, making any rapprochement between Iran and Saudi-Arabia even more impossible. The U.S. eagerness to undermine the economic recovery of Iran, and thus destabilize the Iranian regime, through limiting Iran's gains from the JCPOA, created discord in the ranks of traditional Western allies of the United States. Countries like the UK, Germany and France as well as many others within the EU have been very reluctant to follow the US lead down this dangerous path.

President Trump announced that international companies doing business with Iran will face "secondary sanctions"⁶ (Kanat, 2018:82). The other five countries of the P+1 that agreed on the deal, reacted to the sanctions by stating that the European nations will continue to emphasize their continuing commitment to the JCPOA, since the agreement "remains important for (their) shared security" (ibid.). This is yet another issue that deepens the divide between the traditional Atlantic allies. In August 2018, the European Commission "approved a 50 million euros financial assistance to Iran to help solve the key economic and social problems of the Islamic Republic of Iran" (ibid.). However, how long will the EU be able to resist the U.S. pressures remains to be seen, but the credibility of the international community has already been shattered. It is difficult to predict President Trump's future actions and the effects of the U.S. sanctions on Iran, but harm has already been done to the international efforts to curb nuclear proliferation, mainly through the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), probably ushering in a dangerous arms race and an increased nuclearization of the Middle East.

The Israel-Palestine conflict is a protracted and complex issue, yet President Trump's administration seems to oversimplify the crisis, by adopting a posture that enfeebles the potential of a future peace agreement between Israelis and

⁶ The U.S. sanctions are on Iranian cars, gold, metals, as well as companies specializing in aluminum, graphite, coal, steel, computer programs, oil and gas (Modern Diplomacy, September 2018).

Palestinians. Although President Trump reiterated the U.S. support for the two-state solution before the UN General Assembly last September 2018, the two-state solution does not seem to be a viable option anymore, especially given the “Deal of the Century” strategy that precludes more than it favors the creation of an independent and viable Palestinian state. Moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem and unilaterally recognizing the city as Israel’s capital, contradicts the international community consensus on the issue of Jerusalem and saps the traditional mediator role America has played so far. And even though President Trump did not define what he means by Jerusalem, whether he meant the Jerusalem West or all of Jerusalem, this decision irreversibly undermines the two-state solution (ibid:55). Apart from supporters of Prime Minister Netanyahu, and a substantial segment of President Trump’s electoral base, the recognition was, more than anything, subject to negative responses at the international level (Moten, 2018:6). By acting unilaterally in a protracted and extremely volatile conflict that has consumed the international attention for several decades, President Trump turned up his nose at the international community, and flouted the United Nations resolutions, in particular General Assembly resolution 181, which stipulates the “partition plan for Palestine and the creation of an international zone in Jerusalem known as the corpus separatum” (Tamari, 2018:4). Furthermore, the U.S. lobbied against the UN Security Council Resolution 2334, that condemns the illegal Israeli settlement construction in the Palestinian territory West Bank (Eriksson, 2018:53). The U.S. President’s recognition emboldened Israel, to develop plans for 14,000 new settlements, added to tens of thousands that were already in planning during his administration (ibid: 59). As Tamari argues, the U.S.’ foreign policy under Trump has two ‘unintended consequences’: “First, it brings the status of Jerusalem back to the limelight, after it was pushed to the back burner by the Syrian and Yemeni wars; and second, it has clearly placed the United States outside of the international consensus with regard to any future peace process over the status of the city, or indeed within the Arab Israeli conflict” (Tamari, 2018:3).

This unexpected foreign policy decision further isolates the U.S. from the international consensus on one of the most complex and longest conflict in the world. Many countries such as Turkey and France have already openly expressed their dissatisfaction with President Trump’s unilateral move (Tamari, 2018:3). Moreover, Palestinians have also expressed their interest in having other countries, such as the P5+1 countries perceived to be more impartial, as new mediators, since President Abbas announced that the Palestinians would no longer accept any U.S.-sponsored peace initiative. Given these recent developments, many commentators believe “Israel is extremely unlikely to engage in any negotiating configuration not sponsored by the United States, rendering any such prospect dead in the water. Moreover, the Trump administration is unlikely to relinquish any control of the process beyond their existing Saudi and Egyptian partners.

Trump's disdain for multilateralism is reflected in his frustrations with the European partners to the JCPOA, who insist on its continued implementation as agreed" (Eriksson, 2018:56). Given the worsening of Palestinians' situation and the grim prospects, the search for a durable and just settlement by peaceful means will be trumped by violence, echoing thus President Kennedy's words that those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable⁷.

Towards the end of the US storytelling?

To gauge the political power a state wields at the global level, the traditional thinking focused usually on the military might. Yet, the degree to which a given state is able to influence decisions and the course of events globally cannot be analyzed or fully grasped without taking into account the paramount role power and communication play in international affairs. Political storytelling or soft power assets, and the dexterous ability to wield them effectively have been one of the cornerstones of US foreign policy for several decades. To ensure efficiency, strategic storytelling needs to be in consonance with the political values that the international public perceives the state in question, namely the United States in this case, apply domestically and stand for internationally. Hard power left aside, international politics is about whose story wins.

In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, the soft power concept, coined by the former Clinton administration official Joseph Nye, gained momentum in the world of geopolitics and international affairs. According to him, the US enjoyed a unique source of power to wield on the international stage, without having recourse to military power, in order to have others do its bidding and control the outcome of their decision-making process. Indeed, the United States largely -but not exclusively- relied on its noncoercive power to cement its leadership position in the world. US foreign policy relied on a diversified and comprehensive toolkit, and applied methods for the purposes of persuasion and continued US influence. These tools included media, public diplomacy, civil society potential, information, cultural products and other methods and technologies complementary to traditional diplomacy. This resulted in an expansion of international broadcasting, hosting of global events and a multiplication of cultural institutes, NGO networks, partnerships and exchanges with the ultimate goal to put soft power into practice.

According to this narrative, the United States had a sense of purpose since the Declaration of Independence. Politically, it stood for a government not based on tyranny but rather on Liberty; a binding social contract by the people and

⁷ President John F. Kennedy; remarks on the first anniversary of the Alliance for Progress, 13 March 1962.

for the people, a government that consisted of elected officials – chosen by the people – elected officials, the principles of rule of law and check and balances. Geopolitically, branding America as the world savior from Nazi tyranny, fascism and the specter of communism, consisted of depicting it as the moral torchbearer and defender of liberty, human rights, the advocate of fairness and justice, of good and decency both domestically and internationally. At the social level, the values of hard work, perseverance, never giving up and allowing everyone the chance to achieve their dreams in a “classless society” were projected. For millions around the world the American Dream has been an appealing image and an irresistible sirens’ call. The 19th century Horatio Alger “rags to riches” story, a fable of a person from humble social origins who, through hard work and moral and ethical grittiness, manages to climb the social ladder away from their humble beginnings and rise to the ranks of the privileged, exalted the virtues of perseverance, hope, optimism, possibility, and success, the Horatio Alger Myth is unique American invention, mirroring closely the tenants of the American Dream and its promise of reward for dedication and fortitude. No other discourse had such an appeal globally as the American Dream, with its political and cultural rights, coupled with economic prosperity promised by the US-driven globalization, the post-cold war catchy phrase ‘The end of history’, though completely deceiving and erroneous historically, effectively captured that American sense of purpose that whole world was careening toward.

Yet, this whole strategic narrative has shown unconcealable cracks, creating thus more disappointment than prosperity. To be fair, the US storytelling has been wearing thin for some time now, even before the ascent of President Trump on the world stage. In fact, it could be arguably claimed that President Trump is much more the symptom of a deeper ill than its cause. The American-inspired liberal model has failed its worshipers in most cases. People involved suffered more catastrophic outcomes than reaped the perks of prosperity. Whether it is the distressed American working class, the communities of the Dust Belt, the third wave democracies of the 1970s and 1980s together with the post-Soviet Eastern European states -which hastily threw themselves in the arms of the EU and NATO in the aftermath of the Cold War to- or the African and Arab countries, Godot hasn’t come of a large majority of worshipers of the American model.

Whereas the international aura enjoyed by the US for so long was due to its domestic arrangements, this image received a severe blow during the Bush era after the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, even though it had regained momentum after the 9/11 attacks, then again during the first promising years of Barack Obama, the first President of African descent. President Trump’s ascent, largely due to a growing right-wing movement inside the American society, one among many manifestations of the consequences of the neoliberal turn of the past few decades; in particular the backlash of a deceiving globalization,

coupled with an unprecedented concentration of wealth in the top tier of the American society, the repeated crises of the deregulated financial and economic institutions, and the public bailouts of the white-collar culprits rather than their victims. In fact, the US, which already ranks very low of OECD countries in social measures, is sinking deeper with the current administration's drastic socio-economic measures which created an unprecedented divide inside the American society. Internationally, the image of the US has been further damaged by morally questionable political discourse indirectly encouraging nativism, white supremacy rhetoric, anti-Semitic and Islamophobic ethos and praxis, as well as policies targeting migrants, the "Muslim ban", and the Department of Homeland Security initiative to separate children, and even infants, from their parents to dissuade migrants from trying to reach the promised land. This is despite the fact that -according to many analysts- these thousands of migrants are escaping the socio-economic and political conditions created by US foreign policy decisions; the aftermath of the Honduras coup is one of many telling examples.

Long-term US allies in Europe and elsewhere are more and more questioning US leadership. Europeans governments are divided between those who still favor an alliance with the United States and those who would rather seek a geopolitical alternative to this embarrassing alliance. Right-wing governments and movements in Europe and elsewhere, as well as authoritarian leaders feel encouraged by President Trump's discourse, which gave a free reign to xenophobic, anti-Semitic and aggressive rhetoric and practices. The Brexit vote and President Trump leadership are giving momentum to nationalist politicians in Europe, who are looking forward to creating new opportunities for their political gain, buttressing thus their presence in the European political landscape in the coming years. According to Shashi Tharoor⁸, Trump presidency has shattered the long-lasting embellished image of the US abroad. "It has exposed and encouraged tendencies the world never used to associate with the US: Xenophobia, misogyny, pessimism, and selfishness. A system that promised a level playing field on which anyone could fulfill their aspirations is being denounced by its own political leaders as stacked against ordinary citizens. A country that confidently counsels others on democratic practices has elected a president who suggested that, if he lost, he might not recognize the result".

It is still unclear when and how the world will recover from this grim bequest. What is sure is that Trump's presidency has already harmed the US strategic narrative and its soft power corollary around the world. Trump's legacy will outlive him for years to come, as it will not be easy for the next American president(s) -if progressive at all- to undo the effects of the current administration policies, both domestically and internationally. What is also true is that the US, like the rest of

⁸ Former UN under-secretary-general and former Indian Minister of State for Human Resource Development and Minister of State for External Affairs. "The End of US Soft Power", Project Syndicate, 2016.

the world is undergoing perforce a severe crisis of a civilizational nature, which will no doubt weaken its leadership position in the world. A socio-economic and political model is gradually dying, and with it the taken-for-granted influence and might of hegemons, to the advantage of new powers. What this portends for the US and the future of the world will depend on progressive forces and movements' creative ability to put forward a new model; one that will garner a large popular support and replace the undemocratic, unjust and increasingly authoritarian model ushered in by President Trump for many years to come. "The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born, in this interregnum, a great variety of morbid symptoms appear"⁹.

9 Antonio Gramsci; Selections from the Prison Notebooks, "Wave of Materialism" and "Crisis of Authority" (NY: International Publishers), (1971), pp. 275-276.

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Chapter 5

The Atlantic Alliance: Between Revived Europeanism and Restless Atlanticism

Rachid El Houdaigui

Introduction

In the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall, there was a broad consensus among experts and politicians that the Alliance would face an existential crisis with the disappearance of its major enemy, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Consensus was renewed in the 1990s, this time around an optimistic vision affirming the resurgence of the Alliance through the expansion and redefinition of its Strategic Concept. Today, the Donald Trump effect plunges the consensus into gaping pessimism about the odds of the alliance avoiding turmoil. These reversals of opinion clearly indicate the instability of assertions in the face of a political and military forum in constant flux. In view of this reality, what can be said of the current trajectory of the Atlantic Alliance and its future? Is the crisis of confidence between Europeans and Americans temporary, such as that of the Euro-missiles, or a point of inflection or even rupture?

It should be noted that this alliance model stands out both for its longevity, sixty-nine years, and for its singularity within the global security architecture. Its demise is not on the agenda for the time being. For it to disappear, its refractory members would have to withdraw from the Washington Treaty. But no State is ready to take on this historical responsibility. Besides, one would have to be struck with political short-sightedness to dispose of a strategic umbrella without first planning an alternative. It would also require that the global context be so relaxed for the need for collective defense to no longer be necessary. Yet the international situation is tense enough to remind us of Antonio Gramsci's saying: "The old world is dying, the new world is slow to appear, and in this *chiaroscuro*, monsters emerge".

The premise advocated in this chapter is that the Atlantic Alliance is an evolving strategic concept that now needs fresh strategic consensus around

“NATO’s burden sharing” and collective defense, as Europe, committed to its strategic autonomy project towards the United States, comes up against its own contradictions. In the midst of these two dynamics, an original trend is emerging in Europe in the form of military cooperation initiatives outside the EU and NATO.

I. The Donald Trump effect: Atlanticism wobbles but does not falter!

Ever since Donald Trump referred during his election campaign to NATO as “obsolete”, the Atlantic Alliance has ushered in a time of great concern for Europeans. His subsequent statements increased the pressure, as illustrated at the last NATO Summit in Brussels (11 and 12 July 2018); while the US President reaffirmed the principle of solidarity between Atlantic Alliance states, he remained true to his critical line towards Europe, denouncing its inability to defend itself. “The United States spends much more on NATO than any other country,” he says, adding that “it’s neither fair nor acceptable! ».

This is more a matter of negotiation than a real and strategic desire to dissociate oneself from NATO and the Alliance. In his book “The art of the deal”¹⁰, D. Trump describes his conception of diplomatic negotiation as “overthrowing the table”, in the name of balance of power politics. Even if he personally wanted to get rid of Atlanticism, he could not do so because of a number of operational factors: First, Trump is compelled to work with national institutions loyal to the Atlantic Alliance; second, he cannot escape global economic and security interdependencies; and finally, NATO in no way affects the United States’ freedom of action, nor its strategic supremacy.

What remains is in fact the construction of a new strategic consensus, initiated under the leadership of Donald Trump at the NATO Summit on 25 May 2017. The process still in its early stages seems arduous, as the positions of both sides reflect mutual defiance and mistrust. US defiance over burden sharing is a political line that dates back to the Cold War. It was maintained by various presidents before gaining considerable momentum under D. Trump. The “America first”¹¹ refocusing on the United States means that international deals, particularly commercial deals deemed unfavorable to the United States, are being called into question. This results in a balance of power combining pressure and sanctions against both enemies (China, Iran) and “allies”, particularly Europeans. This attitude is echoed in the Atlantic Alliance by the

10 Translated into French under the title ‘Trump par Trump’, Editor Random House, 2017 (France)

11 « America First Foreign Policy », www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-policy.

strong criticism of NATO members who do not spend enough on their defense. Indeed, NATO member states have committed in 2014 to devote 2% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to defense efforts by 2024, but some 15 states, including Germany, Canada, Italy, Belgium and Spain, have not exceeded 1.4% in 2018 and will not be in a position to meet their commitment¹².

For their part, Europeans do not see the US withdrawal from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty without concern. Concluded in 1987 by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, the INF prohibited ground-based ballistic missiles and intermediate-range cruise missiles - between 500 and 5,500 km. While Europeans and NATO have always been concerned over Russia's development of a missile system in violation of the treaty, they consider the agreement as a guarantee, albeit symbolic, for peace and stability. However, it is still too early to try to assess the impact of this decision on NATO and European partners, but the fact that the main recipients of the US decision are Russia and China heralds a new era of arms race and nuclear proliferation. Initial reactions from major European powers suggest three positions: French silence, British alignment, German doubt. To maintain its unity, the Alliance will have to draw on its historical resources to build consensus on this new post-INF strategic paradigm.

The Atlantic Alliance seems to have adopted a common position on Russia, although D. Trump was not initially convinced by the logic of confrontation with Moscow, as it compels the United States to allocate more resources to guarantee Europe's security. Here again, institutions were instrumental in defining the course of action towards Russia¹³. During the presentation of the new "US National Defense Strategy", released on 19 January 2018, Secretary of Defense James Mattis stressed that the United States is in "strategic competition" with Russia and China. Factors hindering normalization of relations with Moscow are so numerous that it is unlikely that the United States will shift policies. However, this pattern must not obscure the complexity of the interplay of powers within the Alliance, which must maintain a subtle balance between, on the one hand, support for Eastern and Baltic Member States through the deployment of military forces and, on the other hand, the position of countries such as Germany, France and Italy, which, out of Europeanism or national interest, want relations with Russia to be maintained through permanent dialogue between Brussels and Moscow¹⁴. Nevertheless, the participation of NATO's 29 members, with Sweden and Finland as partners, from 25 October to 7 November, in the largest post-bipolar NATO military exercises in northern Europe is yet another

12 On 29 June 2018, Donald Trump sent a letter to 9 NATO countries (Belgium, Canada, Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Luxembourg, Norway and the Netherlands) asking them to respect their commitment to increase military spending.

13 <https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf>

14 Rachid EL HOUDAIGUI, The NATO Summit in Warsaw: the chiaroscuro of the return to containment, Research Paper, OCP Policy Center, Rabat, October 2016, p.16.

indication that the Atlantic Alliance is a symbol of solidarity and that it provides an unrivalled collective defense model.

II. Europeanism struggling to improvise its strategic autonomy

One of the diverse trends emerging from the European strategic debate seems to have reached a consensus among experts: Perhaps the US President's diatribes against NATO are a good medium-term opportunity to transform a rather paternalistic partnership into a more balanced relationship in which Europeans would provide themselves with the necessary resources for a European defense, while maintaining cooperation with the Americans in the context of NATO. Germany's Defense Minister stressed that an objective analysis of the strategic situation necessitates Europe's strategic autonomy, leading to the conclusion that NATO remains essential for Europe's collective defense and security. "This is not going to change, even if the current US government is more jealous of its country's interests"¹⁵. Her French counterpart shares the same view of the situation, stating that "the Atlantic Alliance remains and will remain the pillar of transatlantic security". But there is now room for doubt: will the United States always be on our side, in all places and under all circumstances? Shouldn't Europe wake up and assume more responsibility for defense and security?"¹⁶

Overall, European reaction to this new dynamic is to temper to preserve existing gains, as was the case at the NATO Summit in Brussels in July 2018, while carrying on further investing in common defense. Indeed, concrete measures have been adopted within the EU since 2013 to accelerate the strengthening of military capabilities in Europe: PESCO¹⁷ which brings together co-financed projects in the field of defense, the European Defense Fund, which has 13 billion euros for the 2021-2027 period for joint research, development and procurement and finally the project to create new European civil-military headquarters.

There has certainly been renewed interest in European security and defense policy of late, if not that the EU's long-standing step-by-step approach is now unsuited to tackling the challenges of strategic autonomy, which also entail a shift in the status quo. This vital revival however, depends on a set of variables that need to be considered:

First of all, the demise of the bipolar order has made it possible to recall

15 Speech by Ursula Von Der Leyen, Federal Minister of Defense of Germany, at the Université d'été de la Défense in Paris, 11 and 12 September 2018. http://www.universite-defense.org/L_edition_2018/allocutions-officielles.htm

16 Speech by Florence Parly, Minister of the French Armed Forces, at the Université d'été de la Défense in Paris, 11 and 12 September 2018. http://www.universite-defense.org/L_edition_2018/allocutions-officielles.htm

17 Permanent Structured Cooperation

a pan-European will, so much that it is confused with an act of emancipation from Atlanticism. The issue, however, is highly political: European countries, particularly in Eastern Europe, are committed to the Euro-Atlantic model, as shown by their alignment with US-Russian policy, the choice of US military technology, or their fear that Washington will move away from NATO. Others, on the contrary, consider European solidarity as the only way to achieve greater strategic autonomy from the United States. Recent mobilization for European defense under the impetus of France and Germany probably prefigures the outlines of the Atlantic Alliance's future geometry.

The main unknown however, is how Europeans are going to proceed to transform the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) into a true defense policy? CSDP focuses on peacekeeping operations and conflict prevention (Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU)). While Article 42.7 introduces a mutual defense clause,¹⁸ it is NATO that practically ensures the collective security of Europeans in accordance with the obligation of mutual assistance (Article 5) in the event of aggression against one of its members¹⁹.

Secondly, European defense comes up against a truth highlighted by public goods theory: without a leadership capable of mobilizing necessary resources, a collective objective does not always lead to collective action²⁰. As the cornerstone of European defense policy, the Franco-German couple is confronted with its own differences and inconsistencies²¹. It played a founding role in the progressive construction of European economic and political integration. It is therefore interesting to consider how this diplomatic leadership intends to replicate this convergence to European defense: is Germany actually ready for a long-term military effort? Would France accept to see its strategic autonomy potentially called into question by political and military integration?

In the same vein, any strategic convergence in the field of defense must be combined with a convergence of foreign policy guidelines of all countries concerned. While France and Germany act together on certain international issues, their historical trajectories and foreign policy doctrines mean that long-term strategic convergence is not guaranteed. This is evidenced by the unexpected emergence of the nuclear issue in the strategic debate in Germany: political scientist Christian Hacke spoke out in favor of nuclear weapons in an article published in the (right-wing) weekly newspaper *Die Welt*²². He added

18 The main changes brought about by the Treaty in the field of defense and security are of four kinds: enhanced cooperation and permanent structured cooperation: European Defense Agency (EDA); Mutual assistance and solidarity clauses; Extension of the framework for action.

19 Article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty introduces a mutual defense clause, stating that "in the event that a Member State is subjected to armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall give it aid and assistance by all means in their power.

20 Mancur Olson, *La logique de l'action collective*, PUF, 1978.

21 B. Kunz, "Defending Europe? A stocktaking of French and German Visions for European Defense", *Etudes de l'IRSEM* 41, Paris, 2015

22 "Nuclear power in Germany strengthens Western security" *Die Welt*, 29.07.2018.

that “for the first time since 1949, Germany is no longer under the American nuclear umbrella” and considered any European nuclear deterrence project “illusory”. Long before him, politicians from the right²³ have clearly defended the idea of an increase in military strength, through nuclear technology. The Carnegie Foundation reported in a census on the multiplication of writings on this subject in Germany since 2016²⁴. These minority opinions, however, are currently ignored by the authorities of both countries.

Lastly, the implementation of a European defense policy inevitably requires the existence of a genuine defense industry. Yet progress made so far does not yet allow for us to mention a European industrial complex. Indeed, the defense industry falls within the long-time frame of systems, which explains the preference of European countries for technological cooperation with the United States. When they had to renew their fighter aircraft fleet, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway ordered American F-35s. Poland did the same by engaging in a technological partnership under the F16 program. This trend poses considerable challenges to the European project for an air combat system of the future, the *sine qua non* condition of which is the availability of an autonomous European combat aircraft²⁵.

III. Towards a flexible defensive architecture outside both the EU and NATO?

A major lesson learnt from the above developments and from those observed elsewhere is that multilateral defense cooperation is declining in favor of narrower cooperation formats. Indeed, multilateralism in defense matters struggles to be effective because convergence of interests is often difficult to achieve. Public choice theory²⁶ applied to political science suggests a number of concepts to explain the characteristics of “public goods”. Mancur Olson concedes that the larger the group size, the smaller the collective dividends received, because overly large groups are less likely “to exhibit strategic interaction than small groups”²⁷. Thus, in order to obtain a common position in international organizations, particularly defense organizations, compromises are needed at the cost of arduous negotiations, as we have observed for the EU and NATO.

A number of factors explain this institutional reality within a context of

23 Berthold Kohler, editor of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*; Roderich Kiesewetter, CDU representative; Maximilian Terhalle, political scientist.

24 Ulrich Kühn, Tristan Volpe, Bert Thompson, *Tracking the German Nuclear Debate*, August 15, 2018.

25 Purchase of American F-35 aircraft by Belgium: a snub for European defense, *Le Monde*, October 26, 2018.

26 See Mancur Olson, *Logique de l'action collective*, *Presses Universitaires de France*, 1978, and BRAUD Ph., *Sociologie politique*, Paris, General Law and Jurisprudence Library, Textbook Collection, 2002, p. 303

27 Kevin Martin, *European Defense: a preliminary response to its challenges*, 8 September 2018 www.taurillon.org

political concerns: the slowness of multilateral processes and the dissimilar priorities within major structures, the need for quick and effective action to manage crises and the strategic divide between Eastern and Western Europe over the truth of the Russian threat. An example of EU difficulties is the management of the migration crisis or the divergent positions on the Libyan crisis, as well as the reluctance of States to share their sensitive military technologies. These factors explain the pragmatic approach of limited and fluid structures in military and defense cooperation.

One can now speak of an institutionalization of military cooperation marked by three specific points to reveal the emergence of more focused initiatives: 1) Intergovernmental effectiveness of the method, 2) Flexibility and pooling of efforts within narrow frameworks, 3) Tailor-made commitment in defense matters outside NATO and the EU or as part of the two institutions' format.

Permanent structured cooperation within the EU

The creation of permanent structured cooperation on military matters within the EU (PESCO) in 2017 is a decisive step towards Europe's strategic autonomy, as it should ultimately enable it to lead operations without US support by pooling equipment purchases and setting up a single command structure. Member States will need to strengthen cooperation on industrial, operational and decision-making capacity building. Paradoxically however, this initiative may reproduce the same mistakes of large institutions such as the EU or NATO. The twenty-five members who have joined it must make considerable effort at interaction to adopt the most consensual and flexible approach.

European intervention initiative

The European Intervention Initiative (EII) was launched on 25 June 2018. It brings together nine European countries (Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Estonia, Portugal and the United Kingdom) and aims to create an intervention mechanism that is independent of both NATO and the EU. The aim is to contribute to the emergence of a European strategic culture and to prepare the ground for future concerted and coordinated commitments on crisis management. The project creates an alternative Western European club (except Estonia), including the United Kingdom, which despite the Brexit, remains an essential partner in European defense, according to the very words of French President Emmanuel Macron: "Brexit or not, the deep strategic relationship will

continue to deepen with the British²⁸.

Nordic Defense Cooperation

Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEF) is a comprehensive framework for military cooperation, through which the five Nordic countries, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, aim to improve their operational capabilities and further strengthen national and regional stability and security. As stated in the agreement signed in Helsinki on 4 November 2009, the aim of the program is to “strengthen the national defense of participating countries, explore common synergies and facilitate the effectiveness of common solutions”. Beyond these advances, NORDEF, by its very nature, does not constitute a military alliance, in the same way it does not compete with the EU or NATO.

Three-Sea Initiative

Launched in 2016, the Three Seas Initiative (TSI) brings together twelve countries from Central and Eastern Europe: Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. It is mainly aimed at economic cooperation and energy provision for countries located between the Adriatic, Baltic and Black Seas in a North-South approach. The annexation of Crimea by Russia and events in Ukraine prompted these countries to accelerate the political mechanism to coordinate their actions. While this initiative is about economic cooperation, it is nonetheless a geopolitical attempt to counter Russian, and even German, influence. Energy, particularly gas, and defense issues are part of the regional equation. It is significant that D. Trump took part in the 2nd Summit in Warsaw in 2017, where he expressed his support in two strategic areas: energy and defense. US General James L. Jones, President of the Atlantic Council,²⁹ said that the TSI aims to “relieve the European energy sector from the strong pressure of the Kremlin”, and that it is a “transatlantic project” with enormous geopolitical and geo-economic dimensions. There is every reason to believe that the Three-Sea Initiative may become a new catalyst for tensions with Russia.

28 Declaration on Defense Policy, Paris, 13 July 2018.

29 Discours d'ouverture de la conférence « Faire de l'Initiative des Trois Mers une priorité pour l'avenir » l'Atlantic Council, Istanbul, avril 2017.

Conclusion

Ultimately, NATO remains undissolved despite the official reasons for its creation having disappeared, and despite the US President's virulent statements against Europeans. But the game is open between revived Europeanism and restless Atlanticism. Admittedly, it is still early to draw forecasts on future directions because the matter is ongoing political trajectories differ from one pole to the other. Yet, one common indicator seems to point to the current dynamic: The Euro-Atlantic community, and through it the European order (EU, NATO) conceived by the founding fathers now seems to be running out of steam. This situation is driven by three rational processes that are independent of one another (in order of influence: the Donald Trump effect, the resurgence of Europeanism, and the expansion of initiatives outside the EU and NATO), which will eventually interact with one another to produce a new configuration.



Chapter 6

Africa: The Demography-Migration Nexus

Abdelhak Bassou

Introduction.

Demography is a key parameter to analyze migration patterns. From migration causes and drivers to its probable evolution or effect on societies, from departure to destination, the interference between the two themes appears empirically obvious. Reproducing and multiplying have always been signs of strength and power driving humans to be mobile in order to explore and appropriate new horizons and spaces. In the religious spirit expressed in texts of a different era, this combination of demographic growth and mobility is clearly highlighted. “Look at the sky and count the stars if you can... Those who are born of you will be as many”³⁰, promised God to Abraham. This promise followed a condition/order: The Lord said to Abraham, “Go away from your land, from your homeland, and from your father’s house to the land that I will show you. I will make you a great nation”³¹. Abraham had to migrate, leave his land and his father’s house in exchange for which he received a reward in land and offspring. The two phenomena of migration and progeny are presented as linked.

The correlation between migration and population growth has been demonstrated throughout human history, exhibiting the interference and, at times, interdependence between the two phenomena. Demographic multiplication led to mobility either because the initial space could no longer contain the demographic volume, or because demography being a force, the conquest of other spaces became possible and hegemonic aims achievable.

Mobility is part of the history and genetic heritage of the African continent. Peoples of Africa have always migrated and sought to expand their living spaces as they grew in number. Through numbers, they were able to conquer new territories and, at the same time, find areas commensurate with their demographics. While

30 Genesis 15:5.
31 Genesis 12:1-3

it is true that some historical droughts triggered major population movements, it is no less obvious that population growth also prompted the exploration of new lands.

Today, the demographic prospects of the continent are at the forefront of European concerns about African migration. The volume of current flows does not seem to be a cause for concern. But a projection to 2050 (see table below) suggests that migration will increase, given the strong expected population growth on the continent.

Table 1: Population Estimates and projections by continent (1900 – 2050)

Continent	1900		1950		2014		2050	
	Population	Part de la population mondiale	Population	Part de la population mondiale	Population	Part de la population mondiale	Population	Part de la population mondiale
Afrique	130	8%	230	8,90%	1138	15,71%	2431	24,99%
Amérique latine	75	4,50%	168	6,60%	623	8,7%	779	8,02%
Amérique du Nord	80	5%	170	6,60%	358	4,94%	448	4,62%
Asie	950	57,50%	1400	60%	4342	59,95%	5284	54,32%
Europe	400	25%	549	22%	742	10,26%	726	7,46%
Océanie	6	0,40%	13	0,50%	37	0,53%	57	0,59%

Source: data from World Bank 2015, table from Boniface Pascal "Comprendre le monde, Armand Collin, 2017)

This concern is not, however, motivated solely by population growth. It is explained by its combination with other phenomena such as climate change and the persistence of underdevelopment and poor governance. Wouldn't the current management of African resources and the disparities it generates, combined with the effects of climate change, lead to increased and uncontrollable mobility towards Europe?

This chapter explores the issue of migration from Africa to Europe, a topical issue that monopolizes attention on both continents with different, divergent; and at times conflicting and contradictory perceptions and views and, at times, a source of tension in African-European relations.

The European analysis of the issue and projections into decades to come leads to a disquieting outlook, given the factors that could potentially aggravate an upward trend in migration. Among these factors is climate change, although studies to-date have yet to establish clear relationships or correlations between migration and global warming. Some see the development difficulties of African countries as a factor that will exacerbate migration as young Africans seeking employment and lack of opportunities at home will have no alternative but to

leave for Europe, which is seen as providing more opportunities for African youth to thrive. One of the most frequently cited factors of concern is African demographics, with growth indicators suggesting acute pressure and resulting in increased migration flows.

It is this last point that is the subject of this chapter, which will attempt to draw up an inventory of African demography in general and in migration source countries in particular (part 1), before addressing European concerns in terms of the links between population growth in Africa and migration from Africa to Europe. The foundations of this fear will also be examined, in order to distinguish objective reasons for fear and concerns arising from factors external to Africa. The following section will review European demographics, where indicators point to depopulation prospects based on current data that shows death rates overtaking births. The conclusion will attempt to answer the question of whether, if African demographic growth is confirmed, it will have consequences on migratory flows to Europe on the one hand and whether the increase in these flows should be a cause for concern, on the other hand.

Section 1: Population Growth in Africa

General data

What is the future of demography in the world? The issue is not only of concern to Africa, but to the global community as a whole.

Demographic data is not sought for their own sake. It is not in itself a subject of satisfaction, disappointment or concern. It is sought to inform global policies, particularly in order to compare trends between demographics and resources -- chiefly food resources. Concern for global food security can only address the question of whether Earth's resources will suffice to feed its' population if it can quantify the population to be fed. The problem of demography also arises in terms of distribution of future populations and it is in this sense that demographic trends are studied in regional or continental frameworks. Which region or continent shows signs or trends of overpopulation or depopulation? It is within this framework that Africa, which is expected to grow faster and more densely in terms of population, is attracting attention. Africa is the only continent for which the United Nations has revised population forecasts upwards several times since the 1980s.

The author of "Demographic Challenges: Myths and Realities" attributes these upward revisions to three factors:


- **High total fertility rate** (number of children per woman). It reached 6.6 in the years 1975-1980. It is currently decreasing but relatively slowly and is estimated at 4.7 for the period 2010-2015. Niger holds the record with 7.4 in 2010-2015, followed by Somalia (6.6), the Democratic Republic of Congo (6.4), Angola and Burundi (6.0), Uganda (5.9) and Nigeria (5.7).
- **A youthful population.** Africa is by far the youngest continent. It has the lowest values for median age and the highest proportion of under 15 years of age in the population (e.g. Uganda and Niger).
- **Very significant life expectancy gains.** In terms of life expectancy at birth, this gain is estimated at more than 6.6 years between 2000-2005 and 2010-2015.”

What is the real nature of African demography and what aspects of this demography should be correlated with migration problems? What are the causes of rapid growth of this demography, and which are the measures taken to limit, and what are the means used to this end? What is the assessment of control measures and are they useful or must they be abandoned to reap the benefits of population growth?

Some Europeans are skeptical about the consequences of African demographics. While they believe that population growth is a driver of development, they stress that this growth must be confined to acceptable dimensions. Speaking of demographics in Africa on the sidelines of the G20 summit in July 2017, the French President did not hesitate to underline his skepticism about the soaring demographics of certain African countries: “When countries still have seven to eight children per woman, you may decide to spend billions of euros there, you still will not stabilize anything”.

African demography: facts and figures

Table 2: Demographic evolution by continent



Source: United Nations

The table above shows that Africa is the continent with the highest and fastest population growth rate, to such an extent that its exponential population growth will double the current population by 2050. This number is expected to increase fourfold towards the end of the century. From 2050 onwards, Africa’s population will be the only one still on an upward curve, while populations of all other continents will have started a downward trajectory. Asian population, which will keep growing until 2050 to reach 5 and a quarter billion, will start declining and lose more than half a billion by the end of the century. This downward curve has already begun in Europe and will begin by 2050 on other continents.

One of the characteristics of African demography is its irregularity from one country to another and from one region to another:

- African countries differ widely, from Niger, which holds a record (7.6 children per woman), to South Africa, Tunisia, Morocco and Libya (2.4). The National Institute of Demographic Studies (INED) recently

used another indicator: male fertility, which is higher in sub-Saharan Africa and particularly in the Sahel. It reaches 13.6 children per man in Niger, 13.5 in Southern Sudan.

- A significant margin of difference is apparent between North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. Population growth patterns in North Africa are closer to Europe than to sub-Saharan Africa.
- Of the 2.5 billion people in Africa in 2050, half will be concentrated in only six African countries. These are Nigeria (411 million); the DRC (216 million); Ethiopia (191 million); Egypt (164 million); Tanzania (152 million) and Uganda (96 million). The six countries will have a total population of 1,134,000,000.
- Three fifths of African population by 2050 will live in only 10 African countries; of these 10 countries, only Egypt belongs to North Africa. While West Africa will host the most populous African country in 2050, its other members will not make the top 10, where East Africa will claim the prize, followed by Central Africa. (see table n°4 in the figure above).

Table 3: List of most populous countries

Indicateur (2)	Millions
1 Chine	1 386,8
2 Inde	1 352,6
<i>Union européenne (28)</i>	<i>511,2</i>
3 États-Unis	325,4
4 Indonésie	264,0
5 Brésil	207,9
6 Pakistan	199,3
7 Nigeria	190,9
8 Bangladesh	164,7
9 Russie	146,8
10 Mexique	129,2
11 Japon	126,7
12 Philippines	105,0
13 Ethiopie	105,0
14 Viêt Nam	93,7
15 Égypte	93,4
16 Allemagne	83,1
17 Congo (Rép. dém. du)	81,5
18 Turquie	80,9
19 Iran	80,6
20 Royaume Uni	66,2
21 Thaïlande	66,1
22 France (métropolitaine)	65,0
23 Italie	60,5
24 Tanzanie	57,5
25 Afrique du Sud	56,5
26 Myanmar (Birmanie)	53,4
27 Corée du Sud	51,4
28 Kenya	49,7
29 Colombie	49,3
30 Espagne	46,6
MONDE	7 535,8

Table 4: List of most populous countries by 2050

Indicateur (5)	Millions
1 Inde	1 676
2 Chine	1 343
<i>Union européenne (28)</i>	<i>515</i>
3 Nigeria	411
4 États-Unis	397
5 Indonésie	322
6 Pakistan	311
7 Brésil	231
8 Congo (Rép. dém. du)	216
9 Bangladesh	202
10 Ethiopie	191
11 Mexique	164
12 Égypte	164
13 Tanzanie	152
14 Philippines	151
15 Russie	145
16 Viêt Nam	108
17 Japon	102
18 Ouganda	96
19 Kenya	95
20 Turquie	95
21 Iran	93
22 Soudan	88
23 Allemagne	83
24 Angola	80
25 Royaume Uni	78
26 Irak	77
27 Afrique du Sud	75
28 France (métropolitaine)	72
29 Afghanistan	69
30 Mozambique	68
MONDE	9 846

Source: https://www.sciencesetavenir.fr/sante/quels-seront-les-pays-les-plus-peuples-en-2050_116673

All the data cited above on African population growth raises a question. That of whether this population will settle in its own countries. If not, will it prefer or be forced to leave African areas to migrate elsewhere, mainly to Europe?

African population growth and uncontrolled migration to Europe?

The question raised in conclusion of the previous section concerning the consequences of African population growth on migratory movements from Africa to Europe and whether this growth will lead to human flows from Africa to Europe, needs to be supplemented by other questions:

- Is there no action to be taken, or no plan to be developed, to ensure that African population growth can be achieved in a less dramatic way, so as to keep it within acceptable dimensions?
- Can we not imagine that migration resulting from African population growth could find opportunities other than in Europe?
- Wouldn't Europe, which today fears the scale of migration resulting from population growth, need this migration because of the negative levels of its own demography in 2050?

These questions and the attempts to answer them will shape the following section, on the relationship between demography in Africa and African migration to Europe. It will also attempt to provide an opinion on a number of European fears emerging today, in the aftermath of the 2015 migration crisis.

The change in Africa's high population growth factors is likely to lead to a change in demographic profile

Several specialists and researchers have examined the issue of population growth and its fluctuation between periods of high fertility and periods of decline. Africa is one such case. Conclusions do not reveal a doomed trend of incommensurable growth in African population. If the African's choice of numerous offspring has become part of life's traditions, the extinction of conditions generating the phenomenon can lead to its disappearance:

- Having lived for very long periods under the yoke of epidemics and disease which, combined with precarious living conditions, have made mortality, especially child mortality, very frequent, Africans, like many of their peers facing similar situations, chose to have numerous children in an attempt to offset the aforementioned hazards. This course of action protected them against the disappearance of their group. At the time of slavery, multiple offspring were a means of compensating and remedying

the harms caused by the traffickers.

- Tribal and clan-based societies only recognized the size of a clan or community as an attribute of strength or power. Having numerous offspring gave power to the individual within the clan and to the clan within the community. These intrinsically warrior societies had a need for fighters and could not increase their numbers without an effort of demographic multiplication.

Changing the circumstances leading to the need to maintain high population growth rates is also likely to change the profile of African demographics:

- Progress in health systems shield Africans from the hazards of the past and they are less inclined to have multiple children as a protection against child mortality.
- Today's African societies are modernizing and increasingly less clan-based. The tribal spirit and power derived from demographics is shrinking thus leading to fewer children. On the other hand, several studies show that the longer girls go to school, the later their age of marriage, which leads to a decrease in the average number of children per woman.
- Several African countries have already initiated program to limit births and plan families. Parliamentarians from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Chad and Mauritania pledged, in their July 22nd appeal, to call upon their respective governments to work towards a substantial reduction in total fertility rates (TFR). An objective of three children per woman by 2030 has been solemnly proclaimed.

Current fears of a demographic boom may prove unfounded, especially if efforts are made to combat the conditions that favor it.

Africa could contain its own future demographic boom

Proponents of the idea of a threat of uncontrollable proportions posed by African migrants to Europe due to the continent's high population growth are the same people who think in terms of a double Africa: North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. Yet, countries in North Africa, where population growth is slowing are also countries where development is making visible strides. These countries will be ready to welcome labor in the future; first because of their development, but also because of their need for population to compensate for their demographic deficit. And countries that are currently mainly transit countries to Europe may become African destinations. Some have been destination countries in the past - Gaddafi's Libya - and some are in the process of becoming so - Morocco,

which between 2014 and 2018 legalized the status of over fifty thousand Africans migrants illegally present on its territory. These African countries may in the future contain a portion of African migration.


Other African countries such as South Africa, Kenya, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire may also become popular destination countries for Africans. It is therefore not a given that African demography, even if it continues at current rates, would lead to a migratory rush towards Europe. African countries whose development situation will have changed by 2030 and 2050 will be able to contain this flow, especially if they are supported in accelerating their political and economic development.

The tendency of Africans to migrate within Africa is already a reality and will certainly increase as African states reach higher levels of development and are able to receive more migrants. For example, out of 100 West African emigrants, only 30 reside outside Africa.

Section 2: Europe will certainly need African migration

African migration is currently perceived with great caution by Europeans, who only perceive its negative aspects, lack of integration, lack of qualifications, security risks, etc. This focus on socio-security obsesses minds and veils the opportunities of migration³². The map below reveals low population growth rates in Europe where growth rates of certain populations fail to maintain current population levels.


32 In September 2016, an OECD press release stated that: "[Immigration] has a positive impact on public finances, economic growth and labor markets in the medium and long term". Abdeslam Marfouk, economist at the Walloon Institute of Evaluation, Foresight and Statistics (IWEPS) emphasizes that: "One of the stereotypes, or a preconceived idea, is that immigrants cost public finances and when we look at studies, we see that it is the opposite: they are positive contributors to public finances and do not cost as much as we think".

Figure 1: Fertility rates in the European Union

Source : <https://fr.sputniknews.com/international/201610211028316018-pourquoi-europe-a-besoin-de-migrants/>

This figure below reveals Europe's need for migration. It highlights 2017 population and projections for 2050 with and without migration for each country. It is clear that some countries will not be able to sustain population levels by 2050 without the contribution of migration. Germany is the most striking example. It can only maintain its population at current levels (82,000,000,000) by 2050 with the contribution of migration. Without migration, German population would be in demographic deficit. This is also the case of Italy, Poland and Romania, among others.

Figure 2: Projected population by 2050 with and without migration



Source: Eurostat

In conclusion, the outcome seems to be less dramatic and alarming than the simplifying rationale according to which Africa is about to experience a demographic boom that will inevitably spill over to Europe. Analysis of this phenomenon requires us to ensure that the 2050 projections have every chance of being realized and that no effort is made to disrupt them. This rationale

also needs to be revisited given that future development in African countries could enable the continent to absorb its own migratory flows. One should also remember that if Europe does nothing to improve its population growth, it will only be able to maintain its populations at acceptable demographic proportions via migration.

Chapter 7

Migration: Risks and Consequences for Atlantic Countries, Europe and the World

Soukeyna Ndiaye Ba

The dialogue of the Atlantic countries cannot be done without departing from the fundamental problems that, today, divide, shock the world, and challenge each country. The issue of illegal migration, poverty, economic dependence, populism, environmental problems, as many points of reflection, and exchange that concern each country of the Atlantic, and the world. The need to find timely and appropriate solutions for Nation-states to ensure security and prosperity for their people is also a contribution to lasting global peace.

Migration in the Atlantic countries, indeed, affects tens of millions of people of all ages and different social conditions with an estimated annual increase of 2%. This exponential growth raises concerns in the countries of departure, but also in those of transit and residence with issues that have become transnational and transcontinental.

Poverty, insecurity, and climate change are factors of prime motivation for migrants. The Atlantic countries are confronted with various economic problems, such as poverty, underemployment (especially among young people), closures of companies, and chronic unemployment. Unfair competition led by multinationals, to the disadvantage of local producers, land expropriations in the profile of international companies especially in the agro-business and mining, to the detriment of farmers and small producers forced to go into exile. To these questions are added political troubles, technical-social conflicts, climate change with a lot of problems such as floods, the failure of many public policies, as many plagues with dramatic consequences, which must be the subject of reflection, dialogue, and proposals for solutions destined to the Atlantic countries.

The history of humanity is marked by incessant waves of human migrations, the quest for a better life, security, and also the spirit of conquest and domination, which have pushed millions of men out of their natural environment. These spontaneous, voluntary or forced migrations have been, and still are, the basis

of human dramas of a rare magnitude. Tribal wars of small intensity to world conflicts, through slavery, crusades, genocide, hatred of the other, the desire for power, primitive accumulation, have decimated millions of populations and periodically resulted in the exodus of entire sections of humanity.

Because it is located in the heart of the globe, the Atlantic Ocean has been both the witness of these incredible human dramas and the tomb of these hecatombs, an indelible symbol of human stupidity. It is not surprising that, after thousands of years of transhumance, the Atlantic countries are still at the crossroads of human migration routes from the South to the North mainly, but also, we do not say it enough, between the countries of this ocean front.

In response to this often-clandestine migration, borders are trying to close, and a hive of populism developed in many host countries. Indeed, faced with the helplessness of states to find reassuring answers, the development of a wave of populism appears in many European countries, in particular, and their rhetoric is becoming more worrisome, especially considering the anti-immigration demagogic messages that they adopt. This situation is marked by the decision of certain European countries to close their borders (e.g. Austria, Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia), despite their membership in the European Union and their commitment to respect internal rules governing this joint body, in particular, as regards the obligation to admit foreigners on their soil. The closing of borders and their sealing becomes a common issue.

Therefore, it seems legitimate to ask the nagging questions: what must be done to find the appropriate answers to these dramas and to deal with extremism of all kinds?

How can these torrential flows of men, women, and children, expiatory victims of inextricable situations they are not responsible for, be regulated?

Around the world, and even in areas considered economically emergent, the issue is one of utmost importance. Faced with different interpretations by nations, physical barriers are receding. Increasingly numerous, varied and efficient means of transportation, and organized smuggling networks facilitate access to migration routes. No doubt, the attractiveness of rich countries, which have become richer, while poor countries are getting poorer, are perceived as appealing, triggering security reactions of a rare institutional and political violence. But in fact, what realities cover a theme so overused as migration. What meaning can and should we give it?

Migration can be both simple and complex to define. Among other definitions, it is possible for populations to move from a usual place of residence to another place of residence or passage. These human movements, temporary or lasting (punctual stays or proper immigration) are carried out inside and beyond internationally recognized borders. The migratory phenomenon is as old as the world.

These last generations, it [the migratory phenomenon] has reached a considerable scale, in particular in the countries bordering the Atlantic Ocean. It affects tens of millions of people of all ages and conditions.

However, the exponential growth of migrations - an estimated increase of 2% each year, raises concerns in the countries of departure, transit and long or permanent stay. Many received ideas surround this state of affairs whose stakes have become transnational. In the Atlantic area, the origins, causes and consequences of migration are, more or less, well defined. There is an unfortunate tendency to obscure a reality, which is that more than 80% of people's displacements are within African countries. Because of their low income, poor populations choose the host country to settle in temporarily or permanently. Striking example, The Gambia is the first destination of the Senegalese migrants. This is the case from Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire for Guinean emigration candidates.

Migration movements of Africans to Europe via the countries of Maghreb represent barely 10% of the workforce. Cross-border migrations, by road, plane or makeshift boats, essentially involve the better-off, able to mobilize up to 3,000 euros for the hope of a better world in Europe. Or in the United States, even though poverty has globally declined, the economic causes of migration prevail in the motivations of starters, followed by climate change-related migration. However, contrary to conventional wisdom propagated daily in the Western media and social networks, political unrest, technical-social conflicts, climate change marked by floods, sea advances, school failures, business closures, unemployment, stiff competition from multinationals, local producers, land expropriation orchestrated by international agribusiness companies against farmers and small producers, the failure of public policies etc. constitute explanatory factors of first order of a phenomenon, with dramatic consequences. The use of rudimentary means of transport to cross the Atlantic, the violence from the Coast Guard, the physical risks taken by the migrants to wait for the borders of Europe are macabre sources of personal and collective dramas. In Europe, and particularly in the countries of the Atlantic seaboard, migrations divide the political classes. In fact, they [migrations] accentuate the emergence of xenophobic racist political forces, gaining seats in parliaments and taking up positions in government teams. They are the authors of rogue laws restrictive and fundamentally anti-migratory. Their ideas sprout up in the weaker layers of societies and find a relay in the left parties, which are usually more humanistic and more sensitive to the spirit of tolerance and solidarity. The replacement theory, which recognizes the fallacious certainty that migrants will eventually replace natives and dissolve their cultures, beliefs and civilizations in Islam in particular, seems to be thriving. Moreover, despite the many studies prove that migrants participate in the demographic balance and bring their youth and their know-how to the economy, trade, social welfare institutions, retrograde political forces emerge and cling to the iniquitous theory of replacement.

Atlantic countries cannot sit idly by and let these received ideas spread. They have the imperative obligation to stand up as one to restore, in the Atlantic zone, the cardinal values of fruitful cohabitation, peaceful coexistence, and of fertilizing humanism.

However, this good will, expressed many times in international encounters and fora, encounters significant obstacles. One of the all-first pitfalls is globalization. Because it covers various realities and protean aspects, globalization has become the nodal point of all issues. It is especially provided as the pretext for all abuses.

Although the end of the Second World War did not succeed in burying the cohort of conflicts in the world, it allowed the pacification of relations between the great Western powers and the now ex-country of the Eastern bloc. The collapse of the Soviet Union precipitated the establishment of an armed peace by consecrating the victory of the market economy to the detriment of the communist options. Liberalism and democracy have become the dominant values. Economic interdependence then presents itself as a credo for the conquest of markets and outlets. The gradual disarmament of the barriers should have been logically accompanied by the free movement of capital, goods and people, to put an end to protectionism.

It did not happen. On the contrary, the more open markets are, the easier it is for people to transit. Worse, this all-out market opening has provided an opportunity for wealthy economies to atomize poor economies, with direct consequences, including business closures, unemployment, and migration to other, lighter locations.

Globalization has also provoked an extraordinary wave of relocations of polluting companies, at the root of the climatic disturbances, following an unprecedented modification of the ecosystems. The poor countries in this unequal relationship are the expense of an international division, which confines them in the disabling role of supplier of raw materials. China, which has come into force in the emergence, will accentuate in African countries this spiral of plunder of resources and the introduction of real social dumping on a large scale.

In the Economic Partnership Agreements between Europe and Africa, the Pacific is in the right line in this logic of dispossession of Africa, which already started for centuries. Far from being an opportunity, globalization has become the source of all the evil in the countries of Africa, which are trying, desperately, to set up community organizations, in order to impel an economic integration present in the minds, but far in reality.

The effects of globalization are additionally felt in the extraordinary primacy accorded to information and communication technologies, which have become an instrument of domination in controlling migratory flows.

Trafficking and the sale of liberalized arms, in the name of free market

access, has allowed the spread of terrorist groups, smugglers of migrants, abductions and horrifying mass killings of migrants.

Today, more than ever, the countries of the Atlantic seaboard are bound by necessity, and by history, to put in congruence their strengths, their energies and their means to reinvent a new form of coexistence, which will make migration an enrichment tool that host countries will choose as an economic lever against the aging of their people as well as a social, cultural and economic dividend, or, in other words, a mutual enrichment. It would be a beautiful sense of historicity, that is to say, the demonstration that these peoples united by the sea know how to reverse the course of their destiny and face the world to which they will make a rich and constructive contribution.

by Soukeyna Ndiaye Ba



Chapter 8

Fostering People-Centered Peace and Security in the Atlantic Space

Youssef Mahmoud

Human Security Challenges in the Atlantic Basin

While challenges to inter-state security are most common in the Pacific Rim, the majority of threats in the Atlantic Basin are largely intra-state in nature, and thus relate directly to human security.³³ Most of these threats are driven by powerful networks engaged in the trafficking of people, arms, drugs, and money, which has given rise to extreme violence in many countries that share the Atlantic basin. With technological advancements increasing inter-connectivity and mobility, a sizeable number of these criminal networks have forged their own pan-Atlantic inter-dependencies and engineered various alliances with terrorist organizations across continents.³⁴ The economy of violence these networks engender³⁵ and the incalculable toll their activities have on the wellbeing of people across the world is threatening the governability of certain states in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa. The trans-Atlantic space has not been spared from the wrath of climate change neither: stability is increasingly threatened by rising sea levels and other extreme weather patterns. Human security is also threatened by exclusive, corrupt, or predatory states and their governing elites, as well as by inequitable human development and the denial of basic human rights and lawlessness. Egregious, governance deficits are known to drive a deep wedge between governments and citizens, fostering unhealthy and mistrustful relationships, both vertically and horizontally.³⁶

Many of the existing regional and sub-regional, state-centric structures, institutions, and processes designed to respond to these evolving security

33 <http://www.atlasoftheatlantic.com/narrative/security>

34 <http://globalinitiative.net/atlantic-currents-and-their-illicit-undertow-fragile-states-and-transnational-security-implications/>

35 https://www.cidob.org/ca/articulos/monografias/atlantic_future_shaping_a_new_hemisphere_for_the_21st_century/the_atlantic_space_in_the_21st_century

36 Warrel, M. (2017) "Trust Deficit: the Price We Pay When Power Trumps Principle" <https://www.forbes.com/sites/margiewarrell/2017/03/28/the-trust-deficit-the-price-we-pay-when-power-trumps-principle/#9311a6a441e4>

challenges, as well as to meet the needs of those affected,³⁷ have not fully measured up to the task. Left unchecked, these non-traditional transnational threats could prove disastrous by undermining global trade and disrupting critical functions such as transportation, energy flows, food supply chains, business systems, communications, financial networks, regional development, and overall political stability in the trans-Atlantic region³⁸.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the extent to which people-centered components of the human security paradigm that gained prominence two decades ago can be used to build a framework for strengthening people's and countries' individual and collective resilience to non-traditional threats. In order to address some of the criticisms leveled against this paradigm and lay better foundations for the self-sustainability of human security responses, the concept of positive (sustaining) peace is offered as a complementary framework. However, because both the concepts of human security and sustaining peace are still viewed with suspicion mostly by the global South, the final part of this chapter makes a case for exploring the universally accepted, UN 2030 Agenda for sustainable development as the overarching framework for pursuing both people-centered human security and positive peace in the Trans-Atlantic space.

Human Security: An Evolving Concept

The concept of human security emerged two decades ago largely in response to the limiting traditional perspectives that considered the State as the primary focus of security, a belief that put the military at the center of efforts to ensure peace and stability. According to these perspectives, the State monopolized the rights and means to protect its territory and its citizens, as well as the power to maintain order and peace. Prior to the creation of the United Nations, the two World Wars painfully demonstrated that the security of the State does not necessarily guarantee territorial integrity nor the security of the people inhabiting them.

One of the seminal documents that pushed for the reconceptualization of security based on the traditional ideas of sovereignty, territory, or military power is the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, endorsed by nearly all countries in the world. The Declaration proclaims that “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.” In

37 Atlantic Future: (2015) “Addressing the Atlantic’s Emerging Security challenges” http://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/1115-WP9_GMF_Addressing%20the%20Atlantic%E2%80%99s%20Emerging%20Security%20Challenges.pdf

38 Hamilton, Daniel S., (2014) *A New Atlantic Community: Generating, Growth, Human Development and Security in the Atlantic Hemisphere*, Washington, DC. Center for Transatlantic Relations.

addition, the Declaration affirms that the “disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people.”³⁹

Notwithstanding notable reversals - during the cold war period - that reinforced the concept of state-centric security in a number of countries in Latin America and Africa, the promotion of a broader idea of security continued, practically unabated, culminating in the promulgation of a number of universal covenants and conventions⁴⁰ and multiple studies and reports enshrining the letter and spirit of the 1948 Declaration.

In its first Human Development Report (HDR) of 1994, coming on the heels of the end of the Cold War euphoria,⁴¹ the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) defined human security as “first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life -whether in homes, in jobs or in communities.”⁴² The Report establishes the following essential characteristics:

- Human security is a universal concern. It is relevant to people everywhere, both in rich countries and in poor countries. There are many threats that are common to all people-such as unemployment, drugs, crime, pollution and human rights violations. The degree of the threats may vary from one place to another, but they are real.
- The components of human security are interdependent. When the security of a people is endangered anywhere in the world, all nations are likely to get involved.
- Human security is easier to ensure through early prevention than late intervention.
- Human security is people-centered. “It is concerned with how people live and breathe in a society, how freely they exercise their many choices, how much access they have to market and social opportunities -and whether they live in conflict or in peace”.

According to this report, the threats to human security may be classified into the following seven categories: economic security; food security; health security; environmental security; personal security; community security; and political

39 http://www.un.org/en/udhrbook/pdf/udhr_booklet_en_web.pdf

40 The Core International Human Right Treaties(<https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/CoreTreatiesen.pdf>)

41 Euphoria and Realism in Post-cold War European Security (2003)

https://www.jstor.org/stable/424811?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents

42 UNDP, 1994, Human Development Report http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/hdr_1994_en_complete_nostats.pdf

security.⁴³ Since then, varieties of human security definitions have emerged.⁴⁴ Kofi Annan was among the first to equate human security with national security, stating that “Human security, in its broadest sense, embraces far more than the absence of violent conflict. It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and health care and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfill his or her potential. Every step in this direction is also a step towards reducing poverty, achieving economic growth and preventing conflict. Freedom from want, freedom from fear, and the freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment – these are the interrelated building blocks of human – and therefore national – security.”⁴⁵

Subsequent to the Millennium Summit, held in September 2000, and at the initiative of Japan, the UN Commission on Human Security (CHS) was created. In 2003, the CHS published its report “Human Security Now,” which echoed the first HDR of 1994 defined human security as “protecting the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment. Human security means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people’s strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity.”⁴⁶

The CHS has advocated two key pathways for implementing the human security agenda: protection and empowerment. Protection is defined by the Commission as “strategies set up by states, international agencies, NGOs and the private sector, (to) shield people from menaces” that are beyond their control (natural disasters, financial crises, conflicts). Empowerment is defined as the “strategies (that) enable people to develop their resilience to difficult situations” and implies “bottom-up” measures that aim to develop the capacity of individuals and communities to make informed choices and to act on their own behalf. Empowerment not only enables people to develop their full potential, but also permits them to participate in the design and implementation of solutions to ensure human security for themselves and others.⁴⁷

In paragraph 143 of the Final Document of the 2005 World Summit, the Heads of State and Government refer to human security in the following manner: “We stress the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair. We recognize that all individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential. To

43 *ibid.* p. 24-25

44 <https://www.gdrc.org/sustdev/husec/Definitions.pdf>

45 Kofi Annan: “Secretary-General Salutes International Workshop on Human Security in Mongolia” May 2000. <https://www.un.org/press/en/2000/20000508.sgsm7382.doc.html>

46 Commission on Human Security: *Human Security Now*, New York, 2003, p. 4

47 *ibid.*

this end we commit ourselves to discussing and defining the notion of human security in the General Assembly.”⁴⁸

Human Security: A Contested Concept

Despite the prominence it gained in academic circles and the political milestones it achieved at the national and international levels,⁴⁹ the concept of human security has not been without its critics. Some charge that the concept is too idealistic and overpopulates an area that is already adequately addressed by state security, human development, and human rights initiatives, causing needless confusion and competition over scarce resources.⁵⁰ Others argue that the focus on human security undermines state’s authority and sovereignty and that the best way to guarantee security and liberty is to strengthen democratic states.⁵¹

Other critics feel that the focus on freedom from threats as a conceptual basis for human security negatively defines the legitimate aspirations for human wellbeing. Those who are outright suspicious accuse it of being a neo-imperial initiative aimed at bringing the world community into a Western cultural and political orbit, or as a Trojan horse used to justify outside interventions into eminently domestic affairs. The latter critics, mostly of the global south, bemoan how a concept initially concerned with global justice and equity for people was narrowly securitized and turned it into a prescriptive international tool. They point to the humanitarian NATO-led intervention in Libya under the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine,⁵² as an aberration of this securitization.⁵³

Human Security: Governments Back in the Driver’s Seat

After the opprobrium that followed the 2011 NATO intervention in Libya,⁵⁴ in 2012, as a follow up to paragraph 143 of the Millennium Declaration relating to human security, the UN General Assembly, reached, in resolution 66/99⁵⁵, a

48 UN: Final Document of the 2005 World Summit, General Assembly, Sixtieth session, A/RES/60/1, October 24, 2005.

49 Tadjbacksh, S (2009) “Human Security”: Looking back before Looking forward, paper for ICHSWA Conference Birjand, Iran.

50 Akire, Sabine (2003) A Conceptual Framework for Human Security <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.580.2805&rep=rep1&type=pdf>

51 <https://www.heritage.org/report/the-muddled-notion-human-security-the-un-guide-forus-policymakers>

52 <http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.html>

53 https://www.huffingtonpost.com/stephen-zunes/libya-the-responsibility-_b_841168.html

54 <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/oct/26/libya-war-saving-lives-catastrophic-failure>

55 <http://undocs.org/A/RES/66/290>

common, less interventionist understanding of the human security concept. It defines human security as an approach to assist Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood, and dignity of their people. Based on this common understanding, human security, as expounded in the resolution, includes the following:

- (a) The right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair. All individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential;
- (b) Human security calls for people-centred, comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented responses that strengthen the protection and empowerment of all people and all communities;
- (c) Human security recognizes the interlinkages between peace, development and human rights, and equally considers civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights;
- (d) The notion of human security is distinct from the responsibility to protect and its implementation;
- (e) Human security does not entail the threat or the use of force or coercive measures. Human security does not replace State security;
- (f) Human security is based on national ownership. Since the political, economic, social and cultural conditions for human security vary significantly across and within countries, and at different points in time, human security strengthens national solutions which are compatible with local realities;
- (g) Governments retain the primary role and responsibility for ensuring the survival, livelihood and dignity of their citizens. The role of the international community is to complement and provide the necessary support to Governments, upon their request, to strengthen their capacity to respond to current and emerging threats. Human security requires greater collaboration and partnership among Governments, international and regional organizations and civil society;
- (h) Human security must be implemented with full respect for the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, including full respect for the sovereignty of States, territorial integrity and non-interference in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of States. Human security does not entail additional legal obligations on the part of States.⁵⁶

56 *ibid*, paras. 3&4

The UN 1994 vision of human security, outlined in earlier paragraphs, pointed to a potential tension between human security and the state.⁵⁷ With the adoption of the 2012 UN resolution nearly two decades later that tension dissipated. Governments are back in the driver's seat and the possibility of international interventions for human protection purposes ever so remote. Nowhere in the resolution is it acknowledged that a state can foster insecurity indirectly through its inability to equitably provide public services or directly through corruption, predatory policing, or the criminalization of legitimate political dissent.

Bringing Back “We the Peoples” in Human Security

For the purpose of this chapter, and in order to address the legitimate criticisms leveled at the theory and practice of human security and build upon the above UN GA resolution, I am advocating that harnessing the people-centered components of human security would stand a better chance of enhancing the legitimacy and relevance of the state, while unleashing the leadership potential of citizens so they can participate in the design and implementation of responses to common threats confronting the transatlantic community.

In order for this approach to human security to foster a symbiotic (not parasitic) relation between people and the state in the face of common challenges, it should be guided by the following parameters, principles, or policies:

- **Human security is a complement, not a substitute to national security,** provided the state, in exercising its duties as guarantor and custodian of common public good and universal services, does not wittingly or unwittingly sacrifice on the altar of stability and security, basic human rights and fundamental freedoms. These include the ability to have a voice in public policy debates and to exercise legitimate political dissent, free from fear. The enjoyment of such rights will go a long way in assuaging the concerns noted above that the state, without proper checks and balances, can be a major source of insecurity and violence. Under a people-centered human security paradigm, governments will most likely focus on the human security their citizens need rather than on what the elites, fairly or unfairly elected, think the state needs.⁵⁸ Just and participatory governance is judged as one of the main safeguards against this aberration.⁵⁹ Such form of governance will most likely support drivers of positive reforms in municipalities to deliver public

57 Baluev, Dimitry, et al, (2017), “Human Security Concept as an analytical framework for the study of asymmetric conflict”

<http://www.revistaespacios.com/a17v38n44/a17v38n44p28.pdf>

58 Heinbecker, P. (1999). Human security. Headlines. Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs

59 <http://www.commonactionfortheunitednations.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Stakeholder-Forum-B2015-JustGovernance-FinalforDissemination.pdf>

services in a more accountable, transparent, and inclusive manner. Indeed, in countries where participatory, democratic governance has become the norm this is already happening, particularly in the area of participatory city budgeting.⁶⁰

- A people-centered human security approach cannot be gender-neutral. It should not assume that men's experience is the norm for defining human security needs. Hence, there is a need for an explicit discussion of how traditional and non-traditional threats to security affect women and men differently. As noted above, the respect for human rights has been identified as a key foundation for human security. Women's human rights must therefore be at the core of our understanding of human security. A gendered approach to human security should be motivated by the humility to recognize that women, even in times of crisis and adversity, are not powerless victims.⁶¹ They have resources, skills and capabilities, not just needs. A people centered approach to human security must leverage their agency when describing human security challenges and prescribing solutions.
- In order to unleash the potential of the empowerment component of human security discussed above, governments, both at the local, national and international levels, should enact policies and strategies aimed at creating enabling and inclusive eco-systems for enterprising global citizens, young and old, to engage in social innovations that help meet basic social needs, while making economic gains for themselves and for others in their communities. These policies should also foster public-private partnerships that work towards, not only sustainable societies, but that also help drive responses to regional and global sources of insecurity. Such partnerships have been one of the catalysts of the various transnational social movements and global social good summits of change makers, showcasing young female and male entrepreneurs⁶² as well as private sector leaders imagining new solutions to climate change.⁶³ Many of these solutions leverage technological innovations to accelerate the implementation of global agendas such as the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.⁶⁴ At a time when governance is no longer the sole preserve of governments, and politics not the sole

60 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/01/22/brazil-let-its-citizens-make-decisions-about-city-budgets-heres-what-happened/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.8d1c8ea2d713

61 June Zeitlin, June; Mpoumou, Doris (2004), "No human security without gender equality"

Women's Environment & Development Organization (WEDO)

http://www.morepeacelessaid.org/documentos/No_Humen_SEC.pdf

62 <https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/young-social-entrepreneurs-changing-the-world>

63 Global Climate Action Summit, California, 12-14 September 2018

<https://www.globalclimateactionsummit.org/>

64 Social Good Summit for the 2030 Agenda, New York, 2018

<https://mashable.com/sgs/>

preserve of political parties, empowered or self-empowered people with global identities are better able to rise above and beyond transient political circumstances, change their immediate environment, and sometimes whole societies.⁶⁵ This entails listening to people's aspirations and challenges in an effort to jointly strive for solutions to collective problems. People-centered approaches to human security require no less, particularly when the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, vowing to leave no one behind, is at stake.⁶⁶

Whether it is the African Union Agenda 2063,⁶⁷ the priority program of the newly-elected President of the General Assembly,⁶⁸ the vision of the current UN Secretary-General,⁶⁹ or the pronouncements of academics and civil society leaders,⁷⁰ integrating “we the peoples” in our common search for durable peace, security, and prosperity has increasingly become the rallying clarion call for those reformers seeking to enhance the legitimacy, relevance, and effectiveness of today's global and regional governance structures. The pan-Atlantic patchwork of cooperative arrangements and mechanisms⁷¹ should heed that call and explore adopting people-centered approaches in order to enhance their continued legitimacy and relevance .

With these considerations in mind and short of creating an Atlantic Human Security Forum, as proposed by the Eminent Person Group of the Atlantic Initiative,⁷² I recommend: The organization at a future edition of the Atlantic Dialogues with a conversation on how a people-centered approach to human security could serve as an overarching framework for a meaningful cooperation between states and peoples at the national and transnational levels at a time when faith in political establishments is low and trust in regional and global governance structures are under stress. The decision on the contents and objectives of such an event would be developed in close and wide-ranging consultations with key government actors (including city mayors) and non-governmental actors, including women and youth associations. In a digital age of networked, global citizenry, such a consultation should and would not be onerous.

65 Nagler, Juergen, (2017) “ Are People the drivers of change and development?”

<http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/are-people-drivers-change-and-development>

66 <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2016/09/14/144207/the-importance-of-a-human-centered-approach-in-implementing-the-sustainable-development-goals/>

67 <http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063.pdf>

68 <https://www.un.org/pga/73/2018/09/18/opening-of-the-73rd-session/>

69 Guterres, Antonio (2018) Adress to the 73 Session of the General Assembly

<https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2018-09-25/address-73rd-general-assembly>

70 Anne-Marie Slaughter (2018) “Refocus the UN on people rather than states” <https://www.ft.com/content/e236a712-ba51-11e8-8dfd-2f1cbc7ee27c>

71 Hamilton, Daniel, S, (2014) “A New Atlantic Community Generating Growth, Human Development And Security”, Center for Transatlantic Relations, Washington, DC.

72 *ibid*

Security, Yes, But What About Peace, Positive Peace?

Security comes from the Latin word “se cura,” meaning free from care. Human security focuses, inter-alia, on the protection of people from a variety of threats to their lives and dignity. One of the criticisms levelled at the human security paradigm, as noted above, is that the aspirations for security are depicted negatively, as the absence of threats or physical danger, whether these threats are internally induced or trans-national in origin and effect. The people-centered approach to human security attempts to reformulate the concept of security from a positive perspective by shifting the focus from threats to the protection of the rights and needs of people, by empowering them to become the primary agents of their destiny, with states where possible, playing a facilitating role.

Until recently, peace was also defined, negatively, as the absence of conflict and violence; as the order that ensues war. Defining peace as the end of war, or that which follows the cessation of other serious forms of generalized violence, produces some absurd categorization of the situations of countries in the Atlantic basin and elsewhere. Some of these countries, while are not experiencing outright civil war or engaged in military confrontation with neighbors, are hardly peaceful, given the debilitating prevalence of gang-related urban violence, organized crimes, and other intra-state and trans-border ills. Indeed, several Central American states stand out as clear examples of states that while officially at peace are without security,⁷³ particularly human security.

The focus on negative peace has also led scholars and practitioners to believe that if they understood the pathology of violence and addressed its root causes - exploitation, inequality, corruption - (important in their own right) they will build peace, despite abundant research pointing to the contrary - that peace is not the mirror image of conflict.⁷⁴ Such a myopic focus tends to exclude from the study of peace the conditions needed to move beyond these maladies to foster the attitudes, institutions, and structures, which, when strengthened, can lead to a more peaceful society.⁷⁵

Additionally, the binary relationship ascribed to conflict and peace means that societies that remain stable and even prosper despite internal vulnerabilities and external pressures, are excluded from the study of peace when in fact these are the case studies most likely to unveil the factors associated with peace.

In light of the above considerations and realizing that traditional tools for preventing conflict have proved woefully inadequate in face of the new

73 Millet, R and Stiles, R (2008), “Peace without Security: Central America in the 21st Century” <http://blogs.shu.edu/diplomacy/files/archives/05%20Millett%20and%20Stiles.pdf>

74 Diehl, Paul. F. (2016); “Exploring Peace, Looking Beyond War and Negative Peace”, *International Studies Quarterly* 60, 1-10

75 The pillars of Positive Peace, The Institute for Economics and Peace <http://www.gppplatform.ch/sites/default/files/Pillars%20of%20Peace%20Report%20%20IEP.pdf>

and changing drivers of contemporary violence in a polarized world, a slow but growing movement of policy makers and practitioners are shifting global emphasis from simply ending wars (negative peace) towards building the foundations that can foster positive peace⁷⁶. This has culminated into what is now called the sustaining peace agenda.⁷⁷ The movement is being informed in significant part by multi-disciplinary scientists who are studying peace directly, not through the conflict lens, as advocated by recent UN resolutions on the subject,⁷⁸ but through empirically identifying the conditions and processes conducive to sustainable peace.⁷⁹

One of the findings of these scientists is that peace tends to be the norm in most societies, not the exception.⁸⁰ It is the invisible canvas we take for granted. Once injured, peace, like a tree, grows back from the bottom up. It has better chances to flourish if it is democratically determined, nourished from top down, specifically tailored to context and to every day local needs.⁸¹ Sustaining peace is motivated by the humility to learn from what still works well in society and not focus only what is in disrepair and needs fixing, usually by outsiders. Peace has a chance to endure when it is built on what people have and what they know. Sustaining peace begins with identifying and strengthening those attributes and assets that have sustained social cohesion, the rule of law, the respect of the rights of others⁸² at times of national and global stresses and enabled societies to manage conflicts themselves, non-violently.

These and other findings have been taken up by practitioners⁸³ and think tanks⁸⁴ who have attempted, using their field experience, to showcase their policy implications and potential relevance for the UN discourse on peacebuilding sustaining peace.⁸⁵ For a number of these practitioners, sustaining peace is not confined to unstable environments or designed to calm the ravages of violent conflict. Unlike the enterprise of peacebuilding,⁸⁶ sustaining peace is an explicit,

76 Institute for Economics and Peace, (2017) "Positive Peace: The Lens to Achieve Sustainable Peace"

<http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/05/IPI-Positive-Peace-Report.pdf>

77 Schmidt, M and Mincieli, L, (2018), "Building sustainable peace" http://www.quono.org/sites/default/files/timeline/files/2018/Building%20Sustainable%20Peace_Final.pdf

78 [https://undocs.org/S/RES/2282\(2016\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/2282(2016))

79 Coleman, Peter, (2018) "The Science of Sustaining Peace" <https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-five-percent/201802/the-science-sustaining-peace>

80 Fry, D. (2005), *The Human Potential for Peace: An Anthropological Challenge to Assumptions about War and Violence*, Oxford University Press, London

<https://global.oup.com/ushe/product/the-human-potential-for-peace-9780195181784?cc=us&lang=en&>

81 Roberts, D (2010), "From Liberal to Popular Peace"

<https://www.opendemocracy.net/david-roberts/from-liberal-to-popular-peace>

82 Mahmoud, Y, Athie, A; (2017) "Human Rights and Sustaining Peace", International Peace Institute, New York

https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/1712_Human-Rights-and-Sustaining-Peace.pdf

83 Mahmoud, Y and Makoond, A. (2017); "Sustaining Peace: What Does It Mean in Practice,

International Peace Institute, New York.

https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/1704_Sustaining-Peace-final.pdf

84 Institute for Economics and Peace; (2016), *Positive Peace Report* <http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/02/Positive-Peace-Report-2016.pdf>

85 <https://www.ipinst.org/2018/03/sustaining-peace-in-practice-evidence-measurement-and-indicators>

86 Mahmoud, Y and Makoond, A, (2018) "Can Peacebuilding work for Sustaining Peace", International Peace Institute, New York <https://theglobalobservatory.org/2018/04/peacebuilding-work-sustaining-peace/>

deliberate policy objective for all states. Sustaining peace is not a one-time intervention. It is a multi-sectoral, endogenous, and ongoing process that is the shared responsibility of states and all citizens.⁸⁷

How to make human security work for sustaining peace?

Despite modest attempts,⁸⁸ the biggest challenge facing those seeking to understand sustaining peace is to define the concrete actions that will contribute to its effective implementation. Because of its multi-sectoral, multi-disciplinary underpinnings, the human security approach, as noted above, expands the notion of security and thus, potentially offers a pathway for achieving the goal of sustaining peace and enlarging the policy options for decision makers in the Pan-Atlantic space as they grapple with challenges affecting their countries and peoples. Key components of this pathway are considerations of justice, human rights, and the establishment of accountable and inclusive institutions that safeguard the dignity of ordinary people, respond to their basic needs, and enable them to address their legitimate grievances without fear. Because conflicts erode trust, a people-centered human security approach to sustaining peace implies the nurturing of processes of trust building, reconciliation, and of co-existence.

Beyond protection, human security policies are also directed towards unleashing the “agency” of people, so that they can contribute to their wellbeing. From a human security perspective, “the more populations and their perceptions of the common good are included, the more difficult it would be to simply impose particular ideals, values and models deemed universally applicable but proven problematic in local contexts.”⁸⁹

Preventing conflict and providing security and stability remain important endeavors, for human security as it is currently understood. However, alone they cannot lay the foundations for self-sustaining peace, given that their starting point is conflict and insecurity and methods of prevention, but not the factors of positive peace or how to nurture them. Moreover, given the lingering mistrust with which both norms are still viewed by key stakeholders from the global South, one way of making human security work for sustaining peace is to consider both mutually reinforcing policy objectives as functions of sustainable development. In this context, the 2030 Agenda for sustainable development as a universal plan of action for people, planet, prosperity and peace, may very well serve that

87 Mahmoud, Y and Makoond, A. (2017)

88 Mahmoud, Y., Connolly, L., Mechoulam, D. (eds) (2018) “Sustaining Peace in Practice: Building on What Works”, International Peace Institute

89 Futamora, M., Newman, E., and Tadjbakhsh, S. (2010), “Towards a Human Security Approach to Peacebuilding http://collections.unu.edu/eserv/UNU:2934/unu_researchbrief_10_02.pdf

purpose. The Agenda considers people are both the drivers and beneficiaries of sustainable development, and peace as an enabler and an outcome of that Agenda.

With the above considerations in my mind, and given the ongoing national and global focus on implementing the Sustaining Development Goals and addressing climate change (SDGs), thought should be given to having another conversation during - or in the margins of - the next Atlantic Dialogues on how the SDGs could be leveraged to promote people-centered human security and positive peace as means for sustainably addressing the growing and debilitating, non-traditional security challenges facing the Pan-Atlantic space.

Conclusion

While challenges to inter-state security are greatest in the Pacific Rim, the majority of security threats in the Atlantic Basin are largely intra-state and of human security nature. This chapter argues that given the nature of these threats, largely driven from below by people's actions, people-centered approaches to human security may offer a helpful framework for strengthening countries' individual and collective resilience as well as responses to these threats. However, given that the aspirations for human security tend to be depicted negatively- as the absence of threats-, the results of these responses are not durable and should therefore be pursued from a positive peace perspective, where policy is driven by considering the factors of peace, not the drivers of conflict. Since both the concepts of human security and sustaining peace are still viewed with suspicion, mostly by the global South, the final part of the paper makes a case for exploring the universally accepted UN 2030 Agenda for sustainable development as the overarching framework for pursuing both people-centered human security and positive peace in the Trans-Atlantic space.



Chapter 9

Ten Years After the International Financial Crisis: Is a New One Looming?

Otaviano Canuto and Eric Ntumba

A review of the current literature on the topic tends to broadly suggest that a new crisis is looming for a myriad of reasons, the simplest one being that we have reached the average lifespan of previously observed favorable economic cycles before they are upset by a downturn (estimated at around 10 years). This probably largely explains the focus that has been mounting on the potential next crisis subject on the eve of the 10-year anniversary of the fall of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 marking the beginning of the last global financial crisis. But are we really on the verge of a new International Financial Crisis? One is tempted to say “Yes!” for the following reasons:

First of all, the analysis of a battery of indicators and of a number of factors currently at play suggests that we will experience a crisis in the mid-term essentially triggered by the sharp or progressive tightening of global financial conditions after years of quantitative easing led by central bankers of key developed economies in an effort to alleviate, then eradicate the effects of the last crisis by actively supporting “the recovery in growth, employment and income”⁹⁰ mostly using their money supply levers.⁹¹


This situation, which principal effect has been particularly low (or negative) interest rates has made easy money available for market participants leading to a boom in credit (hence the explosion of debt levels) totally disconnected from the level of savings in the economy creating imbalances, allowing malinvestments⁹² and stretching assets valuations.

90 IMF, 2018, Global Financial Stability Report, October.

91 Canuto, O. and Cavallari, M., 2017, “Bloated Central Bank Balance Sheets”, Capital Finance International, spring.

92 In the words of Mises ““A lowering of the gross market rate of interest as brought about by credit expansion always has the effect of making some projects appear profitable which did not appear before.”

Figure 3: World market capitalization has exceeded the levels witnessed in 2008



As the same central bankers progressively (or abruptly) engage in monetary policy normalization, particularly the US Fed, by raising policy rates and shrinking balance sheets,⁹³ participants having substantially raised their leverage thanks to the previously very accommodative credit conditions might face mounting difficulties to service their debts. So “Yes”, there might well be a financial crisis looming, and like in all previous major crises, its principal vector will revolve around market participants’ debt levels and the pace at which financial conditions will tighten in the near future. Debate is at this stage raging on its potential scale and impact but there is a rising convergence of views toward the likely occurrence of major financial shocks.

An important difference from the run-up to the 2007-09 global financial crisis stems from the fact that this time there is no high systemic exposure to leverage of commercial banks and other retail financial intermediaries. Furthermore, stretched valuation of stocks may well be followed by portfolio corrections and correspondingly negative wealth effects but not necessarily bankruptcies. The major danger this time lies on the debt leverage of corporates, as the quality of lending – as measured by average ratings – clearly declined as standards lowered


⁹³ Canuto, O., 2018, “Lowering the Fed balance sheet”, OMFIF Bulletin, May; Canuto, O., 2018, “The double side of the Fed’s balance sheet unwinding”, OCP Policy Center, April.

along the long period of abnormally low interest rates. At the end of the day, that's where it will be answered whether a recession – rather than a financial crisis – will be the outcome of the monetary policy normalization.

If we agree that we are on the verge of a negative financial shocks and, maybe, a new Financial Crisis, how sure are we of its international nature?

A historical review of the past financial crisis clearly makes a distinction between the ones having had a tremendous global impact like the great depression in 1929 or the “Great recession” in 2008 and the others that range from simple market corrections followed by swift recoveries or regional crisis in emerging markets (Latin America, Asia) with minor to medium effects on a couple of developed ones having exposures on them. There is at this stage a strong debate not on the potential occurrence of major shocks or crisis ahead but on the magnitude of its scale. As previously stated, the next crisis main driver will likely be the tightening of global financial conditions coupled with the current level of debts of market participants. A look at the description of these actors may provide us with a good assessment tool of what might come next. global debt levels have exploded not just in nominal terms but also in comparison to global GDP (clearly suggesting its unsustainability in the long run). Nonetheless, one needs to examine where balance-sheet vulnerabilities are located and what are their systemic implications.

Figure 4: Debt as a percentage of GDP and nominal debt



Source: Bloomberg⁹⁴

94 250 Trillion in Debt: the World's Post-Lehman Legacy By Brian Chappatta September 13 in <https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2018-lehman-debt/>

As mentioned, this includes Global Corporate and Sovereign Debt, to the exception of the financial sector having benefited from stronger macroeconomic and macroprudential frameworks and supervision after the 2008 crisis which have induced a tight control over the banks' leverage levels and strict requirements on building capital and liquidity buffers making them fitter to resist to stressed scenarios. It is worth noticing that the deep interconnectedness between European banks and asset bubbles in the US has dramatically shrunk since the global financial crisis, followed by the Euro crisis.

A deeper analysis on the global players shows 4 buckets of market actors able to influence the course of things:

- **US** which has enjoyed strong recovery and is now reaping the full benefits of its accommodative monetary policy in terms of growth, employment, and income levels while trying to keep inflation under control and keep the current momentum going by progressively normalizing its monetary policy via regular interest rate hikes. It is worth remarking, however, that the extraordinary performance so far in 2018 has a lot to do with the fiscal impulse provided by President Trump's corporate tax cuts, in a context of full employment, the fiscal consequences of which will come to haunt the US economy in the future.
- **Europe** that has recovered at a slower pace, especially due to disparities in economic fundamentals of the countries in the Eurozone, but that is surely doing better and is predicted to continue doing so unless critical disruptive political or trade related factors come into play. Europe will probably, when the time is right, progressively normalize its monetary policy following the path already taken by the US.
- **Emerging countries (China included)** which have strongly benefited as investments destinations during the time accommodative market conditions and very low (or negative) interest rates prevailed by raising the level of their Non-Resident Capital Flows and their debt (Private and Sovereign). The idiosyncrasy of the emerging markets economies pertaining to the expected crisis lies in the span and nature of their exploding debt levels (they are for a great deal dollar or foreign currency denominated, external and short term, they show a growing trend in non-financial corporate lending/Shadow banking, and a strong rise in the level of public debt which has doubled since 2008⁹⁵), the fact that their external debt is higher than their Exports (to the exception of China)⁹⁶ coupled with low levels of foreign exchange reserves exacerbating their vulnerability to external shocks and the prevalence of policy and political

⁹⁵ For emerging markets (excluding China) IMF GFSR October 2018.

⁹⁶ IMF suggests that emerging countries where external debt is too high relative to exports now account for 40% of aggregate GDP of emerging markets (excluding China) GFSR October 2018

uncertainties. Emerging Economies seems to be vulnerable, given the current conditions and any tightening scenario might put their growth at risk. On the other hand, aggregate figures for emerging markets may hide a relevant diversity of situations. China makes a case apart as a major responsible for high debt figures exhibited by emerging markets, while holding special conditions to unwind it in some smoother way as its foreign-exchange balance sheet remains favorable. Among the other emerging markets, in turn, degrees of vulnerability differ to a large extent.⁹⁷

- **Frontier and Low-Income Markets:** These countries seem already in trouble after years where market participants chasing for returns made them look very attractive and fostered high yield investments that contributed to their growth levels. They display all the vulnerabilities of emerging economies at their culminating points. They are the first at risk of a flight of funds (capital portfolio reversal) that is already well engaged. They also represent the strongest balance of payment imbalances mostly due to their strong dependence on extractive industries (with no or little value addition within their economies) and their highly extrovert nature (importing most of the consumers' goods they need). All the above being exacerbated by a poor and unreliable policy framework, poor quality of the borrowers, the level of inequalities prevailing in their economies and weak political institutions prone to instability. The global risk appetite for this market is shrinking fast as attested by the postponement of most of these countries external issuance plans and the growing recourse to the support of International Financial Institutions. In its October 2018 Global Financial Stability Report the IMF points out that "As of August 2018, over 45% of low-income countries were at high risk of, or already in, debt distress compared with one-third in 2016 and one-quarter in 2013".

Those 4 buckets of country cases and their diverging economic trajectories largely point to a possible international dynamic along the next financial shocks/crisis: As the US and other mature economies having recovered from the effect of the past crisis stop their quantitative easing policies and push for monetary policy normalization in an effort to maintain their fundamentals they will tighten global financial conditions, particularly by raising policy rates and making it very difficult for emerging markets actor to meet external debt service requirements and further deteriorating the already noticeable distress of frontier and low-income markets. This situation might be exacerbated by a capital flows portfolio reversal triggered by the renewed attractiveness of US and other

97 Canuto, O., 2018, "Emerging markets face multiple tantrums", OCP Policy Center, July; Canuto, O., 2018, "Argentina, Turkey and the May Storm in Emerging Markets", OCP Policy Center, June.

mature economies as investment destinations (given the rising return on safer investments they offer during progressive decline in emerging market global risk appetite). Such new international financial shock/crisis would in its first stage be an Emerging Markets one and would have direct impacts on the real economy of this group of countries and the capacity of their respective governments to meet international debt obligations as they fall due or rollover short term facilities. Its international nature would be amplified as mature economies (and their Corporate or Sovereign actors) having strong exposures on the emerging ones' start taking the hits of their successive defaults.

This outlook is likely to be exacerbated by the following non-exhaustive number of potential crises catalysts or could be mitigated if global awareness of the current, short-term and mid-term situation leads to converging efforts of global supervision, monitoring and oversight of those vulnerabilities in order to address them efficiently and shield the real economy from their adverse potential impact:

- **Global converging efforts to prevent the crisis and harmonize the response in case of its occurrence is less likely to happen in nowadays “leaderless world”⁹⁸ raising the risk to see us collectively “sleepwalking into a future crisis”⁹⁹ while a historical review of previous crisis demonstrates that only a concerted global effort piloted by a strong global leadership can help us avoid or end international financial crisis as William Rhodes puts it “One of the things that is clear in all of the crises is that strong leadership is crucial”¹⁰⁰.**
- **Mounting fears of deregulation in the US mainly might reverse progress made in the post 2008 crisis era** triggering a “race to the bottom”¹⁰¹ approach that will exacerbate existing vulnerabilities and the global systemic risk as supported by statements from the US administration seemingly tempted to ease or undo the restrictive measures implemented as part of the Dodd-Frank regulation in order to rein in and fence commercial banks activities from speculative ones. This risk is also pregnant in the potential aftermath of the Brexit with the temptation to undo the well-advanced Basel III implementation in an attempt to attract key actors based in UK on the European continent or on flip side to retain them in the UK.
- **Rising global levels of Shadow Banking (lending by non-financial corporates or institutions) especially in emerging markets.**¹⁰² This

98 As coined by former British Prime Minister Gordon Brown in “World economy at risk of another financial crash, says IMF”, Philip Inman, The Guardian 03 October 2018

99 Idem

100 IFR international Financial Review <http://www.ifre.com/a-history-of-the-past-40-years-in-financial-crises/21102949.fullarticle> quoting William Rhodes book “Banker to the World”.

101 Competitive deregulation

102 The ongoing problems with China’s P2P system as a form of “shadow banking” were anticipated some time ago by

growing part of the global economy have so far escaped the scope of the 2008 post crisis regulation efforts leading to rising level of lending by hedge funds, assets managers and insurers to riskier borrowers.

- **Escalation of trade tensions beyond the current US-China commercial war to systemic levels** can accelerate the pace of the tightening of global financial conditions and threaten growth and global financial stability by triggering a swift drop in external demand which will put an extra burden of pressure to the balance of payments of countries having high export-to-GDP ratios or closely integrated to global value chains and in doing so deepening their existing imbalances (especially for emerging countries)¹⁰³
- **A rise in political and policy uncertainties exacerbated by a correlated rise in inequalities** could constitute a serious threat both at the individual country and at the global levels putting growth and stability at serious jeopardy.
- **The revival of the Sovereign-Bank nexus¹⁰⁴, the level of cross border exposures of banks and the fact that a couple of them have gone beyond the “too-big-to-fail” threshold witnessed in 2008** could act as a serious systemic contagion factors (geographically making Banks and financial institutions of mature economies vulnerable to emerging market borrowers risk of default; and globally from the speculative sphere to the real economy).
- **Other unpredicted idiosyncratic global factors** (crypto-currencies, growing disintermediation by banks to the benefits of unregulated Fintechs, etc.) suddenly disrupting market conditions **or country specific factors triggering a domino effects on surrounding economies**
- **The compounded effects of the last crisis remnants in economies still on the path to recovery with a progressive (or sudden) change in market conditions** triggered by the ongoing or expected normalization of the monetary policies in mature economies.

While we agree with the classic Austrian Business Cycle Theory approach in foreseeing increasingly deteriorated asset-liability structures as a consequence of abnormally loose monetary-financial conditions, maintained for long periods, we do not associate ourselves with the proposal also associated with that school of thought: Do nothing, let the market sort itself, since otherwise unsustainable

Canuto, O. and Zhuang, L., 2015, “Shadow banking in China: a morphing target”, *EconoMonitor*, November.

103 IMF, 2018, *Global Financial Stability Report*, October.

104 Describing the transmission of risks from banks to sovereigns and vice versa, particularly acute during the Eurozone crisis where the positive relationship between bank and sovereign credit risks acted as a major threat for the stability of the Eurozone (cfr. “what drives the Sovereign Bank Nexus? By Schnabel, Isabel & Schuwer, Ulrich. 2017).

structures may survive and thereby retard the end of a crisis.

As the Austrian school of thought would suggest, this next crisis will simply come as a consequence of excessive growth in money supply or levels of liquidity (associated with artificially low interest rates) coupled with the multiplying effect of the fractional reserve system which have set the conditions for a credit-sourced boom (and its inherent chunk of malinvestments) fostering volatile and unstable imbalances between savings and investments having successfully put the economy on an unsustainable growth path that will sooner or later lead to a credit crunch (market correction) once the money supply or liquidity contracts with the end of easing policies

This was known before the 2008 crisis (and most of its predecessor) but has seemingly not triggered the necessary reaction until it was too late. Steve H Hanke, totally in-sync with this theory, points the responsibility of global apathy on the matter to Central Bankers for having refuted this mechanics over decades.

While not denying the unsustainability that tends to derive from the structure of incentives prevailing during too-easy-for-too-long monetary policies, as stressed by the Austrian school, we believe in the usefulness of a Keynesian approach when it comes to the relevant answer that must be brought about:¹⁰⁵

A strong policy response is needed to help avoid the crisis if possible or seriously contain its magnitude and impact on the real economy. The sooner we collectively act the better it will be for all.

1. In Mature Economies and the US in particular

- The US should take a more global approach in analyzing the impact of its monetary normalization policy bearing in mind the externalities it imposes on emerging economies and the potential threat this situation, if not paced well enough, represents to the global financial stability while rightfully pursuing its recovery objectives. A strong deterioration of global market conditions triggered by a blindly self-centered monetary normalization endeavor might allow its economy to reap the expected fruits in the near term but will not be sustainable and end up in affecting the US economy own fundamentals in the long run.
- The US should attempt to ease its trade tension with China in particular via a bilateral approach or using existing or renewed multilateral channels. Other mature economies can help setting-up such a forum.


¹⁰⁵ In fact, Hyman Minsky's Keynesian approach to finance-led business cycles and crisis shows how the Austrian school is not the only one to generate that forecast from ultra-loose, protracted abnormal liquidity. Furthermore, it can be argued that the resort to very lax monetary policies in the US and other advanced economies, after the global financial crisis, might have been less intensive if fiscal policies had also been pro-actively implemented: Canuto, O., 2014, "Macroeconomics and stagnation – Keynesian-Schumpeterian wars", Capital Finance International, spring.

- Mature economies having recovered from the last crisis should shy away from deregulation temptations and push for the inclusion of global shadow banking actors within the regulated prudential realm to avoid losing the benefits they have gained from strengthening Banks and financial actors' balance sheets through sound capital and liquidity buffers requirements making them "healthier and more resilient to another shock".¹⁰⁶ They should also pursue consistent economic and financial overseeing processes both at the macro and micro prudential levels.
- Mature economies "lenders of last resource" must stand ready to timely intervene (even if this requires bailing out Corporate or Sovereign actors) to ring-fence any financial distress and avoid its systemic propagation. The same "ready to act" posture is strongly encouraged from International Financial Institutions.
- Drive the global convergence agenda and efforts of the 4 diverging buckets of countries (US, Europe and other mature markets, emerging markets and frontier ones) to avoid furthering the dislocation of the global economy which will only exacerbate the risks and volatility as well as empower cross-cutting contagion vectors on a global scale.

2. In Emerging Countries

The key risks, vulnerabilities and the mitigating policy axis needed to be explored (buffers) in order to prevent the occurrence of the crisis or reduce its acuity for emerging countries are well summarized in the following diagram from the IMF:

Figure 5: Risks, vulnerabilities, and buffers



Source: The IMF

106 250 Trillion in Debt: the World's Post-Lehman Legacy By Brian Chappatta September 13 in <https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2018-lehman-debt/>

In completion of the above, Emerging countries should:

- Strive to develop sound institutional and regulatory frameworks and strive towards more inclusive economic institutions as extractive economic ones can only bring unsustainable growth before leading to a collapse. The Institutional gap (in terms of quality) between most of these countries and the developed ones as often been named as one of the main reasons they seemed trapped at the middle-income level (the so-called Middle-Income Trap). Engaging in these reforms will not only mitigate the challenges raised by the looming crisis but also paved the way for the awaited glass ceiling breakthrough towards the club of advanced economies.
- Strive to deepen local markets and build local investors bases to foster their domestic capital levels making them more resilient to external shocks.
- Strive to fully implement Basel III recommendations and launch converging policies to address the shadow banking risks (limiting the capacity of nonbank lenders to provide credit) by regulating non-financial lending to prevent future crashes through a mix of macroeconomic and prudential frameworks.
- Strive to improve the sustainability of their public sector debts, build foreign exchange reserves, implement hedging policies and enhance their fiscal buffers.

3. In low-income countries, frontier markets and Africa in particular

- Must invest time in continuously diversifying their economies, building foreign exchange reserves, building local investors bases and markets, putting in place “local content” policies enabling the emergence of domestic capital in order to shield away from external shocks. The diversification of the economy must no longer come as a token answer in times of trials but must be eagerly pursued, attempting to scale up to regional markets and value chains in order to support regional integration efforts.
- Must boost intra-African trade and South-South partnerships in order to raise their global bargaining power and rebalance the equilibrium of forces in global trade to their own advantage. This calls for a well thought continental agenda pushing for more integration of the currently scattered African markets and a continental macroeconomic and macroprudential policy convergence drive. This can be gradually

achieved through regional (or sub regional) integration initiatives building momentum until they aggregate at the continental level.

- The African Union should consider fast-tracking its 2063 agenda creating the Pan-African Financial Institutions (PAFI: the African Investment Bank, the Pan African Stock Exchange, the African Monetary Fund and the African Central Bank) as they can be of great importance in order to help regulate and oversee macroeconomics and macroprudential frameworks (hence alleviating the hazard of country specific factors) and pilot the drive to bring more economic and financial policy convergence across the continent. 2063 is just too far as a target especially for the setting-up of the African Monetary Fund and the African Investment Bank (it could remain for the single currency prospect).
- Must strive to build more inclusive and democratic institutions, able to work towards reducing the inequalities gap and foster inclusive growth to reduce country specific factors (usually political) hampering their development. They must boldly “take decisive steps toward inclusive economic institutions” to “ignite rapid economic growth”¹⁰⁷
- Keep at fostering growth and market friendly regulations easing their business climate in order to raise their attractiveness levels in the eyes of foreign investors and build a conducive environment for local businesses to prosper.

107 Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J.A., 2012, “Why Nations Fail, the origins of power, prosperity and poverty”.



Chapter 10

Agriculture and Food Security in Africa and Latin America: Opportunities for Transatlantic Cooperation

Fatima Ezzahra Mengoub and Tharcisse Guèdègbé

In the economic and political history of the Atlantic area and the world, the two great regions of Africa and Latin America are known to have immense agricultural potential that can make each of them a key player in agribusiness worldwide. With the commitment of various stakeholders, different strategies have been put in place at the regional and national levels to create, in each of these two regions, what can be considered as the green revolution. Today, these two potential granaries of the world seem to be at different stages of transformation of plant and animal productions. While one (Latin America) seems to have consolidated its giant position on the world agricultural market, the other (Africa) seems to have not yet found optimal strategies.

In this chapter, we will explore to what extent these various pathways of sustainable transformation of the agricultural sector have been reflected in the performance of the sector and on food security. By reviewing the history of recent agricultural policies that have induced these transformations, we will try to understand how these two regions can demonstrate examples of co-development by putting in place appropriate strategies and in what conditions these strategies would be likely to succeed. For this purpose, we will explore ways to improve the transatlantic partnership between Africa and Latin America in the financial, technical, commercial, economic and institutional dimensions.

State of agriculture in Africa and Latin America

Africa recorded significant improvements in terms of food security. This can be observed through the five indicators presented in Table 5, which describes progress in food production and its quality. Overall, food production increases enough to offset population growth, resulting in an increase in per capita food

production. The latter increased from approximately \$ 160 before 2003 to \$ 173 in the period 2014-16. However, the current level remains below the world average, which is nearly double of the African average.

The variability of food supply per capita remained lower than the world average and seems to decline in recent years. This can lead to more stable availability, access and quality of food. The coverage of energy and protein requirements is slightly increasing but it is still below the world average. According to the most recent observations, energy needs are covered at 107% compared to 120% worldwide. The supply of protein was 49 grams per person per day compared to 80 in the world.

These improvements helped to reduce undernourishment in Africa. The prevalence of undernourishment decreased from 24% in the period 1999-2003 to 19% in the period 2014-16; with a significant inter-country variability. In the last period observed, the rates were 5% in North Africa, 31% in the East, 25% in the Center, 8% in the South and 12% in the West of the continent.

Table 5: Characterization of agriculture and food security in Africa

	1994-1998	1999-2003	2004-2008	2009-2013	2014-2016	World
Agricultural growth	4,3	5,5	4,6	4,7	3,2	2,4
Per capita food production	154	160	170	175	173	311
Per capita food supply variability	-	5,8	7,2	5,6	-	7,6
Coverage of energy requirements	-	103	106	108	107	120
Protein supply	-	46	48	49	-	80
Prevalence of undernourishment	-	24	21	19	19	10,7

Source: FAOSTAT and authors calculations

Units: Food production per person in constant prices, 2004-2006 international dollars. Protein supply in grams per capita per day. The other indicators are measured in percentage.

On the other side of the globe, the level of food security in Latin American countries is less alarming than in Africa. Latin America is home to 19 countries, which represents about 604 million people (8% of the world's population). In this region, the total number of undernourished people decreased significantly over the period 2000-2017 with a growth rate of -3.6% resulting in a decrease in the

total number of undernourished people (from 56 million in 2000 to 33 million in 2017). However, the situation is contrasted by country. In some countries such as Bolivia, Nicaragua and Guatemala, the number of undernourished people is 20%, 16% and 15% respectively of the total population. A rate that may be low for other countries such as Argentina and Uruguay, where the share of undernourished people does not exceed 4% of the total population.

The increase in the average value of per capita food production in Latin America is an indicator of improvements in food security. During the last two decades, it recorded a 2% increase, rising from approximately I\$ 6036 in 2000 to I\$ 7820 in 2016. All Latin American countries experienced a positive growth rate of the average value of food production per capita, with the exception of Cuba and Panama, where per capita food production fell by -1.1% and -0.3% respectively. The energy needs of the populations in the region are met on average at 116%, thus approaching the world average (117%).

The average protein availability for Latin populations has also increased from about 70 g per person per day to 80 g per person per day. A minimum protein availability of about 40 g per person per day is recorded in Panama while the maximum is reached in Brazil and Argentina, 116 and 114 g per person per day respectively. This situation leads to the improvement of food prevalence in Latin America. It decreased from 15.3% in the early 2000s to 8.5% in 2017. This reduction reflects governments' efforts to fight famine.

Table 6: Characterization of Agriculture and Food Security in Latin America

	2000-2016	World
Agricultural growth (%)	3.0	2.4
Per capita food production (2004-2006 \$ per capita)	389	287
Per capita food supply variability %	15.5	2.1
Coverage of energy requirements (%)	116	117
Proteins supply (g/capita/day)	74.3	75
Prevalence of undernourishment %	12	13

Source: FAOSTAT and authors calculations

Despite this positive trend, short-term evidences show that Latin American countries experienced a severe food crisis during the 2000s, affecting food-insecure low-income consumers and small farmers. During the 2006-2008 period, the imbalance between supply and demand in the international market led to a significant increase in food prices, even if we consider the region as

a net exporter of agricultural products, particularly food. The consequences of this imbalance were reflected in the consumer food price index (IPCA), which increased on average by 30%. These consequences were also contrasted from one country to another. The most affected countries were Nicaragua and Honduras, where the IPCA increased by 45%.

Overall, these statistics cited above reflect efforts and progress made at national, regional or continental levels in terms of eradicating hunger in Africa and Latin America. Moreover, they reflect the commitment of decision makers and all stakeholders to achieve the sustainable development goals. From this perspective, the following sections look at different policies implemented and implications for better development strategies in both regions.

Efforts to improve food security in Africa and Latin America

Ensuring food security implies different strategies that affect firstly technical and organizational aspects of domestic food production. Indeed, the restructuring of the agricultural sector is a necessary condition for intensifying and improving food production within countries. This requires interventions along the food value chain, from upstream to downstream. The use of new techniques and technologies such as high yielding seeds, irrigation, mechanization, fertilization, phytosanitary treatments, improved harvesting techniques, conservation and storage is imperative to enhance agricultural productivity, the efficiency of the use of production factors and to improve resilience. Organizational aspects include infrastructure-related elements (road, rail and air distribution networks, storage and processing units, access to electricity, and many others) required for the chain's development.

On the other hand, imports in turn play an important role in ensuring food security. They allow countries to obtain from the rest of the world foodstuffs not produced in the national territories or to supplement the needs of consumers during periods of insufficient production. Thanks to these investments, consumers have easier financial and physical access to food. All these aspects are part of agricultural policy implemented at country level.

Aware of the magnitude of the problem, African policymakers have stepped up efforts in terms of policies and other measures to improve food security in the continent. They placed agriculture at the heart of their development strategies. In 2003, they formalized this craze through the Maputo Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security and adopted the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP). This was also followed by the Abuja Declaration on Fertilizers for a Green Revolution in Africa (2006) and the

Malabo Declaration on Accelerating Agricultural Growth and Transformation (2014), among others.

Among the key objectives defined, 6% of agricultural growth per year, 10% of national budgets to allocate to agriculture and a level of fertilizer use of 50 kg per hectare. So much to shape a productive, resilient and competitive agriculture that guarantees food safety and protection of the environment.

More than a decade after the solemnity of 2003, heterogeneous progress has been observed, reflecting the diverse economic, climatic, social and political conjunctures. On average, agricultural growth has not improved significantly. Although it has fallen slightly compared to the period before 2003, it remains stronger than the world average. Countries such as Angola, Ethiopia and Mali achieved agricultural growth levels that were more than 6% per year in the post-2003 period. Although targeted indicators suggest substantial progress, there is still a long way to go.

The recent assessment of the African Union about the degree of transformation of the agricultural sector in each member state in reference to the declared intentions in Malabo reveals that while several countries are on track to fulfill their commitments, headed by Rwanda, Mali and Ethiopia, others are recording insufficient improvements sufficient (African Union, 2017). These multiple trajectories of transformation of African agriculture and related value chains had diverse impacts on conditions of rural and urban households' livelihood, more particularly the security of their nutrition.

At the same time in Latin America, many efforts were also made by governments, the private sector and international organizations to improve agricultural value chains and food security. Agricultural policies in Latin America date back to the 1950s. The periods of food crises (famines and shortages) experienced by the world in general and in Latin America in the 1950s, pushed the countries in Latin America to adopt intensive agricultural policies based on the use of high-yielding seeds (i.e. corn in Mexico and soybeans in Argentina and Brazil), fertilizer applications and irrigation development.

Knowing that production alone cannot guarantee food security in Latin America, decision-makers began reforms aimed at restructuring the agricultural sector, disengaging the State, liberalizing the prices of agricultural products, opening on international market and promoting agricultural exports. Countries such as Chile, Mexico and Brazil have embarked on cycles of institutional reforms, reconsidering the land tenure status of agricultural land (land reform in Chile started in 1980), the role of trade (Mexico's accession to GATT in 1986). In addition, the signing of MERCOSUR by Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela in 1985 aims to create a customs union in order to reduce tariffs and eliminates non-tariff barriers, in particular for agricultural products. Other countries joined this union such as Bolivia (1996, currently being integrated),

Chile (1996), Peru (2003), Colombia and Ecuador (2004). Observer status is assigned to Mexico.

In 2016, Latin American countries have once again renewed their willingness to meet the food needs of their people. “Eradicating hunger, adapting to climate change and strengthening family farming” are the three priorities set for FAO by the Latin American and Caribbean governments during the recent Regional Conference of the Organization.

Technical and institutional efforts enabled countries in this part of the world to benefit from a relatively organized agricultural sector, an adequate infrastructure (storage units, distribution networks, market organization, etc.) as well as to guarantee a constantly improving agricultural production which, since 2000, has recorded a growth rate of 3% (higher than that achieved worldwide). However, these countries remain subject to external risks. Exogenous factors such as the variability of international food supply, social and economic policies conducted at the national level, notably Venezuela, Bolivia and many others, hinder food security.

This illustrates that African and American leaders have tried to transform their agricultural sector, increase food production, and eradicate hunger. However, one can also identify major bottlenecks hindering this sector’s transformation. In this perspective, North-South and South-South cooperation, involving African states and their Atlantic neighbors offers a windfall to realize the dream of food security in both regions.

The transatlantic partnership: risks and opportunities for food security in Africa and Latin America

The four dimensions of food security (availability, access, utilization and stability) imply that several areas of cooperation (technical, financial and commercial) can directly or indirectly impact food security. For example, cooperation in improving plant and animal species and upgrading technical itineraries stimulates the domestic food supply. Cooperation in the construction of transport infrastructure, food storage and irrigation play a significant role in all four dimensions of food security.

Beyond the agricultural sector and its production environment, the development of other economic activities, particularly labor-intensive ones, raises the income and the purchasing power of households - thereby contributing to greater food security. With a more controversial impact on agricultural development and food security, food trade and related policies also link Africa to its Atlantic neighbors while influencing the security of nutrition.

At the financial level

Intensification of relationships between countries located in Africa and Latin America and their Atlantic neighbors can be read through official development assistance (ODA), which provides financing for various programs and projects related to food security.

From 1970-79 to 2000-16, the amount of ODA received by African states increased from US\$ 17 billion to US\$ 48 billion (in 2015 constant prices). The top five African countries receiving ODA in 2016 were Ethiopia, Nigeria, Tanzania, Kenya and Egypt. Furthermore, United States of America is the first donor of ODA in Africa, providing 20% of aid to Africa, followed by European Union, which accounts for about 13%. The repartition of ODA to Africa shows that 44% of the total amount has been oriented towards social sectors, 30% towards economy and production, 8% in multi-sectoral investments, 5% in aid programs, 11% for humanitarian aspects, 2% for debt and other aspects. As indicated, all these “aid” areas have an impact on food security. The agricultural sector received 6.1% of the total financial commitments of the Development Assistance Committee (OECD, 2018).

In 2016, Latin American countries received about 4 billion dollars of ODA. Mexico is the first recipient country and accounts alone for 18% of total aid to Latin America, representing about \$ 809 million (WDI, 2018). Mexico is followed by Brazil, Bolivia (15%) and Honduras (9%) of total ODA flows to the region. Similarly to Africa, the United States of America is the largest donor of ODA in Latin America.

Beyond ODA, which brings together grants and concessional loans, there are also non-concessional loans, diaspora remittances and foreign direct investment (FDI) flows that play major roles in terms of developing agricultural sector, enhancing productivity and ensuring food security. These forms of financing have the capacity to boost agricultural production rapidly and better organize the sector (e.g. provision of necessary infrastructure) through the implementation of agricultural projects that generate added value and create job opportunities (Mengoub, 2018).

In this capacity, countries located in the Atlantic area made the most investments in Africa (see three examples in Table 7). France accounted for 70% of the incoming FDI stock in Côte d’Ivoire and 35% in Angola. The United Kingdom and the Netherlands each accounted for 12% of the incoming FDI stock in Nigeria.

Table 7: Importance of Atlantic countries in the stock of FDI entering Africa in 2012: Case of Angola, Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire

Angola	Nigeria	Côte d'Ivoire
France 35%	United Kingdom 12%	France 70%
Portugal 20%	Netherlands 12%	Switzerland 18%
Brazil 5%	France 6%	United states 6%
	United states 5%	

Source: UNCTADSTAT and authors calculations

Compared to Africa, Latin America receives considerable FDI. In 2016, Latin America countries received about 158 billion dollars against only 58 billion for Africa. The main origin of these foreign investments is North America. Latin America has also invested about \$ 9 billion in other countries located in Africa such as Angola, cited above. From field realities, we can conclude that Latin America is one of the world's leading agricultural players and can be an important partner for African countries.

At the commercial level

Due to insufficient transformation of production systems and along food value chains, combined to the exponentially growing demand, African countries are still importing staple foods from other regions in order to satisfy their needs. According to FAO, one-quarter of African demand for cereals is satisfied by imports. The dependency rate on cereal imports even increased slightly from 24% in 1999-01 to 25% in 2011-13. It increased in all sub-regions and accounted recently for 53% in North Africa, 13% in East Africa, 25% in Central Africa, 10% in Southern Africa and 22% in West Africa. It can be observed in Table 8, which presents the case of cereals that Atlantic neighbors export to Africa. The major suppliers include United States, Canada, France, Argentina and Brazil.

Table 8: Major suppliers of cereals and cereals preparations in 2017 by sub-regions in Africa

#	West	South	Center	East	North
1	India 14%	South Africa 7%	Thailand 9%	Pakistan 9%	Russia 35%
2	Thailand 14%	Thailand 6%	France 4%	Russia 7%	Argentine 31%
3	USA 13%	India 2%	Turkey 3%	India 6%	Ukraine 27%
4	Russia 9%	Russia 2%	Russia 2%	South Africa 5%	France 25%
5	Canada 7%	USA 2%	Belgium 2%	Zambia 4%	Canada 13%
6	Viet Nam 6%	Germany 1%	Brazil 1%	USA 4%	Brazil 11%
7	France 5%	Ukraine 1%	South Africa 1%	Thailand 3%	USA 8%
8	Pakistan 4%	Romania 1%	India 1%	Argentine 3%	Romania 6%
9	Australia 3%	Czech Republic 1%	Portugal 1%	Mexico 3%	Germany 4%
10	Argentine 3%	Australia 1%	Tanzania 1%	Germany 3%	Turkey 4%

Source: UNCTADSTAT, author's calculations

For other staple foods such as roots and tubers, domestic production seems to cover current consumption in the continent (see FAO Food Balances or Doukkali, Guèdègbé and Mengoub (2017) for further discussion on this kind of staple crops). However, these products are not subject to a real international market and a competitive foreign supply that can stimulate the latent demand of African consumers. In addition, the agro-climatic conditions of their production and their forms of consumption in Africa seem to give the continent a natural protection and competitiveness. Those advantages should be further harnessed in order to increase productivity and competitiveness of producing such crops, for instance through regional research programs that could benefit from technical support from Atlantic partners.

African trade relations are also shaped by intra-Africa trade agreements and those with partners outside Africa, especially with European Union and United

States of America. Among those agreements, regional integration programs that try to ensure food security through facilitation of staple foods' trade. It is the case of Trade Liberalization Scheme of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which liberalized the trade of agricultural raw materials since its birth.

Given the concordance of diets between several neighboring countries in Africa, trade can improve food availability across group of countries sharing the same food preferences. However, many obstacles remain to realize this potential. In West African corridors for example, there are many formal and informal control posts that hinder trade (Ly & Guèdègbé, 2018). Non-tariff barriers are also considered as one of major constraints that cause serious difficulties for private operators and affect negatively food quality and prices (Guèdègbé, 2016).

Outside the continent, agreements or draft agreements with major partners such as European Union under the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) or the United States under the Africa Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA) are also subject to special attention and intense debate. The impacts on the short and medium term of the EPA projects have so far been controversial, opposing those who argue that reciprocal trade liberalization between the EU and Africa will boost growth and development in Africa and those who insists on their negative effects, especially on those most vulnerable to food insecurity. AGOA is presented as an open door until 2025 to 39 countries in sub-Saharan Africa that can exports a list of products at preferential tariffs to United States. From 2001 to 2016, agricultural exports to the United States by eligible countries increased by almost 600%. In the same period, those of food products grew by more than 1000% (USITC / US Dept. Commerce). However, there has been almost no export of animal products under AGOA and AGOA's effects on agricultural development are still disputed (Pawlotsky & Assoko, 2015).

Whatever their nature, bilateral and multilateral partnerships are never unanimous. They will always be subject to criticism and debate by economic, political and social actors. Indeed, while they can really open up many opportunities for countries and regions, decision-makers must take the right steps to catalyze their benefits. The real obstacle for African exports of agricultural products to developed economies lies in non-tariff measures, including the quality requirements imposed in potential importing countries. States should therefore take steps to act in this direction.

The Agricultural Competitiveness and Diversification Program (ACDP) in Mali showed that public sector could improve substantially the incomes within any export oriented agricultural sector. The mango sector is one of the priorities of Malian government and has benefit from special treatment in ACDP. Different measures have been taken such as *Périmètre Logistique Aménagé en Zone Aéroportuaire (PLAZA)* that are arranged logistical perimeters located in

airport zones, cold chains, packaging technologies as well as research funding and laboratories materials. Thank to this policy, the sector recorded an annual increase in volume exported from 4,700 tons in 2007 to 28,000 tons in 2015 (Samaké, 2015).

The Latin American experience tells a different story. This region is well known for its agricultural wealth. In 2016, Latin American countries imported about US\$ 44 billion of agricultural products of which 82% were destined to human consumption. On the other hand, the region exported US\$ 103 billion of agricultural products of which 71% are food products. From these numbers we can conclude that commercial balance of food in the region is positive and the region is in surplus in terms of food production. Distribution of Latin American agricultural exports by continent shows that they mainly go to Asia (33%), North America (31%) and Europe (28%). Africa comes in the fourth place with only 8% (UNCTADSTAT, 2018). The commercial relations between Latin America and Africa are still weak compared to the other region in the world. This offers an opportunity for the two zones to collaborate and strengthen their partnerships.

Trade relations within Latin America have not known the same evolution as in Africa, with the creation of two free trade zones. The first, known as the Andean Pact or the Cartagena Agreement between Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela, aimed at enabling the fructification of intra-regional trade by providing businesses with a broad market and alternative outlets. The economic results of this integration are positive (Montaud, 2005). GDP in the Andean region has been multiplied by 10, exports to the rest of the world by 9 and intra-Community trade by 50.

The second free trade area named Southern Common Market or MERCOSUR is the result of negotiations between Brazil and Argentina to achieve greater economic and political cooperation. The first economic results of this union were up to expectations. In fact, intra-regional trade has increased considerably. Between 1990 and 1998, exports within the community increased from 8.9% to 25.1%, and intra-regional imports increased from 14.1% to 21.4% (Neves, 2003). However, this union has been constantly challenged by the United States and the World Bank considered as discriminated integration against third States. In addition, there have been several controversies regarding cross-investment between Brazil and Argentina. In light of these observations, countries in Latin America have benefited, through the economic and commercial history, from the opportunity to establish quite solid and successful commercial relations.

Beyond exchanging final products, technical partnership plays also major role in terms of sharing expertise and contributing to reach expected growth rates. Depending on its priority sectors, each country can implement a technology and skill transfer strategies to improve product quality. Through the analysis of similarities in food preferences within groups of countries and

consumers' willingness to diversify their diet, one can find a great potential for food trade and inter-varietal food. This is for example the case of exporting dates between countries in North Africa or cereals such as maize for Latin America. These technics can be marketed in transatlantic countries such as Sub-Saharan African countries, which will be discussed in the next section.

At the technical level

From a historical point of view, agriculture has benefited from a large spectrum of innovations that have increased productivity of land and labor, facilitated production processes and optimized inputs uses. In this context, different technologies can be mentioned such as high yielding varieties use that allow farmers to get higher production even in difficult and extreme situations. 'More crop per drop' was the slogan of the utilization of new technique of irrigation called drip irrigation that helped save water and apply the exact water quantities that crops need for their development. Machines are also a great example to consider in term of agricultural innovations since they increase labor productivity and automate some difficult processes. Some countries have accelerated the innovation and the adoption of these technologies while others still suffer from a lack of new technology use.

African countries use less technology and sometimes-obsolete technics in their agricultural processes. In this sense, technical cooperation between African countries, Latin American countries and their other neighbors in the Atlantic region represents an enormous potential in terms of sharing expertise, enhancing African agricultural production, ensuring food security and reducing poverty. Comparing yields level between countries located in this area leave the possibilities of transfer know-how (Doukkali, Guèdègbé & Mengoub, 2017). Similarly, extensive analyzes can reveal local knowledge of food storage that is transferable between countries in order to reduce post-harvest losses. States must capitalize on this potential through institutional cooperation to share existing knowledge and further improve it.

African governments launched numerous initiatives to overcome this chokepoint. A good illustration would be the West African Agricultural Productivity Program (WAAPP), a sub-regional initiative aimed at generating and accelerating the adoption of improved technologies along value chains considered as priorities in the regional agricultural policy (ECOWAP). The second phase aims to intensify the production, dissemination and adoption of improved technologies in priority areas. Evaluations indicate that numerous technologies are crossing borders in the value chains of rice, cassava and tomato among other priority sectors (CORAF, 2015).

Outside the continent, African agriculture also benefits from partnerships with neighboring Atlantic countries. In particular, the United States Agency for International Development provides important support for agricultural research in Africa and the dissemination of the results of this research. Today, Brazil has become a reference model in agrarian development, particularly in tropical agriculture research. Several African countries can benefit from the experience of Brazil, the world's largest producer and exporter of soybeans, coffee, cane sugar, orange juice and meat. Brazil is also a country that has made the choice of dual agricultural sector (the cohabitation of small and large agriculture). Africa can learn from the Brazilian experience to build a public food and nutrition security system (Inter-Réseaux, 2012) (Abrandh and Oxfam, 2012), (World Bank and Ipea, 2011).

There were some examples of projects that encourage technical and technological transfers between countries in order to improve agricultural sector and reduce food insecurity. However, without a solid legal framework, fruitful economic conditions and good governance, it will be almost impossible to get expected results. In this capacity, the next section discusses institutional conditions that should be taking into consideration while establishing partnerships and cooperation agreements between countries and regions.

At the economic and institutional levels

There is no doubt that cooperation requires the right legal framework in order to lead to better economic, political and social conditions. Latin American countries as well as African countries suffer from governance issues, legal frameworks and others institutional problems.

Latin America experienced recently long periods of food insecurity. Venezuela was the most touched by food scarcity. The country is facing today a political and economic crisis that lead to severe food shortages and hyperinflations since oil prices collapse (Tsakok, 2018). Due to this crisis, Venezuelans report high weight losses estimated approximatively to 11 kilograms by person in 2016 (Sequera, 2018). Government policies, currency and price controls and corruption were pointed out as major causes of this situation. Cooperation between countries North of the Atlantic could be helpful. Those countries are known for their relatively solid policies and legal frameworks and could bring their expertise to reduce constraints and failures encountered by African and Latin American countries.

Conclusion

Food security exists when all people have access to enough food that satisfy their daily needs. Improving food security means ensuring that populations can lead healthy, economically active, safe and stable lives. Food security can be reached by improving agricultural production or promoting continental or regional cooperation.

Commercial, technical, financial and institutional transatlantic cooperation (whether South-South or North-South) offers numerous opportunities to stimulate growth and development of the agricultural sector in both African and Latin American continents. However, countries must ensure that growth is inclusive and affects the poorest populations. To have a real impact on food security in Africa and Latin America, agreements should include technical, financial and/or institutional supports towards improving the production, storage, processing and marketing of the products concerned.

With or without a trade agreement, the opportunities offered by foreign trade for inclusive agricultural growth are conditioned by the upgrading of links in the various sectors in order to meet international standards and gain competitiveness. In this capacity, transatlantic partnerships can go a long way towards accelerating this upgrade.

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Chapter 11

Rebalancing the North-South Discussion on Climate Change

Rim Berahab and Mbuih Zukane

Introduction

The Climate Change crisis is one of the major challenges facing humankind. It is inherently linked to significant fluctuations in global temperature, precipitation, and wind patterns that take place over several decades or longer. Evidence also indicates that climate change is closely correlated with increasing levels of greenhouse gases (GHG) in the atmosphere.

One can argue that climate change is far from a contemporary phenomenon but rather a natural one. It is true that climate has previously alternated between cool and warm periods. However, these changes happened at a much slower pace over long periods. Natural factors alone cannot explain the magnitude and speed of current climate change. GHG emissions from human activity are very likely the main cause.

The 21st Conference of Parties (COP21) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) held in Paris in 2015 marks a turning point in international climate debates. Six years after the Copenhagen climate summit, over 190 countries signed an ambitious agreement to join forces to scale down their reliance on fossil fuels, in an effort to contain the temperature rise well below 2 °C compared to the pre-industrial era.

One of the features of this agreement is that it goes far beyond the old duality between developed and developing countries. Thus, it aims at creating a policy framework that takes into account economic development as well related emissions increases, a dimension that was not previously addressed by the international policy framework.

However, three years later, the aspirations of the Paris Agreement are colliding with the present. Climate actions are dampened due to delays in the negotiation process. The core obstacles remain indeed rooted in a North- South divide¹⁰⁸,

108 In this paper, we use the terms “the North” and “developed countries”, and the “The South” and “developing countries” interchangeably.

which reflects the asymmetries between developed and developing countries in terms of responsibility of climate change, which region will experience the most adverse effects, and who will bear the cost of adapting and mitigation.

This chapter provides the reader with an overview of historical and recent trends in carbon dioxide emissions for both the North and South. It explores the key issues that perpetuate the North-South divide in climate discussions, as well as counter discourses to rebalance it.

Historical and Recent Trends in Carbon Dioxide (CO₂) Emissions¹⁰⁹


Global energy-related CO₂ emissions have nearly doubled since the 1970s. While they remained flat for the last three years, they are rising again. In fact, they increased by 1.4% in 2017 reaching a historic high of 32.5 Gt. This trend is driven by robust global economic growth, increased fossil-energy use, particularly in developing countries, and weaker energy-efficiency efforts. It also reflects different, and sometimes contrasting, regional dynamics.

1971-1990: Dominance of the North as top CO₂ Emitters

Prompted by the industrial revolution, the world has witnessed a steady growth of CO₂ emission as a result of rapid industrialization and population growth. Historically, the North, also known as Annex I countries, referred to also as developed countries, emitted the bulk of CO₂ emissions. It accounted for 81% of total emissions in 1971 compared to 15% for the South, also referred to as developing countries (Figure 6-a). This trend was led by the United States, whose share of cumulated world's CO₂ emissions averaged 26% during this period, followed by the Russian Federation (16%) and Germany (6%). Among the South, China accounted for 8% while India represented only 2% (Figure 6-b). While the North's emissions slowly decreased to 67% by 1990, the gap between developed and developing countries remains huge.

¹⁰⁹ Climate change is induced by various gases. Six of them are responsible of the bulk of the global warming, of which three- carbon dioxide (CO₂), methane (CH₄) and nitrous oxide (N₂O) - are the most potent and account for 97% of global greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions. There are other factor that cause warming (land-use, deforestations etc...), but unless otherwise mentioned, in this paper, the term "emissions" refers to CO₂ emissions from fossil fuel combustion, while the climate impacts described are based on a consideration of all the climate forcing gases.

Figure 6 : Share of global CO2 emissions by regions (a) – TOP 10 of cumulated global CO2 emissions (b), 1971-1990




Source: IEA CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion, OECD/IEA, Paris, 2017.

1991-2006: The Shrinking Gap between the North and the South

Starting from the mid-90s, a shift was slowly taking shape, as the gap between the North and South gradually shrank. By 2006, almost an equal share of CO2 was emitted by both regions (Figure 7-a). During the same period, China, a developing country, started witnessing a robust increase in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) rates. As a result, its emissions skyrocketed, which propelled the country to the second top emitter in the world, after the United States, with a share of 15% of cumulated CO2 emissions between 1991 and 2006 versus 8% during the previous period (Figure 7-b). A similar trend, but at a smaller scale, was observed also for India, whose cumulated emissions doubled to 4%, ranking as the 6th most polluting country.

Figure 7 : Share of global CO2 emissions by regions (a) – TOP 10 of cumulated global CO2 emissions (b), 1991-2006




Source: IEA CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion, OECD/IEA, Paris, 2017.

2007-2016: The South as Top CO2 Emitters

Since the mid-2000s, the North witnessed a sharp decrease in their CO2 emissions- particularly due to the economic slowdown after 2009-, which fell to 38% in 2016, while the South has seen a steady increase up to 58% (Figure 8-a). During this period, emerging countries of Asia ascended as the top CO2 emitters, reaching 17.4 GtCO2 in 2016, which is equivalent to two times the level of the Americas, and three times that of Europe. This was mainly driven by China, which accounted for nearly 52% of Asia's emissions in 2016, followed by India with 12%. On the other hand, Africa, along with Oceania, remain one of the lowest emitters.

Figure 8: Share of global CO2 emissions by regions (a) – TOP 10 of cumulated global CO2 emissions (b), 2007-2016



Source: IEA CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion, OECD/IEA, Paris, 2017

At the country level, the top five world CO2 emitters are China with more than 10 Gt in 2016 (compared to 4 Gt in 2000) and who is responsible for nearly 26% of emitted CO2 in the atmosphere, followed by the United States, India, the Russian Federation and Japan (Figure 8-b). On a per-capita basis, however, small countries with energy-intensive industries seem to emit far more CO2 than most of the large economies¹¹⁰.

From this perspective, the list is topped by countries like Curacao, Qatar, Trinidad and Tobago, Kuwait and United Arab Emirates, with a cumulated 158 tonnes of CO2 emitted in 2016. The United States and the Russian Federation are ranked 16th and 22nd respectively with 16 and 12 tonnes of CO2, while the large


110 CO2 emissions at country level can be misleading in comparing nations due to their vastly varied sizes and populations. To get a more meaningful picture, it is essential also to consider emissions on a per-person basis or on a GDP basis.

developing nations such as China and India come at the 41 and 126 positions, with 7 and 2 tonnes of CO₂, hence looking significantly less polluting (Figure 9).

In 2016, most of CO₂ emissions originated from energy production, particularly from fossil-fuel combustion, which accounts for two-thirds of global CO₂ emissions. Emissions from oil for transport, gas for electricity, and heat generation increased among all regions, while emissions by coal fell homogenously in the Americas, Europe and China, increasing only in the rest of Asia.

Therefore, since climate change is not the result of a particular year of CO₂ emissions in the atmosphere, but rather the accumulation of emissions over a long period of time, the historical analysis shows that the North is responsible for the bulk of CO₂ emitted in the atmosphere, while the South is only emerging in the most recent years as a big emitter.

Figure 9: CO₂ emissions by country, 2016



Source: European Commission. Joint Research Centre (EC-JRC)/Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL). Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR). *Rest of the World.

The North-South Divide in Climate Discussions

Several choke points, which are deeply rooted in the North-South divide, delay the implementation of climate actions. Indeed, the disparities between developing and developed countries, particularly in terms of current growth in GHG emissions and accountability of historical emissions, poses a serious question regarding who should bear the costs of reducing emissions. The following section will discuss the origin of the North-South divide and its current manifestations in climate change talks.

How the Kyoto protocol widened the North-South divide

The world received with splendor the ambitious target that was set in Kyoto, as an international treaty, extending the mandate and scope of the United Nations Framework on Climate Change (UNFCCC). This protocol aimed at reducing greenhouse emissions by 5% between 2008-2012 against a 1990 baseline, thus, regulating the anthropocentric actions of the developed world (North), while approving sectoral reduction in emissions in the global South.

The Kyoto protocol¹¹¹, from its inception, instantly created a North-South divide by adopting a ‘positive discriminatory’ approach in favor of countries of the South, with the pretext that the North is responsible for the current climate predicament, with its impact mainly felt by countries of the South. For obvious reasons this positive discrimination was necessary, but it didn’t take into consideration certain specificities as some countries of the South are very high polluters, while some are still besieged in abject poverty.

It is therefore quite clear that the Kyoto protocol was grounded on ambiguity, because most of its decisions are non-binding and because of the fact that countries can easily withdraw at will. Canada for instance agreed to cap its emission levels below 6% by 2012 and in 2009, their emission levels were 17% higher than the 1990 baseline. That is why it decided to withdraw and not sign the second round of the protocol. In the same light, the USA is another example worth discussing¹¹². The Clinton administration signed the protocol on November the 12th 1998 and till date has never been ratified, because they estimated that 80% of the world is not involved, including big polluters like China and India. This reticence of large polluters renders it impossible to meet the target of GHG reduction as stated by article 3 (1) of the protocol.

The cost of the protocol overshadows its benefits as it sounds too go-getting, inequitable and inefficient to reduce GHG emissions. In addition to this, the 1990 base year, and methods of measuring its CO₂ emissions led to a lot of controversies¹¹³. All the parties of the Kyoto protocol had a common baseline, yet the agreement of plummeting GHG emissions was different and could only lead to a crisis. Some annex 1 countries agreed to reduce their GHG emission below their individual base year levels, while others agreed to cap theirs at the base year levels. This makes it difficult to objectively evaluate or set a control mechanism. In the same light, non-annex 1 countries who were not obligated to cap their GHG, never had a baseline and today account for 2/3 of GHG emission.

111 Adopted in Kyoto, Japan on the 11 December 1992, it entered into force on the 16 February 2005. Today the Kyoto protocol/c has 191 parties.

112 Brechin1, S. R. (2003). Comparative public opinion and knowledge on global climatic change and the Kyoto Protocol: The US versus the World?. *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy*, 23(10), 106-134.

113 Refer to the section “Is the “Common but differentiated responsibilities” Principle Still Applicable Today?”

Is the “Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR)” Principle Still Applicable Today?

The Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) is a concept introduced by the UNFCCC within the Kyoto Protocol in 1992, that asserts the responsibility of all states for addressing climate change, yet acknowledges that all are not equally responsible. It puts a great emphasis on recognizing the wide differences in economic development levels between countries when allocating responsibilities for global environmental damage.

Despite this seemingly simple definition, the CBDR principle remains a central obstacle in the current climate negotiations. Indeed, the previous interpretation of this principle was that because developing countries were not responsible for the bulk of GHG emitted in the atmosphere, they were not to endure the burden of mitigating climate change. However, as stated in the first section, with the rising emissions of developing countries, this principle does not seem viable anymore, especially from the developed countries' point of view.

Developed countries are now pushing to re-evaluate the CBDR principle in a way that takes into consideration the increasing responsibilities of the developing countries in global GHG emissions. Therefore, they advocate that reductions in emissions should be based on current annual emissions. Since economic growth is still closely linked with growing GHG emissions, this poses a serious issue for developing countries. Indeed, imposing drastic emission restraints can hinder their growth and impede on measures towards poverty reduction. Developing countries argue, thus, that the emission-reductions should be based on cumulative or historical emissions, rather than the annual emissions.

Even if developed and developing countries succeed in finding a middle ground, there is another issue: how emissions should be measured? As emphasized in the first section, the picture changes drastically when considering emissions at their basis level versus at the per capita, or per GDP level. The first method is certainly the easiest but overlooks the size (both in terms of population and surface area) and the growth path of the countries. Emissions per capita or per GDP basis are preferable as they take into account both social and economic factors and give more accurate information. For instance, due to increases in population or GDP, those alternative measures can decrease while total emissions are still on the rise, which still depicts an overall reduction in the growth of CO₂ emissions on the long-run. Another issue that arises is whether “to measure GDP at purchasing power parity or market exchange rates is also critical, as it makes a large difference to China and India.”¹¹⁴

114 Whalley, J. and Walsh, S. (2009).

Climate finance and the skepticism of the South in meeting the 2020 goals¹¹⁵

Achieving Climate Change mitigation and adaptation goals calls for important investments. One of the major stepping-stones in climate finance talks took place during the COP15 held in Copenhagen in 2009, where developed countries pledged to mobilize 100 billion US dollars annually for climate finance by 2020.

This initiative falls within the principle of CBDR, under which developed country Parties ought to support developing countries by providing financial resources to help them implement the objectives of the UNFCCC. Following the Paris Agreement in 2015, developed countries were urged to adopt a concrete roadmap to scale-up their level of support, while for the first time also encouraging voluntary contributions from developing countries.

These funds are raised through different sources, including bilateral assistance, multilateral funds, but also international financial institutions, national development finance institutions and export credit agencies, as well as various forms of private finance. Up to 2015, the OECD¹¹⁶ estimate climate finance commitment, from both bilateral providers and multilateral institutions, to reach 47 billion US dollars. During the same year, Asia was the first recipient of climate-related development finance commitments, with 19.5 billion US dollars (46%); followed by Africa with 11.0 billion US dollars (Figure 10-a).

However, the amount required for climate finance is faced with uncertainty around climate impacts, emerging technologies and broader economic factors. Moreover, climate finance discussions remain entangled in a North–South dichotomy, which hampers the ability of developing countries to cope with climate change, as they are the most vulnerable ones.

Therefore, developing countries are raising concerns regarding the current state of finance flows as fears of not meeting the promised USD 100 billion per year in 2020 arise. One key concern is related to the predictability of climate finance flows, which is crucial for developing countries as it allows them a better planning for effective climate actions. Even though reporting future levels of finance flows is mandatory under article 9.5 of the Paris Agreement, developed countries do not seem willing to address it as a priority.

Another point of contention refers to the very nature of the climate related financial flows. In a recent report, Oxfam¹¹⁷ questions the reported levels of climate finance support of developed countries towards developing countries. It is believed that those levels are overstated due to an upsurge in loans, particularly to middle-income countries. Indeed, loans accounted for 69% of the climate-

115 UNFCCC. (2018).


116 OECD. (2018).

117 Oxfam. (2018).

related development finance across all sectors. While these instruments play an important role in providing climate finance, they continue to be counted at their full-face value, instead of the net amount of money given to developing countries.

Moreover, climate-related finance given by developed countries favors mitigation projects, while funding for adaptation to climate change, which is the priority of the world's poorest countries remains limited. Recent numbers from the OECD highlight this trend, as around 60% of bilateral and multilateral climate finance targeted primarily mitigation projects, while adaptation accounted for only 26.5% (Figure 10-b).

Figure 10: Bilateral and Multilateral climate finance of developed countries, 2014-15 average



Source: OECD DAC External Development Finance Statistics, 2018. *Excluding OECD countries.

The Dominance of the North in Environmental Science: A North-South Knowledge Divide

Northern domination of scientific research regarding environmental damage, climate change policy and action, coupled with limited research from southern countries is likely to hamper further adoption and implementation of climate change actions both globally and nationally.

The scope of the North-South knowledge divide is a reflection of the unequal research capacity between the two regions: The North is indeed more stable, wealthier and has better access to higher education and resources needed for research and innovation. The South, on the other hand, faces several practical


challenges such as data availability, lack of access to higher education and weaker support to research and development.

North-South knowledge divide can be depicted by an analysis of Climate Change related scientific publications. This reveals that during 2000 and 2014, nearly 90% of the articles that address climate change are led by OECD countries (Figure 11).

This asymmetry in climate change science favors developed countries while putting least developed countries and small island developing states at high risk, further fueling the existing gap in global negotiations between Northern and Southern policies. In fact, the South would less likely accept policies put forward by the North as they may regard them as biased toward developed countries' interests.

In the same line of view, limited research about Southern countries, particularly led by researchers from local institutions, may limit the efficacy and legitimacy of climate change vulnerability assessments, identification and prioritization of adaptation options, and disaster risk reduction and management.

Figure 11: Affiliations of authors of scientific articles about Climate Change in relation to countries' economic status, 2000-2014



Source: Malgorzata B. et al. (2017).

On Rebalancing the North-South Discussion on Climate Change

Over the recent few years, there have been modest efforts by the international community to address the chokepoints constraining climate talks discussed in the previous section. This section gives an overview of the measures taken since the Paris Agreement to address the North-South Divide in climate, as well as several recommendations to further implement them.

The Paris agreement on Climate Change was a momentous accord, which marked a turning point in international Climate Change policy because of its inclusiveness and global acceptability. From its inception, the Paris agreement paved the way to bridging the North-South firewall as pundits estimate that the agreement dismantled the 'global warming gridlock'.

Contrary to the Kyoto protocol, which imposed a top-down approach on climate regulations, creating a gap and evasiveness by high GHG emitters (Annex-1 countries), the Paris agreement unswervingly adopted a bottom-top approach, whereby each country is to be accountable for its mitigation strategies.

Each party to the convention will have to submit national pledges in a five-year interval (article 4 (9)) based on their Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) and not on whether they are developed or less-developed economies. The Paris agreement established a system of mandatory national reporting on emission by sources and removals of GHG by carbon sinks, thus, promoting transparency, accountability, peer monitoring and cooperation in updating and enhancing their pledges (article 14(3)), thereby expunging the North-South gap.

The Paris agreement created an enabling environment for dialogue. An interim review of the progress made so far as well as a modus operandi for stock-taking prior to the 2020 valuation was established. This review known as the 'facilitative dialogue' brings parties to the convention on an inclusive dialogue as a way of bridging the North-South divide on climate. This was embedded in decision 1/CP.21, where parties were to organize a facilitative dialogue in 2018 in relation to progress on long-term goals referred to in article 4 (1) and to take stock on INDC rooted in article 4 (8) of the agreement.

Notwithstanding, despite the numerous pledges and agreements by developed countries to contribute to climate financing and the doubling of efforts towards mitigation, adaptation and cooperation vis-à-vis their counterparts of the global South, the Paris agreement however remains a paper tiger and an ambiguous platform, full of ambition with no concrete control and sanction mechanisms.

Developing countries are still stocked in the status-quo with the withdrawal (cease implementing INDC and financial contribution) of the US from the Paris agreement on August 4th, 2017. This withdrawal engendered an imbalance in the Climate Change endeavors, with a fallback on financial burden on annex-1 countries. This prompts us to think that the Paris agreement, despite being a success story in Climate Change diplomacy and in filling the North-South gap still needs further actions. The followings are some recommendations to rebalance the North-South discussion on Climate Change.

Create a Southern Counter-Narrative to Climate Change

The South needs to build its own narrative regarding global climate actions in order to have a more powerful stand, since it tends to have less bargaining power to drive international decision-making process. A South-South collaboration would thus be a complementary way to address Climate Change, beside international cooperation with the North.

In this context, developing countries can offer mutual assistance to undertake climate actions. Several initiatives have recently emerged such as the South-South Cooperation Action Plan by the United Nations in 2017, which has a climate change component or the South-South Cooperation on Climate Change (SSCCC). These initiatives try to bridge the gap resulting from the asymmetries with developed countries in terms of cooperation, assistance, technology transfer and funding climate projects for the South.

South-South cooperation in Climate Change is reaching a momentum. However, additional efforts are needed to enhance partnerships on climate action. Indeed, the success of such initiatives lies in efficient government support and the improvement of cooperation mechanisms and institutional arrangements.

Bridge the North – South knowledge Gap

Rebalancing the North- South divide in climate science calls for the need to strengthen scientific and technological abilities of developing countries. Both the North and South have their role to play in doing so.

Developed countries, international organizations and intergovernmental organizations must promote higher education in developing countries, which is a crucial step to tackle the gap in environmental and Climate Change sciences. Their support could take the form of financial aid to students from developing countries to pursue their post-graduate education, funding to provide the necessary equipment and laboratory facilities for climate related R&D activities and endorsing exchange programs between students from the North and the South.

Southern research institutions, on the other hand, need to develop alliances with their Northern counterparts with the aim of sharing research infrastructure and expertise in order to reinforce local ability to achieve perform high-quality research. In addition, special emphasis needs to be addressed to build new partnerships with institutions from fellow developing countries to promote South-South cooperation in research and innovation regarding Climate Change. To do so, governments of the South need to support local research programs through funding.

REDD+ and Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) – local exigencies

REDD+ is one of the success stories in bridging the North – South gap on Climate Change. Mindful of the fact that deforestation and forest degradation account for 17% of total CO₂ emissions, countries have undertaken concerted efforts to create financial value for the carbon stored in forests by offering incentives for reducing emissions in forested areas as well as investing in low carbon paths.

Thus, countries of the South receive result-based payments for result-based actions¹¹⁸. The UN Forest Resources Assessment, estimated that the global forest has a stock of 289 gigatonnes (Gt) of carbon in their biomass. It should be noted that eight countries, mostly located in the global South (Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, DRC, Ghana, Indonesia and PNG) account for 50% of worldwide deforestation, meaning most REDD+ should be geared towards these countries and other countries of the South. REDD+, especially the aspect of conservation of forest carbon stock, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stock have been in control of countries of the North, especially when it comes to technology transfer, green energy and carbon trading.

Payment for ecosystem (PES), which is another success story in the North-South climate divide, entails a direct or indirect payment to an ecosystem service provider by a user. Global PES is estimated to be between US\$36-42 billion, including more than 550 active programs (mostly sponsored by countries of the North), which pay for land management to secure the provision of ecosystem services¹¹⁹.

Towards Climatic Clusters and Regional Mitigation Blocs

For the North-South debate to reach at a consensus, there is a need to decipher the gridlock that often hinders international negotiations on climate. Clustering countries, based on their regional realities, are likely to overcome structural barriers that hinder climate negotiations and widen the North-South gap.

These clusters should be made up of countries with similar biogeographical and climatic parallels. In such a case, it would be easier for the clustered countries and blocs to do peer-to-peer monitoring of emissions. With a regional cluster, a more specific baseline could be set, per region, following specific targets for reduction, based on their climatic and specific realities.

118 <https://www.unredd.net/about/what-is-redd-plus.html> (accessed on 21/10/2018)

119 <http://www.undp.org/content/sdfinance/en/home/solutions/payments-for-ecosystem-services.html> (accessed on 21/10/2018)

A cluster or regional division is advantageous because if implemented, it will increase the scope of implementing REDD+, as a concerted effort will be attained at local levels, because decentralizing monitoring mechanisms may be more efficient.

With such a decentralization, mitigation would have a common goal, following a common climatic reality. With such a breakdown, the North-South divide would still exist, but in a rebalanced manner and as such, mitigation, negotiations and sanctions would be easy to reach. This breakdown would create climatic hubs that will enhance political dialogue during multilateral negotiations, when faced with super powers.

Conclusion

Climate change and its effects remain one of the most talked about and negotiated issues at the global level, with a lot of controversies. By the end of the 30 glorious years and the convening of the Rio conference, the world realized that development was happening at the detriment of the environment because of increased fossil-energy use and weaker energy-efficiency efforts. From post-industrial revolution to the 90s, countries of the North accounted for most of the CO₂ emission in the world, reaching about 81% of total emissions in 1971, compared to 15% for the South.

In the aftermath of the Rio conference and with the creation of UNFCCC, there was a reversal in the stock of CO₂ emission as some countries initially considered as less-developed countries witnessed an escalation in CO₂ emission, with China, for instance, propelling itself, to be ranked second by 2006 (15% of global CO₂ emission). Having realized that the planet is shared, with the impact of global warming being felt by all, the Kyoto protocol was adopted to regularize the Climate Change crisis.

This protocol, from its inception, instantly created a North-South divide by adopting a 'positive discriminatory' approach in favor of countries of the South, who were quick to conclude that having common emission goals will be unfair and even imperialist. The countries of the North, on the other hand, argued that they had reached the pinnacle of development, making them pollute less, compared to their counterparts in the South, who are still entangled between development, GHG emissions and poverty.

It was, therefore, necessary to address these choke points, which kept on deterring Climate Change negotiations. The 2015 Paris agreement on climate change brought in a near infallible answer and a fresh impetus, with the dogma of Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC), which established a

system of mandatory national reporting on emissions by sources and removals of GHG by carbon sinks, thus, promoting transparency, accountability, peer monitoring and cooperation in updating and enhancing their pledges.

The Paris agreement, however, remains a paper tiger and an ambiguous platform, full of ambition with no concrete control and sanction mechanisms. Therefore, a suitable rebalance in the North-South discussion in Climate Change will require regionalism and multilateralism in Climate Change endeavors, by grouping mitigation efforts per regional clusters, following specific biogeographical, economic and climatic realities.

A southern counter narrative, with a South-South mitigation and adaptation strategy and why not a North-North strategy will close the North-South gap. Rebalancing will also require filling the knowledge gap that exists between the two regions through R&D, technology transfer and educational cooperation. Rebalancing the North-South will be more inclusive if it takes into consideration some local exigencies like REDD+, PES, proper financing and the willingness of all to swivel to renewable-energy usage.

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Chapter 12

Revisiting the Concept of “the South”

El Mostafa Rezrazi

Introduction

This chapter seeks to re-examine the concept of the South, the developments it has undergone, and the different uses it has been subject to ever since the 1950's. Indeed, the South has elicited a fair amount of literature that teems with economic, philosophical and sociological thoughts. Regrettably, this literature was generally excluded in the development of discussions on our own future. Such an act of exclusion was due either to the manipulation of aspects of technicality that stemmed from empirical and micro-economic analysis, or to the fear of falling into the nets of revolutionary and rebellious spirit that permeated such a literature. It must be therefore admitted that no one today has attempted to re-read this literature with a view to dissociating it from its ideological framework; putting it to a more efficient use and ultimately reconnecting it to the new architecture of a New South; a South which appropriates its own philosophy, its own concepts, its own language, as well as its own empowerment.

This chapter offers an attempt to revisit the development of the concept of the South by tracking its evolution since the Bandung Conference (1950). Major landmarks include national liberation movements that tried to create alliances and ideological representations to confront the imperialist tide during post-colonial eras, such as the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization (OSPAA, 1957), Organization for the Solidarity of the Peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America (OSPAAAL, 1966). No less important is the fission stage that marked the disjuncture between several national liberation movements and their leaders who came to occupy the highest level-positions in the power structure in a number of countries. This led to a polarization in the thinking about the South between those who would rather fight for the construction of the continental unity from /and within official channels, such as The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM,1961); the Organization of African Unity (OAU,1963);the African Union (AU,2002) and a rebel group whose agenda was animated by the dream of

changing the world order and structuring international relations on the basis of reparation, equity and reconciliation.

The process of the scramble for the South as conducted by these two modes of thinking, which are inherently two poles apart, is set to continue operating within both official and popular channels. Indeed, and as consequence of such a process, some projects stalemated and then stumbled while other emerging projects deviated from their constitutive goals. Few projects have managed to achieve consensus among state-members, but wielded little influence in the face of North hegemony and have been distorted in the process due to the absence of reciprocity.

The thrust of this chapter therefore explores the dichotomy between empirical implementation of the concept of the South in realpolitik in Africa, Asia together with Latin America and the philosophical conceptualization of the "South" that Marxists/Leftists used to advance their criticism towards "imperialistic" or "colonial powers".

The debates that were sparked in the early fifties were not only debilitated within political channels, but also cast their shadow over theories of economic and social thoughts through "the Global South" (with Oglesby Carl, Pagel, Heikie; Ranke, Karen; Hempel, Fabian; Köhler, Jonas and others), "North-South" (Willy Brandt and others), "Center-periphery" (Milton Santoz, Samir Amin and others). Our use of the concept of the South is bound to be confused as the concept itself has lost its independence. The North sets and chooses the entries, whether on matters of development, or the redistribution of wealth in the world, or on issues regarding the restructuring of regional incursions.

With the second millennium, the concept was normalized by international institutions that started to use the terms "South" and "Global South" to refer either to developing countries, which are located primarily in the Southern Hemisphere, or to a technical tool to assess, benchmark, or identify the cartography of world geopolitics. The concept of the South lost its initial meaning that suggested self-building and self-management of its capabilities, and it now survives simply as a technical tool of classification, while the specter of old concepts such as the Third World and the backward world did not vanish completely and is still entertained in the deep recess of our imagination. Old concepts returned in sugar-coated shapes that hide the return to the stronghold when describing the South as insecure, lethargic, and in compliant. With the death of ideology, and following the disengagement of southern intellectuals to explore the global south as a potential space for a prosperous life, the concept was once again hijacked by several northern institutions that undertook the task to think on the South, and for the South. This is the challenge that the research-chapter aims to address.

If South-South relations today refer to a multitude of political, economic, technical, social and cultural relations between developing countries, whereas

they were ideological before the end of the cold war. During the last three decades, these relations were intensifying and progressively institutionalized through multilateral cooperation mechanisms, particularly within the framework of the United Nations.

Since 1947, international relations were dominated by East-West tensions, between two blocks carrying rival ideologies and whose objective were to extend their influences beyond their pre-acquired regional spheres. The issues of influence, including extension of alliances gradually spread to developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, many of which were experiencing at that time their recent political independence or were in a state of transition, struggling for their liberation from colonial yoke.

The agreements concluded by victorious countries at the Second World War – and their engagements for building new alliances to guarantee international security, to reengineer the balances between liberal and communist worlds, and mainly to ensure their continued domination over newly independent southern countries–were a major factor that provoked leading southern intelligencia to lobby to create their own club or a common front to deal with the new paradigms of northern domination.

Despite of the fact that the concept known as South has not yet become one of the structural key-concepts in the strategic thinking of the elites of southern countries, the general trends were shaping the mental mapping of a South that attempts to draw and settle new characters of connections between colonial state and ancient colonies.

I. The Third World Project

The Colombo Conference, 28 April – 2 May 1954

The Colombo Conference, which met on 28 April 1954 and ended at Kandy on 2 May, was not convening for any particular purpose. It was an initiative originating from Ceylon, to have a meeting of Prime Ministers of the five Asian nations which have achieved independence since 1945; Burma (Myanmar), Ceylon, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan. According to the Central Intelligence Agency archives, the conference did not have a specific agenda, but the initiative aimed to address the outstanding issues between these countries, especially disputed territories. The summit ended under the tone of India-Pakistan rivalries, but it gave hope that these countries could build confidence measures, and handcraft common ground to possibly operate jointly on international issues. This conference had, however, an impact on future efforts, particularly on the initiation of the Bandung Conference.

Bogor conference, December 1954

To understand the preparatory stage of the Bandung Conference, it is important to review the minutes of Bogor summit that was held in December 1954¹²⁰ and that was characterized by high tensions during deliberations about issues related to the agenda of the coming Afro-Asian Conference, as well as to the nature and the list of participants. It was agreed, however, that the list of participants would exclusively include representatives of independent states from Africa and Asia, while excluding participation of official representatives of Western countries. It was also agreed upon by China, despite some participants' reservations on its invitation, not to invite Taiwan. However, another list of delegations of observers was later accepted, including representatives of national liberation movements of non-independent states such as Algeria¹²¹ and Morocco, as well as some Western institutions.

In fact, to attend the Bandung conference, the national movements of the Maghreb region formed one single North African delegation led by Tunisian constitutional leader Saleh Ben Youssef, Allal Fassi from Morocco, and Hussein Ait Ahmed from Algeria. They attended the session of the Political Committee discussing their country's issues held on 21 April 1955, and they submitted to the conference a joint note, with an annex on Algeria. The document called upon the countries participating in the conference to support the right of the Algerian, Tunisian, and Moroccan peoples to independence. It also mandated to the conference secretary to bring the Algerian case to the United Nations, in addition to the issues of the other two Maghreb issues.

The Bandung Conference

When the Bandung Conference was launched, the main purpose was to take advantage of the post-war transition of the international community and to work out a plan for influencing the world order from a point of view that expressed the positions of countries that were newly independent- or in the midst of the struggle for independence. Other conferences concerning the anti-colonial struggle across Africa and Asia were held prior to Bandung, but were located in the western pole, such as the one held in London in 1900 and in Manchester in 1945. The conference took place in Bandung town in Indonesia, but the organizing

120 View of the Asian-African Conference from the Bogor Conference. 1955, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, PRC FMA 207-00001-03, 7-12. Obtained by Amitav Acharya and translated by Yang Shanhou.

121 Mohammed Yazid, one of the architects of the participation of the FLN at the first international conference, said that the Liberation Front, through Bandung conference was able to access enter to international arena with great support from Jamal Abdel Nasser who strengthened the Algerian revolution, and worked for introducing the international public opinion. See: Ahmed Bin Fliss, International politics of provisory government of the Algerian republic (in Arabic), Master thesis in Political Sciences. University of Alger. 1985. P 155

committee was formed by Indonesia, Burma (Myanmar), Pakistan, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), and India. The Bandung Conference is considered as the first biggest international conference outside the UN, representing the two third of mankind. In the blueprint of the conference, the intention was clearly aimed at making this conference the first manifestation outside the western world, and outside the monopoly of the two blocks superpowers (USA and Soviet Union). Today, Bandung is still considered the first initiative that marked the entry of the "Third World" into international politics.

The main outputs of this conference were the handcrafting of the principle of non-alignment, and the call for equitable representation in international decision-making for newly independent states. It requested the international community to take seriously international justice principles, particularly that of procedural justice, in the management of world affairs. The Bandung conference articulated an alternative set of principles for inter-state engagement that emphasized dialogue and accommodation, collective problem-solving, and the search for consensus or compromise. These principles were regarded as more suitable to the increasingly plural international society of states that followed decolonization, and as a necessary alternative to the power politics and coercion that had been the basis of colonialism and that threatened to dominate international relations in a world of superpower bloc politics.

The ten principles adopted by the Bandung Conference:

- Respect of fundamental human rights and of the objectives and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
- Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations.
- Recognition of the equality among all races and of the equality among all nations, both large and small.
- Non-intervention or non-interference into the internal affairs of another -country.
- Respect of the right of every nation to defend itself, either individually or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.
- Non-use of collective defense pacts to benefit the specific interests of any of the great powers.
- Refraining from acts or threats of aggression and use of force in against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country. Non-use of pressures by any country against other countries.
- Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement as well as

other peaceful means of the parties' own choice, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.

- Promotion of mutual interest and cooperation.
- Respect for justice and international obligations.

The final communiqué of the Bandung Conference highlighted the need for developing countries to loosen their economic dependence on leading industrialized nations by providing technical assistance to one another through the exchange of experts and technical assistance for development projects, as well as the exchange of technological know-how and the establishment of regional training and research institutes. To maintain the engagement of participating countries in the first edition of the Bandung Conference was politically difficult, since they had difficulties to agree on a common position on the East and West blocks. Different tendencies between pro-Western (Pakistan, Thailand, Turkey), neutralist (India, Egypt) and communist (China) contradicted one another without leading to the adoption of a specific course of action. Non-interference, however, was proclaimed.

If the conference did not really weaken the alliance systems already put in place by the superpowers, the ideas of neutralism and non-alignment emerged from Bandung. The principles adopted at the conference have hope for the future and development of Third World countries, but would soon hold more of a symbolic value and encourage the launch of other intellectual, ideological, and institutional initiatives.

Indeed, the Afro-Asian movement did not resist differences of opinion and lack of affirmation of a common policy. The event was however highly publicized and undeniably marked a step forward in the affirmation of Third World countries. Although the world organization that is the United Nations has a function to solve all world problems, it did not succeed in making the world condition more peaceful. If the Bandung Conference has failed to physically implement its objectives, for reasons related to the vulnerability of new independent nation states, to an unfortunate lack of a vision and a legal framework unable to overcome borders' demarcation, we should admit that the conference successfully raised awareness about the need for regional or continental empowerment to face the new ambitions of former colonial powers.

Great powers were also critically aware of the repercussions of building alliances and hostile blocs by countries of the South, so they initiated several security and geostrategic hubs, such as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), which was created immediately after the Bandung Conference. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization was introduced as an international organization for collective defense in Southeast Asia, based on the Southeast

Asia Collective Defense Treaty, or Manila Pact, signed in September 1954 in Manila, Philippines. SEATO was chiefly created to block further communism expanding in Southeast Asia, but was a failure because internal conflict and dispute held back the general use of SEATO’s military capacities. However, the funding of cultural and educational programs left long-standing effects in Southeast Asia. When it exhausted its goals for which it was created, SEATO was dissolved on 30 June 1977 after many members lost interest and withdrew. Following the French defeat in 1954, Indochina was divided into North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, and a demilitarized zone consequently formed the borders between North and South Vietnam. North Vietnam, under Ho Chi Minh, became a communist nation. In such a context, the United States sponsored the creation of the eight-nation group (SEATO) to protect Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam from the spread of communism.

There were plans to organize a second edition of the Bandung Conference during the Cold War period, but it did not take place until 2005. The failure to host the Second Afro-Asian Conference in Algiers in June-July 1965 affected the process of the Bandung project, although this sudden cancelation was not entirely due to the sudden deposition of Ben Bella as President of Algeria. Although Ben Bella’s fall provided the pretext for the cancelation, it did not serve as a credible explanation. It lies, in fact, in the divisions amongst the Afro-Asian countries and the changed circumstances of the 1960’s in comparison to those of the 1950’s; Ten years after the first edition of Bandung conference of 1955, independent Afro-Asian countries had greatly increased in number, and their affairs had grown more complex. The density of restraining factors was related to increasing rivalries between the southern nations themselves (The Sino-Indian War in 1962, Vietnam War in 1959–1975, Second Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958, Tibetan uprising in 1959, Sino-Soviet border conflict in 1969, India-Pakistan wars in 1965, 1971, Algeria-Morocco Sand War in 1963...), but also to the colored political foreign policy attitude of the ruling party (FLN) in the potential hosting country Algeria. It was a pretext for many African and Asian leaders to excuse themselves from attendance. “They had gained sophistication in international affairs, and tacitly recognized that simple anti-imperialist cries do not solve all the problems of a divided world”¹²².

It was decided to postpone the summit to the 5th November of the same year of 1965, but states did not respond properly to the calendar. According to the Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai (1898-1976), the nature of the conference made it impossible to be held. The Afro-Asian movement in itself was an anti-colonial and anti-imperialist movement that had two main opponents lobbying against it: “imperialism” (embodied by the United States) and “revisionism” (embodied by the Soviet Union). The Afro-Asian movement was thus engulfed in

122 T. B. Millar & J. D. B. Miller, Afro-Asian disunity: Algiers, 1965, *Australian Outlook*, 19:3, 306-321. 1965

the Cold War tendencies it had tried to distance itself from at the first conference in Bandung¹²³.

Before Algeria, other countries were expecting to organize the conference in Africa, more specifically in Cairo¹²⁴. The second Afro-Asian conference in Cairo was cancelled under the new speedy changes that occurred in Asia and Africa, mainly the Suez Crisis, the changes in leadership of the Colombo Powers countries and their subsequent alliance shift: Ceylon was no longer pro-Western and Pakistan, changes in Chinese foreign policy, and the deteriorating tensions with the Soviet Union. Disputes between states-members in Africa and Asia played an important role in ending the project. Despite not being part of the Colombo powers, China became the main advocate behind the second conference, with support from Indonesia that wished to maintain its legacy.

Despite the failure to organize the conference in time, several attempts to revive the Bandung spirit have remained resilient, but within another project known as the New South, which will be discussed later. Asian-African countries finally organized the second edition of the Bandung Conference after fifty years (1955-2005), while the third edition was held in 2015¹²⁵. But the latter two versions were more inclined to address African-Asian development and cooperation issues than to think about continental solidarity mechanisms based on the concept of a common “front”.

The Non-Alignment movement (NAM)

The founders of the Bandung Conference planned to develop another mechanism, expanding the circle of alliances of the states affected by bipolarity, regardless of their continental affiliation. The “Initiative of the Five” was the platform for the founding fathers¹²⁶ to initiate the NAM. The organization was founded on the Brijuni islands in Yugoslavia in 1956, and was formalized by the Declaration of Brijuni on 19 July 1956. The Declaration was signed by Yugoslavia’s president, Josip Broz Tito, India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Egypt’s president, Jamal Abdel Nasser. In September 1961, the First Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries was held in Belgrade, Yugoslavia. If the Bandung Conference represented a precursor

123 In 1955, Zhou was a prominent participant in the Asian–African Conference held in Indonesia. On his way to the Bandung conference, an assassination attempt was made against Zhou when a bomb was planted on the Air India plane Kashmir Princess, chartered for Zhou’s trip from Hong Kong to Jakarta. Zhou avoided the attempt when he changed planes at the last minute, but all 11 of the flight’s other passengers were killed, with only three crew members surviving the crash.

124 David Kimche, *Afro-Asian Movement: Ideology and Policy of the Third World*. Israel Universities Press, 1973, pp76-81

125 M.M. Voorendt, *the Anti-Climax of the “Second Bandung”*: the failure of the second Afro-Asian Conference in the period 1955-1965. Utrecht University

126 The most famous figures who supervised such format were Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia, Jawaharlal Nehru of India, Sukarno of Indonesia, Jamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana.

to the formation of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries¹²⁷, there was a need for a political club like the NAM at that time in order to monitor doctrinal divergences that emerged between “Third World countries”, as they began to side with one of the two major socialist or capitalist camps.

The term “non-alignment” was established in 1953 at the United Nations¹²⁸. But Nehru turned into a key-concept to deal with post-Bandung emerging issues, mainly for managing some of the most critical tensions between China and India. In a speech in Colombo, Sri Lanka in 1954, Nehru introduced five pillars to be used as a guide for Sino-Indian relations called Panchsheel (five restraints). The five principles were:

- Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.
- Mutual non-aggression.
- Mutual non-interference in domestic affairs.
- Equality and mutual benefit.
- Peaceful co-existence.

These principles would later serve as the basis of the Non-Aligned Movement

- Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
- Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations.
- Recognition of the movements for national independence.
- Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations, large and small.
- Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country.
- Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.
- Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country.
- Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.
- Promotion of mutual interests and co-operation.
- Respect for justice and international obligations.

It is interesting to note that the requirements for membership of the Non-

127 Mark T. Berger, *The Battle for Asia: From decolonization to globalization*. P 50. Routledge-Falmer. 2004

128 first used to represent the Indian doctrine of world system by diplomat V. K. Krishna Menon in the UN

Aligned Movement interfere closely with the ten “Bandung principles”. In fact, the second edition of the Bandung Conference was not the only subject of disappointment. The outcome of the NAM conference in Cairo in 1964 and the call for nuclear disarmament, along with deliberations on about the United States’ intervention in Vietnam were also sources of controversies.¹²⁹ Nasser wanted to preserve Egypt’s leading role within the Afro-Asian framework, as illustrated by his efforts to hold the second Afro-Asian conference in Cairo and make the city the capital of the Third World, while Indonesia wanted to prolong the Bandung legacy. In addition, Syria and Cambodia also wanted to host the conference in order to create a forum to air international tensions, while China and Ceylon wanted it to de-isolate themselves at the international level.¹³⁰

The Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization (AAPSO)

After these developments, the establishment of the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) took place in Cairo in the beginning of 1958. AAPSO’s pro-Communist stance alienated key countries such as India. Similarly, it saw no place for countries with a different geographical location, such as Yugoslavia. These countries voiced their non-alignment by creating the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), whose first meeting was held in Belgrade in 1961.¹³¹ Between these different movements, a deteriorating relation between China and the Soviet Union became clear, opening opportunity for increased assistance to countries from the Third World, since both looked for local allies.

This kind of “radical approach then gradually lost its pull on the Third World after the Sino-Soviet split transformed AAPSO meetings into shouting matches among Communist factions”.¹³² From the perspective of postcolonial studies, it seems that the fundamental differences between the various solidarity or unionist organizations created were philosophically different in the way that they were reading reality and identifying its constituents from a number of manifestations, including the concept of colonialism. Understandings of colonialism in organizations from the Asian South tend to reject the definition of colonialism as a practice associated with pigmentation and saltwater test. However, for Pan-African initiatives, colonialism was reflected as the oppressive practice of the white man who crosses the ocean to the detriment of the natives.¹³³

129 LuwamDirar, *Rethinking the Concept of Colonialism in Bandung and Its African Union Aftermath in Nations and Their Others* Edited by Luis Eslava, University of Kent, Canterbury, Michael Fakhri, University of Oregon, Vasuki Nesiiah, New York University. Cambridge University Press. pp 355-366

130 *ibid*

131 Itty Abraham, *from Bandung to NAM: Non-alignment and Indian Foreign Policy, 1947–65*. *Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*. Volume 46, 2008 - Issue 2. Pp 202-204

132 Mark Lawrence Atwood, “The Rise and Fall of Nonalignment”, in: *The Cold War in the Third World*, 143-144

133 Rupert Emerson, “Colonialism and Decolonization” (1969) 4 *Journal of Contemporary History*

The Tricontinental Conference

In January 1966, Cuba hosted the Tricontinental, a conference of revolutionary movements from Africa, Asia and Latin America (Primera Conferencia de Solidaridad de Los Pueblos de Africa, Asia, America Latina). This conference was prompted by two forms of dynamics:

- The states that had created the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961, bringing together not only countries with radical regimes, but also those adopting a more conciliatory attitude towards “imperialism”.
- The organization was not limited to member-states, but also includes movements and organizations engaged in the anti-colonial and anti-imperial struggle. In fact, NAM and AAPSO platforms often collaborated together to provide the cultural space from which the Tricontinental would emerge.

During the Tricontinental Conference, AAPSO was extended to the Organization for Solidarity with the Peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America (OSPAAAL), whose secretariat continues to operate in Havana (Cuba). The Tricontinental adopted as slogan: peace and socialism, two objectives for which all means should be allocated to be achieved. After Havana, OSPAAAL provided the necessary infrastructure for mutual understanding of the movements of the three continents. It published the famous Tricontinental magazine, which has been seen as the supplier of iconic posters conveying the message of anti-colonial socialism.

In addition to this movement, revolutionary elites from liberal movements adopted radical doctrines aiming at changing regimes in Africa and Asia and transforming them into socialist regimes; This further deepened the rift between state-sponsored solidarity projects and revolutionary activities sponsored by communist states in order to dissipate the idea of the unity and appropriation of the South in favor of the victory of ideology.

Despite the importance the Tricontinental in the history of Third World movements, it has received very little attention from scholars. Academic interest focused more on the relatively modest claims of the Bandung Conference and neglected the political cleavages represented at the Tricontinental. This is representative of a more general erasure of the radical wing of the Third World movement— leaving out a key element of Third World history. Indeed, the rich heterodox theoretical and political perspectives advanced by the Tricontinental remain lost in the course of time.

II. From the Global South to the North-South project

The concept of a southern country was invented in the early seventies to distinguish less developed countries and create imaginary borders separating developed countries from poor (southern) countries. Nevertheless, this divide represented the worldview that aimed to rationalize the world order inequality and injustice. Previously, other labels were used to identify this category of countries, including “Third World”, underdeveloped countries, developing countries, marginalized countries, peripheral countries and least developed countries. Western literature tried to dedicate the boundaries between what is called North and South. The North is the component of all the ingredients that could identify, differentiate the West, and then divide it from all the others named South. Indeed, readers of Western social sciences over the past five decades will discover that the tendency to distinguish the North-South divide was an urgent need for the West to ensure interaction from the outside, which it either tied to the rule of values or civilizations or systems, and later to justify the authoritarian return, to control its resources by a mechanism other than colonialism that had become outdated. This marked the beginning of economic analysis.

Various attempts have been made to establish such a boundary between North and South, as the adoption of such boundaries forms a basis for international development plans and programs. This distinction continues to play an important role in the reports of international committees and bodies, both official and informal. The “developed world” is identified as following the North and belonging to “civilization”. Members of northern societies can adopt the “advanced” approach of their thinking, their behavior, and their everyday attitudes. This dividing line is used to separate states from one another, while oceans are used to separate the world into two very different parts according to a criteria used in which geography plays no role (not even the equator, which could play a proper role in dividing the world into two entities a North and a South).

The Brandt line and the North-South Divide

The Brandt line

In 1980 Willy Brandt suggested, the Brandt Line which became a visual representation of the North-South economic division, based on countries’ GDP per capita. It surrounds the world at a latitude of 30 ° N, passing between North America and Central America, North Africa and India, but lowered to the South to include Australia and New Zealand above the line.

In 2001, reports by the Brandt Commission provided the international community with a forward-looking plan aimed to balance wealth creation with the provision of public goods and the preservation of the environment. Brandt's cause was noble, but the fallout from this dichotomous theory was catastrophic for development economics. It reintroduces the Brandt Commission's vision of a sustainable global economy, emphasizing that the fate of global society is global, rather than any individual, group or nation. It calls for a complete reorganization of global priorities to address the interrelated economic problems of humanity and development needs. It is a project for the economy of the 21st century.

The southern part of the Atlantic Ocean is an area of shared interest, although subject to territorial disputes between states. The southwest of the ocean is marked by economic and political rivalries between Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile and the United Kingdom, still present on some islands. The problems faced by countries in this part of the Atlantic lead to a complex division, resulting from the existence of fishery resources and hydrocarbons. The sharing of this space has given rise to numerous conflicts between states, which have often resulted in agreements, with the exception of the Falklands, where tensions between Argentina and the United Kingdom persist, partly due to hydrocarbons. Maritime trafficking remains low in this area despite the existence of a safe maritime route (without piracy), known as the strategic crossing of the Strait of Magellan.

To address the negative effects of North-South systems, several theories have emerged aimed to restructure the relationship between industrialized and developing countries. They were motivated by the need to build assessment measures for development projects or as theories aiming to re-understand the imbalances between North and South. Among the theories that emerged in the early 1980s, one can cite the center-periphery theory, the concepts of development and human security, the theory of happiness, and other more advanced mechanisms of analysis. However, up to this day, the South continues to miss an integrated theoretical framework.

The Global South

The first use of the Global South in contemporary political context dates back to 1969. Carl Oglesby, editor of the liberal Catholic Commonwealth magazine in a special issue on the Vietnam War, claimed that “centuries of US dominance over the global south... have converged ... to produce an intolerable social order”¹³⁴. The term continued to gain ground and seduce throughout the second half of the 20th century. The emergence of this term is a result of a “complex historical and social process, illustrating how the term has been loaded with

134 Oglesby, Carl, Vietnamism has failed. The revolution can only be mauled, not defeated. Commonwealth, 90. 1969.

various nuances”¹³⁵. For Inge Kaul¹³⁶ (2013) the Global South is another way of instrumentalizing culture into a set of needs and services.

Africa and the Emerging project of a New South

While reviewing the African perception on the south, we find out that three heavy if not traumatic memory syndromes: the first is mostly deeply cohesive inside the historical legends of slave trade¹³⁷, the second associated to the North a privileged pathway of Western attacks against African coasts¹³⁸. The third one is linked to perceptions woven by fictional legends of Africans on the exchanges with the American continent.¹³⁹

If the first two syndromes remain ultimate and revealed consequently in several official documents shaped by most continental and regional organizations. The third one, is unlikely fundamental, and resulted of the weak down-up of dialogue between Northern and Southern shores, as well as the underprivileged communication between Western and Eastern coasts of the Atlantic basin.

AU dedicated its 2050 AIM STRATEGY to “to the memory of those who died at sea trying to earn a better quality of life, and of those who passed away on the oceans in the course of the slave trade, colonialism, and the fight for Africa’s self-determination and independence”¹⁴⁰. Once again, when we read in “2063 Agenda”, the most important document issued by the African Union in recent years, We face again the fall of the theory that claims that the history of slavery is just remnants of history no longer has an effect on the construction of African political awareness.

In the part related to “Aspiration 5” entitled “Africa with a strong cultural identity, common heritage, values and ethics”¹⁴¹, the 2063 agenda names the goal 5-1 “African cultural renaissance”, and calls for the achievement of targets to facilitate “the ratification by member states the protocols on the amendments to the Constitutive Act to enable the Diaspora participate in the building of AU” and “the implementation by member states the UN General Assembly resolutions on Permanent Memorial to and remembrance of the victims of slavery and the

135 Vincenzo Di Nicola, The Global South: An Emergent Epistemology. A working paper

136 Kaul, Inge, The Rise of the Global South: Implications for the Provisioning of Global Public. 2013

137 David Eltis, David Richardson, David W. Blight, David Brion Davis, Atlas of the Transatlantic Slave Trade (The Lewis Walpole Series in Eighteenth-Century Culture and History). Yale University Press. 2010

138 Kristin Mann, Shifting Paradigms in the Study of the African Diaspora and of Atlantic History and Culture. Journal Slavery & Abolition Volume 22, 2001 - Issue 1. (Electronic Edition). Taylor & Francis.

139 Garikai Chengu, Before Columbus: How Africans Brought Civilization to America. Global Research, the Centre for Research on Globalization. December 30, 2015, in: <http://www.globalresearch.ca/before-columbus-how-africans-brought-civilization-to-america/5407584>

140 AU, 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy. 2050 AIM STRATEGY. P 6. 2012

141 AU, 2063 Agenda. Framework Document. P 175. September, 2015

trans-Atlantic slave trade"¹⁴² Over the past three decades, Africa has experienced the creation of several regional and sub-regional initiatives aimed to combine between the developmental approach, generating employment, economic growth and wealth creation and the project of continental solidarity and continental integration.

Those initiatives, both those that engineered by the North, or by the south, or by a combination of the two, those initiatives were initiated on thematic basis that differentiate in term of priorities, depending on the nature of initiatives, and on the identity of its upholders. But Pan-Africanist initiatives all together, revolutionary ones or those born under the roof of establishment, have failed to create a valuable process of self-empowerment.

To be knowledgeable about the reality of the south, we may need to review what Boaventura de Sousa Santos calls it the ecology of knowledges, by starting an intercultural dialogue and translation among different critical knowledges and practices: South-centric and North-centric, popular and scientific, religious and secular, female and male, urban and rural, and so forth¹⁴³. But this requires and "need for creating a distance in relation to Western-centric political imagination and critical theory"¹⁴⁴.

Today, the need to restructure awareness of geographical and geo-strategic advantages of the South has been expanded based on more noble but more realistic values, where man is at the center of the initiative and its goal. In Africa, the dream grows with countries undertaking structural reforms, but also with a new generation of research centers that are working towards advancing the development of the continent based on creativity, self-empowerment, and mutual and equal cooperation with other geographies of the world.

142 Ibid

143 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, *Epistemologies of the South*. P 42. 2016. Routledge

144 Ibid, p ix (preface)



Conclusion

Mohammed Loulichki

The Transatlantic area, whose peoples have for centuries forged relations - sometimes of domination, often of mutual influence- is currently plagued by disruptive currents which have undermined the foundations of globalization and upset the peace of mind which peoples of the world had settled into since the end of the Second World War.

In the field of trade, President Trump's protectionist measures against China and the European Union (EU), in particular, and his challenge to the Transatlantic Partnership Agreement (TPA) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), have strained international trade dynamics and eroded the World Trade Organization's (WTO) regulatory function. In Uri Dadush's view, the tensions and concerns raised by these measures and their likely extension may get worse before they are alleviated. He identifies five sets of problems, ranging from inequitable sharing of the benefits of globalization and technological progress, to the wave of populism, macro-economic imbalances, Chinese expansion and WTO dysfunctions. The author expresses moderate optimism about the prospects for a reversal of these current dynamics and recommends a reforming and revamping of the WTO's dispute settlement system.

The same cautious optimism surrounds the implementation of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. Following confirmation of the United States' withdrawal from this instrument, its implementation is nevertheless still expected to continue. Despite the decision of several American states and major cities to implement the Agreement, there are genuine fears that the international community will not fulfill its financial commitments to developing countries in helping them to adapt to climate change. According to Rim Berahab and Mbuih Zukane, the Paris Agreement is hampered by ambiguity, a lack of mechanisms to monitor State parties' commitments and sanctions. Effective implementation would require regional mitigation efforts that take into account local climate realities and close the North-South technology gap.

This challenge to the Paris Agreement and Trade Agreements is part of a global approach, directed against multiculturalism in the name of the primacy of American national laws. Indeed, the "America First" paradigm has been put forward to withdraw from the painstakingly concluded 5+1 Agreement with Iran, UNESCO and to substantially reduce the United States' contribution to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.

Younes Abouyoub argues that this dangerous turning point in American

politics raises the question of whether the Trump administration's international legacy is not likely to lead to "a destruction of the international governance system in place since the Second World War and an irreversible erosion of the American tale".

In terms of security, two major themes have dominated the transatlantic scene over the past three years: the redistribution of financial burdens among members of the Atlantic Alliance and the migration crisis.

The rebalancing of fiscal burdens within NATO is part of a coordinated approach by the new US Administration aimed at charging the "right price" countries or groups of countries whose strategic security depends on US power. This is the case, among others, for NATO members, Gulf countries, Japan and South Korea.

With regard to NATO, which was initially described as "obsolete", the upward revision of European members' contributions has been called for by the then candidate and subsequently President of the United States. The idea is not new and was present in the agenda of his predecessors, presidents Obama and Bush Jr. The difference lies in the determination of the current President to act and the Europeans' acquiescence to proceed with it.

This perspective has prompted European NATO members to move forward with the European Defense project and to step up measures taken since 2013 to build military capabilities through the PESCO program, the European Defense Fund and the Civil and Military Headquarters.

This ambition is, however, hampered by major obstacles, in particular a lack of leadership, an inadequate defense industry and a lack of consistency between the foreign policies of major EU member states.

Faced with these realities and challenges, Rachid El Houdaigui expressed the need for Alliance members to build a new strategic consensus around "NATO burden sharing" and collective defense. He noted the emergence of flexible defense architectures, such as the "Nordic Defense Cooperation" and the "Three Seas Initiative", involving twelve countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

The second security issue that has dominated the news in recent years is illegal migration, which has recently witnessed alarming, even tragic, developments on the three continents bordering the Atlantic.

Notwithstanding the long history of migration and its importance in the formation of a number of nations in the transatlantic area, the 2015 crisis in Europe - caused by the unpredictable and massive arrival of tens of thousands of refugees at the gates of the Schengen area - has had social, economic and political repercussions, both at domestic and international levels.

With the nationalist upsurge that followed the crisis and the resulting retreat into a sense of identity, the positive aspects of migration have been systematically

overshadowed in favor of the security dimension. As Abdelhak Bassou points out, with an ageing population, Europe will certainly need foreign migration. Countries such as Germany, Italy, Poland and Romania will only be able to maintain their populations by 2050 through migration, mainly from Africa.

In her analysis of the root causes of migration, Soukeyna Ndiaye Ba singled out poverty, insecurity and climate change, but also the unfair consequences of globalization as determining factors in Africans' decision to migrate. She calls for collective reflection, open dialogue and pragmatic solutions that take into account the interests of origin, transit and destination countries, far from any stigmatization or xenophobia.

This necessity to cooperate for a humane and pragmatic management of the migration challenge does not exempt countries of origin from their primary responsibilities to provide their citizens with decent living conditions, and countries of destination from upholding both their international treaty obligations and the customary rules in force.

Taking as a starting point the progress achieved by Latin American countries in the agricultural sector, in contrast to the chronic deficit of African agriculture, Fatima Ezzahra Mengoub and Tharcisse Guèdègbé suggest the establishment of a transatlantic partnership in this area, with the aim of meeting the needs of a rapidly growing population, estimated at 2.5 billion Africans in 2050.

It was precisely to limit a food deficit amounting to 38 billion dollars that the African continent placed agriculture at the heart of its development strategies, with the successive adoption of the Declarations in Maputo (2003), Abuja (2006) and Malabu (2014). One of the objectives of this agricultural strategy is to increase production by 6% annually, allocate 10% of the annual budget to the sector and use 50 kg of fertilizers per hectare.

The success of this strategy requires the establishment of partnerships, such as those concluded between Morocco and Ethiopia or Kenya and Nigeria in order to increase their agricultural production through fertilizers adapted to each country's soils and climate.

Whether it is to ensure food security, combat the negative effects of climate change or combat transnational trafficking of all kinds, Youssef Mahmoud sees the achievement of the 17 sustainable development objectives as key to tackle all these challenges. In his view, the concept of human security, which has been the main driver of United Nations action since 1948, represents a universal concern whose constituent elements are interdependent, placing humans at the center of public policy. Its implementation requires a recognition of the primary responsibility of states towards their populations, the involvement of citizens at all levels and strengthening the notion of states' individual and collective resilience.

One of the ways to promote such collective resilience in response to the many challenges facing the world is to promote a culture of dialogue, mutual understanding and tolerance, as called for by Mohamed Benaïssa and Paulo Antonio Paranagua. Drawing on the origins of Christopher Columbus' discovery of America and the painful history of enslavement of millions of Africans, the two authors call for fostering a shared heritage, which can serve as an “antidote against identity-driven downward spiral” and a “correction of the negative image” that the peoples and culture of the three continents have about each other. To consolidate and build on this shared multifaceted capital, Paulo Antonio Paranagua advocates for the revival of existing structures for the dissemination of cultures and the establishment of new networks and platforms, by leveraging new information and communication technologies, so as to universally spread the culture of democracy, human rights and the rule of law.

Selected Indicators for Integration Process Assessment within the Atlantic Space

Badr Mandri and Yassine Msadfa

Abstract

This chapter is intended to complement the various issues addressed in this book. This is a statistical annex that aims to provide readers of the “Atlantic Current” with an overview of the different economies of the Atlantic Area, their convergence and degree of integration. In this edition, the reader can find a selection of the most relevant indicators in the form of tables and graphs that highlight the economic and labour market situations as well as the business climate in each Atlantic country or sub-region. They also illustrate the different flows that exist between these countries and sub regions in terms of trade, direct investment, migration and remittances.

The geographical sample of the Atlantic space

Africa Sub-region

- Angola
- Benin
- Cameroon
- Cape Verde
- Democratic Republic of the Congo
- Republic of Congo
- Côte d'Ivoire
- Equatorial Guinea
- Gabon
- Gambia
- Ghana
- Guinea
- Guinea-Bissau
- Liberia
- Mauritania
- Morocco
- Namibia
- Nigeria
- São Tomé and Príncipe
- Senegal
- Sierra Leone
- South Africa
- Togo

Latin America & Caribbean Sub-region

- Antigua and Barbuda
- Argentina
- Bahamas
- Barbados
- Belize
- Bermuda
- Brazil
- Chile
- Colombia
- Costa Rica
- Cuba
- Dominica
- Dominican Republic
- French Guiana
- Grenada
- Guatemala
- Guyana
- Haiti
- Honduras
- Jamaica
- Mexico
- Nicaragua
- Panama
- St. Kitts and Nevis
- St. Lucia
- St. Vincent and the Grenadines
- Suriname
- Trinidad and Tobago
- Uruguay
- Venezuela

USA & Canada

- Canada
- United States

Europe Sub-region


- Austria
- Belgium
- Bulgaria
- Croatia
- Cyprus
- Czech Republic
- Denmark
- Estonia
- Finland
- France
- Germany
- Greece
- Greenland
- Hungary
- Iceland
- Ireland
- Italy
- Latvia
- Lithuania
- Luxembourg
- Malta
- Netherlands
- Norway
- Poland
- Portugal
- Romania
- Slovakia
- Slovenia
- Spain
- Sweden
- Switzerland
- United Kingdom

Figure 12: GDP Per Capita PPP By Sub-Region in the Atlantic area (constant 2011 in 1000 US\$)

Average by sub-region	2007-2009	2010-2012	2013-2017
Africa	5,7	5,8	5,7
Latin America & the Caribbean	14,9	14,9	14,5
USA & Canada	45,5	45,6	47,8
Europe	35,9	35,2	37,1
Atlantic area	20,9	20,6	21,4
Standard deviation across Atlantic countries	17,9	17,3	17,7

Source : Author's calculation based on the World Development Indicators Database, World Bank

Figure 13: GDP Per Capita PPP by Sub-region in the Atlantic area (constant 2011 in 1000 US\$)




Source : Author's calculation based on the World Development Indicators Database, World Bank

Figure 14: Real GDP by Sub-region in the Atlantic area (constant 2010 in millions US\$)

Atlantic sub-region	Average 2014-2017	Share in total Atlantic GDP 2014-2017	Share in total world GDP 2014-2017
Africa	1 239 564,66	2,9%	1,7%
Latin American & Caribbean	4 626 128,28	10,9%	6,3%
USA & Canada	18 142 457,70	42,7%	24,9%
Europe	17 681 752,10	41,6%	24,3%
Total Atlantic area	42 533 471,05	100,0%	58,4%

Source : Author’s calculation based on the World Development Indicators Database, World Bank

Figure 15: Share of the Atlantic Sub-regions in Total Atlantic Real GDP (2014-2017 average)




Source : Author’s calculation based on the World Development Indicators Database, World Bank

Figure 16: Real GDP Growth Rates Synchronization in the Atlantic Area¹⁴⁵

Mean of bilateral correlations within sub-regions of the Atlantic Area	1985-1994	1995-2004	2005-2015
Intra-African sub-region	0,03	0,00	0,04
Intra-European sub-region	0,28	0,11	0,76
Intra USA & Canada sub-region	0,89	0,72	0,93
Intra-Latin American & Caribbean sub-region	0,01	0,11	0,45
Mean of bilateral correlations between sub-regions of the Atlantic Area	1985-1994	1995-2004	2005-2015
Africa / Europe	0,09	-0,03	0,17
Africa / USA & Canada	0,18	-0,07	0,21
Africa / Latin America & Caribbean	-0,03	0,02	0,15
Europe / USA & Canada	0,30	0,29	0,69
Europe / Latin America & Caribbean	0,01	0,08	0,57
USA & Canada / Latin America & Caribbean	0,04	0,18	0,52
Mean of bilateral correlations between all countries in the Atlantic area	0,05	0,05	0,38

Source : author's calculation based on the World Development Indicators Database, World Bank


Figure 17: Correlations Within Sub-Regions in the Atlantic Area



Source : Author's calculation based on the World Development Indicators Database, World Bank


145 A positive coefficient of correlation could be interpreted as a synchronization effect. The higher the positive coefficient of correlation, the higher the synchronization between countries.

Figure 18: Correlations Between Sub-Regions in the Atlantic Area



Source : Author’s calculation based on the World Development Indicators Database, World Bank

Figure 19: Correlation Amongst the Atlantic Countries



Source : Author’s calculation based on the World Development Indicators Database, World Bank

Figure 20: Real GDP Growth by country (period average)

Country	1990-1999	2000-2009	2010-2017
Angola	1,42	11,46	3,36
Benin	4,94	4,15	4,68
Cabo Verde	6,15	6,06	2,42
Cameroon	0,42	3,40	4,46
Democratic Republic of the Congo	-5,47	3,31	6,65
Republic of Congo	0,83	4,57	2,36
Côte d'Ivoire	3,76	0,45	6,11
Equatorial Guinea	34,31	18,13	-2,88
Gabon	2,47	0,51	4,51
The Gambia	4,28	3,79	2,85
Ghana	4,42	5,55	7,14
Guinea	4,22	2,63	3,88
Guinea-Bissau	1,19	2,83	3,87
Liberia		2,29	4,08
Mauritania	2,96	4,47	4,61
Morocco	2,79	4,74	3,60
Namibia	3,89	4,45	3,93
Nigeria	4,97	8,54	4,25
São Tomé and Príncipe	1,25	4,51	4,41
Senegal	2,72	4,01	4,48
Sierra Leone	-7,38	8,96	4,87
South Africa	1,39	3,60	1,94
Togo	1,90	1,70	5,22
AFRICA	3,52	4,96	3,95
Canada	2,39	2,09	2,29
United States	3,23	1,82	2,17
USA & Canada	2,81	1,96	2,23
Antigua and Barbuda	3,36	2,82	1,03
Argentina	4,28	3,05	2,93
The Bahamas	2,70	1,00	0,82
Barbados	0,47	1,14	0,67
Belize	5,93	5,02	2,00
Brazil	1,72	3,36	1,33
Chile	6,34	3,97	3,52

Colombia	2,89	3,99	3,80
Costa Rica	5,42	4,08	3,99
Dominica	2,63	3,08	0,13
Dominican Republic	4,49	4,67	5,31
Grenada	4,13	2,62	1,74
Guatemala	3,74	3,32	3,42
Guyana	4,79	1,85	4,14
Haiti	0,37	0,77	1,88
Honduras	2,76	4,36	3,70
Jamaica	1,30	0,87	0,39
Mexico	3,47	1,84	2,99
Nicaragua	3,17	2,95	4,62
Panama	6,09	5,91	7,49
St. Kitts and Nevis	4,33	3,02	1,65
St. Lucia	3,63	1,76	0,78
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	3,58	3,13	0,93
Suriname	0,58	4,49	2,22
Trinidad and Tobago	3,94	6,52	-0,40
Uruguay	3,22	2,16	4,25
Venezuela	2,46	3,97	-0,72
Latin American & Caribbean	3,40	3,18	2,39
Austria	2,72	1,67	1,46
Belgium	2,22	1,62	1,25
Bulgaria	-5,27	4,57	1,89
Croatia	2,49	3,13	0,16
Cyprus	4,80	3,38	-0,08
Czech Republic	1,18	3,43	1,95
Denmark	2,45	0,93	1,05
Estonia	4,06	4,39	3,50
Finland	1,65	2,03	0,98
France	2,01	1,42	1,15
Germany	2,19	0,84	1,96
Greece	2,09	2,79	-3,15
Hungary	-0,27	2,41	1,93
Iceland	2,29	3,59	2,67
Ireland	6,93	3,53	3,12
Italy	1,43	0,54	0,07

Latvia	1,21	5,15	2,81
Lithuania	5,00	4,89	3,21
Luxembourg	4,76	3,05	2,78
Malta	-	1,90	3,71
Netherlands	3,12	1,71	1,06
Norway	3,56	1,83	1,40
Poland	2,69	3,91	3,27
Portugal	3,42	0,94	0,15
Romania	-2,28	4,81	2,79
Slovak Republic	4,88	4,55	2,86
Slovenia	4,21	3,02	1,41
Spain	2,79	2,75	0,86
Sweden	1,97	2,02	2,51
Switzerland	1,17	1,99	1,66
United Kingdom	2,08	1,94	1,83
Europe	2,38	2,73	1,68

Source: Author's calculation based on the World Economic Outlook Database

Figure 21: Inflation Rates in the Atlantic Area Sub-Regions, Consumer Prices (percent)

Average by sub-region	2007-2009	2010-2012	2013-2017
Africa	7,92	6,60	5,25
Latin america & Caribbean	6,47	5,60	7,35
USA & Canada	1,86	2,18	1,36
Europe	3,74	2,84	0,76
Atlantic area average	6,35	4,76	3,94
World	5,75	4,06	2,05
Standard deviation across Atlantic countries	5,25	4,23	15,38

Source: Author's calculation based on the World Economic Outlook Database

Figure 22: Inflation Convergence Between the Atlantic Area Countries (percent)



Source : Author's calculation based on the World Development Indicators Database, World Bank

Figure 23: Inflation Rates in the Atlantic Area (three - year average, in percent)


Country	2010-2013	2014-2017
Angola	11,75	20,41
Benin	3,19	-0,39
Cameroon	2,28	1,40
Cabo Verde	2,65	-0,18
Congo, Rep.	4,05	-
Congo, Dem. Rep.	8,44	2,89
Equatorial Guinea	6,81	1,08
Cote d'Ivoire	2,62	0,78
Gabon	1,47	2,11
Ghana	10,05	15,62
Gambia, The	4,95	6,59
Guinea	15,98	8,54
Guinea-Bissau	2,60	0,83
Liberia	7,55	10,63
Morocco	1,27	1,10

Namibia	5,55	5,41
Nigeria	11,31	12,32
Sao Tome and Principe	10,59	5,70
Senegal	1,69	0,31
Sierra Leone	13,99	11,10
South Africa	5,18	5,48
Togo	2,45	0,47
Mauritania	5,25	1,86
Africa	6,16	5,18
Canada	1,79	1,51
United States	2,08	1,28
USA & Canada	1,93	1,40
Antigua and Barbuda	2,82	0,97
Bahamas, The	1,72	0,79
Barbados	5,40	1,63
Belize	0,97	0,31
Brazil	5,82	6,89
Chile	2,39	3,68
Colombia	2,72	4,93
Costa Rica	5,07	1,73
Dominica	1,73	-0,06
Dominican Republic	5,83	2,18
Grenada	2,21	0,39
Guatemala	4,55	3,67
Guyana	2,82	0,84
Haiti	6,56	10,52
Honduras	5,46	3,99
Jamaica	9,10	4,67
Mexico	3,87	3,90
Nicaragua	6,97	4,35
Panama	4,77	1,09
St. Kitts and Nevis	2,43	-0,80
St. Lucia	2,92	-1,32
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	2,02	0,09
Suriname	7,91	21,94
Trinidad and Tobago	7,53	3,20
Uruguay	7,86	8,35

Venezuela, RB	29,00	188,34
Latin America & Caribbean	5,40	10,63
Austria	2,39	1,37
Belgium	2,42	1,25
Bulgaria	2,63	-0,06
Croatia	2,23	-0,17
Cyprus	1,92	-1,15
Czech Republic	2,02	0,95
Denmark	2,06	0,60
Estonia	3,67	0,74
Finland	2,23	0,49
France	1,62	0,44
Germany	1,67	0,84
Greece	2,16	-0,69
Hungary	4,07	0,61
Iceland	4,62	1,78
Ireland	0,96	0,06
Italy	2,14	0,35
Latvia	1,38	0,98
Lithuania	2,41	0,96
Luxembourg	2,52	0,78
Malta	2,01	0,85
Netherlands	2,14	0,82
Norway	1,64	2,41
Poland	2,89	0,13
Portugal	2,03	0,55
Romania	4,80	0,07
Slovak Republic	2,47	0,10
Slovenia	2,00	0,26
Spain	2,21	0,28
Sweden	1,24	0,64
Swaziland	6,29	-0,35
United Kingdom	3,29	1,21
Europe	2,52	0,55
Atlantic area	4,44	5,06


Source: Author's calculation based on the World Development Indicators Database, World Bank

Figure 24: Unemployment Rate By Sub-Region In the Atlantic Area (percent of total labor force)



Source : Author's calculation based on the World Development Indicators Database, World Bank (ILO Estimates)

Figure 25: Employment Ratio By Atlantic Area Sub-Region (percent share in 15+ aged population)




Source : Author's calculation based on the World Development Indicators Database, World Bank (ILO Estimates)

Figure 26: Budget Deficit/surplus (percent of GDP)

Average by sub-region	2004-2006	2007-2009	2010-2016
Africa	-0,50	3,71	-4,04
Latin america & Caribbean	-1,13	-2,14	-2,94
USA & Canada	-0,85	-2,84	-3,08
Europe	-0,72	-1,79	-2,53
Atlantic area	-0,79	-0,61	-2,93
World average	-0,20	-2,60	-3,91
Standard deviation across Atlantic area countries	4,10	6,90	4,07

Source : Author's calculation based on the World Development Indicators Database, World Bank

Figure 27: Budget Balance Convergence Between the Atlantic Area Countries (percent of GDP)



Source : Author's calculation based on the World Development Indicators Database, World Bank

Figure 28: Credit to Private Sector (percent of GDP)

Average by sub-region	2005-2009	2010-2013	2014-2017
Africa	23,99	28,66	30,08
Latin america & Caribbean	45,35	49,18	49,71
USA & Canada	176,53	187,84	192,65
Europe	113,30	120,77	90,30
Atlantic area	67,26	71,65	62,17
World average	131,17	127,22	127,92
Standard deviation across Atlantic area countries	58,12	59,62	46,30


Source : Author's calculation based on the World Development Indicators Database, World Bank

Figure 29: Credit To Private Sector By Sub-Region in the Atlantic Area (percent of GDP)



Source : Author's calculation based on the World Development Indicators Database, World Bank

Figure 30: Average Turnover Ratios 2012-2015 (percent)¹⁴⁶



Source : Author's calculation based on the World Development Indicators Database, World Bank


¹⁴⁶ Turnover ratio is the total value of shares traded during the period divided by the average market capitalization for the period. Average market capitalization is calculated as the average of the end-of-period values for the current period and the previous period.

Figure 31: Geographical Breakdown of Exportations: Intra-Regional & Towards the Rest of the World (three-year average share in total exportation, in percent)

Toward	Africa		Latin America & Caribbean		USA & Canada		Europe		Atlantic area		Rest of the world	
From	2009-2011	2012-2015	2009-2011	2012-2015	2009-2011	2012-2015	2009-2011	2012-2015	2009-2011	2012-2015	2009-2011	2012-2015
Africa	10,7	11,1	6,0	5,0	16,9	9,4	30,0	33,0	63,7	58,5	36,3	41,5
Latin America & the Caribbean	1,1	1,0	15,0	13,6	39,7	42,2	12,7	11,9	68,5	68,7	31,5	31,3
USA & Canada	1,1	1,2	17,6	19,4	32,0	31,8	18,4	16,5	69,3	68,9	30,7	31,1
Europe	1,7	1,8	2,2	2,4	6,9	7,4	68,2	65,7	79,0	77,3	21,0	22,7
Total Atlantic area									74,9	74,2	25,1	25,8


Source : Author's calculation based on the International Trade Centre Database

Figure 32: Distribution of the Atlantic African Countries' Exportation (share of total exports of African sub-region)




Source: Author's calculation based on the World Development Indicators Database, World Bank

Figure 33: Distribution of the Latin American Sub-Region’s Exportsations (share of total exports of Latin American & Caribbean sub-region)




Source: Author’s calculation based on the World Development Indicators Database, World Bank

Figure 34: Distribution of the ‘USA & Canada’ Sub-Region’s Exportsations (share of total exports of USA & Canada sub-region)




Source: Author’s calculation based on the World Development Indicators Database, World Bank

Figure 35: Distribution of the European Sub-Region's Exportations (share of total exports of European sub-region)



Source: Author's calculation based on the World Development Indicators Database, World Bank

Figure 36: Intra-regional Share of the Atlantic Area Exports in Total Exports



Source: Author's calculation based on the International Trade Centre Database

Figure 37: Foreign Direct Investments Inflows by Destination (in million US\$)

Average by sub-region	2008-2010	2011-2017
Africa	27 842	22 668
Latin america & Caribbean	109 143	172 685
USA & Canada	253 557	342 580
Europe	468 560	571 506
Atlantic area	864 769	1 116 055
world	1 487 034	1 589 277
Shares in Atlantic area inflows (by destination in percent)	2008-2010	2011-2017
Africa	3%	2%
Latin america & Caribbean	13%	15%
USA & Canada	29%	31%
Europe	54%	51%
Atlantic area	100%	100%
Shares in Atlantic area inflows (by destination in percent)	2008-2010	2011-2017
Africa	2%	1%
Latin america & Caribbean	7%	11%
USA & Canada	17%	22%
Europe	32%	36%
Atlantic area	58%	70%
Rest of the world	42%	30%

Source: Author's calculation based on the World Investment Report 2016, UNCTAD


Figure 38: Foreign Direct Investments Outflows by Origin (in million US\$)

Average by sub-region	2008-2010	2011-2017
Africa	484	9 352
Latin america & Caribbean	32 439	42 641
USA & Canada	342 526	428 874
Europe	689 296	601 420
Atlantic area	1 064 745	1 082 287
world	1 546 049	1 443 049
Shares in Atlantic area inflows (by destination in percent)	2008-2010	2011-2017
Africa	0,05%	1%
Latin america & Caribbean	3%	4%
USA & Canada	32%	40%

Europe	65%	56%
Atlantic area	100%	100%
Shares in Atlantic area inflows (by destination in percent)		
	2008-2010	2011-2017
Africa	0%	1%
Latin america & Caribbean	2%	3%
USA & Canada	22%	30%
Europe	45%	42%
Atlantic area	69%	75%
Rest of the world	31%	25%


Source: Author's calculation based on the World Investment Report 2016, UNCTAD

Figure 39: Atlantic Sub-Regions Received FDI (percent share in world inflows)




Source : Author's calculation based on the World Development Indicators Database, World Bank

Figure 40: Atlantic Sub-Regions Received FDI (percent share in Atlantic inflows)




Source : Author's calculation based on the World Development Indicators Database, World Bank

Figure 41: Atlantic Sub-Regions FDI Outflows (percent share in World inflows)



Source : Author's calculation based on the World Development Indicators Database, World Bank

Figure 42: Atlantic Sub-Regions FDI Outflows (percent share in Atlantic inflows)



Source : Author's calculation based on the World Development Indicators Database, World Bank

Figure 43: Portfolio Investments Received By the African Sub-Region By Origin (three-year average, percent share)




Figure 44: Portfolio Investments Received By Latin American & Caribbean Sub-Region By Origin (three-year average, percent share)




Figure 45: Portfolio Investments Received By USA & Canada Sub-Region By Origin (three-year average, percent share)




Figure 46: Portfolio Investments Received By The European Sub-Region By Origin (three-year average, percent share)





Figure 47: Portfolio Investments Received By All Countries Included in the Atlantic Area By Origin (three-year average, percent share)



Source : Author's calculations based on the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) database, IMF

Figure 48: Geographical Breakdown of Received Portfolio Investment (percent share in total portfolio investment received by each sub-region, three-year average)

From	Africa		Latine America & the Caribbean		USA & Canada		Europe		Total Atlantic area		Rest of the World	
	2010-2012	2013-2016	2010-2012	2013-2016	2010-2012	2013-2016	2010-2012	2013-2016	2010-2012	2013-2016	2010-2012	2013-2016
Africa	0,39	0,47	1,00	0,49	44,66	46,68	47,03	43,53	92,90	91,17	7,10	8,93
Latine America & the Caribbean	1,02	0,65	2,77	2,14	46,33	46,39	33,00	31,78	82,75	80,77	17,25	19,23
USA & Canada	0,21	0,22	4,82	3,99	12,21	12,58	38,09	38,39	55,24	55,11	44,76	44,89
Europe	0,48	0,47	1,15	0,80	15,99	19,65	65,33	50,99	82,78	84,12	17,22	15,88
Total Atlantic area									74,29	77,79	25,71	22,23

Source : Author's calculations based on the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) database, IMF

Figure 49: Population in Atlantic area by sub-region (2017)

	Population size	Share in Atlantic population	Share in world population	Average annual population growth rate (2010-2017)
Africa	551 699 701	27%	7%	2,2%
Latin America & Caribbean	567 291 981	28%	8%	1,0%
USA & Canada	362 427 261	18%	5%	0,7%
Europe	526 606 985	26%	7%	0,2%
Atlantic Area	2 008 025 928	100%	27%	1,0%


Source : author calculation based on World Development indicators Database, World Bank

Figure 50: Population distribution in Atlantic area (2017)

	Residence area		Gender		Age		
	Urban	Rural	Female	Mal	0-14	15-64	65 and above
Africa	52,4%	47,6%	50,0%	50,0%	41,1%	55,5%	3,4%
Latin America & Caribbean	81,5%	18,5%	50,6%	49,4%	24,5%	67,4%	8,1%
USA & Canada	82,0%	18,0%	50,5%	49,5%	18,6%	65,8%	15,6%
Europe	75,5%	24,5%	51,0%	49,0%	15,4%	64,9%	19,7%
Atlantic Area	72,0%	28,0%	50,5%	49,5%	25,6%	63,2%	11,2%


Source : author calculation based on World Development indicators Database, World Bank

Figure 51: Net flow of migrants during five-year period (USA & Canada: 2012-2017)




Source : author calculation based on World Development indicators Database, World Bank

Figure 52: Net flow of migrants during five-year period (Europe: 2012-2017)




Source : author calculation based on World Development indicators Database, World Bank

Figure 53: Net flow of migrants during five-year period (Latin America & Caribbean: 2012-2017)



Source : author calculation based on World Development indicators Database, World Bank

Figure 54: Net flow of migrants during five-year period (Africa: 2012-2017)




Source : Author calculation based on World Development indicators Database, World Bank

Figure 55: Total Migrant Population at Mid-Year by Origin and Destination in the Atlantic Area, 2017 (Thousands)

Origin / Destination	Africa	Latin America & Caribbean	USA & Canada	Europe	Atlantic Area	Rest of the World
Africa	4050,6	28,3	35,1	666,5	4780,6	12570,4
Latin America & Caribbean	43,1	3244,2	1119,3	1110,4	5517,0	7997,6
USA & Canada	1214,7	21901,9	1199,8	6128,4	30444,8	57638,2
Europe	5053,5	3349,6	992,8	23026,5	32422,3	58734,4
Atlantic Area	10361,9	28523,9	3347,0	30931,8	73164,6	136940,6
Rest of the World	2719,0	1305,5	1029,2	6710,3	11764,0	120774,8

Source : Author calculations based on Migration and Remittances Data, World Bank

Figure 56: Share of intra-Atlantic migrant population, 2017 (percent in total migrant population in the Atlantic area)




Source : Author calculations based on Migration and Remittances Data, World Bank

Figure 57: Remittances inflow towards Atlantic area sub-region, 2017 (millions \$)

Towards	From Africa	Latin America & Caribbean	USA & Canada	Europe	Atlantic Area	Rest of the World
Africa	7384	64	8432	18145	34026	3370
Latin America & Caribbean	16	4889	56588	5033	66527	2404
USA & Canada	56	2220	1541	1828	5645	2317
Europe	1918	4957	20485	80884	108244	19308
Atlantic Area	9374	12130	87046	105891	214441	27399
Rest of the World	2480	4120	86001	53685	146287	399024

Source : Author calculations based on Migration and Remittances Data, World Bank

Figure 58: Remittances inflow towards Atlantic area sub-region (percent share in total received remittances - 2017)



Source : Author calculations based on on Migration and Remittances Data, World Bank

Figure 59: Population with access to communication infrastructure (2017)

	Fixed telephone subscriptions (per 100 people)	Fixed broadband subscriptions (per 100 people)	Average of people using the Internet (% of population) (2016)
Africa	1,84	0,73	24,6
Latin America & Caribbean	17,62	12,75	57,4
USA & Canada	37,14	34,15	83,7
Europe	42,38	34,33	80,9
Total Atlantic area	24,33	19,34	61,6

Source : author calculation based on World Development indicators Database, World Bank

Figure 60: Maritime connectivity: Average of liner shipping connectivity index¹⁴⁷ by sub-region in the Atlantic area (base maximum¹⁴⁸ value in 2004 = 100)

	2008	2012	2016
Africa	11,04	13,64	16,92
Latin America & Caribbean	12,66	16,36	17,61
USA & Canada	58,37	65,00	70,67
Europe	31,00	37,65	42,42
Atlantic Area	28,27	33,16	36,91

Source : author calculation based on World Development indicators Database, World Bank

147 The liner shipping connectivity index (LSCI) indicates a country's integration level into global liner shipping networks. The index base year is 2004, and the base value is on a country showing a maximum figure for 2004. LSCI is generated from five components: 1) the number of ships; 2) the total container-carrying capacity of those ships; 3) the maximum vessel size; 4) the number of services; and 5) the number of companies that deploy container ships on services from and to a country's ports. The data are derived from Containerization International Online and Lloyds List Intelligence.

148 China's indice was 100 in 2004.

Figure 61: Overall logistics performance index (1=low to 5=high)¹⁴⁹

	2010	2012	2016
Africa	2,5	2,5	2,4
Latin America & Caribbean	2,8	2,7	2,7
USA & Canada	3,9	3,9	4,0
Europe	3,5	3,5	3,6
Atlantic Area	3,2	3,2	3,2

Source : author calculation based on World Development indicators Database, World Bank

Figure 62: Voice and Accountability (Percentile rank among all countries)

Country	Rank	Country	Rank
Latin America & Caribbean		Europe	
Uruguay	86,7	Norway	100,0
Costa Rica	84,7	Sweden	99,5
Barbados	84,2	Netherlands	99,0
Chile	79,3	Switzerland	98,0
St. Kitts and Nevis	78,8	Finland	97,5
St. Lucia	77,8	Luxembourg	97,0
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	76,4	Denmark	96,6
Dominica	75,4	Germany	95,6
Bahamas, The	74,9	Belgium	95,1
Grenada	71,9	Iceland	94,1
Jamaica	69,5	Austria	93,6
Antigua and Barbuda	68,5	United Kingdom	93,1
Belize	67,0	Greenland	92,6
Trinidad and Tobago	66,5	Ireland	90,6
Argentina	65,5	Estonia	89,7
Panama	65,0	Portugal	88,7
Brazil	61,6	Malta	87,2

¹⁴⁹ Logistics Performance Index overall score reflects perceptions of a country's logistics based on efficiency of customs clearance process, quality of trade- and transport-related infrastructure, ease of arranging competitively priced shipments, quality of logistics services, ability to track and trace consignments, and frequency with which shipments reach the consignee within the scheduled time. The index ranges from 1 to 5, with a higher score representing better performance. Data are from Logistics Performance Index surveys conducted by the World Bank in partnership with academic and international institutions and private companies and individuals engaged in international logistics. The 2009 round of surveys covered more than 5,000 country assessments by nearly 1,000 international freight forwarders. Respondents evaluate eight markets on six core dimensions on a scale from 1 (worst) to 5 (best).

Suriname	61,1	France	85,7
Guyana	55,7	Cyprus	83,3
Dominican Republic	52,2	Italy	82,8
Colombia	49,3	Spain	81,3
Mexico	42,9	Slovenia	79,8
Guatemala	37,4	Lithuania	78,3
Honduras	32,5	Czech Republic	76,8
Nicaragua	27,1	Slovak Republic	75,9
Haiti	26,1	Latvia	73,9
Venezuela, RB	14,3	Poland	72,9
Cuba	7,4	Greece	70,9
USA & Canada		Romania	64,5
Canada	96,1	Croatia	64,0
United States	82,3	Bulgaria	59,1
		Hungary	58,1
Africa			
Cabo Verde	77,3	Gambia, The	29,1
South Africa	69,0	Morocco	28,6
Ghana	67,5	Guinea	25,1
Namibia	66,0	Guinea-Bissau	24,6
Benin	58,6	Mauritania	24,1
Sao Tome and Principe	57,1	Cameroon	20,2
Senegal	56,7	Gabon	19,7
Liberia	46,3	Angola	17,7
Sierra Leone	39,4	Congo, Rep.	16,7
Cote d'Ivoire	37,9	Congo, Dem. Rep.	8,9
Nigeria	35,0	Equatorial Guinea	1,5
Togo	29,6		

Source : author calculation based on World Governance Indicators, World Bank

Figure 63: Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism (Percentile rank among all countries)

Country	Rank	Country	Rank
Latin America & Caribbean		Europe	
St. Lucia	90,5	Greenland	100,0
Uruguay	87,1	Iceland	96,7
Dominica	86,7	Luxembourg	95,7
Grenada	85,2	Malta	93,8
Bermuda	83,8	Switzerland	92,9
Bahamas, The	82,4	Norway	90,0
Barbados	81,0	Portugal	88,1
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	78,6	Finland	87,6
Antigua and Barbuda	72,4	Austria	86,2
Cuba	70,0	Ireland	84,8
St. Kitts and Nevis	68,1	Czech Republic	84,3
Costa Rica	64,3	Sweden	81,4
Panama	61,4	Netherlands	79,5
Chile	61,0	Slovenia	77,1
Trinidad and Tobago	58,1	Slovak Republic	76,2
Jamaica	56,2	Denmark	75,7
Argentina	53,3	Hungary	74,3
Dominican Republic	51,9	Lithuania	72,9
Suriname	51,4	Croatia	71,9
Belize	48,6	Estonia	69,0
Guyana	44,3	Cyprus	67,1
Nicaragua	42,9	Germany	66,7
Brazil	31,4	Poland	64,8
Honduras	27,6	Latvia	63,8
Guatemala	26,7	Belgium	62,9
Mexico	23,3	Bulgaria	60,5
Haiti	21,0	Spain	57,6
Colombia	17,6	United Kingdom	56,7
Venezuela, RB	11,4	Italy	55,7
USA & Canada		France	54,3
Canada	88,6	Romania	49,0
United States	59,0	Greece	41,0

Africa			
Cabo Verde	79,0	Morocco	31,0
Namibia	68,6	Liberia	30,5
Sao Tome and Principe	55,2	Congo, Rep.	28,6
Ghana	49,5	Guinea-Bissau	25,2
Benin	48,1	Guinea	24,8
Sierra Leone	46,7	Mauritania	24,3
Senegal	43,3	Togo	19,5
Gabon	41,9	Cameroon	12,4
Equatorial Guinea	40,5	Cote d'Ivoire	11,9
Gambia, The	39,0	Nigeria	5,2
South Africa	35,7	Congo, Dem. Rep.	3,8
Angola	34,3		

Source : author calculation based on World Governance Indicators, World Bank

Figure 64: Government Effectiveness (Percentile rank among all countries)

Country	Rank	Country	Rank
Latin America & Caribbean		Europe	
Brazil	89,9	Switzerland	99,5
Colombia	77,9	Norway	99,0
Belize	77,4	Finland	98,1
Barbados	73,1	Netherlands	96,6
St. Kitts and Nevis	71,6	Sweden	96,2
Jamaica	69,2	Denmark	95,7
Uruguay	67,8	Germany	94,2
St. Lucia	64,9	Luxembourg	93,8
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	64,9	Austria	91,8
Trinidad and Tobago	63,0	Iceland	91,3
Cuba	62,0	United Kingdom	90,9
Bahamas, The	59,6	France	88,0
Argentina	54,3	Portugal	87,5
Panama	53,4	Ireland	87,0
Mexico	52,4	Belgium	85,1
Costa Rica	51,4	Slovenia	84,6
Guatemala	45,7	Estonia	83,7

Dominica	44,7	Spain	81,7
Dominican Republic	42,8	Czech Republic	81,3
Chile	41,8	Malta	80,8
Haiti	41,3	Lithuania	80,3
Grenada	38,9	Cyprus	79,8
Honduras	33,7	Latvia	78,8
Suriname	29,8	Greenland	76,9
Bermuda	27,9	Slovak Republic	75,0
Nicaragua	27,4	Poland	74,0
Guyana	26,9	Croatia	72,6
Antigua and Barbuda	14,9	Hungary	70,2
Venezuela, RB	7,7	Italy	69,7
USA & Canada		Greece	66,3
Canada	97,1	Bulgaria	63,9
United States	92,8	Romania	46,2
Africa			
South Africa	65,4	Gabon	16,8
Namibia	61,1	Nigeria	16,3
Cabo Verde	59,1	Angola	14,9
Ghana	49,0	Guinea	13,9
Morocco	47,6	Togo	12,5
Senegal	40,4	Congo, Rep.	11,1
Benin	26,4	Sierra Leone	10,6
Gambia, The	26,0	Liberia	8,2
Mauritania	22,6	Equatorial Guinea	6,7
Cote d'Ivoire	21,6	Congo, Dem. Rep.	4,8
Sao Tome and Principe	20,7	Guinea-Bissau	3,4
Cameroon	19,7		

Source : author calculation based on World Governance Indicators, World Bank

Figure 65: Regulatory Quality (Percentile rank among all countries)

Country	Rank	Country	Rank
Latin America & Caribbean		Europe	
Chile	88,9	Netherlands	98,6
Bermuda	77,9	Switzerland	97,1
Uruguay	73,6	Finland	96,6
St. Kitts and Nevis	71,6	Norway	96,2
Barbados	70,7	Sweden	95,7
Costa Rica	69,2	Germany	95,2
Panama	66,3	United Kingdom	94,2
Colombia	65,9	Luxembourg	93,8
St. Lucia	65,4	Estonia	93,3
Antigua and Barbuda	63,9	Denmark	92,3
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	63,5	Ireland	91,8
Mexico	61,5	Austria	90,9
Jamaica	60,1	Iceland	90,4
Dominica	59,1	Greenland	88,5
Bahamas, The	58,7	Malta	88,0
Trinidad and Tobago	56,7	Belgium	86,5
Grenada	53,8	Czech Republic	86,1
Dominican Republic	52,9	France	83,7
Brazil	51,4	Lithuania	83,2
Guatemala	41,8	Latvia	82,7
Argentina	41,3	Cyprus	81,3
Guyana	37,5	Spain	79,8
Honduras	35,1	Portugal	79,3
Suriname	31,7	Poland	78,8
Belize	31,3	Slovak Republic	76,4
Nicaragua	27,4	Italy	75,0
Haiti	8,2	Hungary	73,1
Cuba	7,7	Bulgaria	72,6
Venezuela, RB	2,4	Slovenia	72,1
USA & Canada		Romania	70,2
Canada	97,6	Croatia	68,8
United States	92,8	Greece	63,0

Africa			
South Africa	62,5	Cameroon	20,2
Ghana	49,5	Sao Tome and Principe	18,8
Senegal	49,0	Guinea	17,8
Namibia	46,6	Nigeria	16,8
Cabo Verde	46,2	Sierra Leone	15,9
Morocco	44,7	Liberia	15,4
Cote d'Ivoire	38,0	Angola	12,5
Gambia, The	34,1	Guinea-Bissau	11,1
Benin	33,2	Congo, Rep.	7,2
Mauritania	23,1	Equatorial Guinea	6,3
Gabon	22,6	Congo, Dem. Rep.	5,3
Togo	21,6		

Source : author calculation based on World Governance Indicators, World Bank

Figure 66: Rule of Law (Percentile rank among all countries)

Country	Rank	Country	Rank
Latin America & Caribbean		Europe	
Chile	81,7	Finland	100,0
Bermuda	79,3	Norway	99,5
Barbados	75,5	Sweden	99,0
Dominica	75,0	Switzerland	98,6
St. Lucia	72,6	Denmark	97,6
Uruguay	72,1	Netherlands	97,1
St. Kitts and Nevis	70,7	Austria	96,2
Costa Rica	67,8	Luxembourg	95,2
Antigua and Barbuda	66,8	Greenland	94,7
Grenada	66,3	United Kingdom	92,8
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	65,4	Germany	91,3
Bahamas, The	60,1	Iceland	90,9
Panama	54,3	France	89,4
Trinidad and Tobago	51,0	Ireland	88,9
Suriname	50,0	Belgium	87,5
Jamaica	49,0	Estonia	86,5
Argentina	46,2	Malta	85,1

Brazil	43,8	Portugal	84,1
Guyana	43,3	Czech Republic	83,7
Colombia	40,4	Slovenia	82,7
Dominican Republic	36,1	Spain	81,3
Cuba	35,1	Lithuania	80,8
Mexico	31,7	Latvia	80,3
Nicaragua	29,3	Cyprus	79,8
Belize	16,3	Slovak Republic	71,6
Honduras	14,4	Hungary	70,2
Guatemala	13,0	Poland	68,3
Haiti	12,5	Romania	63,9
Venezuela, RB	0,5	Croatia	63,5
USA & Canada		Italy	62,5
Canada	95,7	Greece	56,7
United States	91,8	Bulgaria	51,9
Africa			
Cabo Verde	64,4	Togo	24,5
Namibia	60,6	Sierra Leone	22,6
Ghana	59,1	Nigeria	18,8
South Africa	52,4	Liberia	15,9
Senegal	50,5	Cameroon	14,9
Morocco	48,6	Congo, Rep.	12,0
Gambia, The	34,1	Angola	11,5
Mauritania	31,3	Guinea	9,1
Benin	30,3	Guinea-Bissau	6,7
Cote d'Ivoire	29,8	Equatorial Guinea	5,8
Gabon	26,9	Congo, Dem. Rep.	3,8
Sao Tome and Principe	26,4		

Source : author calculation based on World Governance Indicators, World Bank

Figure 67: Control of Corruption (Percentile rank among all countries)

Country	Rank	Country	Rank
Latin America & Caribbean		Europe	
Barbados	89,4	Norway	99,5
Uruguay	88,5	Finland	99,0
Bermuda	86,5	Denmark	98,6
Bahamas, The	83,7	Sweden	98,1
Chile	82,2	Switzerland	96,6
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	75,5	Luxembourg	96,2
Dominica	73,6	Netherlands	95,2
St. Lucia	71,2	United Kingdom	94,7
St. Kitts and Nevis	68,8	Germany	94,2
Grenada	67,3	Iceland	93,3
Costa Rica	66,8	Ireland	91,3
Cuba	64,4	Austria	90,9
Antigua and Barbuda	63,0	Belgium	89,9
Jamaica	50,5	France	87,5
Suriname	50,0	Estonia	87,0
Argentina	47,6	Greenland	84,1
Belize	46,2	Portugal	80,8
Trinidad and Tobago	44,2	Slovenia	79,3
Colombia	43,8	Cyprus	78,4
Guyana	37,5	Malta	76,9
Brazil	36,1	Poland	76,0
Panama	35,1	Czech Republic	70,7
Honduras	25,5	Lithuania	70,2
Dominican Republic	24,5	Latvia	69,7
Guatemala	24,0	Spain	68,3
Nicaragua	18,3	Slovak Republic	62,5
Mexico	16,3	Italy	61,5
Haiti	10,1	Croatia	61,1
Venezuela, RB	7,2	Hungary	59,1
USA & Canada		Romania	55,3
Canada	95,7	Greece	52,4
United States	88,9	Bulgaria	51,0

Africa			
Cabo Verde	80,3	Togo	26,0
Namibia	64,9	Mauritania	23,1
Sao Tome and Principe	60,6	Gabon	20,7
South Africa	56,7	Guinea	14,4
Senegal	54,8	Nigeria	12,5
Morocco	52,9	Cameroon	11,1
Ghana	49,0	Congo, Rep.	8,2
Cote d'Ivoire	36,5	Angola	6,3
Benin	33,7	Congo, Dem. Rep.	5,8
Sierra Leone	31,3	Guinea-Bissau	2,9
Gambia, The	27,4	Equatorial Guinea	0,0
Liberia	26,4		

Source : author calculation based on World Governance Indicators, World Bank

Figure 68: Atlantic countries Ranking according to the Doing Business Project (2018)

Country	Global Rank	Country	Global Rank	Country	Global Rank
Denmark	3	Chile	56	Barbados	129
Norway	7	Cyprus	57	St. Vincent and the Grenadines	130
United States	8	Croatia	58	Cabo Verde	131
United Kingdom	9	Bulgaria	59	Nicaragua	132
Sweden	12	Morocco	60	Guyana	134
Lithuania	14	Colombia	65	Togo	137
Estonia	16	Luxembourg	66	St. Kitts and Nevis	140
Finland	17	Costa Rica	67	Senegal	141
Latvia	19	Greece	72	Nigeria	146
Iceland	21	Jamaica	75	Grenada	147
Canada	22	Panama	79	Mauritania	148
Ireland	23	South Africa	82	Gambia, The	149
Germany	24	Malta	84	Guinea	152
Austria	26	St. Lucia	93	Benin	153
Spain	30	Uruguay	95	Sierra Leone	163
France	32	Guatemala	98	Suriname	165

Poland	33	Dominican Re- public	102	Cameroon	166
Portugal	34	Dominica	103	Gabon	169
Czech Republic	35	Trinidad and Tobago	105	Sao Tome and Principe	170
Netherlands	36	Namibia	107	Angola	173
Switzerland	38	Brazil	109	Liberia	174
Slovenia	40	Antigua and Bar- buda	112	Guinea-Bissau	175
Slovak Republic	42	Ghana	114	Equatorial Guinea	177
Belgium	45	Bahamas, The	118	Congo, Rep.	180
Italy	51	Argentina	119	Haiti	182
Romania	52	Honduras	121	Congo, Dem. Rep.	184
Hungary	53	Cote d'Ivoire	122	Venezuela, RB	188
Mexico	54	Belize	125		

Source : author calculation based on World Governance Indicators, World Bank

The Atlantic Area in 4 points

- A significant economic weight of the Atlantic area, with a share in world GDP, amounting to more than 58% in 2017.
- Dynamic intra-regional trade, particularly between countries on the northern shore of the Atlantic (66% between countries on the European Atlantic coast, 32% for the United States and Canada). On the other hand, South-South trade in the Atlantic remains low, at around 12% on the Latin American side and 11% between countries on the African Atlantic coast.
- A differentiated attractiveness of foreign direct investment, with 82% of incoming FDI flows captured by the countries of the northern rim: the United States (31%) and the European countries bordering the Atlantic (51%). African countries bordering the Atlantic receive only 2% of FDI flows to the Atlantic area. For its part, the Latin American and Caribbean subregion receives 15% of FDI flows.
- An area characterised by a strong internal migration dynamic, with a workforce of nearly 85 million immigrants from the various Atlantic regions in 2017. It should be noted that there are two poles of attraction for migrants: Europe for nationals of African countries (5 million immigrants) and the United States for nationals of Latin American countries (22 million people). This migration dynamic explains the volume of remittances made by immigrant workers to their countries of origin: \$18.1 billion received by African countries bordering the Atlantic and \$56.5 billion received by countries on the Atlantic coast of Latin America.

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